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ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 


ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 


BY 

E.  MALCOLM  CARROLL 

Assistant  Professor  of  History  in  Duke  University 


O 

o 


75£5<o 

DUKE  UNIVERSITY  PRESS 
DURHAM,  N.  C. 

1925 


COPYRIGHT  1925 
DUKE  UNIVERSITY 


THE  PRESSES  OF 

SEEMAN  PRINTERY  INCORPORATED 


DURHAM,  N.  C. 


TO  MY  MOTHER  AND  FATHER 


75£>*5<o 


PREFACE 


This  study  was  first  prepared  under  the  direc¬ 
tion  of  Professor  U.  B.  Phillips  and  Professor 
C.  H.  Van  Tyne  and  was  accepted  by  the  Graduate 
School  of  the  University  of  Michigan  in  partial 
fulfillment  of  the  requirements  for  the  degree  of 
doctor  of  philosophy.  Additional  material  has 
since  been  incorporated,  and  it  is  largely  new  in 
form. 

The  author’s  tasks  have  been  materially  light¬ 
ened  by  the  work  of  other  laborers  in  fields  allied 
to  his  own.  Professor  A.  C.  Cole’s  monograph, 
The  Whig  Party  in  the  South,  was  particularly 
helpful  in  this  respect,  for  it  made  unnecessary  an 
exhaustive  study  of  the  party’s  fortunes  in  that 
section.  Little  more  than  a  beginning,  however, 
has  been  made  in  tracing  the  history  of  the  Whig 
party  within  the  various  states. 

Material  assistance  was  rendered  in  the  course 
of  the  author’s  researches  and  in  the  preparation 
of  their  results.  My  colleagues,  Professors  W. 
T.  Laprade  and  W.  K.  Boyd,  have  kindly  read 
the  manuscript,  and  many  a  rough  passage  has 
been  smoothed  as  a  result  of  their  stimulating 
criticisms.  Professor  Laprade  has  undertaken 
the  arduous  task  of  seeing  the  manuscript  through 


PREFACE 


viii 

the  press.  Professor  iA.  C.  Cole  and  Professor  J. 
S.  Bassett,  on  behalf  of  the  American  Historical 
Association,  gave  permission  to  use  the  maps  for 
the  presidential  elections  of  1836  and  1840  for 
the  southern  states  in  The  Whig  Party  in  the 
South.  Dr.  C.  O.  Paullin  of  the  Carnegie  Insti¬ 
tution  of  Washington  rendered  signal  aid  in 
locating  data  for  the  preparation  of  the  election 
maps.  Mr.  J.  C.  Fitzpatrick  of  the  Manuscripts 
Division  of  the  Library  of  Congress  was  untiring 
in  his  efforts  to  assist  the  author  in  his  search  for 
material.  Acknowledgment  is  due  the  South 
Atlantic  Quarterly  for  permission  to  use  the 
author’s  article,  “Politics  in  the  Administration  of 
John  Quincy  Adams,”  which  contains  the  sub¬ 
stance  of  the  first  chapter  of  this  study. 

E.  M.  C. 

Durham,  N.  C.,  May,  1925. 


CONTENTS 


PAGE 

Preface .  vi 

Chapter  I. 

John  Quincy  Adams  and  the  National  Republican 

Party .  1 

Chapter  II. 

The  Campaign  of  1832  .  29 

Chapter  III. 

The  Crisis  of  1833  71 

Chapter  IV. 

Party  Strategy  and  New  Leadership . 118 

Chapter  V. 

Expediency  versus  Consistency . 171 

Conclusions . 221 

Bibliography . 228 

Index . 239 

Appendix . 259 

List  of  Maps 

New  York  State  Assembly,  1837  .  .  .  opposite  151 

Presidential  Election  of  1832  . Appendix 

Presidential  Election  of  1836  . Appendix 

Presidential  Election  of  1840  . Appendix 


ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 


CHAPTER  I 

JOHN  QUINCY  ADAMS  AND  THE  NATIONAL 
REPUBLICAN  PARTY 

THE  names  of  American  political  parties  give 
a  superficial  impression  of  unity  that  rarely 
exists  in  fact.  Individual  differences  of  opinion, 
sectional  interests,  and  conflicting  personal  ambi¬ 
tions  combine  to  make  complete  harmony  an  ideal 
that  can  only  be  approximated  by  a  free  use  of 
compromises  and  adjustments.  While  contempo¬ 
rary  parties  face  these  problems  in  aggravated 
form,  few  have  suffered  so  much  from  divided 
opinions  and  leadership  as  the  Whig  party  in  the 
Jacksonian  period.  Organized  in  1834,  it  inher¬ 
ited  from  diverse  sources  a  perplexing  variety 
of  opinions  and  a  divided  leadership  that  made 
united  action  exceedingly  difficult.  Upon  one 
issue  alone,  that  of  opposing  Jackson  and  the 
Democratic  party,  could  its  various  elements  co¬ 
operate  with  any  degree  of  harmony,  and  when  in 
in  1840  it  ceased  to  be  the  opposition  it  promptly 
reverted  to  its  former  divisions.  The  difficulties  of 


2  ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 

the  Whig  party  were  largely  due  to  its  necessities 
as  an  opposition,  which  required  the  aid  of  all 
who  were  dissatisfied  with  the  administration,  but 
the  experiences  of  its  immediate  predecessor,  the 
National  Republican  party,  and  the  personality 
of  that  party’s  one  president,  John  Quincy 
Adams,  were  contributing  factors  that  deserve 
more  attention  than  they  have  received. 

In  1825  Adams  and  his  associates  had  a  fair 
opportunity  for  the  organization  of  a  well-dis¬ 
ciplined  party  if  the  necessary  political  leader¬ 
ship  had  been  available.  The  patronage  was  in 
their  possession,  and  they  also  had  more  than 
their  proportionate  share  of  the  country’s  able 
men.  Moreover,  given  a  favorable  political  sit¬ 
uation,  Adams’  plans  of  natural  development  had 
much  to  commend  them.1  In  spite  of  these 
promising  beginnings  crushing  defeat  in  the  elec¬ 
tion  of  1828  permanently  discredited  Adams  as  a 
presidential  candidate  and  revealed  the  weakness 
of  the  National  Republican  party.  The  rising 
tide  of  frontier  democracy  in  support  of  Jackson 
goes  far  toward  an  explanation  of  this  result; 
however,  it  was  in  part  due  to  Adams’  political 
mistakes  and  to  his  half-hearted  cooperation  with 
the  leaders  of  his  party.  There  is  little  evidence 
that  he  understood,  what  was  clear  to  many  at  the 

1  Adams’  policies  are  given  a  brilliant  interpretation  in  Henry 
Adams,  The  Degradation  of  the  Democratic  Dogma  (N.  Y.,  1920), 
pp.  24,  25. 


JOHN  QUINCY  ADAMS 


3 


time, — that  a  new  period  of  intensely  partisan 
politics  was  about  to  begin. 

Party  lines  that  had  been  firmly  drawn  between 
Federalists  and  Republicans  in  the  early  years  of 
the  republic  were  weakened  during  the  generation 
of  control  by  the  Virginia  dynasty.  So  hopeless 
was  the  situation  of  the  Federalist  party  after 
the  second  war  with  England  that  it  disappeared 
from  national  politics2  and  continued  as  a  factor 
in  only  a  few  states.3  The  disintegration  of  the 
party  machine  did  not  mean,  however,  the  disap¬ 
pearance  of  the  political  ideas  of  which  it  had 
been  the  expression.  Conservatism  and  a  prefer¬ 
ence  for  a  strong,  centralized  government,  the 
distinctive  features  of  Federalism,  remained  the 
political  faith  of  a  minority.  In  1822  Jefferson 
assured  Gallatin  that  the  old  party  alignment  still 
existed  in  fundamentals,  with  the  Federalists 
again  in  support  of  the  old  and  familiar  cause  of 
centralization  in  the  government.4  A  Democratic 
member  of  the  New  York  Assembly  wrote  in 
1824  that  the  attempt  to  ignore  party  differences 

3  Noah  Webster  stated  the  reason  for  this  as  early  as  1807. 
“There  is  one  particular  in  which,  I  think,  the  leading  gentlemen 
of  the  Washington  School  have  uniformly  erred.  They  have 
attempted  to  resist  the  force  of  current  opinion,  instead  of  falling 
into  the  current  with  a  view  to  direct  it.”  Noah  Webster  to  Rufus 
King,  July  6,  1807.  King  Correspondence,  quoted  by  D.  R.  Fox, 
The  Decline  of  Aristocracy  in  the  Politics  of  New  York  (N.  Y., 
1919),  p.  86. 

3  S.  E.  Morison,  The  Life  and  Letters  of  Harrison  Gray  Otis, 
Federalist,  1765-1848  (Boston,  1913),  I.  240-243. 

‘Jefferson  to  Gallatin,  Monticello,  October  29,  1822.  The  Writ¬ 
ings  of  Thomas  Jefferson  (P.  L.  Ford,  ed.,  New  York,  1899),  X. 
235,  236. 


4 


ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 


in  politics  was  “the  last  and  forlorn  expedient  of 
a  set  of  politicians,  who  have  failed  in  every  other 
attempt  to  regain  the  power  which  they  lost  in 
1800.  The  leopard  has  not  changed  his  spots 
nor  the  Ethiopian  his  skin.”5  Van  Buren,  writ¬ 
ing  in  1854  from  the  perspective  of  a  long  politi¬ 
cal  career,  declared  that  the  principles  which  had 
been  so  bitterly  contested  as  to  be  handed  down 
from  father  to  son  had  not  entirely  disappeared 
in  the  era  of  good  feeling.6  These  witnesses 
were  interested  in  fastening  the  stigma  of  Fed¬ 
eralism  upon  their  opponents,  and  it  may  be 
assumed  that  the  transition  between  the  Feder¬ 
alist  and  National  Republican  parties  was  not  so 
direct  as  they  believed.  Webster  wrote  in  May 
1824:  “The  events  of  the  winter,  with  the  com¬ 
mon  operation  of  time,  have  very  much  mixed 
up  Federalists  with  some  one  or  other  of  the 
parties;  and  though  it  is  true  that  some  men 
make  great  efforts  to  keep  up  old  party  distinc¬ 
tions,  they  find  it  difficult.”7  There  probably 
occurred  a  considerable  change  in  party  ties  dur¬ 
ing  the  realignment  of  parties  in  the  decade  from 
1820  to  1830.  Some  Republicans  of  the  Jeffer¬ 
sonian  type  preferred  the  conservatism  of  Adams 
to  the  democracy  of  Jackson  while  some  Fed- 

5  Niles’  Register,  XXVI.  203. 

6  The  Autobiography  of  Martin  Van  Buren  (J.  C.  Fitzpatrick, 
ed.,  Annual  Report  of  the  American  Historical  Association,  Wash¬ 
ington,  1918,)  II.  123,  124. 

7  Webster  to  Jeremiah  Mason,  Washington,  May  9,  1824.  C.  H. 
Van  Tyne,  Webster  Transcripts,  Library  of  Congress. 


JOHN  QUINCY  ADAMS 


5 


eralists  chose  the  more  liberal  party.  A  major¬ 
ity  of  the  old  Federalists  and  those  who  thought 
like  them  were,  however,  a  force  that  Adams  could 
recruit  should  he  decide  to  accept  their  aid. 

New  parties  were  about  to  make  their  appear¬ 
ance,  reflecting  in  their  characters  changed  con¬ 
ditions,  but  in  the  opening  maneuvers  of  the 
campaign  of  1824  the  personalities  of  candidates 
and  considerations  of  political  expediency  were 
determining  factors.  A  striking  poverty  of  po¬ 
litical  principles  is  reflected  by  the  ease  with 
which  combinations  were  made  between  leading 
candidates.  This  is  nowhere  more  clearly  seen 
than  in  the  favor  which  Adams  gave  to  the  pro¬ 
posal  that  Jackson  be  coupled  with  him  as  a 
candidate  for  the  vice-presidency.  When  this 
arrangement  was  first  suggested  by  Calhoun  in 
January,  1824,  Adams  was  distinctly  skeptical;  he 
suspected  that  it  was  the  result  of  a  clever  scheme 
concocted  by  Calhoun  to  advance  his  own  politi¬ 
cal  interests.8  Two  months  later  he  had  changed 
his  mind  and  advised  his  friends  that  they  could 
vote  for  Jackson  “on  correct  principle — his  fit¬ 
ness  for  the  place,  the  fitness  of  the  place  for  him, 
and  the  peculiar  advantages  of  the  geographical 
association.”0  After  repeating  this  endorsement 
on  other  occasions,  Adams  withdrew  it  when  he 

'  J.  Q.  Adams,  Memoirs,  VI.  241,  242.  R.  M.  Johnson,  who 
approached  Adams  for  this  purpose,  was  engaged  in  an  effort  to 
arrange  a  union  of  the  candidates  opposed  to  Crawford.  Clay  was 
to  be  made  secretary  of  state. 

•  Ibid.,  VI.  253,  254. 


6 


ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 


saw  that  Jackson’s  popularity  had  outgrown  the 
vice-presidency.10  His  dislike  of  Clay  and  an 
appreciation  of  the  strength  Jackson  would  bring 
to  him  from  the  West  made  this  combination 
more  satisfactory  than  that  with  Clay. 

The  union  between  Adams,  Clay,  and  Webster 
that  was  to  become  the  nucleus  of  the  National 
Republican  party  was  delayed  until  the  election 
showed  that  no  candidate  had  a  majority  of  elec¬ 
toral  votes.  The  similarity  of  their  political  ideas, 
each  finding  nothing  to  oppose  in  the  protective 
tariff  and  internal  improvements,  pointed  to  such 
an  understanding,  but  its  consummation  was  for 
a  time  delayed  by  political  reasons  and  personal 
dislike.  A  rival  candidate,  Clay  was  first  of  all 
concerned  with  his  own  prospects  of  success,  until 
the  election  determined  that  his  name  would  not 
be  sent  to  the  House  of  Representatives.  The 
personalities  of  Clay  and  Adams  were  so  different 
that  friendly  relations  were  difficult.  After  a 
dinner  at  which  Clay  was  present,  Adams  wrote 
that  he  “became  warm,  vehement,  and  absurd 
upon  the  tariff.  .  .  .  He  is  so  ardent,  dog¬ 
matical  and  overbearing  that  it  is  extremely  diffi¬ 
cult  to  preserve  the  temper  of  friendly  society 
with  him.”11 

The  timeliness  of  Clay’s  aid  in  the  House  and 
his  acceptance  of  the  chief  office  in  Adams’  cabi¬ 
net  gave  color  to  the  charges  of  a  corrupt  bargain. 

10  Ibid.,  VI.  274,  417. 

11  Adams,  Memoirs,  VI.  258. 


JOHN  QUINCY  ADAMS 


7 


Historians  of  this  period  have  on  the  whole  ex¬ 
onerated  them,  and  there  is  no  available  evidence 
that  justifies  dissent  from  this  judgment.  Yet 
it  is  clear  from  his  own  account  that  Adams 
allowed  friends  of  Clay  to  believe  that  something 
would  be  done  in  return  for  Clay’s  aid.  The  first 
move  toward  the  establishment  of  better  relations 
between  the  two  men  came  from  the  initiative  of 
one  of  Clay’s  friends. 

The  drift  of  Letcher’s  discourse  was  that  Clay  would 
willingly  support  me  if  he  could  thereby  serve  himself, 
and  the  substance  of  his  meaning  was,  that  if  Clay’s 
friends  could  know  that  he  would  have  a  prominent  share 
in  the  administration,  that  might  induce  them  to  vote  for 
me,  even  in  the  face  of  instruction.12 

Letcher  was  neither  given  reason  to  believe  that 
this  would  be  done  nor  was  he  specifically  for¬ 
bidden  to  hope  that  it  would  be.  When  John 
Scott,  a  member  of  the  House  from  Missouri, 
came  to  him  on  behalf  of  Clay’s  interests,  Adams 
was  somewhat  more  yielding:  “I  told  him  that 
he  would  not  expect  me  to  enter  into  details  with 
regard  to  the  formation  of  an  Administration, 
but  that  if  I  should  be  elected  by  the  suffrage  of 
the  West,  I  should  naturally  look  to  the  West  for 
much  of  the  support  that  I  should  need.”  That 
this  was  not  unsatisfactory  is  clear  since  Scott 
“parted  from  me  apparently  satisfied.”13  While 

u  Letcher  did  not  claim  authority  from  Clay  in  making  this  over¬ 
ture.  Ibid,.,  VI.  447.  Cf.  F.  J.  Turner,  The  Rise  of  the  New 
West  (1906),  p.  262. 

13  Adams,  Memoirs,  VI.  474. 


8 


ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 


Adams  was  not  committed  to  a  definite  appoint¬ 
ment,  Clay’s  friends  could  henceforth  be  confi¬ 
dent  that  something  would  be  done  for  him.  It 
is  certain  that  Clay  was  not  influenced  to  support 
Adams  by  personal  preference.14  He  believed 
that  he  was  faced  by  a  choice  of  two  evils,  of 
which  Jackson  seemed  the  more  dangerous  to  the 
future  of  the  country  and  perhaps  to  his  own 
political  future.  He  assured  his  friends  that 
Adams  would  not  have  been  his  choice  if  he  had 
been  at  ^liberty  to  draw  from  the  whole  mass  of 
our  citizens  for  a  President.”15  The  similarity 
between  their  political  points  of  view  may  well 
have  been  the  determining  factor  in  the  end. 

The  enlistment  of  Webster’s  aid,  sufficiently 
difficult  because  of  the  coolness  between  him  and 
Adams,16  was  further  complicated  by  the  problem 
of  establishing  friendly  relations  between  Adams 
and  his  own  Federalist  associates.17  Their  co- 

14  Adams’  support  of  the  policy  of  internal  improvements  at 
national  expense  formed  a  point  of  contact  with  Clay’s  western 
friends.  The  interests  of  the  West  were  so  intimately  associated 
with  this  issue  that  Jackson  politicians  found  it  most  embarrass¬ 
ing  in  view  of  their  disapproval  of  centralized  government. 
Eugene  Roseboom,  “Ohio  in  the  Presidential  Election  of  1824,” 
Ohio  Archaeological  and  Historical  Quarterly,  XXVI,  184. 

15  Clay  to  Francis  P.  Blair,  Washington,  January  29,  1825.  The 
Private  Correspondence  of  Henry  Clay  (Calvin  Colton,  ed.,)  pp. 
Ill,  112;  Clay  to  Francis  Brooke,  Washington,  February  18,  1825. 
Ibid.,  pp.  114-116. 

“Adams,  Memoirs,  VI.  275.  Webster  wras  reported  to  have 
questioned  Adams’  position  on  the  tariff.  As  to  the  campaign, 
Webster  was  not  interested  in  it.  April,  1824 :  “it  seemed  to  him 
that  nothing  was  to  be  got  with  one  more  than  with  another.” 

17  Differences  had  existed  between  Adams  and  the  Massachusetts 
Federalists  since  1807  when  they  had  divided  on  questions  of 
foreign  policy.  S.  E.  Morison,  The  Life  and  Letters  of  H.  G. 
Otis,  II.  245-246. 


JOHN  QUINCY  ADAMS 


9 


operation  would  bring  him  valuable  support  in 
the  New  England  states,  but  it  was  an  open  ques¬ 
tion  if  this  added  strength  would  compensate  for 
the  advantages  which  an  association  with  the  rem¬ 
nants  of  this  discredited  party  would  give  to 
Adams’  opponents.  As  in  the  negotiations  be¬ 
tween  Adams  and  Clay’s  friends,  the  first  steps 
were  taken  by  Federalists.  They  had  a  material 
interest  in  making  certain  that  they  would  not  be 
excluded  from  the  patronage  in  the  event  of 
Adams’  success.  Accordingly,  he  was  sounded 
on  various  occasions  as  to  the  treatment  that 
might  be  expected  from  him.  John  Reed,  a  mem¬ 
ber  of  the  House  from  Massachusetts,  reported 
that  Federalist  opposition  to  him  was  due  to  the 
fear  of  a  general  exclusion  from  office.  In  reply 
to  this  obvious  plea  for  a  share  of  the  spoils, 
Adams  declared  that  he  would  be  under  obliga¬ 
tion  to  give  preference  to  members  of  the  other 
party  in  the  event  that  his  election  should  be  won 
against  Federalist  opposition.18  His  resentment 
at  this  attempted  dictation  soon  cooled,  for  he 
assured  Reed  on  the  following  day  that  Web¬ 
ster’s  fear  of  a  “proscription  from  office”  was 
unfounded.19  Webster  was  neutral,  according  to 
William  Plumer,  a  representative  from  New 
Hampshire,  but  he  suggested  that  Webster  would 
be  pleased  if  something  were  done  for  Jeremiah 
Mason  and  if  the  vice-presidency  were  given  to 

“Adams,  Memoirs,  VI.  312,  313. 


10 


ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 


Richard  Rush.20  Assurances  were  given  that 
party  lines  would  not  be  followed  in  the  distribu¬ 
tion  of  the  offices,  but,  as  in  the  negotiations  with 
Clay’s  friends,  no  definite  promises  were  made. 
Efforts  were  renewed  to  commit  Adams  to  a 
favorable  point  of  view  on  the  eve  of  the  bal- 
lotting  in  the  House  of  Representatives.  In  Feb¬ 
ruary,  1825,  an  exchange  of  letters  took  place 
between  Henry  R.  Warfield,  a  representative 
from  Maryland,  and  Wester,  which  was  probably 
arranged  as  a  means  to  accomplish  this  object.  In 
his  first  letter  Warfield  voiced  the  fears  of  Fed¬ 
eralists  that  “should  Mr.  Adams  be  the  President, 
he  will  administer  the  government  on  party  corn 
siderations;  that  the  old  landmarks  of  party  dis¬ 
tinctions  will  be  built  up.  .  .  .”21  Webster  im¬ 
mediately  sounded  Adams  by  showing  him  a  draft 
of  his  reply  in  which  he  asserted  that  Adams 
“would  administer  the  government  on  libera 
principles,  not  excluding  Federalists  as  such,  fron 
his  regard  and  esteem,”  and  that  accordingly 
Webster’s  vote  would  be  given  to  him.  Confi 
dence  was  expressed  that  Adams  would,  i 
elected,  appoint  a  Federalist  to  office  as  proof  tha 
party  allegiance  would  not  be  followed  in  th< 
disposal  of  the  patronage.  Adams  replied  that  i 
this  confidence  was  founded  upon  an  anticipate< 

20  Ibid.,  VI.  332. 

21 N.  R.  Warfield  to  Webster,  Washington,  February  3,  182, 
The  Private  Correspondence  of  Daniel  Webster  (Fletcher  Wet 
ster,  ed.,  Boston,  1857),  I.  377. 


JOHN  QUINCY  ADAMS 


11 


appointment  to  a  cabinet  position,  it  was  unwar¬ 
ranted;  however,  the  draft  received  his  endorse¬ 
ment  when  Webster  explained  that  he  had  in 
mind  an  office  of  importance  such  as  a  judicial 
post  rather  than  a  cabinet  appointment.22  Not¬ 
withstanding  the  unpopularity  of  the  Federalists, 
it  is  clear  that  their  position  at  this  time  as  an 
independent  group,  unattached  to  either  of  the 
candidates,  made  them  an  object  of  solicitude  and 
therefore  of  tolerance.  According  to  Webster, 
writing  in  February,  1824,  all  candidates  “are 
.  .  .  just  now,  very  civil  towards  Federalists. 
We  see  and  hear  no  abuse  of  us  except  in  some 
parts  of  New  England.”23  Webster’s  aid  went  to 
Adams,  and  after  the  election  he  was  instrumental 
in  keeping  the  Federalists  loyal  to  the  adminis¬ 
tration. 

In  the  events  leading  to  his  election  Adams 
showed  distinct  skill  as  a  politician.  The  cooper¬ 
ation  of  Clay  and  Webster  formed  a  nucleus 
about  which  a  party  might  be  organized.  Evi¬ 
dence  was  rapidly  accumulating  that  an  early 
renewal  of  partisan  politics  was  impending  and 
that  a  party  in  support  of  the  weak-government 

22  Adams,  Memoirs,  VI.  492,  493.  Webster’s  letter  to  Warfield 
is  printed  in  Webster,  Private  Correspondence,  I.  378,  379. 

23  Webster  to  Jeremiah  Mason,  February  15,  1824.  Van  Tyne, 
Webster  Transcripts.  This  letter  is  inaccurately  printed  in  The 
Writings  and  Speeches  of  Daniel  Webster  (National  Edition,  Bos¬ 
ton,  1903),  XVI.  80,  81.  It  was  apparently  copied  from  The 
Memoirs  and  Correspondence  of  Jeremiah  Mason  (Cambridge, 
1873),  not  from  the  MSS. 


12  ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 

theory  would  be  formed.24  Nevertheless,  Adams 
and  Webster  were  agreed  that  an  attempt  should 
be  made  to  form  an  administration  without  refer¬ 
ence  to  party  divisions.  As  a  Federalist,  fearing 
that  emphasis  upon  party  ties  would  work  to  the 
disadvantage  of  his  friends,  Webster  obviously 
had  a  material  interest  in  this  point  of  view.  “I 
wish  to  see  nothing  like  a  portioning,  parcelling 
out  or  distributing  offices  of  trust  among  men 
called  by  different  denominations.  Such  a  pro¬ 
ceeding  would  be  to  acknowledge  and  to  regard 
the  existence  of  distinction ;  whereas  my  wish  is, 
that  distinctions  be  disregarded.”25  Adams  was 
attracted  by  the  ideal  of  an  administration  that 
would  be  without  partisan  bias.  This  aim  clearly 
was  behind  his  ambitious  plans  for  national 
development  which  he  thought  should  have  the 
support  of  all.  A  few  days  before  the  election  in 
the  House  Adams  confided  to  his  diary  that  ‘‘his 
great  object  would  be  to  break  up  the  remnant  of 
old  party  distinctions,  and  to  bring  the  whole 
people  together  as  much  as  possible.”26  From  the 
first  Clay  did  not  definitely  disapprove  a  partisan 
organization,  and  the  appearance  of  the  charge 
of  a  corrupt  bargain  made  intolerable  for  him 
association  with  its  authors  in  support  of  the 
administration. 

24  S.  R.  Gammon,  The  Presidential  Campaign  of  1832  (Balti¬ 
more,  1922),  pp.  21,  22. 

“Webster  to  Warfield,  House  of  Representatives,  February  5, 
1825.  Webster,  Private  Correspondence ,  I.  378. 

“Adams,  Memoirs,  VI.  474;  cf.  Ibid.,  493. 


JOHN  QUINCY  ADAMS 


13 


The  most  serious  obstacles  to  the  building  of 
an  effective  party  proved  to  be  Adams’  own  per¬ 
sonality  and  standards.  In  curious  contrast  with 
his  skillful  maneuvers  during  the  election,  as 
president  he  showed  no  liking  for  nor  adaptability 
to  the  requirements  of  party  leadership.  He  did 
not  understand  that  the  president  must  not  only 
be  the  chief  executive  of  the  nation  but  that  he 
must  also  be  the  leader  of  his  party  in  order  to 
assure  success  to  his  policies.  His  conceptions  of 
the  duties  of  his  office  and  the  rigor  of  his  puritan 
conscience  prevented  a  diversion  of  his  energy 
from  his  legitimate  functions  to  the  activities 
of  a  politician  and  the  subordination  of  public 
interests  to  his  political  career  or  to  party  success. 
Cold,  reserved,  critical  of  his  associates  and  men 
whom  he  casually  met,  he  had  few  of  the  quali¬ 
ties  of  political  leadership.  When  Thurlow  Weed 
applied  to  him  in  June,  1825,  for  an  appointment 
in  the  interest  of  the  party’s  welfare,  the  Presi¬ 
dent,  due  to  “political  impractability”  as  Weed 
wrote,  would  do  nothing.  Weed’s  judgment  is 
important  as  that  of  an  experienced  politician. 
“Mr.  Adams,  during  his  administration,  failed  to 
cherish,  strengthen,  or  even  recognize  the  party 
to  which  he  owed  his  election ;  nor  as  far  as  I  am 
informed,  with  the  great  power  he  possessed  did 
he  make  a  single  influential  friend.”  Joseph 
Gales,  editor  of  the  National  Intelligencer,  as¬ 
sured  Weed  that  if  Clay  had  been  president  his 


14 


ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 


wishes  in  regard  to  the  appointment  would  have 
been  satisfied.27  More  of  an  opportunist  in  poli¬ 
tics,  Clay  was  convinced  that  the  usual  weapons 
of  party  warfare  should  be  freely  employed. 
Webster  soon  abandoned  hope  of  a  prolonged 
period  of  good  feeling  and  was  thereafter  in 
accord  with  Clay’s  point  of  view. 

With  the  appearance  of  a  vigorous  and  popular 
opposition,  disciplined  by  its  encounter  with  the 
administration  over,  the  Panama  mission,  Clay 
and  Webster  were  confirmed  in  their  judgment 
that  organization  was  necessary  and  that  news¬ 
paper  support  must  be  cultivated.  Clay  paid  little 
attention  to  the  moral  significance  of  the  use  of 
money  for  this  purpose  and  to  the  possible 
squeamishness  of  editors,  and  the  lack  of  funds 
were  the  only  limits  which  he  recognized  in  his 
policy  of  subsidizing  friendly  newspapers.  Clay 
wrote  to  Webster  in  August,  1827 : 

C.  Hammond’s  paper  at  Cincinnati  is  ...  I  think 
upon  the  whole,  the  most  efficient  and  discreet  gazette  that 
espouses  our  cause.  He  is  poor,  disinterested  and  proud. 
.  .  .  I  think  he  is  every  way  worthy  of  encourage¬ 

ment  and  patronage.  The  only  assistance  he  would  re¬ 
ceive  would  be  in  the  extension  of  the  subscription  list. 
Perhaps  he  might  receive  a  present  of  a  new  lot  of 
types.28 

In  a  later  letter  there  is  reference  to  an  agree¬ 
ment  made  in  the  preceding  year  that,  as  a  general 

27  The  Autobiography  of  Thurlow  Weed  (Harriet  A.  Weed,  ed., 
Boston,  1884),  pp.  178-182. 

28  Clay  to  Webster,  Washington,  August  19,  1827.  Webster 
MSS.  Library  of  Congress. 


JOHN  QUINCY  ADAMS 


15 


policy,  financial  support  was  to  be  given  to  deserv¬ 
ing  newspapers  and  that  a  proportionate  amount 
of  free  circulation  should  by  this  means  be 
devoted  to  party  purposes.29  No  evidence  is  avail¬ 
able  as  to  the  methods  to  be  used  in  raising  a 
fund  for  this  purpose  or  as  to  the  amount  actually 
collected  and  expended  in  this  way.  Leaders  of 
the  party,  however,  were  expected  to  aid  in  similar 
enterprises,  for  Webster  indirectly  solicited  a 
contribution  from  Adams  to  be  used  in  a  state 
campaign.  John  Bailey,  a  member  of  the  House 
from  Massachusetts,  who  admitted  that  the  sug¬ 
gestion  had  originated  with  Webster,  asked 
Adams  if  he  had  a  sum  of  “from  five  to  ten  thou¬ 
sand  dollars,  that  I  was  disposed  to  give  without 
inquiring  how  it  would  be  disposed,  but  which 
would  be  employed  to  secure  the  election  of  Gover¬ 
nor  Metcalf  in  Kentucky  next  August.”  Unlike 
Clay  and  Webster,  Adams  had  scruples  as  to  the 
morality  of  a  scheme  of  this  kind,  and  he  sternly 
refused  to  have  anything  to  do  with  it,  “in  a 
manner  altogether  explicit.”  His  reflections  on 
this  occasion  reveal  the  fundamental  difference 
between  his  point  of  view  in  public  life  and  that 
of  his  political  associates.  The  use  of  money  in 
elections,  he  believed,  was  wrong  in  principle. 
Should  he  violate  that  principle  “there  was  no  rule 

w  Clay  to  Webster,  Washington,  October  25,  1827.  Ibid.  An 
appeal,  he  thought,  should  be  made  to  the  large  cities  where  capital 
was  to  be  found.  Cf.  Clay  to  Webster,  Washington,  October  8, 
1827.  Webster  secured  a  contribution  which  was  to  go  to  J.  H. 
Pleasants,  editor  of  the  Richmond  Whig.  Ibid. 


16  ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 

either  of  expediency  or  morality,  which  would 
enable  me  to  limit  the  amount  of  expenditure  I 
ought  to  incur.  I  could  certainly  appropriate  half 
a  million  dollars  to  the  same  object  without  tran¬ 
scending  any  law,  and  with  as  much  propriety  as 
I  could  devote  five  thousand  to  the  election  of  a 
governor  of  Kentucky.”30 

An  equally  sharp  difference  of  opinion  de¬ 
veloped  between  Adams  and  his  lieutenants  in 
regard  to  the  disposal  of  the  patronage.  The  rec¬ 
ord  of  the  civil  service  in  his  administration  is  on 
the  whole  in  striking  contrast  with  the  spoils  sys¬ 
tem  inaugurated  by  Jackson,31  yet  political  expedi¬ 
ency  encroached  more  and  more  upon  the  merit 
system  as  his  political  needs  became  more  evident. 
The  retention  of  John  McLean  as  postmaster 
general,  an  office  he  had  filled  under  Monroe,  in 
the  face  of  Clay’s  repeated  charges  of  disloyalty32 
and  in  spite  of  his  refusal  to  use  the  patronage  of 
his  office  for  the  purpose  of  strengthening  the 
National  Republican  party33  requires  more  than 

30  Adams,  Memoirs,  VII.  468,  469. 

31  C  R.  Fish,  The  Civil  Service  and  the  Patronage  (New  York, 
1905),  p.  72. 

32  Ibid.,  VII.  343,  349,  355,  364.  Adams  seems  in  the  end  to 
have  been  convinced  that  McLean  was  secretly  disloyal;  neverthe¬ 
less,  he  was  retained  in  office  until  the  end  of  the  term.  Cf.  C.  R. 
Fish,  The  Civil  Service  and  the  Patronage  (N.  Y.,  1905),  p.  72. 
Professor  Fish  explains  McLean’s  retention  as  due  to  the  reluc¬ 
tance  of  Adams  to  take  up  the  question  of  finding  a  successor. 

33  His  point  of  view  in  regard  to  the  patronage  was  stated  in  a 
letter  to  an  obscure  correspondent.  “It  is  my  decided  opinion, 
that  the  officers  of  the  general  government,  and  especially  those 
that  reside  at  this  place,  and  have  no  votes,  ought  to  take  no 
step  aside  from  their  official  duties  to  influence  the  election  of 


JOHN  QUINCY  ADAMS 


17 


passing  attention,  as  it  is  usually  taken  as  the 
clearest  example  of  Adams’  loyalty  to  the  merit 
system.  Not  even  Clay  questioned  the  efficiency 
of  McLean’s  management  of  the  postal  service, 
but  contemporary  charges  that  he  used  the  patron¬ 
age  of  his  office  in  the  interest  of  Calhoun  and 
Jackson  have  been  generally  endorsed  by  histori¬ 
ans.34  This  decision,  although  it  is  almost 
unanimous,  cannot  be  accepted  without  reser¬ 
vation.  In  specific  terms  and  on  many  occasions 
he  denied  in  his  private  letters  any  disloyalty 
in  the  making  of  appointments.  Moreover', 
sound  political  reasons  argued  against  his  dis¬ 
missal  and  were  probably  not  without  weight 
in  influencing  Adams  to  retain  him.  The  effici¬ 
ency  of  the  postal  service  under  his  direction  had 
made  many  friends  for  him  who  might  have  been 
lost  to  the  administration  by  his  dismissal.  He 
was  warned  that  the  hand  of  his  enemies  had  been 
withheld  because  it  was  feared  that  otherwise 
public  opinion,  especially  in  Ohio,  would  be 

the  President,  either  for  or  against  any  individual.”  He  thought 
that  the  faithful  discharge  of  public  duties  was  the  best  support 
which  they  could  give  any  administration.  McLean  to  Robert 
Sweeney,  Washington,  August  15,  1828.  McLean  MSS.,  Library 
of  Congress. 

34  F.  J.  Turner,  Rise  of  the  New  West,  p.  272.  Cf.  Mary  Hins¬ 
dale,  History  of  the  President’s  Cabinet  (Ann  Arbor,  1911),  p. 
83.  Professor  Channing  is  not  so  positive  in  this  opinion  after 
examining  the  McLean  papers.  Edward  Channing,  A  History  of 
the  United  States  (New  York,  1921),  V.  372,  373.  Dr.  W.  C. 
Ford  finds  in  Jackson’s  offer  to  reappoint  McLean  as  postmaster 
general  sufficient  proof  that  he  had  been  useful  during  the  cam¬ 
paign  of  1828.  Proceedings  of  the  Massachusetts  Historical 
Society  (Third  Series,  1907)  I.  359-393. 


18 


ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 


adversely  affected.35  The  attitude  of  the  admin¬ 
istration  was  expressed  by  the  comment  of  the 
National  Intelligencer  when  the  Democratic  Rich¬ 
mond  Enquirer  questioned  the  true  character  of 
McLean’s  politics;  it  refused  to  discuss  his  con¬ 
duct  in  office,  as  he  was  “a  valuable  public  officer, 
and  has  our  unfeigned  personal  respect.”36 

There  was  in  fact  common  ground  between 
Adams  and  McLean  as  to  the  principles  that 
ought  to  govern  the  disposal  of  the  patronage. 
Both  stood  in  theory  squarely  upon  the  merit 
system.  McLean’s  point  of  view  found  expression 
in  the  course  of  an  interesting  correspondence 
with  Edward  Everett  from  August  1  to  October 
7,  1828.37  It  began  when  McLean  charged 
Everett  with  responsibility  for  a  criticism  of  his 
distribution  of  the  patronage,38  and  in  the  letters 
that  followed  Everett  clearly  aligned  himself  in 
favor  of  a  strictly  partisan  distribution  of  offices. 
He  argued  that  only  in  this  way  could  a  party  be 
effectively  organized. 

What  then  binds  the  mass  of  the  parties  together,  I  say 
the  mass,  not  the  high  minded,  few  patriotic  individuals — 

35  S.  J.  Richardson  to  McLean,  Frankfort,  Kentucky,  October  4, 
1828.  McLean  MSS. 

36  National  Intelligencer,  September  9,  1828. 

37  These  letters,  with  an  introduction  and  explanatory  notes  by 
Dr.  W.  C.  Ford,  are  printed  from  the  MSS.  in  the  Library  of 
Congress  in  the  Proceedings  of  the  Massachusetts  Historical 
Society  (Third  Series,  1907),  I.  359-393. 

38  It  was  charged  specifically  that  Isaac  Hill  of  New  Hampshire 
had  used  his  contract  for  the  transportation  of  the  mails  in  that 
state  as  a  means  of  distributing  his  newspaper,  The  New  Hamp¬ 
shire  Patriot,  without  expense.  Ibid.,  pp.  362,  363. 


JOHN  QUINCY  ADAMS 


19 


but  the  mass?  Indubitably  the  hope  of  office,  and  its 
honors  and  instruments.  The  consequence  is,  that  the 
moment  any  administration  is  formed,  every  man  out  of 
office,  and  desirous  of  getting  in,  is  arrayed  against  it.  If 
the  administration  then  discard  the  principle  of  bestowing 
the  patronage  on  their  political  friends,  they  turn  against 
themselves,  not  only  the  expectants,  but  the  incumbents. 

.  .  .  For  an  administration  then  to  bestow  its  patron¬ 

age,  without  distinction  of  party,  is  to  court  its  own 
destruction.  I  think,  therefore,  that  fidelity  to  itself 
requires,  that  every  administration  should  have  the  benefit 
of  the  cordial  cooperation  of  all  its  members — the  rule 
ought  to  be  that,  other  things  being  equal,  the  friends  of 
the  administration  should  have  the  preference.  Our  pres¬ 
ent  chief  magistrate  made  the  experiment  of  the  higher 
principle ;  of  exclusive  regard  to  merit :  what  has  been  his 
reward?  A  most  furious  opposition  rallied  on  the  charge 
of  corrupt  distribution  of  office,  and  the  open  or  silent 
hostility  of  three-fourths  of  the  office-holders  in  the 
Union.39 

McLean  acknowledged  his  friendship  with  Cal¬ 
houn  but  insisted  that  his  appointments  had  been 
in  no  way  influenced  by  it.  The  friendship  would 
end,  he  wrote,  the  moment  he  should  believe 
Calhoun  capable  of  attempting  to  influence  his 
policies.40  He  stood  squarely  upon  the  merit  sys¬ 
tem,  and  he  was  able  to  convince  Everett,  as  the 
letters  continued,  that  friends  of  the  administra¬ 
tion  should  at  least  have  equal  qualifications  with 

'"Ibid.,  p.  389. 

40  McLean  to  Everett,  Washington,  August  S,  1828.  McLean 
MSS.  Great  care  was  taken  in  writing  this  letter.  A  draft  is 
preserved  among  the  McLean  MSS.  in  which  many  changes  and 
interlineations  are  shown. 


20 


ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 


those  of  other  aspirants.41  With  this  concession 
a  correspondence  that  may  well  have  become 
tiresome  came  to  an  end. 

Clay  and  Webster,  though  their  position  appar¬ 
ently  was  never  so  clearly  stated  as  that  of 
Everett,  were  in  substantial  agreement.  In  any 
event,  Adams’  attitude  in  regard  to  the  patronage 
found  little  favor  with  them.  Neither  went  so  far 
as  to  anticipate  Jackson’s  spoils  system  by  urging 
a  general  removal  of  office  holders,  but  the  extent 
of  Jackson’s  activities  in  this  respect  suggests 
that  few  of  his  friends  held  office  under  his  pre¬ 
decessor.  Clay  was  definitely  in  favor  of  making 
appointments  for  party  purposes.  He  wrote  in 
1827:  “Henceforward  I  think  that  the  principle 
ought  to  be  adhered  to  is  of  [sic.]  appointing  only 
friends  to  the  Administration  in  public  offices. 
Such  I  believe  is  the  general  conviction  in  the 
cabinet.”42  On  several  occasions  Webster  at¬ 
tempted  to  persuade  Adams  to  use  practical 
methods  in  the  building  of  a  party  organization. 
Not  only  was  he  asked  to  contribute  money  for 
use  in  elections,  but  in  1827  Webster  urged  the 
importance  of  inducing  Robert  Walsh,  editor  of 
the  Philadelphia  National  Gazette,  to  abandon  his 
neutral  attitude  in  favor  of  active  support.  This 
might  be  accomplished  by  the  appointment  to 

11  Proceedings  of  the  Massachusetts  Historical  Society  (Third 
Series,  1907),  I.  389. 

“Clay  (?)  to  Webster,  April  14,  1827.  Webster  MSS.  The 
signature  to  this  letter  has  been  cut  out,  but  the  text  is  in  Clay’s 
handwriting. 


JOHN  QUINCY  ADAMS 


21 


office  of  a  friend  who  felt  himself  “neglected  and 
injured.”43  Apparently  nothing  was  done,  for  in 
the  following  year,  according  to  Adams,1  Walsh 
was  but  a  lukewarm  friend  of  the  administra¬ 
tion.44 

During  his  correspondence  with  McLean, 
Everett  attributed  to  the  President  a  scrupulous 
regard  for  the  merit  rule.  Nevertheless,  to  other 
contemporaries  influenced  either  by  disappointed 
hopes  or  by  political  prejudices,  it  seemed  that 
Adams’  use  of  the  patronage  was  not  above  sus¬ 
picion  or  at  least  that  he  allowed  men  under  him 
to  favor  friends  of  the  administration.  Gales,  of 
the  National  Intelligencer,  assured  Weed  in  1825 
that  Clay  had  already  appointed  many.  McLean 
was  told  by  Isaac  Hill,  the  powerful  Democratic 
leader  in  New  Hampshire,  that  employees  of  the 
post-office  had  been  threatened  with  dismissal  if 
they  did  not  work  for  Adams.  Hill  also  asserted 
that  in  his  state  “every  Jacksonian,  who  could  be 
reached  has  been  removed  by  our  state  executive 
and  legislature,  and  every  place  not  already  filled 
by  federalists  has  been  supplied  from  the  ranks 
of  that  party  or  the  traitors  that  have  joined 

“Webster  to  J.  Q.  Adams,  Philadelphia,  March  27,  1827.  Web¬ 
ster  Letters  (C.  H.  Van  Tyne,  ed.,  N.  Y.,  1920),  pp.  123,  124. 
Webster  was  confident  that  the  appointment  of  Hopkinson,  the 
friend  in  question  and  a  leader  among  the  forty  or  fifty  thousand 
survivors  of  the  Federalist  party  in  Pennsylvania,  “would  heal 
much  of  the  wound,  which  is  felt  in  New  Jersey,  and  would 
suffice  even  in  New  England  to  waken  the  activity  of  many 
friends.” 

M  Adams,  Memoirs,  VIII.  491,  492. 


22 


ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 


it.”45  In  a  letter  to  Everett,  McLean  wrote  that 
with  the  single  exception  of  Joel  R.  Poinsett  as 
minister  to  Mexico  all  appointments  of  impor¬ 
tant  offices  of  a  political  character  had  been  made, 
from  friends  of  the  administration.46  However 
favorable  the  judgment  of  history  has  been  in  re¬ 
gard  to  Adams’  policy  in  this  respect,  it  gave  little 
satisfaction  to  his  contemporaries.  Federalists 
and  their  friends  felt  themselves  neglected.  Re¬ 
publicans  who  had  supported  Adams  believed  that 
Federalists  had  been  given  undue  consideration. 
Silas  Wright  of  New  York,  a  Crawford  man 
who  had  followed  his  New  England  predilections 
in  supporting  Adams,  doubtless  was  only  one  of 
many  whose  enthusiasm  cooled.  A  superannu¬ 
ated  Federalist,  Rufus  King,  had  been  appointed 
minister  to  England,  he  complained,  and  to  the 
survivors  of  the  same  party  had  gone  the  federal 
offices  in  New  York  state.  Webster,  one  of  the 
leaders  of  the  Hartford  Convention,  according  to 
Wright,  was  in  1827  the  recognized  leader  of  the 
administration  in  Congress.  “All  say  party  is 
done  away,  but  come  to  selections  for  office  Fed¬ 
eralists  are  never  forgotten,  and  we  should  sup¬ 
pose  that  in  the  doing  away  of  party,  the  old  line 
of  Democrats  was  done  away  by  annihilation.”47 

As  the  campaign  of  1828  approached  Adams,  in 

• 

45  Isaac  Hill  to  McLean,  Concord,  N.  H.,  November  27,  1828. 
McLean  MSS. 

46  Proceedings  of  the  Massachusetts  Historical  Society  (Third 
Series,  1907),  I.  p.  378. 

47  Silas  Wright  to  A.  C.  Flagg,  Washington,  December  20,  1827. 
A.  C.  Flagg  MSS.  New  York  Public  Library. 


JOHN  QUINCY  ADAMS 


23 


fact,  was  more  and  more  compelled  to  compromise 
with  his  principles  in  the  making  of  appointments 
in  order,  as  he  phrased  it,  to  maintain  harmonious 
relations  with  his  associates.  In  spite  of  his 
reluctance  and  acting  in  such  a  way  as  to  impair 
the  political  effect  of  his  concessions,  men  were 
appointed  to  office  against  his  better  judgment. 
This  was  notably  true  in  the  nomination  of 
Walsh’s  friend  Hopkinson  as  district  judge  of 
Pennsylvania.48  The  extent  to  which  Adams  was 
forced  to  yield  to  political  necessity  is  seen  most 
clearly  in  his  remarks  in  regard  to  the  appoint¬ 
ment  of  General  Peter  B.  Porter  as  secretary  of 
war  and  of  W.  H.  Harrison  as  minister  to 
Colombia. 

Porter  is  devoted  to  Mr.  Clay,  and  has  taken  the  lead 
in  the  New  York  Legislature  of  the  friends  of  the  Admin¬ 
istration.  .  .  .  Harrison  wants  the  mission  to  Colom¬ 

bia  more  than  it  wants  him,  or  than  it  is  wanted  by  the 
public  interest.  .  .  .  These  men  will  all  discharge 

the  duties  of  their  offices  faithfully  to  the  best  of  their 
ability.  Nothing  would  induce  me  to  compromise  on  that 
point ;  but  in  all  short  of  that  the  right  must  in  this,  as  in 
numberless  other  cases,  yield  to  the  expedient.  The  only 
possibility  left  me  is  to  terminate  the  administration  in 
harmony  with  itself,  and  for  the  sake  of  that  I  acquiesce 
in  these  measures,  against  the  whole  tenor  of  my 
judgment.49 

Making  use  of  effective  political  methods  reluc¬ 
tantly  and  too  late  in  the  campaign  to  be  of  much 
use,  unwilling  to  cooperate  unreservedly  in  the 

“  C.  R.  Fish,  Civil  Service  and  the  Patronage,  p.  72.  Professor 
Fish’s  reference  to  Adams,  Memoirs,  VII.  207  is  incorrect. 

“Adams,  Memoirs,  VIII.  4,  S. 


24 


ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 


activities  of  party  leaders,  Adams  could  only 
count  with  certainty  upon  those  regions  which 
were  predisposed  in  favor  of  the  political  pur¬ 
poses  he  represented.  The  centers  of  National 
Republican  strength  were,  for  the  most  part,  in  the 
long  established  communities  of  the  eastern  and 
the  middle  states.50  For  a  time  the  South  was  in 
sympathy  with  nationalist  policies,  but  diverging 
interests  had  persuaded  her  leaders  by  1828  that 
a  mistake  had  been  made.  Except  for  the  die-' 
hard  survivors  of  Federalism51  and  the  chance 
allies  provided  by  the  fortunes  of  local  politics 
and  dissension  within  the  Democratic  party, 
National  Republicanism  found  little  support  in 
the  South  outside  of  Kentucky  and  Louisiana 
where  local  interests  argued  effectively  in  favor 
of  the  protective  tariff.  No  consistent  effort  was 
therefore  made  by  the  leaders  to  rally  strength  in 
that  section.  The  situation  was  somewhat  more 
favorable  in  the  West.  Earlier  there  had  been  a 
common  interest  between  the  West  and  the  South 
in  opposition  to  a  strong  central  government,  but 
as  the  frontier  was  pushed  further  west  the  prob¬ 
lem  of  internal  improvements  was  brought  into 
prominence.  Far  from  their  markets,  westerners 
were  interested  in  securing  aid  from  the  national 
government  for  the  construction  of  roads  and 

10  A.  C.  Cole,  The  Whig  Party  in  the  South  (Washington,  1913). 

p.  1. 

51  U.  B.  Phillips,  “The  Federalists  in  South  Carolina,”  American 
Historical  Review,  XIV.  776-790. 


JOHN  QUINCY  ADAMS 


25 


canals.  Here  was  a  fertile  field  for  the  expound¬ 
ing  of  the  American  System.  By  stressing  in¬ 
ternal  improvements  in  the  West,  protection  in 
New  England,  and  the  relations  of  both  with  the 
commercial  interests,  an  alliance  between  these 
sections  might  be  sealed.  This  was  the  substance 
of  Clay’s  advice  to  Webster  in  1827 : 

The  West  and  Pennsylvania  should  be  made  sensible 
of  that  support  [of  internal  improvements]  .  .  .  You 

have  some  difficulty  to  sustain  it  in  New  England,  but  I 
hope  that  notwithstanding  your  limited  territory  and  its 
improved  condition  you  will  be  able  to  sustain  it  by 
prudence  and  discretion.  You  have  your  equivalents  in 
other  forms,  if  not  that  of  internal  improvements.  We 
must  keep  the  two  interests  of  domestic  manufactures 
and  internal  improvements  allied,  and  both  lead  to  the 
support  of  that  other  great  and  no  less  important  interest 
of  navigation.52 

This  frank  appeal  to  material  interests,  while 
very  effective  on  numerous  occasions  in  Amer¬ 
ican  politics,  failed  to  win  the  new  democracy  then 
stirring  on  the  frontier.  It  was  Adams’  failure  to 
understand  this  element,  and  above  all  his  dislike 
of  it,  that  constituted  his  chief  weakness.  The 
frontier  was  to  a  large  degree  emotional  rather 
than  rational,  and  Jackson  possessed  the  invalu¬ 
able  advantage  of  appealing  to  its  imagination. 
He  was  a  product  of  the  western  frontier,  and  it 

M  Clay  to  Webster,  April  14,  1827.  Webster  MSS.  Clay  ap¬ 
parently  was  active  in  promoting  the  meeting  of  the  friends  of 
protection  at  Harrisburg  in  this  year.  Clay  to  B.  W.  Crowin- 
shield,  Washington,  March,  1827.  Quarterly  Journal  of  Eco¬ 
nomics,  II.  490,  491. 


26  ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 

saw  in  his  candidacy  a  means  of  trying  its  hand 
in  national  politics,  while  considerable  minorities 
in  the  East,  workingmen  in  the  cities  and  small 
farmers,  interpreted  his  career  as  a  promise  that 
social  position,  wealth,  or  training  would  not  con¬ 
tinue  to  be  necessary  qualifications  for  political 
leadership.  Political  ability,  of  a  very  practical 
variety,  to  make  the  most  of  this  enthusiasm  was 
not  lacking  among  Jackson’s  friends.  Office 
holders  were  denounced  as  aristocratic,  and  evi¬ 
dence  of  the  alleged  luxurious  tastes  of  Adams 
was  distributed  broadcast  to  the  ignorant.  Con¬ 
clusive  proof  of  decadence  from  sound  American 
standards  was  seen  in  the  billiard  table  charge, 
and  Adams  was  denounced  as  an  Englishman  at 
heart  who  was  ready  to  hand  over  his  country  to 
the  English  armies.53  In  this  crisis  the  friends  of 
the  administration  had  little  to  hope  for  in  the 
President’s  leadership.  He  had  lacked  from  the 
beginning  the  sanction  of  popular  approval  which 
is  given  by  a  clear  majority  of  the  popular  vote, 
and  by  temperament  he  was  unable  to  adapt  him¬ 
self  to  the  changes  that  were  taking  place  in 
public  opinion.  Defeat  became  inevitable  when 
the  campaign,  as  a  result  of  decisions  for  which 
he  was  probably  not  responsible,  centered  upon 
Jackson’s  personality  and  capacity  at  a  time  when 
a  great  majority  of  voters  did  not  consider  that 

“Francis  Johnson  to  James  Barbour,  Bowling  Green,  Ky., 
August  31,  1827.  James  Barbour  MSS.  New  York  Public 
Library. 


JOHN  QUINCY  ADAMS 


27 


these  questions  were  involved.  That  mythical 
person,  the  average  man,  was  held  to  be  capable 
of  filling  the  most  difficult  of  offices.  Mistakes  in 
political  tactics  reveal  a  complete  failure  among 
the  National  Republican  leaders  to  understand 
the  realities  of  the  situation.  Attempts  were 
made  to  arouse  moral  disapprobation  in  regard  to 
certain  features  of  Jackson’s  life  which  were  not 
calculated  to  convince  an  unconventional  West.54 
In  a  series  of  carefully  prepared  articles  the 
National  Intelligencer  stressed  those  phases  of 
Jackson’s  career  and  personality  that  indicated  a 
lack  of  capacity  to  accommodate  himself  to  the 
constitutional  restraints  of  the  presidency  and  a 
lack  of  training  for  its  duties.55  These  argu¬ 
ments  might  confirm  the  judgment  of  conser¬ 
vatives,  they  did  not  convert  the  rank  and 
file  of  those  whose  votes  were  necessary  for  suc¬ 
cess  in  the  election.  An  admirable  but  a  politi¬ 
cally  unfortunate  reluctance  to  follow  Democratic 
political  methods  prevented  Adams  from  making 
use  of  good  material  against  Jackson.  In  the 
case  of  the  six  militiamen,56  a  favorite  example 
of  Jackson’s  arbitrary  methods,  he  refused  to 
allow  the  decision  of  the  court  martial  which  had 

M  Truth’s  Advocate  and  Monthly  Anti-Jackson  Expositor,  pub¬ 
lished  at  Cincinnati,  stressed  this  scurrilous  phase  of  the  campaign. 

“  These  articles  appeared  under  the  title,  “The  Acts  of  Andrew 
Jackson  as  a  Legislature,”  and  had  reference  to  his  conduct  as 
governor  of  Florida. 

“  This  case  was  reported  in  a  pamphlet,  The  Laws  and  the  Facts, 
and  given  wide  circulation.  Richard  Peters  to  James  Barbour, 
Philadelphia,  September  1,  1827.  Barbour  MSS. 


28 


ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 


sentenced  them  to  be  copied  from  the  records  of 
the  War  Department,  alleging  that  it  might  be  a 
violation  of  precedent  and  “would  be  considered 
as  a  measure  of  hostility  against  General 
Jackson.”57 

Adams  was  permanently  discredited  as  a  party 
leader  by  his  crushing  defeat  in  1828.58  There 
was  to  be  no  thought  of  returning  to  him  as  a 
presidential  candidate  in  the  future,  though  it  is 
by  no  means  clear  that  any  other  of  the  National 
Republican  leaders  could  have  made  a  better 
showing  against  Jackson’s  popularity.  National 
leadership  in  the  party  was  to  pass  to  Clay  as  the 
most  effective  organizer  and  the  most  popular 
candidate  the  party  possessed.  Whether  the  Na¬ 
tional  Republicans  could  become  a  more  effective 
party  as  the  opposition  than  when  in  power 
remained  to  be  demonstrated  in  the  course  of  the 
next  four  years. 

”  J.  Q.  Adams,  Memoirs,  VII.  275. 

“  The  Intelligencer  was  confident  that  the  return  to  nationalist 
policies  under  Adams  would  not  be  changed  even  in  the  event  of  his 
defeat.  “Revolutions  never  go  backward.  The  policy  of  this  gov¬ 
ernment  is  established,  and  it  is  approved  by  the  people;  and  no 
statesman — no,  nor  any  soldier  either  can  ever  stop  it.”  National 
Intelligencer,  June  5,  1828. 


CHAPTER  II 


THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  1832 

THE  shock  of  Jackson’s  overwhelming  victory 
aroused  sincere  pessimism  among  National 
Republicans  in  regard  to  the  future  of  American 
institutions.  Profoundly  disruptive  influences 
were  seen  in  the  conduct  of  the  crowd  at  Jack¬ 
son’s  inaugural,1  changes  amounting  to  a  revolu¬ 
tion  in  the  government  service  were  anticipated,2 
and  in  conservative  New  England  it  was  feared 
by  some  that  the  foundations  of  the  country’s 
civilization  would  be  destroyed.3  W.  H.  Seward, 

‘James  Parton,  Life  of  Andrew  Jackson  (N.  Y.,  1861),  III.  170. 
Cf.  Webster  to  Mrs.  E.  Webster,  Washington,  March  4,  1829. 
Webster,  Private  Correspondence,  I.  473.  In  1830,  Mrs.  Richard 
Rush  found  Washington  society  so  disagreeable  under  the  Demo¬ 
cratic  regime  that  she  left  the  city.  Rush  to  Barbour,  Washing¬ 
ton,  April  5,  1830.  Barbour  MSS. 

‘John  Taliaferro  to  Barbour,  Washington,  February  2,  1829. 
Barbour  MSS. 

3  C.  T.  Congdon,  Reminiscences  of  a  Journalist  (Boston,  1888), 
p.  25.  “I  had  a  strong  belief  not  only  that  the  republic  would  go 
to  ruin,  but  that  general  ignorance  would  prevail,  that  no  new 
books  would  be  printed,  that  public  schools  would  be  abolished, 
that  universal  poverty  would  ensue,  and  that  the  whaling  business, 
especially,  would  come  to  an  end  ...  I  doubt  if  any  public 
man  was  ever  more  thoroughly  hated  than  General  Jackson  was 
in  Massachusetts.  We  even  named  a  cutaneous  complaint  con¬ 
tracted  in  barber  shops  after  the  much  admired  and  much  abused 
hero.  Then  there  was  a  particularly  square  toed  boot  which  we 
called  the  Jackson.”  The  significance  of  these  gloomy  reflections 
is  lessened  in  that  Congdon  was  then  a  child  of  eight  years. 


30 


ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 


writing  long  after  the  event,  foresaw  the  loss  of 
protection,  of  internal  improvements,  “the  future 
disunion  of  the  states,  and  ultimately  the  uni¬ 
versal  prevalence  of  slavery.”4  In  less  timid 
minds  this  depression,  if  it  existed  at  all,  was 
temporary.  Even  in  the  dark  days  following  the 
election  Clay  saw  nothing  that  would  “discour¬ 
age  the  hope  of  a  speedy  restoration  of  the  reign 
of  reason  and  common  sense.”5  In  May,  1829, 
Pleasants  of  the  Richmond  Whig  was  confident 
that  the  removals  from  office  had  already  re¬ 
sulted  in  many  desertions  from  the  Democratic 
party,  and  he  predicted  the  overthrow  of  Jack- 
son  in  1832.fi  Though  it  seemed  to  Francis 
Brooke,  Clay’s  friend  and  correspondent,  that  all 
but  honor  had  been  lost,  he  found  some  consola¬ 
tion  in  the  belief  that  the  victory  had  been  won 
against  Adams  rather  than  against  the  cabinet.7 
-The  party,  however,  had  been  reduced  to  a  dis¬ 
organized  minority8  with  a  dependable  source  of 
power  only  in  New  England  and  with  a  precari¬ 
ous  influence  in  scattered  areas  elsewhere.9  To 

4  W.  H.  Seward,  Autobiography  (N.  Y.,  1877),  p.  74. 

5  Clay  to  Barbour,  Ashland,  Ky.,  November  21,  1829.  Barbour 
MSS. 

°J.  H.  Pleasants  to  Barbour,  Richmond,  May  30,  1829.  Ibid. 

'  Brooke  to  Barbour,  Richmond,  January  27,  1829.  Ibid. 

8  Immediately  after  the  election,  Adams  and  J.  W.  Taylor,  a 
member  of  the  House  from  New  York,  agreed  that  “the  two 
recent  parties  are  virtually  dissolved— and  that  of  the  administra¬ 
tion  irretrievably.”  Adams,  Memoirs,  VIII.  89. 

9  Adams  was  given  all  the  electoral  votes  from  New  England  ex¬ 
cept  one  in  Maine,  but,  except  for  sixteen  in  New  York,  he  carried 
only  New  Jersey  and  Delaware  of  the  middle  states.  Maryland, 
a  border  state,  gave  him  six  votes. 


/ 


THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  1832 


31 


rebuild  and  increase  its  strength  it  would  be  nec¬ 
essary  to  solve  the  problems  of  organization, 
leadership,  and  campaign  issues  in  such  a  way  as 
^o  unite  all  elements  in  opposition  to  Jackson  and, 
in  addition,  to  make  gains  at  his  expense. 

Factional  differences  barred  the  way  to  the 
solution  of  these  problems.  Although  many  were 
conscious  of  common  ground  in  support  of  a 
nationalist  conception  of  government,  minor 
issues,  such  as  anti-masonry,  and  the  obscure 
ramifications  of  personal  ambition  made  the 
organization  of  a  more  effective  National  Repub¬ 
lican  party  difficult  without  the  cement  of  patron¬ 
age  and  power.  That  sense  of  loyalty  or  alle¬ 
giance  to  party  which  is  a  result  of  definite 
organization  was  not  highly  developed;10  indi¬ 
vidual  rather  than  party  standards  controlled  the 
decisions  of  many.  A  beginning  towards  an  or¬ 
ganization  was  made,  however,  in  the  winter  of 
1830-1831  as  a  result  of  the  formation  of  a  con¬ 
gressional  caucus.11  Adams  was  told  in  March 
that  members  of  the  opposition,  probably  of  the 
House,  had  held  weekly  meetings  during  the 

10  C.  F.  Mercer  to  Barbour,  Washington,  September  20,  1830 
Barbour  MSS. 

n  Materials  for  the  study  of  the  party  from  the  point  of  view 
of  its  national  organization  are  meager.  The  files  of  the  National 
Intelligencer  do  not  throw  much  light  upon  the  subject.  Adams’ 
Memoirs  give  occasional  hints,  since  he  was  in  the  confidence  of 
some  of  the  National  Republican  leaders  in  Congress,  particularly 
in  that  of  J.  W.  Taylor.  His  lack  of  interest  in  the  details  of 
party  management,  except  in  so  far  as  they  offered  food  for 
reflection  upon  the  weaknesses  of  human  nature,  probably  kept 
him  from  writing  all  that  he  knew. 


32 


ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 


session  at  the  lodgings  of  J.  W.  Taylor.  There 
is  a  hint  that  Webster  and  Edward  Everett  were 
named  as  a  committee  on  publicity.  Little  was 
done  in  the  nature  of  propaganda,  although  Tay-^ 
lor  pointed  out  an  article  in  the  Intelligencer 
which  he  thought  was  the  work  of  Webster.12 
Early  in  the  following  session  Adams  reported  a 
conference  of  seventeen  members  of  the  House, 
all  friends  of  protection,  for  the  purpose  of  de¬ 
termining  the  line  of  action  to  be  followed.  Its 
purpose  was  not  primarily  to  advance  the  inter¬ 
ests  of  the  National  Republican  party,  but  its 
membership  was  largely  drawn  from  that 
source.13  At  a  later  session,  attended  by  such 
apostles  of  protection  as  Clay,  John  Davis  of 
Massachusetts,  and  Hezekiah  Niles  of  the  Regis¬ 
ter,  Adams  was  convinced  that  Clay  was  inter¬ 
ested  in  the  revision  of  the  tariff  as  a  means  of 
advancing  his  presidential  ambitions.14  The  func¬ 
tions  of  this  caucus  broadened  until  they  included 
the  determination  of  the  opposition’s  plan  of 
campaign.  A  member  was  appointed  from  each 
state  to  confer  with  his  associates,  and  in  Janu- 

u  Adams,  Memoirs,  VIII.  337. 

13  Ibid.,  VIII.  439.  Adams  attended  these  party  conclaves  as  a 
result  of  his  interest  in  the  tariff  question  and  of  his  position  as 
chairman  of  the  House  committee  on  manufactures.  He  was  not 
however  one  of  the  party  leaders.  “I  had  never  been  consulted, 
and  never  wished  to  be  consulted,  upon  the  movements  of  the 
party  since  the  3d  of  March,  1829.”  Ibid.,  VIII.  401. 

11  As  chairman  of  the  committee  which  had  the  function  of  pre¬ 
paring  a  plan  of  action  Clay  reported  a  bill  that  would  reduce 
rates  to  the  extent  of  more  than  seven  millions  in  one  year.  Ibid.. 
VIII.  446-447. 


THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  1832 


33 


ary,  1832,  these  delegates  met  to  arrange  the  “op¬ 
position’s  course  of  policy”  after  canvassing  the 
policies  of  the  administration.15  The  continuation 
«Pf  these  meetings  and  the  development  from  them 
of  a  national  organization  was  made  impossible 
by  irreconcilable  differences  and  by  a  reluctance 
to  incur  the  unpopularity  of  a  congressional  cau¬ 
cus.16  Difficulties  in  harmonizing  the  various 
elements  that  would  have  to  be  included  in  a 
rejuvenated  party  and  the  lack  of  coordination 
between  national  and  state  leaders17  were  in  part 
responsible  for  the  absence  of  a  permanent  na¬ 
tional  organization.  It  is  possible,  however,  that 
many  were  attracted  to  a  party  in  which  con¬ 
siderable  differences  existed  who  might  have  been 
repelled  by  one  that  had  more  exacting  standards 
of  discipline. 

More  successful  efforts  were  made  within  cer¬ 
tain  states  in  the  construction  of  party  machinery. 
In  New  York  the  Democratic  party  under  the 
Regency  provided  a  highly  efficient  model  which 
some  of  the  National  Republican  leaders  wished 
to  follow.  Oran  Follett,  a  Buffalo  politician  of 
some  importance,  wrote  early  in  1832  in  support 

"Ibid.,  VIII.  456. 

”  “Mr.  Clay’s  objection  to  the  continuance  of  the  meetings  was. 
that  it  would  have  the  appearance  of  a  permanent  association  to 
dictate  measures  to  Congress.  There  was  a  proposition  for  holding 
weekly  meetings ;  but  it  did  not  prevail.”  Ibid.,  VIII.  448. 

”  The  loose  connection  between  party  leaders  in  Washington  and 
in  the  various  states  is  illustrated  by  the  Intelligencer’s  confession 
that  it  did  not  know  the  party  allegiance  of  candidates  in  distant 
states.  National  Intelligencer,  August  27,  1830. 


34 


ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 


of  his  recommendations  that  a  newspaper  be 
established  to  serve  the  interests  of  the  National 
Republicans  as  the  Albany  Argus  had  served 
those  of  the  Regency:  “It  is  a  wrong  policy  $ 
founded  in  a  false  estimate  of  things,  that  makes 
us  too  wise,  in  any  of  the  relations  of  life  to  learn 
wisdom  of  our  enemies.”  He  was  confident  that 
there  were  one  hundred  men  in  the  city  of  New 
York  who  would  each  give  one  hundred  dollars 
for  this  purpose,  and  that  the  faithful  in  the 
smaller  cities  of  the  state  could  be  depended  upon 
to  increase  the  total  to  more  than  three  thou¬ 
sand.18  That  anything  was  done  in  this  direction 
does  not  appear  from  the  evidence,  but  further 
measures  were  taken  for  the  creation  of  an  effect¬ 
ive  party.  The  National  Republicans  in  New 
York  City  organized  in  December,  1830,  and  ap- 
^pointed  a  committee  of  seventy.19  In  June  of  the 
following  year  a  state  convention  met  in  Albany, 
named  a  state  correspondence  committee  of  seven 
members,  and  recommended  that  committees  be 
appointed  in  each  county  that  had  not  already 
created  one.20  An  active  correspondence  was 

13  Oran  Follett  to  Joseph  Hoxie,  February  6,  1832.  “Follett 
Papers”  (L.  Belle  Hamlin,  ed.),  I.  Quarterly  Publications  of  the 
Historical  and  Philosophical  Society  of  Ohio,  V.  S3,  54. 

“  S.  R.  Gammon,  The  Presidential  Campaign  of  1832,  p.  60. 

20  The  county  correspondence  committees  were  instructed  to  call 
meetings  and  to  inform  the  state  committees  as  to  local  develop¬ 
ments.  Not  only  was  the  state  committee  to  correspond  with  the 
county  committee,  but  it  was  directed  to  maintain  a  lively  ex¬ 
change  of  letters  with  the  committees  of  other  states.  Niles’ 
Register,  XL.  279.  Similar  action  was  authorized  at  a  meeting  of 


THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  1832 


35 


carried  on,  and  an  office  was  opened  at  Number 
Three  Broad  Street  where  an  attendant  was  to  be 
at  all  hours  of  the  day  to  consult  with  any  who 
'came.21  This  system  was  apparently  found  de¬ 
sirable,  for  a  resolution  was  adopted  by  the 
National  Republican  Convention  at  Baltimore  in 
December,  1831,  recommending  that  organiza¬ 
tions  similar  to  that  in  New  York  be  established 
in  states  where  they  did  not  already  exist.22 
While  the  party  was  developing  a  capacity  for 
organization  within  the  states,  no  action  was 
taken  for  the  creation  of  a  permanent  national 
committee,  but  central  leadership  of  a  sort  was 
doubtless  furnished  by  Clay  and  other  party 
leaders.  The  National  Intelligencer  by  reason  of 
its  wide  circulation  and  standing  with  leaders  of 
the  party  was,  in  some  measure,  a  binding  in¬ 
fluence.  Nevertheless  the  absence  of  letters  from 
national  leaders  in  the  Follett  Papers  suggests 

National  Republicans  in  New  York  city  as  a  means  of  preparing 
for  the  National  Republican  Young  Men’s  Convention,  which  had 
been  called  to  meet  in  Washington.  National  Intelligencer,  Feb¬ 
ruary  29,  1832. 

21  Hiram  Ketchum  to  the  State  Corresponding  Committee  in 
Buffalo,  New  York,  August  10,  1832.  Follett  Papers,  V.  66,  67 ; 
National  Republican  State  Corresponding  Committee  in  Buffalo, 
September  14,  1832.  Ibid.,  69,  70.  The  state  committee  recom¬ 
mended  that  an  office  be  opened  in  Buffalo,  and  for  this  purpose 
the  party  there  was  authorized  to  draw  upon  National  Republicans 
in  New  York  City  for  a  small  amount.  John  Youngs  advised 
the  Buffalo  committee  that  in  order  to  bring  home  to  the  people 
the  seriousness  of  the  situation  it  would  be  necessary  to  call 
primary  assemblies.  John  Youngs  to  the  National  Republican 
State  Corresponding  Committee  in  Buffalo,  Burdette,  September 
19,  1832.  Ibid.,  p.  71. 

”  National  Intelligencer,  December  16,  1831. 


36 


ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 


that  the  party  in  each  state  was  left  largely  to 
its  own  devices. 

For  a  time  after  the  catastrophe  of  1832 
leaders  of  the  opposition  and  the  Intelligencer 
followed  a  passive  policy  in  regard  to  the  nomi¬ 
nation  of  a  presidential  candidate.  Clay  wrote 
to  Webster  that,  in  his  opinion,  a  colorless  atti¬ 
tude  should  for  the  time  being  be  maintained  in 
regard  to  the  administration.  An  immediate 
declaration  of  hostilities  would  preserve  unity 
among  Jackson’s  friends ;  the  events  of  the  winter 
of  1828-1829,  the  formation  of  a  new  cabinet, 
and  the  inaugural  address  would  make  clear  “the 
whole  ground  of  future  operations.”  It  was  of 
great  importance,  Clay  believed,  that  the  ques¬ 
tion  of  a  nomination  for  the  campaign  of  1832 
should  not  be  prematurely  agitated.23  Similar 
views  were  expressed  by  Webster  in  1830.  He 
thought  that  nothing  should  be  done  in  regard 
to  a  nomination,  that  the  party  should  for  the 
present  follow  a  policy  of  obstruction.24  The 
administration  would  defeat  itself,  he  wrote  to 
Clay,  if  it  were  given  an  opportunity;  he  immedi¬ 
ately  added  however  that  by  no  means  should  “we 
.  .  .  let  them  disturb  the  tariff,  or  injure  any 
other  existing  interest.”25 

”  Clay  to  Webster,  Washington,  November  30,  1828.  Webster 
MSS. 

“Webster  to  J.  H.  Pleasants,  Washington,  March  6,  1830. 
Webster,  Private  Correspondence,  I.  492. 

“Webster  to  Clay,  Washington,  April  18,  1830.  Colton,  Private 
Correspondence,  p.  260. 


THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  1832 


37 


The  result  of  the  election  of  1828  was  scarcely 
known  before  the  Intelligencer  was  urging  the 
importance  of  delaying  the  discussion  of  a  nomi¬ 
nation  for  a  period  of  at  least  two  years.26  In 
August,  1829,  its  position  was  expressed  in  a 
clipping  from  the  Western  Times.  The  appear¬ 
ance  of  conflicting  candidacies  was  to  be  regretted, 
because  it  would  revive  dissension  within  the 
party  in  regions  where  it  had  subsided.  Rivalry 
between  party  leaders  at  this  stage  of  the  cam¬ 
paign  would  compromise  the  prospects  of  success. 
“We  hope,  therefore,  that  the  day  of  trouble  will 
be  removed  as  far  as  possible,  and  not  be  brought 
prematurely  upon  us,  by  those  who  ‘delight  to 
rule  the  tempest’  and  those  who  love  ‘unceasing 
warfare’.”27 

It  was  clearly  for  the  sake  of  expediency  alone 
that  agitation  for  Clay’s  nomination  was  delayed. 
His  support  of  Adams,  his  American  System,  and 
his  efforts  to  organize  the  party  when  it  was 
in  power  marked  him  as  the  logical  candidate. 
Although  the  Intelligencer  gave  him  no  open  sup¬ 
port  during  the  first  months  of  Jackson’s  ad¬ 
ministration,  it  was  evident  that  he  was  being 
groomed  for  the  race.  Whatever  he  did  was 
carefully  noted,  and  his  occasional  speeches  were 
reported  in  full.  When  the  Cincinnati  Gazette 
suggested  that  the  candidate  should  be  accepted 

“  National  Intelligencer,  November  21,  1828. 

"  Ibid.,  August  10,  1829. 


38 


ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 


whose  chances  for  success  were  most  promising, 
the  Intelligencer  hastened  to  explain  in  August, 
1829,  that  this  indicated  no  intention  of  setting 
Clay  aside.  “With  the  prominent  place  Mr.  Clay 
has  so  long  maintained  in  the  public  view,  and 
with  his  increasing  popularity,  he  could  not  keep 
himself  out  of  view  if  he  would.  The  country 
will  probably  demand  his  services,  and  he  dare  not 
refuse  if  he  would.”28  The  paper’s  appearance 
of  neutrality  was  entirely  abandoned  in  the  sum¬ 
mer  of  1830,  when  it  openly  came  out  for  Clay. 
The  enthusiasm  which  his  name  aroused  at  fourth 
of  July  banquets  and  his  nominations  by  local 
meetings  in  various  states  were  carefully  noted.29 
According  to  the  New  York  American  the  enthu¬ 
siasm  of  a  meeting  of  his  friends  in  that  city  was 
evidence  of  the  affectionate  regard  of  the  people 
for  Clay.  “It  was  not  merely  the  calm,  cold 
assent  of  the  judgment  in  his  favor  .  .  .  but 
the  overflowing  of  strong  personal  predilections 
on  the  part  of  thousands  who  had  never  seen  the 
man.”30  Clay  was  in  fact  popular  with  great 
numbers  of  the  people,  and  the  advantages  of  his 

28  Ibid.,  August  26,  1829.  The  campaign  for  Clay’s  nomination 
had  not  been  initiated  by  his  friends  because  of  “a  proper  deference 
to  public  opinion,  which  they  mean  to  follow,  and  not  to  attempt 
to  lead.” 

“  Ibid.,  August  6,  21,  October  2,  1830. 

20  Ibid.,  December  17,  1830,  quoting  New  York  American,  Decem¬ 
ber  14,  1830.  W.  L.  Stone,  editor  of  the  New  York  Commercial 
Advertiser  wrote  to  Webster  that  Clay’s  name  in  itself  would  add 
strength  to  the  party.  Stone  to  Webster,  New  York,  December 
14,  1830.  Webster  MSS. 


THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  1832 


39 


candidacy  in  this  respect  were  in  such  striking 
contrast  with  Adams’  leadership  that  its  effective¬ 
ness  in  winning  votes  was  exaggerated.  The 
Intelligencer,  for  example,  refused  to  consider 
the  possibility  that  the  nomination  might  better 
be  given  even  to  a  new  man  if  that  would  improve 
the  party’s  prospects. 

The  reluctance  of  the  Intelligencer  to  endorse 
the  call  for  a  national  convention  was,  therefore, 
consistent  with  its  previous  stand.  There  was  no 
real  object  to  be  served,  and  it  was  doubtless 
feared  that  a  convention  would  bring  out  dif¬ 
ferences  within  the  party.  “Convention  or  no 
Convention,  Henry  Clay  stands  in  full  view  of 
the  people  as  the  National  Republican  candidate 
for  the  presidency.”31  But  by  August,  1831,  the 
demand  for  a  convention  was  so  general  and  the 
alternative,  a  nomination  by  a  congressional  cau¬ 
cus,  so  objectionable,  that  the  Intelligencer  took 
the  ground  that  a  convention  would  be  the  most 
effective  way  of  securing  harmonious  support  for 
the  party’s  candidates.  The  nomination  of  a  suit¬ 
able  candidate  for  the  vice-presidency  would  be 
its  most  immediate  task.32  In  fact  the  conven¬ 
tion,  when  it  named  Clay,  ratified  a  nomination 
that  had  already  been  made  by  a  carefully 
fostered  public  opinion. 

“  National  Intelligencer,  December  28,  1830. 

31  Ibid.,  August  23,  1831. 


40  ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 

The  skilful  maneuvers  of  Clay  and  his  friends 
made  his  position  as  the  leader  of  the  party  so 
secure  that  the  National  Republicans  found  it 
impossible  to  consider  seriously  the  merits  of 
another  leader  whose  chances  might  have  been 
better  in  the  difficult  task  of  defeating  Jackson. 
In  Calhoun’s  opinion  John  McLean  of  Ohio  had 
no  chance  of  success,  but  the  movement  in  his 
behalf  at  least  contained  such  a  possibility  and 
therefore  merits  notice.  He  had  made  friends  in 
both  parties  by  his  efficient  administration  of  the 
postal  service  under  Monroe  and  Adams.  A 
member  of  the  Supreme  Court  at  this  time,  hav¬ 
ing  been  appointed  by  Jackson  after  his  refusal 
to  continue  as  postmaster  general,  his  legal  and 
judicial  experience  and  above  all  his  attitude  in  re¬ 
gard  to  the  use  of  the  patronage  had  removed  him 
from  the  field  of  partisan  politics  and  had  made 
him  a  favorite  with  the  dissatisfied  elements  of 
both  parties.  His  potential  strength  as  a  leading 
politician  of  Ohio,  an  argument  which  later  had 
more  weight,  was  urged  in  his  favor.33  The  elec¬ 
tion  of  1828  was  scarcely  over  when  suggestions 
were  made  to  McLean  that  he  might  enter  the 
next  campaign  as  a  presidential  candidate.  At 
the  time  he  was  not  clear  as  to  his  attitude 
towards  Jackson;  he  hoped  in  any  case  that  the 
question  of  nominations  would  not  be  agitated 

33 J.  S.  Barbour  to  James  Barbour,  Catalpa,  (Virginia?),  July 
30,  1831.  Barbour  MSS. 


THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  1832 


41 


prematurely.34  B.  W.  Richards,35  probably  the 
closest  of  his  political  advisers,  at  first  discour¬ 
aged  an  open  break  with  the  administration  in 
order  that  McLean  might  be  in  a  position  to  suc¬ 
ceed  Jackson,  in  the  event  of  Jackson’s  refusal  to 
run  for  a  second  term.36  According  to  Buchanan, 
Pennsylvania  would  prefer  him  to  any  other  can¬ 
didate,  should  Jackson  withdraw;  therefore  it  was 
desirable  that  McLean  should  not  be  maneuvered 
into  a  position  of  hostility  to  the  President.37 
Elisha  Whittlesey,  an  important  National  Repub¬ 
lican  leader  in  Ohio  and  a  member  of  the  House, 
wrote  that  if  he  had  not  withdrawn  from  political 
life  by  accepting  a  place  on  the  Supreme  Court 
the  moderates  of  all  parties  would  have  rallied  to 
his  name.38  McLean  and  his  friends  remained 
in  touch  with  the  situation  in  the  Democratic 
party;  Richards  gave  assurances  in  June,  1830,  to 
some  of  its  leaders  that  McLean  would  be  kept  in 
the  center  of  public  attention  ready  to  take  ad¬ 
vantage  of  “any  contingency  preventing  the  re- 

**  McLean  to  W.  L.  Pratt,  Washington,  December  31,  1828. 
McLean  MSS. 

35  Richards  had  been  appointed  by  Jackson  as  a  government 
director  of  the  United  States  Bank ;  he  later  resigned  after  his 
election  as  mayor  of  Philadelphia. 

30  Richards  reported  an  increasing  confidence  in  Pennsylvania 
that  Jackson  would  decline  a  renomination  on  the  grounds  of  ill 
health.  Richards  to  McLean,  Harrisburg,  February  4,  1830.  Mc¬ 
Lean  MSS.  Should  Jackson  be  out  of  the  race  he  was  confident 
that  McLean  would  find  increasing  support  among  the  people. 
Richards  to  McLean,  Philadelphia,  May  IS,  1830.  Ibid. 

37  James  Buchanan  to  McLean,  Lancaster,  June  9,  1830.  Ibid. 

38  Elisha  Whittlesey  to  McLean,  Washington,  May  23,  1830. 
Imd. 


42  ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 

election  of  Genl.  [Jackson].’ 39  In  the  fall  of  that 
year,  when  it  became  clear  that  Jackson  would 
again  be  a  candidate,  Richards  at  first  urged 
McLean  to  try  for  the  vice-presidency  on  the 
Democratic  ticket,40  and  similar  advice  came  from 
Democratic  quarters.41  Later  when  McLean  de¬ 
cided  against  this,  Richards  approved.  “The 
semblance  of  an  intimate  connection  at  this  time,” 
he  wrote,  “with  any  of  the  high  contending  parties 
cannot  be  desirable  and  must  be  of  doubtful 
influence  with  the  public.”42 

McLean  was  regarded  by  his  friends  as  well 
qualified  to  act  as  a  fusion  candidate.  An  Ohio 
correspondent  of  some  apparent  influence  in¬ 
formed  him  that  all  parties  there  looked  to  him 
as  a  means  of  healing  the  divisions  of  partisan 
politics. 

I  have  spoken  of  the  very  unpleasant  situation  of  the 
2  great  political  parties  in  Ohio,  continually  involved  in 
Violence  and  Contention,  with  which  we  are  all  tired  and 
disgusted,  and  wished  to  know  whether  we  could  not 
unite  on  some  man,  and  come  together  again,  and  men- 

38  Richards  to  McLean,  Philadelphia,  June  17,  1830.  Ibid. 
McLean  had  been  formally  nominated  for  the  presidency  in  the 
columns  of  Poulson’s  Daily  Advertiser.  Richard  Rush  believed 
that  the  friends  that  McLean  numbered  among  the  Anti-Masons 
were  chiefly  those  who  had  formerly  been  Democrats.  Rush  to 
Barbour,  Washington,  August  7,  1830.  Barbour  MSS. 

40  Richards  to  McLean,  November  1,  [1830?];  November  2, 
1830;  January  31,  1831.  McLean  MSS. 

41  Two  Democrats  suggested  the  advisability  of  a  nomination 
for  the  vice-presidency ;  there  was  a  popular  movement,  they  re¬ 
ported,  to  name  a  strong  candidate  for  that  office  in  view  of  Jack¬ 
son’s  uncertain  health.  John  A.  Avery  and  James  Ruside  (?)  tc 
McLean,  Washington,  October  7,  1831.  Ibid. 

42  Richards  to  McLean,  Philadelphia,  March  2,  1831.  Ibid. 


THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  1832 


43 


tioned  your  name  as  the  most  likely  to  have  that  effect  in 
Ohio,  with  which  almost  all  seemed  to  agree,  and  many 
seemed  pleased  with  the  idea  that  there  was  still  hope  that 
we  might  come  together  again  for  you  may  rest  assured 
we  are  tired  of  political  contentions  and  it  is  very  injuri¬ 
ous  to  Ohio.  I  do  hope  that  not  only  Ohio  but  the  South 
and  some  parts  of  the  East  may  yet  unite  in  this  object. 

Many  members  of  the  legislature  had  endorsed 
these  views,  and  newspapers  without  reference  to 
their  party  bias  were  ready  to  support  McLean.43 
A  few  weeks  later  a  Pennsylvania  politician  wrote 
that  the  nomination  of  McLean  by  both  parties 
was  still  a  possibility.44 

The  state  election  in  Kentucky,  August,  1831, 
was  admittedly  a  crisis  in  Clay’s  candidacy,45  for 
a  defeat  in  his  home  state  would  forecast  a  similar 
result  in  the  national  elections.  Clay’s  friends 
won  a  majority  of  eleven  in  a  total  of  one  hun¬ 
dred  and  twenty-one  members,46  but  the  margin 
was  so  small  that  it  aroused  doubts  as  to  Clay’s 
success.  Andrew  Stewart,  long  a  member  of  the 
House  from  Pennsylvania,  wrote  that  Clay  must 
be  given  up  in  view  of  this  result;  even  had  he 
been  more  successful  in  Kentucky,  he  could  not 
win  the  discontented  elements  in  the  Democratic 
party.  All  parties,  according  to  Stewart,  seemed 

43  Samuel  H.  Hale  to  McLean,  Columbus,  February  6,  1830. 
Ibid.  Had  it  not  been  for  Calhoun’s  unpopularity,  he  might  have 
been  used  for  this  purpose  if  McLean  refused  to  be  a  candidate. 

44 J.  Ruside  (?)  to  McLean,  Columbus,  February  26,  1830.  Ibid. 

46 National  Intelligencer,  September  17,  1831,  quoting  Boston 
Daily  Advertiser,  September  13. 

44  Niles’  Register,  XLI.  1. 


44 


ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 


to  agree  that  McLean  was  perhaps  the  only  man 
who  could  unite  all  elements  of  the  opposition  and 
thus  “arrest  the  course  of  administration  which 
not  only  endangers  the  Union  but  threatens  tht 
subversion  of  everything  valuable  in  the  Republic 
— the  judiciary,  tariff,  internal  improvements,  the 
bank  and  in  short  everything.”47  It  was  sug¬ 
gested  to  McLean  in  September,  1831,  that  if 
Clay’s  name  should  be  withdrawn,  joint  meetings 
of  former  Clay  and  Jackson  men  in  his  interest 
might  be  called  in  Pennsylvania.48  McLean  and 
his  friends  exaggerated  the  chances  he  would 
have  in  a  contest  with  Jackson,  for  the  bitter 
temper  characteristic  of  politics  in  the  campaign 
of  1832  made  improbable  the  success  of  a  candi¬ 
date  of  so  little  color.  Nevertheless,  had  he  been 
nominated  by  the  National  Republicans,  it  is 
probable  that  he  would  have  been  endorsed  by  a 
part,  at  least,  of  the  Bank  and  tariff  Democrats; 
and  the  support  of  the  Anti-Masons,  which  he 
had  a  fair  chance  of  winning,  would  have  com¬ 
pleted  the  union  of  the  most  important  elements 
of  the  opposition.  In  neglecting  to  weigh  the 
political  prospects  of  other  leaders  than  Clay,  and 
especially  in  ignoring  McLean,  the  National  Re¬ 
publican  Convention  refused  to  follow  the  only 

47  Andrew  Stewart  to  McLean,  Union  Tower,  Pa.,  August  13, 
1831.  McLean  MSS. 

48  To  McLean,  Philadelphia,  September  14,  1831.  Ibid.  The 
signature  of  this  letter  has  been  cut  out.  Former  Jackson  men, 
like  Stewart,  ought  to  be  chairmen  of  these  meetings  according 
to  the  writer. 


THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  1832 


45 


policy  that  had  any  prospect  of  success.  This  was 
pointed  out  by  one  of  McLean’s  correspondents. 

If  the  great  December  convention  assemble  to  select 
a  particular  individual,  instead  of  designating  him  who 
might  most  successfully  compete  with  Van  Buren’s  Presi¬ 
dent  (or  Kendall’s),  it  will  long  be  regretted  by  the 
Nation.  I  hope  and  pray  that  the  person  may  be  sup¬ 
ported  whom  all  circumstances  considered  will  offer  the 
best  prospect  of  success,  for  so  certain  as  General  Jackson 
succeeds  another  four  years  so  certain  Van  Buren  follows 
12  long  years.49 

At  an  early  period  of  the  campaign,  there  was 
discussion  as  to  a  possible  combination  between 
McLean  and  Calhoun  with  the  latter  as  the 
presidential  candidate.  In  December,  1829,  this 
arrangement  was  suggested  to  McLean  by  a  Vir¬ 
ginian.50  A  rumor  to  this  effect  was  reported 
from  Ohio  by  Thomas  L.  Hamer,  a  Democratic 
member  of  the  House  from  that  state,51  and 
Webster,  writing  to  John  H.  Pleasants,  referred 
to  this  proposal  as  a  negotiation  that  was  in  pro¬ 
gress.52  It  was  asserted  by  the  Washington 
Globe ,  the  administration  paper,  that  Duff  Green 
of  the  United  States  Telegraph  was  back  of  the 

« W.  Bradley  to  McLean,  Washington,  October  6,  1831.  Ibid. 

60  J.  F.  Caldwell  to  McLean,  Lewisburg,  Va.,  December  30,  1829. 
Ibid.  A  similar  proposal  was  made  to  S.  L.  Gouverneur,  Post¬ 
master  of  New  York,  in  an  anonymous  undated  letter  from  Keene, 
New  Hampshire.  Gouverneur  MSS.,  New  York  Public  Library. 

S1  Hamer  to  McLean,  Columbus,  February  16,  1830.  McLean 
MSS. 

“Webster  to  Pleasants,  Washington,  March  6,  1830.  Webster, 
Private  Correspondence,  I.  492. 


46 


ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 


scheme.53  It  never  assumed  more  definite  shape 
than  that  of  similarly  nebulous  proposals  which 
are  not  uncommon  in  the  first  phases  of  a  cam¬ 
paign,  yet  it  is  of  interest  as  a  tentative  step  in 
a  revived  understanding  between  the  South  and 
the  West.  The  scheme  found  little  favor  even 
with  the  men  in  whose  interests  it  had  been 
started,  in  spite  of  the  personal  friendship  that 
existed  between  them.54  A  correspondent  told 
McLean  that  he  had  been  frequently  questioned 
as  to  the  prospects  of  a  coalition  with  Calhoun ;  in 
each  case  he  had  replied  that  if  this  arrangement 
were  made  McLean  would  lose  all  claim  to  the 
support  of  his  friends.55  Whittlesey  had  no  de¬ 
sire  to  injure  the  friendship  between  McLean  and 
Calhoun,  but  no  political  union  must  be  consid¬ 
ered.  “There  is  not  on  earth  a  man  who  would 
set  in  motion  more  efficient  measures  to  prostrate 
you,  if  you  crossed  his  path,  than  Mr.  Calhoun.”56 
Calhoun  was  probably  just  as  reluctant  to  make 
an  arrangement  with  McLean.  At  a  later  time, 

53  National  Intelligencer,  April  1830,  quoting  Washington  Globe, 
April  1,  1831. 

M  McLean  had  preferred  Calhoun  to  Clay  in  the  campaign  of 
1824.  McLean  to  George  B.  Torrence,  February  12,  1823.  “Tor¬ 
rence  Papers,”  Quarterly  Publications  of  the  Historical  and  Phil¬ 
osophical  Society  of  Ohio,  1907,  II.  7.  Among  the  McLean  MSS. 
in  the  Library  of  Congress  are  a  number  of  friendly  letters  from 
Calhoun. 

55  W.  Bradley  to  McLean,  Washington,  May  7,  1830.  McLean 
MSS. 

“Whittlesey  to  McLean,  Washington,  May  27,  1830.  Ibid. 
Whittlesey  was  obviously  interested  in  preventing  an  open  break 
between  McLean  and  Clay. 


THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  1832 


47 


when  the  approaching  Anti-Masonic  convention 
was  arousing  ambitions  among  opposition  leaders, 
he  pointed  out  the  dangers  of  McLean’s  nomina¬ 
tion.  Among  other  things,  the  Judge  could  not 
make  a  successful  campaign  in  the  South  because 
he  was  not  widely  known.  Moreover  his  endorse¬ 
ment  of  the  distribution  of  the  surplus  revenue,  a 
measure  that  was  more  odious  in  the  South  than 
the  American  System  as  it  was  a  sugar-coated 
bribe  to  secure  consent  for  protection,  made  it 
impossible  for  McLean  to  increase  his  popularity 
there.57  There  was  at  no  time  a  reasonable  pros¬ 
pect  of  an  agreement  between  Calhoun  and  Mc¬ 
Lean,  but  the  existence  of  a  possibility  of  this 
kind  constituted  a  danger  to  Clay’s  undisputed 
leadership  and  probably  contributed  to  the  prema¬ 
ture  agitation  for  his  nomination. 

Discussion  of  a  union  with  Calhoun,  like  that 
of  McLean’s  presidential  ambitions,  had  no  defi¬ 
nite  results,  and  in  the  end  McLean  apparently 
had  little  or  no  influence  in  the  election.  The 
influence  of  Elisha  Whittlesey  aided  in  the  pre¬ 
servation  of  at  least  a  neutral  attitude  towards 
Clay.  In  view  of  the  existing  political  crisis,  he 
wrote  in  June,  1830,  that  the  question  of  first 
importance  was  the  success  of  principles,  not  of 
men.  He  was  convinced  that  McLean  and  Clay 

"  Calhoun  to  Christopher  Van  Deventer,  Fort  Hill,  May  25, 
1831.  “Correspondence  of  John  C.  Calhoun”  (Jameson,  J.  F„  ed! 
Annual  Report  of  the  American  Historical  Association,  1899), 


48  ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 

were  essentially  in  accord  upon  national  policies, 
that  accordingly  it  would  be  a  catastrophe  if  both 
were  to  run,  “for,”  he  concluded,  “in  that  event 
neither  of  you  could  be  elected.”58  In  order  to 
remove  a  possible  obstacle  to  a  truce  between 
them  he  assured  McLean  that  Clay  had  not  tried 
to  ruin  his  political  career  during  Adams’  admin¬ 
istration.59  As  late  as  June,  1832,  with  a  view,  it 
seems,  to  the  campaign  of  1836,  Whittlesey  asked 
McLean  not  to  array  himself  so  decidedly 
“against  Mr.  Clay,  as  to  preclude  his  friends 
generally  hereafter,  from  uniting  in  your 
support.”60 

The  problems  of  consolidating  the  opposition 
and  of  recruiting  new  strength  were  largely  con¬ 
cerned  with  a  possible  conciliation  of  the  Anti- 
Masonic  party,  composed  as  it  was  of  deserters 
from  each  of  the  two  parties.61  There  was  at 

“  Whittlesey  to  McLean,  Canfield,  Ohio,  June  9,  1830.  McLean 
MSS. 

58  Whittlesey  to  McLean,  Canfield,  August  30,  1830.  Ibid.  I 
think  your  information  that  Mr.  Clay  and  his  friends  wished  to 
crush  you  during  the  late  administration  has  been  somewhat 
exaggerated.  I  am  aware,  there  was  some  jealousy  respecting 
your  course  on  the  part  of  Mr.  Clay’s  friends.  I  was  in  the  habit 
of  having  free  conversation  with  Mr.  Clay  and  I  recollect  of  his 
having  spoken  of  you  in  terms  of  respect,  and  so  far  as  the 
conversation  turned  on  your  political  course,  much  delicacy  was 
observed  by  him.”  It  is  quite  clear  from  the  evidence  in  the 
first  chapter  of  this  study  that  Clay  in  fact  did  attempt  to  discredit 
McLean  with  Adams. 

80  Whittlesey  to  McLean,  Washington,  June  20.  1832.  Ibid. 

61  The  Anti-Masonic  party  had  its  origin  in  Western  New  York 
a  region  settled  largely  by  people  from  New  England  who  were 
friendly  to  Adams  and  the  National  Republicans.  Charles  Mc¬ 
Carthy.  “The  Anti-Masonic  Party”  ( Annual  Report  of  the  Ameri¬ 
can  Historical  Association.  1902),  I.  383.  It  was  not  long  how¬ 
ever  in  attracting  support  from  the  ranks  of  the  Democratic  party. 


THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  1832 


49 


least  a  possibility  that  the  two  important  divisions 
of  the  opposition  might  agree  upon  a  single 
candidate  for  the  presidency.  Welcome  as  Anti- 
Masonic  support  would  be,  those  National  Repub¬ 
licans  who  knew  the  party  most  intimately  were 
far  from  enthusiastic  over  the  prospect  of  making 
common  cause  with  it.  Cooperation  with  “this 
demon  of  Anti-Masonry”  was  most  distasteful  to 
party  leaders  in  New  York,  where  earlier  ex¬ 
periences  had  resulted  unsatisfactorily.62  Many 
hated  the  “Anti-Masonic  excitement,”  but  as  in 
the  case  of  Hezekiah  Niles  their  dislike  was  not 
so  strong  as  their  will  to  defeat  Jackson.  “The 
great  cause  is,  with  me,  like  Aaron’s  rod.  It 
swallows  up  all  other  considerations.”63  As  it 
was  improbable  that  the  National  Republicans 
would  abandon  Clay,  the  prospects  for  cooper¬ 
ation  in  the  national  election  depended  upon  the 
Anti-Masonic  convention.  Unwilling  to  commit 

03  W.  B.  Lawrence  to  Clay,  New  York,  November  8,  1830.  Clay 
MSS.  Library  of  Congress.  Lawrence  sketched  in  broad  out¬ 
lines  the  problem  which  existed  wherever  National  Republicans 
and  Anti-Masons  were  in  contact :  “We  have  nailed  your  colours 
to  the  mast.  But  what  are  we  to  do  with  this  demon  of  Anti- 
Masonry,  which  seems  destined  to  blast  the  fairest  prospects  of 
putting  down  a  proscribing  and  corrupt  administration.  With  a 
union  of  all  opposed  to  General  Jackson  our  entire  triumph  in 
this  state,  the  electors  being  chosen  by  general  ticket  would  be 
certain ;  separated  from  the  Anti-Masons  we  must  be  in  a  minority 
.  .  .  It  has  been  suggested  that  by  aiding  the  Anti-Masons  to 
win  this  State  from  Jackson,  even  in  favor  of  a  third  person, 
the  success  of  our  candidate  in  the  House  of  Representatives 
would  be  secured.”  But  Lawrence  believed  that  another  attempt 
to  cooperate  with  the  Anti-Masons  would  alienate  valuable  mem¬ 
bers  of  their  own  party. 

,a  Hezekiah  Niles  to  Clay,  September  17,  1830.  Ibid. 


50  ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 

himself  to  the  principles  of  that  party,  by  the 
summer  of  1831  Clay  had  abandoned  hope  of  its 
nomination.64  Consideration  was  first  given  to 
Richard  Rush  and  J.  Q.  Adams,  but  McLean  was 
clearly  the  favorite  among  the  delegates  when 
they  assembled  in  Baltimore.  His  friends  had 
warned  McLean  that  too  close  an  association  with 
the  Anti-Masons  would  injure  his  chances  of 
drawing  support  from  any  portion  of  the  Demo¬ 
cratic  party, 6a  and  when  he  finally  sent  a  state¬ 
ment  to  Anti-Masonic  leaders  which  satisfied  that 
party66  he  conditioned  his  acceptance  of  a  possible 
nomination  upon  the  absence  of  another  opposi¬ 
tion  candidate  in  the  campaign.67  Nevertheless, 
when  his  final  refusal  was  received,  so  reluctantly 
was  his  name  abandoned  that  he  was  given  a 
plurality  of  three  votes  on  the  first  ballot  taken  in 
the  caucus  that  preceded  the  convention.68  Albert 
H.  Tracy,  a  leader  among  the  Anti-Masons  of 
New  York,  wrote  in  October,  1832,  that  he  had 

61 S.  R.  Gammon,  Presidential  Campaign  of  1832,  p.  43.  Cf . 
Clay  to  Francis  Brooke,  Ashland,  June  23,  1831.  Colton,  Private 
Correspondence ,  p.  304 ;  Clay  to  Adam  Beatty,  Ashland  June  25, 
1831.  Ibid.,  p.  305;  Clay  to  Francis  Brooke,  Ashland,  October 
4,  1831.  Ibid.,  pp.  316,  317. 

“Richards  to  McLean,  Harrisburg,  February  4,  1830.  McLean 
MSS.  Buchanan  to  McLean,  June  9,  1830.  Ibid, 

“McLean  to  Francis  Wyatt,  Secretary  of  the  Anti-Masonic 
Society  of  Cincinnati,  May  24.  1831.  Ibid.  Without  specifically 
endorsing  Anti-Masonic  principles,  he  made  clear  his  disapproval 
of  “all  associations  designed  to  influence  the  public  will’  which  did 
not  have  the  interests  of  the  public  exclusively  in  mind. 

S.  R.  Gammon,  Presidential  Campaign  of  1832,  p.  45. 

68  National  Intelligencer,  October  19,  1831,  quoting  the  Rhode 
Island  Republican.  The  editor  of  the  Republican  had  acted  as 
the  secretary  of  the  caucus. 


THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  1832 


51 


always  been  convinced  that  Clay  would  have  been 
“driven  from  the  field”  if  McLean  had  accepted 
nomination  of  his  party.69  As  a  result  of  Clay’s 
hostility70  and  of  McLean’s  withdrawal71  the  con¬ 
vention  turned  as  a  last  resort  to  William  Wirt. 
Convinced  that  an  independent  Anti-Masonic 
campaign  would  have  little  weight  in  the  elec¬ 
tions,  Wirt  was  ready  in  the  interests  of  harmony 
to  resign  in  favor  of  McLean  or  any  other  can¬ 
didate  other  than  Clay  whom  the  National  Repub¬ 
licans  might  nominate.72  It  was  the  latter  party  s 
attachment  to  its  chosen  leader,  and  the  natural 
suspicions  of  a  conservative  for  a  radical  party, 
that  prevented  a  pooling  of  their  strength  in  the 
common  cause.  In  April,  1832,  W3rt  was  certain 
that  the  leading  politicians  of  the  opposition,  both 
of  the  National  Republican  and  Anti-Masonic 


m  Tracy  perhaps  had  in  mind  the  campaign  of  1836  when  he 
assured  McLean  that  no  animosity  was  felt  by  Anti-Masons 
because  of  his  refusal  of  their  nomination.  Mr.  Clay  will  cer¬ 
tainly  be  used  up  in  the  present  contest  so  that  I  trust  his  most 
hallucinated  partisans  will  not  dream  of  his  ever  again  competing 
for  the  presidency.”  Tracy  to  McLean,  New  York,  October  19, 
1832.  McLean  MSS. 

,0It  was  not  until  the  Anti-Masonic  nomination  had  been  made 
that  Clay  for  the  first  time  unequivocally  repudiated  principles 
of  that  party.  To  a  committee  of  Indiana  Anti-Masons,  Ashland, 
October  8,  1831.  Niles’  Register.  XLI.  260,  261.  Adams  told 
Joseph  E.  Sprague  that  Clay’s  friends  had  “kicked  and  buffeted 
the  Anti-Masonic  party  till  it  was  impossible  they  should  support 
Mr.  Clay.”  Adams,  Memoirs,  VIII.  400. 

”  Niles’  Register,  XLI,  259,  260. 

13  Wirt  decided  not  to  withdraw  at  so  early  a  stage  in  the  cam¬ 
paign,  believing  that  those  Anti-Masons  who  had  formerly  been 
Democrats  would  return  to  their  first  allegiance  rather  than  to  sup¬ 
port  Clay.  Wirt  to  Carr,  Baltimore,  January  12,  1830.  J.  P. 
Kennedy,  Memoirs  of  the  Life  of  William  Wirt  (Philadelphia, 
1860),  II.  317. 


52 


ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 


parties,  had  lost  all  hope  of  success,73  but  in  the 
event  of  the  election  going-  into  the  House  he  was 
ready  to  use  his  influence  even  in  favor  of  Clay.74 

More  successful  efforts  for  an  understanding 
between  the  two  parties  were  made  within  the 
states,  where  the  influence  of  Clay’s  dislike  of 
Anti-Masonry  was  not  so  immediately  felt.  In 
New  York  united  support  was  given  to  a  single 
list  of  electors,75  while  in  Pennsylvania  the 
National  Republicans  abandoned  their  electoral 
ticket  for  that  of  the  Anti-Masons  in  fear  that 
otherwise  the  state  would  return  a  majority  for 
Jackson.76  The  example  set  by  Pennsylvania  was 
followed  in  Ohio.  The  National  Republican  can¬ 
didate  for  governor  withdrew  his  name,  and  the 
party  threw  its  strength  to  the  Anti-Masonic 
candidate  and  to  the  electoral  ticket  of  the  party.77 
In  these  states  the  Democratic  party  was  in 
power;  to  make  headway  against  it  cooperation 
was  necessary,  an  argument  which  was  more 
effective  in  state  than  in  national  politics.  Agree¬ 
ment  proved  impossible  where  National  Republi¬ 
cans  were  in  control  of  the  state  administrations ; 
such  was  the  situation  in  Vermont,  Massachu- 

73  S.  R.  Gammon,  Presidential  Campaign  of  1832,  p.  142. 

71  Wirt  to  Carr,  Baltimore,  October  25,  1832.  Kennedy,  William 
Wirt,  II.  329. 

75  McCarthy,  Anti-Masonic  Party,  pp.  415,  416.  It  was  under¬ 
stood  that  if  this  ticket  won  a  majority  its  votes  would  be  given 
either  to  Clay  or  to  Wirt  as  circumstances  might  require  in  order 
to  defeat  Jackson. 

78  Ibid.,  p.  446. 

77  Ibid.,  pp.  528-530. 


THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  1832 


53 


setts,  Rhode  Island,  and  New  Jersey.78  Clay 
attributed  the  hostile  feeling  of  Anti-Masons  in 
these  states  to  a  belief  that  the  party  in  power, 
whether  National  Republican  or  Democratic, 
would  have  to  be  changed  in  order  to  eliminate 
Masonic  influences.79 

If  a  basis  of  common  action  could  be  found  the 
forcing  of  Calhoun  out  of  the  Democratic  party 
by  Van  Buren  offered  the  possibility  of  making 
new  allies  for  the  National  Republicans.80  Web¬ 
ster,  however,  was  convinced  that  no  help  could 
be  expected  from  the  South  except  in  Louisiana, 
where  the  desire  of  the  sugar  planters  for  protec¬ 
tion  gave  rise  to  interests  similar  to  those  of  the 
manufacturing  states.81  Nor  was  Clay  more 
optimistic  as  to  the  ' possibilities  in  that  section. 
Calhoun  seemed  to  him  to  have  so  little  influence 
outside  of  South  Carolina  as  to  make  it  unprofit¬ 
able  to  seek  his  aid.82  From  Calhoun’s  point  of 
view  the  prospect  of  cooperation  with  Clay  and 
his  party  was  most  distasteful,83  as  an  alliance 
with  men  whose  political  ideas  he  thoroughly 
disapproved.  Nevertheless,  a  moderation  appeared 

78  Ibid.,  pp.  510,  518,  551,  555. 

78  Clay  to  John  Bailhacke,  Ashland,  November  24,  1830.  Colton, 
Private  Correspondence,  p.  289. 

80  Gammon,  Presidential  Campaign  of  1832,  pp.  76-95. 

81  Webster  to  Clay,  Washington,  May  29,  1830.  Colton,  Private 
Correspondence,  p.  289. 

“Clay  to  Francis  Brooke,  Washington,  April  1,  1832.  Ibid., 
332-333. 

“Calhoun  to  James  H.  Hammond,  Fort  Hill,  May  16,  1831 
Calhoun,  Correspondence,  p.  291. 


54 


ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 


in  the  opinion  of  both  which  suggests  a  desire 
of  each  to  gain  the  ear  of  the  other.  Clay  was 
willing  to  restrict  the  funds  for  internal  improve¬ 
ments  in  part  to  an  occasional  and  problematical 
surplus  but  chiefly  to  the  proceeds  from  the  sale 
of  public  lands.84  On  this  important  question, 
Calhoun  conceded  the  use  of  the  public  lands, 
provided  that  his  constitutional  scruples  be  satis¬ 
fied  by  an  amendment  expressly  authorizing  in¬ 
ternal  improvements  by  national  aid.85  In  regard 
to  the  vital  question  of  the  tariff,  Clay  believed 
that  it  should  be  reduced  to  the  needs  of  an  eco¬ 
nomical  administration,  with  the  reservation  that 
the  principle  of  protection  should  not  be  aban¬ 
doned.86  In  the  spring  of  1832  an  attempt  was 
made  to  arrange  a  basis  of  cooperation  between 
the  friends  of  Clay  and  Calhoun  in  the  southern 
states.  Clay  was  informed  that  Duff  Green,  after 
a  conference  with  Calhoun,  had  proposed  that 
their  friends  should  unite  in  support  of  Calhoun 
in  Virginia.  It  was  thought  that  if  Calhoun 
should  carry  three  or  four  states  the  election 
would  be  forced  into  the  House  where  his  in¬ 
fluence  could  be  used  in  favor  of  Clay.  More¬ 
over,  the  prospect  of  a  measure  of  success  in 

M  Clay  to  Francis  Brooke,  Ashland,  October  4,  1831.  Colton, 
Private  Correspondence,  p.  315. 

86  Calhoun  to  Christopher  Van  Deventer,  Fort  Hill,  August  5, 
1831.  Calhoun,  Correspondence,  p.  29 7. 

88  Clay  to  Francis  Brooke,  Ashland,  October  4,  1831.  Colton, 
Private  Correspondence,  pp.  314,  315.  Clay  was  of  the  same 
opinion  in  the  spring  of  1832.  Clay  to  James  Barbour,  Washing¬ 
ton,  March  10,  1832.  Barbour  MSS. 


THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  1832 


55 


the  South  would,  it  seemed  to  Clay,  encourage 
his  friends  elsewhere.  Skeptical  of  Calhoun’s 
strength  outside  South  Carolina  and  doubtful  of 
the  willingness  of  his  friends  in  Virginia  to  join 
Calhoun,  he  chose  to  allow  events  to  take  their 
course  rather  than  to  make  a  definite  arrange¬ 
ment.87  The  appearance  of  the  Bank  question  as 
the  dominant  issue  in  the  summer  of  1832,  an 
issue  in  regard  to  which  Calhoun  did  not  take 
his  usually  anti-nationalist  point  of  view,88  pro¬ 
vided  an  additional  basis  of  cooperation.  *doali-) 
tion  was  distinctly  the  expedient  policy,  but  it/ 
was  defeated  by  differences  between  the  political 
ideas  of  the  two  men  and  by  Calhoun’s  growing 
belief  that  a  standard  should  be  raised  about 
which  the  South  might  rally  in  defense  of  its 
interests.89  Calhoun  would  have  brought  Clay 
little  strength,  for  his  candidate,  Floyd,  carried 
South  Carolina  alone,  while  the  rest  of  the  sec¬ 
tion,  with  the  exception  of  Maryland  and  Ken¬ 
tucky  of  the  border  states,  went  unanimously  for 
Jackson. 

The  quest  of  the  National  Republicans  for  an 
effective  campaign  issue  proved  to  be  no  more 
fruitful  in  its  results  than  the  attempt  to  create 


81  Clay  to  Francis  Brooke,  Washington,  April  1,  1832.  Colton, 
Private  Correspondence,  pp.  332,  333. 

**  Calhoun  to  Van  Deventer,  Washington,  March  21,  1830.  Cal¬ 
houn,  Correspondence,  p.  271. 

““A.  C.  Cole,  Whig  Party  in  the  South,  p.  33. 


56 


ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 


an  efficient  national  organization  and  to  unite  the 
various  elements  of  the  opposition.  Protection, 
nhvinnslv  would  not  serve  the  purpose,  in  view 
of  the  desirability  of  gaining  greater  strength  in 
the  South.  A  clear-cut  division  did  not  exist 
upon  this  issue,  since  Jackson  had  not  completely 
identified  himself  with  those  who  were  opposed 
to  protection.  The  President  had  signed  a  num¬ 
ber  of  bills  appropriating  money  for  internal  im¬ 
provements  :90  accordingly  Adams’  favorite  issue 
was  not  available.  The  immediate  effect  of  the 
Maysville  Road  veto  indicated  a  popular  reaction 
which  might  be  useful,  but  the  ultimate  result 
strengthened  Jackson’s  position.  These  consid¬ 
erations  having  made  the  important  questions 
unavailable,  Clay  attempted  to  create  an  issue  of 
his  own.  It  seemed  to  him  that  it  would  be 
expedient  to  initiate  a  movement  for  a  constitu¬ 
tional  amendment  to  enable  Congress  to  pass  a 
bill  over  the  president’s  veto  by  a  simple  majority 
in  both  houses;  the  administration  by  this  ma¬ 
neuver  would  be  placed  upon  “the  aristocratic 
bench”  in  defending  the  more  stringent  require¬ 
ment  in  the  constitution.91  There  was  merit  in 

90  Henry  G.  Wheeler,  History  of  Congress,  Biographical  and 
Political;  comprising  a  History  of  Internal  Improvements  (N.  Y. 
1848),  II.  124-140.  The  annual  appropriations  for  this  purpose 
during  the  Jackson  and  Van  Buren  administrations  were  consist¬ 
ently  large. 

91  Clay  to  Webster,  Ashland.  June  7,  1830.  Webster.  Private 
Correspondence,  I.  504.  Cf.  Clay  to  Adam  Beattie,  Ashland. 
June  8,  1830.  Colton,  Private  Correspondence,  p.  277 ;  Clay  to  J. 
S.  Johnston,  Lexington,  June  14.  1830.  Ibid.,  p.  278. 


THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  1832 


57 


this  scheme  as  an  incident  in  the  give-and-take 
of  party  struggles,  but  it  contained  a  minimum  of 
promise  as  a  campaign  issue  against  Jackson,  the 
unquestioned  leader  of  the  new  democracy. 

As  a  result  of  the  failure  to  develop  a  popular 
issue  that  would  unite  the  various  divisions  of  the 
opposition,  no  formal  platform  was  adopted  when 
the  National  Republican  convention  met  at  Balti¬ 
more  in  December,  1831.  The  address,  which 
was  its  substitute,  presented  the  position  of  the 
party  fairly  enough  by  attacking  Jackson  and  all 
his  works;  lacking  principles  in  common,  except 
in  a  conservative  point  of  view  which  it  was  inex¬ 
pedient  to  emphasize,  no  choice  remained  but  a 
deliberately  negative  position.  The  real  issue,  the 
address  stated,  was  Jackson’s  administration  of 
the  government.92  Friends  of  protection  had 
urged  the  importance  of  a  definite  statement  of 
the  party’s  principles.  This  was  Niles’  desire  in 
1830: 

If  a  nomination  is  made  without  a  statement  of  these 
broad  principles  on  which  all  nominations  should  be  sup¬ 
ported,  we  run  the  risk  of  offending  friends  at  home, 
whose  character  and  talent  deserve  our  courtesy  and  com¬ 
mand  our  respect.  ...  I  am  in  favor  of  meeting  the 
whole  question  fairly — of  grasping  the  entire  subject  at 
once,  doing  what  I  think  is  right,  and  leaving  the  result 
to  take  care  of  itself,  on  its  own  just  principles.93 

Fear  of  alienating  possible  allies  made  undesirable 
a  frank  statement  of  the  issues,  implicit  as  they 

8J  Niles’  Register,  XLI.  307-312. 

"Niles  to  Clay,  October  28,  1830.  Clay  MSS. 


58 


ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 


were  in  Clay’s  American  System.  More  definite 
in  its  position  was  the  convention  of  National 
Republican  Young  Men  which  met  in  Washing¬ 
ton  in  May,  1832,  for  propagandist  purposes.  A 
statement  was  issued  which  endorsed  an  “ade¬ 
quate”  tariff,  internal  improvements,  the  su¬ 
premacy  of  the  Supreme  Court  as  the  final  au¬ 
thority  for  the  settlement  for  the  constitutional 
questions,  and  the  power  of  the  Senate  as  essen¬ 
tial  to  the  preservation  of  the  separation  of 
powers.94  It  is  improbable  that  this  platform 
was  prepared  without  the  consent  of  the  party 
leaders,  and  it  is  therefore  possible  that  they 
intended  by  this  indirect  means  to  satisfy  the 
demands  of  men  like  Niles  who  wished  a  clear 
formulation  of  their  principles.  No  mention 
was  made,  it  is  to  be  noted,  of  the  Bank  issue,95 
which  was  to  become  the  deciding  factor  in  the 
campaign. 

Professor  Catterall  demonstrated  a  generation 
ago  that  the  responsibility  for  fastening  the  dead 
weight  of  the  Bank  issue  upon  the  opposition 
belongs  to  Nicholas  Biddle  rather  than  to  Clay 
or  any  other  National  Republican  leader.96  Due 

w  Niles’  Register,  XLII.  236,  237. 

M  This  omission  was  probably  intentional.  Until  the  President 
took  a  definite  stand  upon  the  question  there  remained  a  possibility 
that  a  rechartering  act  might  after  all  become  a  law.  To  bring 
the  issue  into  the  campaign  at  this  time  might  therefore  be 
premature. 

98  R.  C.  H.  Catterall,  The  Second  Bank  of  the  United  States 
(Chicago,  1903),  pp.  215,  216. 


THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  1832 


59 


to  the  hostility  of  Jackson,  it  was  certain  to  be¬ 
come  a  political  issue  after  the  expiration  of  its 
charter  in  1836,  but  it  became  involved  in  the 
preceding  campaign  when  Biddle  decided  as  a 
result  of  his  own  opinion  and  the  advice  given 
him  by  George  McDuffie, 97  a  member  of  the  House 
from  South  Carolina,  to  present  his  memorial 
for  a  renewal  of  the  charter  early  in  January, 
1832.  Friends  of  the  Bank  believed  that  Jack- 
son  would  sign  the  proposed  bill  in  preference 
to  making  this  an  issue  and  that  in  the  event  of 
a  veto  an  outraged  public  opinion  would  defeat 
him.98  Until  1831  Clay  had  opposed  an  appli¬ 
cation  for  the  renewal  of  the  Bank’s  charter  prior 
to  the  election.  Speaking  at  Cincinnati  in  August, 
1830,  he  favored  the  indefinite  postponement  of 
the  question. 

Whether  the  charter  ought  to  be  renewed  or  not,  near 
six  years  hence,  in  my  judgment,  is  a  question  of  expedi¬ 
ency  to  be  decided  by  the  then  existing  state  of  the  coun¬ 
try.  It  will  be  necessary  at  that  time  to  look  carefully  at 
the  condition  both  of  the  bank  and  of  the  union.  To 
ascertain,  if  the  public  debt  shall,  in  the  meantime,  be  paid 
off,  what  effect  will  that  produce  ?  What  will  be  our  then 
financial  condition  ?  what  that  of  our  local  banks,  the  state 
of  our  commerce,  foreign  and  domestic.  .  .  .  ?  I  am, 

therefore,  not  now  prepared  to  say  whether  the  charter 
ought  or  ought  not  to  be  renewed  on  the  expiration  of 

07  McDuffie,  a  friend  of  Calhoun,  was  at  this  time  Chairman  of 
the  Committee  on  Ways  and  Means  in  the  House  of  Repre¬ 
sentatives. 

*8  Richards  to  McLean,  Washington,  July  19,  1832.  McLean 
MSS. 


60 


ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 


its  present  term.  The  question  is  premature.  ...  It 
belongs  to  posterity  ...  it  ought  to  be  indefinitely 
postponed." 

Only  a  clear  majority  in  both  houses  and  the  cer¬ 
tain  approval  of  the  President,  he  wrote  to  Biddle 
in  September,  would  justify  an  application.  If 
a  bill  to  recharter  the  Bank  were  vetoed  the  Bank 
would  probably  become  the  “controlling  question 
in  American  politics”  and  Jackson’s  election  on 
that  issue  would  “amount  to  something  like  a 
popular  ratification  of  the  previous  rejection  of 
the  renewal  of  the  charter  of  the  Bank.”100  By 
the  fall  of  1831  Clay  had  decided  that  the  Bank 
ought  to  make  an  application  before  the  elec¬ 
tion,101  a  change  of  opinion  which  may  have  been 
caused  in  part  by  the  discouraging  result  of  the 
August  election  in  Kentucky  and  by  a  hope  that 
the  Bank  issue  might  strengthen  him.  He  was 
not,  however,  in  Biddle’s  confidence  at  this  time; 
only  three  weeks  before  the  application  was  made, 
he  wrote  to  the  president  of  the  Bank:  “Have 
you  come  to  any  decision  about  an  application  to 

n  Niles’  Register,  XXXIX.  25,  26. 

100  Clay  to  Biddle,  Ashland,  September  11,  1830.  The  Corre¬ 
spondence  of  Nicholas  Biddle,  dealing  with  National  Affairs,  1807- 
1844  (R.  C.  McGrane,  ed.,  Boston,  1919)  pp.  110-114.  Clay 
advised  that  the  application  be  made  to  Congress  in  its  first 
session  after  the  election.  In  his  reply  Biddle  agreed  that  it  would 
be  better  to  do  nothing  in  the  short  session  of  1830-1831.  Biddle 
to  Clay,  Philadelphia,  November  3,  1830.  Colton,  Private  Corre¬ 
spondence,  p.  287. 

101  Clay  to  Brooke.  Ashland,  October  4,  1831.  Colton,  Private 
Correspondence,  p.  316. 


THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  1832 


61 


Congress  at  this  Session  for  the  renewal  of  your 
charter?”102 

Although  it  is  generally  agreed  that  Clay  was 
not  responsible  for  Biddle’s  decision,  it  needs  to 
be  demonstrated  that  Clay  was  perhaps  chiefly 
interested  in  the  Bank  issue  as  it  affected  the 
political  situation,  more  particularly  in  its  bearing 
upon  his  own  ambitions,  and  that  Biddle  may 
have  suspected  the  motives  of  Clay’s  interest  in 
his  institution.  There  is  more  than  a  suggestion 
of  a  personal  interest  in  Clay’s  earlier  advice 
against  an  application  before  the  election.  At 
Cincinnati  he  refused  to  commit  himself  to  a 
renewal  of  the  charter  even  in  1836.  The  cashier 
of  the  branch  bank  at  Savannah  forwarded  a 
letter  to  Biddle  that  contained  an  inference  as  to 
Clay’s  motives  that  had  probably  occurred  to 
many.  “The  inference  is  obvious.  He  doubts 
the  result  of  the  application  for  a  new  charter, 
and  is  unwilling  to  hazard  his  popularity  by 
becoming  its  advocate.”103  When  Clay  decided 

103  Clay  to  Biddle,  Washington,  December  IS,  1831.  McGrane, 
Biddle  Correspondence,  p.  142.  Cf.  Smith  to  Biddle,  Washington, 
December  17,  1831.  Ibid.,  p.  143. 

103  M.  W.  B.  to  Hunter,  October  30,  1830.  Biddle  MSS.  Library 
of  Congress.  Hunter  copied  this  letter,  and  with  an  enclosure  of 
his  own,  sent  it  to  Biddle.  He  explained  that  the  writer  was  a 
prominent  lawyer  in  Georgia,  employed  by  the  Bank  in  view  of 
an  impending  conflict  with  the  state  banks,  and  that  he  wished  to 
arrange  satisfactory  terms  for  a  renewal  of  his  employment.  An 
extract  from  the  letter  to  Hunter  without  an  explanation  of  its 
presence  in  the  Biddle  MSS.  is  printed  in  McGrane,  Biddle 
Correspondence,  p.  114.  Hunter’s  own  letter  is  not  printed,  and 
Professor  McGrane  is  mistaken  in  identifying  Hunter  as  cashier 
of  the  Nashville  branch  at  this  time. 


62 


ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 


to  reverse  his  attitude,  his  change  was  perhaps 
due  to  an  increased  confidence  in  the  effectiveness 
of  the  Bank  as  a  political  issue.  In  December, 
1831,  friends  of  the  Bank  noted  that  the  opposi¬ 
tion  was  chiefly  concerned  with  the  political 
aspects  of  the  question.  Biddle’s  agent  in  Wash¬ 
ington,  Thomas  Cadwallader,  reported  that  Web¬ 
ster  favored  an  application  directly  a  favorable 
majority  was  certain  in  the  House;  he  believed 
that  in  this  event  neither  the  Senate  nor  the 
President  would  reject  it.  Webster’s  opinions, 
like  those  of  most  of  Clay’s  friends,  were,  he 
thought,  guided  by  party  considerations.104  The 
Bank  issue  would  in  fact  be  a  means  of  cooperat¬ 
ing  with  Calhoun  and  his  friends.105 

It  was  McDuffie  who  convinced  Biddle  that 
application  should  be  made  before  the  election.106 
He  was  the  Bank’s  chief  reliance  in  the  House; 
Biddle  was  informed  that  he  “is  our  main  stay.”107 

1<M  Cadwallader  to  Biddle,  Washington,  December  25,  1831. 
McGrane,  Biddle  Correspondence,  pp.  155,  156.  Webster  and  Clay 
were  said  to  have  regarded  any  possibility  of  a  reconciliation 
between  the  administration  and  the  bank  as  evidence  of  hostility 
against  themselves.  Catterall,  Second  Bank,  pp.  216,  217. 

105  Roswell  L.  Colt  to  Biddle,  Baltimore,  January  29,  1831. 
McGrane,  Biddle  Correspondence,  p.  122. 

108  Catterall,  Second  Bank,  p.  220. 

Cadwallader  to  Biddle,  Washington.  December  25,  1831. 
McGrane,  Biddle  Correspondence,  p.  158.  Cf.  Ibid.,  p.  105,  note. 
Professor  McGrane  suggests  that  the  attack  upon  the  bank  was 
planned  by  Van  Buren,  then  secretary  of  state,  in  a  conference 
with  Virginia  politicians  at  Richmond  as  a  means  of  covering  the 
pro-slavery  agitation  in  the  Virginia  constitutional  convention  then 
in  session.  A  letter  from  Clay  to  Biddle  is  quoted  in  evidence. 
“  ‘Unless  I  am  deceived  by  information  from  one  of  the  most 
intelligent  citizens  of  Virginia,  the  plan  was  laid  at  Richmond 


THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  1832 


63 


Cadwallader  was  in  constant  communication  with 
McDuffie  in  the  critical  days  of  December,  1831, 
when  the  final  decision  was  made,108  and  when  he 
was  uncertain  as  to  who  should  sponsor  the  pro¬ 
posed  bill  in  the  Senate  he  turned  to  McDuffie  for 
advice.109  When  Biddle  wrote  to  him  in  Febru¬ 
ary,  1832,  he  mentioned  the  qualities  of  “tact,  the 
gentleness  and  firmness”  with  which  Calhoun  had 
carried  the  existing  charter  through  the  House 
in  1816:  “we  rely  that  the  union  of  the  same 
qualities  will  enable  you  to  be  equally  successful 

during  a  visit  made  to  that  place  by  the  Secy,  of  State  last  autumn, 
to  make  the  destruction  of  the  Bank  the  basis  of  the  next  Presi¬ 
dential  election.  .  .  Clay  to  Biddle,  Ashland,  June  14,  1830. 
McGrane,  Biddle  Correspondence,  p.  105.  Van  Buren  in  fact  did 
go  to  Richmond  during  the  sessions  of  the  convention.  National 
Intelligencer,  November  10,  1829.  It  is  improbable,  however,  that 
this  debate,  though  it  was  important  in  other  connections,  could 
have  determined  the  course  of  national  politics  at  this  time.  While 
McDuffie,  as  a  friend  of  Calhoun,  was  a  representative  of  the 
extreme  southern  point  of  view,  his  part  in  bringing  the  Bank 
issue  into  politics  was  probably  the  result  of  a  desire  to  find  a 
basis  of  cooperation  with  the  National  Republicans  and  a  convic¬ 
tion  that  the  Bank  should  be  retained.  More  shares  of  the  Bank’s 
stock  were  owned  in  South  Carolina,  it  is  to  be  noted,  than  in  any 
other  state  than  Pennsylvania.  Catterall,  Second  Bank,  App.  IX. 
p.  508.  At  least  one  leader  of  the  opposition  in  the  South  was 
not  in  favor  of  making  the  Bank  the  campaign  issue.  Willie  P. 
Mangum  of  North  Carolina  feared  that  the  question  would  “ulti¬ 
mately  take  an  appearance  of  a  trial  of  strength  between  General 
Jackson  and  the  Bank.  In  that  case  the  Bank  will  go  down.  For 
General  Jackson’s  popularity  is  of  a  sort  not  to  be  shaken  at 
present.”  Mangum  to  William  Gaston,  Washington,  January  19, 
1832.  Mangum  MSS.  Library  of  Congress. 

108  Thomas  Cadwallader  to  Biddle,  Washington,  December  22, 
1831.  McGrane,  Biddle  Correspondence,  pp.  151,  152.  McDuffie’s 
advice  was  that  the  application  should  be  made  without  reference 
to  the  President’s  action  if  a  majority  could  be  depended  upon 
in  both  houses. 

109  Cadwallader  to  Biddle,  Washington,  December  26  1831  Ibid 
158,  159. 


64 


ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 


now.”110  The  leadership  of  a  Calhoun  man  on 
behalf  of  an  issue  that  had  the  approval  of  Clay 
and  Webster  suggested  to  contemporaries  that 
Calhoun  and  his  friends  had  driven  a  sharp  bar¬ 
gain  with  the  tariff  leaders.  Elisha  Whittlesey 
thought  that  the  price  of  McDuffie’s  services 
would  be  a  tariff  bill  that  would  satisfy  Cal¬ 
houn.111  There  is  no  evidence  that  a  formal 
understanding  was  reached  between  Clay  and 
Calhoun  to  this  effect;  nevertheless,  after  the 
nullification  movement  had  reached  its  crisis,  the 
compromise  tariff  bill  indicated  the  extent  of 
Clay’s  concessions. 

The  Bank  became  a  political  issue  when  its 
memorial  was  presented  in  Congress  January  6, 
1832,  and  the  effect  of  Jackson’s  veto  was  to 
make  it  the  dominant  issue  of  the  campaign.  Its 
resources  were  then  marshalled  in  support  of 
Clay,112  although  Biddle  continued  the  pretense 
that  the  Bank’s  activities  in  arousing  public 

uo  Biddle  to  McDuffie,  Philadelphia,  February  10,  1832.  Ibid., 
178,  179. 

U1  Whittlesey  to  McLean,  Washington,  June  20,  1832.  McLean 
MSS. 

112  The  part  played  by  the  bank  in  the  campaign  is  described  by 
Jabez  D.  Hammond  in  his  authoritative  history  of  New  York. 
“The  Bank,  with  its  array  of  officers  and  debtors,  constituting  a 
considerable  portion  of  the  entire  population  in  every  state  of 
the  union,  uniting  its  exertions  with  the  National  Republicans 
and  old  opponents  of  General  Jackson,  while  the  friends  of 
Jackson  and  Van  Buren,  and,  I  may  say,  the  old  democratic 
party,  encouraged  and  cheered  on  by  the  state  banks  and  their 
dependents,  produced  a  war  of  no  ordinary  character  for  warmth 
and  zeal.”  Jabez  D.  Hammond,  The  Political  History  of  New 
York  (Buffalo,  1850),  II.  419.  Cf.  Biddle  to  Clay,  Philadelpiha, 
August  1,  1832.  McGrane,  Biddle  Correspondence,  pp.  196,  197. 


THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  1832 


65 


opinion  had  no  direct  connection  with  Clay’s  can¬ 
didacy.  Biddle  was  given  complete  liberty  by 
his  directors  to  spend  money  in  order  to  influence 
opinion,113  and  from  Biddle’s  expense  account  it 
is  clear  that  more  than  forty-two  thousand  dollars 
were  spent  for  this  purpose.114  The  Intelligencer 
diligently  reported  evidence  that  might  suggest 
an  aroused  public  opinion  on  account  of  the 
veto,115  and  it  endeavored,  particularly  by  its 
clippings,  to  convince  its  readers  that  the  veto 
had  resulted  in  disastrous  economic  disturbances. 
In  Cincinnati,  it  was  said,  not  a  bid  had  been 
offered  at  an  auction  sale  of  choice  real  estate, 
and  prices  offered  for  lots  were  one  half  what 
they  had  been  six  months  before.  “What  prices, 
we  will  ask,  may  be  expected  next  spring,  if  Jack- 
son  is  reelected?  That  is  the  question;  and  let 
those  who  have  property  look  to  it.”116  Further 
alarming  information  as  to  the  trend  of  economic 
conditions  appeared  in  a  letter,  which  had  been 
going  the  rounds  of  the  press,  reporting  that  one 
of  finest  houses  in  Marietta  had  been  sold  for 
one-tenth  of  its  original  cost.  According  to  the 
Cincinnati  Advertiser  other  forms  of  business 
had  also  suffered.  In  the  preceding  year  citizens 
of  that  city  had  paid  three  hundred  thousand 
dollars  to  country  traders  and  farmers  for  hogs, 

”3  Gammon,  Campaign  of  1832,  p.  121. 

114  Ibid.,  p.  151. 

115  National  Intelligencer,  July  19,  20,  August  9,  22,  1832. 

1111  Ibid.,  October  4,  1832. 


66 


ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 


whereas  the  most  diligent  inquiry  had  not  shown 
that  “one  dollar  has  been  advanced  this  season” 
for  a  similar  purpose.117  It  was  pointed  out  for 
the  particular  benefit  of  the  workingmen  that  the 
Bank  was  useful  to  them  in  that  it  helped  industry 
by  providing  a  stable  currency.  Economic  argu¬ 
ments,  however,  made  little  headway  against  the 
popular  belief,  fostered  by  Democratic  politicians, 
that  the  Bank  was  a  corrupt  monopoly,  dominated 
by  a  few  wealthy  men  and  by  foreign  influences. 

As  the  campaign  progressed  discontent  de¬ 
veloped  among  the  National  Republican  leaders 
and  their  friends  in  regard  to  the  management 
of  the  party.  Biddle  endorsed  Clay  after  the 
Bank  issue  had  been  taken  up  by  his  party,  but 
earlier  he  had  worked  for  the  nomination  of 
McLean  at  the  Anti-Masonic  convention.  He  ad¬ 
vised  McLean  indirectly  not  to  refuse  an  offer, 
because  he  was  convinced  that  the  National  Re¬ 
publicans  would  unite  in  supporting  him.118  So 
interested  was  Biddle  that  he  went  to  Baltimore, 
writing  to  Richards  from  there  that  he  should 
immediately  be  told  what  action  McLean  would 
take.119  Dissatisfaction  with  Clay’s  leadership 
appeared  even  among  National  Republican  politi- 

117  Ibid.,  October  8,  1832. 

Richards  was  not  convinced  that  Biddle’s  suggestions  were 
wise.  “I  have  much  reliance  on  his  good  feelings,  but  am  not 
able  to  determine  how  far  he  may  feel  an  active  interest  in  the 
matter,  or  how  far  his  political  sagacity  may  be  relied  upon” 
Richards  to  McLean,  Philadelphia,  September  8,  1831.  McLean 
MSS. 

119  Biddle  to  Richards,  Baltimore,  September  25,  1831.  Ibid. 


THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  1832 


67 


cians.  Adams  did  not  make  an  effective  use  in 
his  favor  of  what  influence  he  still  had.120  In 
December,  1831,  Oran  Follett  wrote  to  John  G. 
Camp,  whom  he  later  described  as  a  confidential 
friend  of  Clay,  proposing  that  Clay  be  withdrawn 
for  the  purpose  of  using  his  name  under  more 
favorable  auspices  in  1836.  The  opportunity  for 
Clay’s  success  in  the  campaign  then  in  progress 
had  been  lost  “in  coaxing  Anti-Masonry  in  New 
York,  and  in  other  moonshine  expedients  to  unite 
the  elements  of  the  opposition.”  It  was  Follett’s 
opinion  that  Clay  should  refuse  the  National  Re¬ 
publican  nomination ;  all  were  aware  that  Clay  s 
election  as  parties  then  stood  was  as  “hopeless  as 
salvation  without  repentance.”121  Before  the  con¬ 
vention  met,  Timothy  Pickering  asked  Clay  to 
withdraw  so  that  the  opposition  could  unite  in 
support  of  Wirt.122  As  a  last  effort  to  accomplish 
the  same  purpose  Edward  and  A.  H.  Everett 
wrote  to  Clay — and  the  letter  was  sent  to  a  num¬ 
ber  of  his  friends — demanding  a  sacrifice  in  the 

““J.  S.  Barbour  to  James  Barbour,  Washington,  March  25, 
1832.  Barbour  MSS. 

121  Follett  believed  that  if  Clay  would  wait  until  1836  he  would 
stand  without  a  rival  as  the  leader  of  the  combination  made  up 
of  all  parties  committed  to  the  support  of  a  modified  tariff,  an 
issue  that  might  restore  his  popularity,  to  a  rechartering  act, 
and  to  internal  improvements.  Follett  to  Major  G.  Camp. 
Buffalo,  December  13,  1831.  Follett  Papers,  I.  50,  51.  After  the 
election  Follett  explained  to  Clay  that  the  suggestion  for  his 
withdrawal  had  been  suppressed  by  Clay  s  friends.  Follett  to 
ciay,  January  10,  1833.  Ibid.,  I.  p.  75. 

1M  Pickering  to  Clay,  Boston,  October  22,  1831.  Colton,  Private 
Correspondence,  p.  319. 


68 


ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 


interest  of  unity.123  But  the  party  was  under  too 
many  obligations  to  Clay,  and  he  had  entrenched 
his  position  as  its  leader  too  firmly  for  a  change, 
though  many,  late  in  the  campaign,  recognized 
its  desirability. 

The  cordiality  with  which  Webster  had  ac¬ 
cepted  Clay  as  the  party  leader  gradually  cooled 
as  the  campaign  progressed.  His  loyalty  was 
beyond  question  in  1830.  He  assured  Clay  in 
May  that  he  would  necessarily  be  the  leader  of 
the  party  in  support  of  protection  and  internal 
improvements.124  The  people  could  not  be  re¬ 
strained,  he  wrote  in  the  summer  of  that  year, 
from  making  him  a  candidate  against  Jackson.125 
Influenced  perhaps  by  an  increasing  conviction 
that  Clay  would  not  be  successful  and  perhaps  by 
doubt  as  to  Clay’s  loyalty  to  the  protective  tariff, 
a  change  was  perceptible  in  Webster’s  attitude 
by  the  fall  of  1831.  It  was  also  clear  that  Anti- 
Masons  could  not  be  persuaded  to  endorse  Clay.126 
The  election  of  the  state  legislature  in  Kentucky, 

123  Edward  Everett,  A.  H.  Everett  to  Clay,  Charlestown,  Mass., 
October  29,  1832.  Clay  MSS.  Edward  Everett  had  been  cool 
towards  Clay’s  candidacy  at  the  beginning  of  the  campaign. 
Adams,  Memoirs,  VIII.  86.  Abbott  Lawrence,  a  wealthy  merchant 
of  Boston,  believed  that  Adams  agreed  with  the  Everetts  but  that 
their  letter  did  not  reflect  the  opinion  of  a  majority  of  the  voters 
in  Massachusetts.  Lawrence  to  Clay.  Boston,  October  30,  1832. 
Clay  MSS. 

Webster  to  Clay.  Washington,  May  29,  1830.  Colton,  Private 
Correspondence,  p.  276. 

125  Webster  to  Clay.  Washington,  June  4,  1930.  Webster,  Writ¬ 
ings  (National  Edition),  XVI.  205. 

129  Ambrose  Spencer  to  Webster,  Albany,  October  24,  1831.  Van 
Tyne,  Webster  Letters,  p.  24. 


THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  1832 


69 


August,  1831,  was  regarded  as  a  critical  point  in 
the  campaign,  and  its  indecisive  result  gave  a 
convincing  proof  that  Clay’s  strength  was  not  as 
sound  as  it  had  been  supposed.  Before  this  elec¬ 
tion  Stephen  White,  a  personal  friend  of  Web¬ 
ster,  told  the  National  Republican  state  central 
committee  of  Massachusetts  that  friends  of  Web¬ 
ster  would  continue  their  support  of  Clay  except 
in  the  event  of  his  death  or  defeat  in  Kentucky, 
“both  equally  fatal  to  his  success.”  Should  either 
of  these  contingencies  occur  Webster’s  own  can¬ 
didacy,  he  believed,  should  be  considered.127  The 
growth  of  the  nullification  movement  in  South 
Carolina  suggested  that  issues  were  at  stake  in¬ 
volving  constitutional  theories  of  more  funda¬ 
mental  importance  than  those  which  Clay  repre¬ 
sented.  This  same  fact  probably  contributed  to 
the  decline  of  Webster’s  interest  in  Clay  and  sug¬ 
gested  to  him  the  conception  of  a  new  party 
organized  openly  in  defense  of  nationalist  princi¬ 
ples  with  himself  as  its  leader  which  developed 
more  fully  in  1833.  According  to  White,  the 
leaders  of  all  parties  whom  he  had  met  in  his 
travels  were  well  disposed,  and  there  was  a 
strong  disposition  to  “create  a  constitutional  party 
and  to  place  you  at  the  head  of  it.”128  Webster 
feared,  he  wrote  to  Clay  in  October,  1831,  an 
attack  upon  the  constitution  in  the  approaching 

^  White  to  Webster,  New  York,  August  7,  1831.  Van  Tyne, 
Webster  Letters,  pp.  161,  162. 

128  Ibid. 


70 


ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 


session  of  Congress.  “Not  only  the  Tariff,  but 
the  Constitution  itself,  in  its  elementary  and 
fundamental  provisions  will  be  assailed  with 
talent,  vigor  and  union.  Everything  is  to  be 
debated  as  if  nothing  had  been  settled.”  He 
therefore  urged  Clay  to  reenter  the  Senate  where 
his  leadership  was  needed,  and  it  is  significant 
that  in  this  letter,  written  not  long  before  the 
convention,  no  mention  is  made  of  Clay’s  presi¬ 
dential  aspirations.129  All  thought  of  a  new  party, 
if  indeed  it  had  been  seriously  considered,  was 
of  course  abandoned  for  the  duration  of  the 
campaign. 

The  Bank  issue  instead  of  improving  Clay’s 
position  was  the  most  important  factor  in  the  re- 
election  of  Jackson,  a  result  that  was  made  doubly 
certain  by  dissensions  within  the  opposition. 
Adams  had  been  defeated  and  eliminated  as  a 
presidential  candidate,  partly  in  consequence  of 
his  lack  of  talents  as  a  politician;  Clay  suffered 
the  same  fate  because  in  his  long  and  active 
political  career  he  had  made  too  many  enemies 
and  had  in  part  lost  the  confidence  of  the  people. 
His  defeat  eliminated  the  last  of  the  available 
candidates  who  were  closely  identified  with  the 
traditions  of  the  party.  Webster  remained,  but 
at  no  time  in  this  period  were  his  chances  good 
even  for  a  nomination  by  a  united  party.  The 
way  was  therefore  clear  for  a  new  departure. 

129  Webster  to  Clay,  Boston,  October  5,  1831.  Colton,  Private 
Correspondence,  p.  318. 


CHAPTER  III 


THE  CRISIS  OF  1833 

THE  nullification  crisis  in  the  winter  of 
1832-1833,  by  justifying  Webster’s  fear  of 
an  impending  attack  upon  the  constitution  as  it 
was  then  interpreted,  threw  party  lines  into  con¬ 
fusion.  Attention  was  called  to  the  fundamental 
problem  of  the  proper  relations  between  the  state 
and  federal  governments,  a  question  to  which  all 
parties,  in  trying  to  avoid  vital  issues,  had  paid 
perfunctory  respect,  or  which  they  had  entirely 
ignored.  While  the  greater  number  of  the  friends 
of  nullification  were  or  had  been  Democrats,  not  a 
few  National  Republicans  like  Clay  found  it  ex¬ 
pedient  to  be  somewhat  tolerant,  and,  on  the  other 
hand,  a  considerable  fraction  of  the  Democratic 
party  endorsed  Jackson’s  vigorous  policy.  Out  of 
this  confusion  in  1833  appeared  the  possibility  of 
a  new  alignment  of  parties  upon  the  issue  of  main¬ 
taining  the  authority  of  the  federal  government. 
The  issues  of  the  previous  campaign  were  tempo¬ 
rarily  set  aside.  The  attempt  to  secure  a  longer 
lease  of  life  for  the  Bank  had  been  decisively  de¬ 
feated,  internal  improvement  made  no  immediate 
appeal,  and  friends  of  protection  found  much  to 


72 


ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 


approve  in  the  Nullification  Proclamation  and  in 
Jackson’s  message  of  January  16.  Moreover,  the 
opposition  was  at  odds  within  itself  with  reference 
to  the  President’s  policy  as  expressed  in  these 
documents.  Some  were  disposed,  because  of  state 
rights  predilections  or  for  political  reasons,  to 
await  events,  but  friends  of  federal  supremacy, 
regardless  of  party  ties,  endorsed  Jackson’s  policy 
with  enthusiasm,  the  more  heartily  in  some  cases 
because  of  the  consideration  that  the  tariff  laws 
were  those  which  were  to  be  enforced. 

A  realignment  of  parties  upon  the  “union” 
issue  would  have  involved  at  least  a  temporary 
agreement  between  Webster  and  Jackson.1  Diffi¬ 
cult  as  it  would  have  been  to  harmonize  their  ideas 
in  regard  to  specific  political  problems,  powerful 
influences  were  at  work  in  1833  to  bring  them 
together.  The  way  was  prepared  by  Webster’s 
endorsement  of  the  proclamation.  A  copy  of  that 
document  reached  Boston  as  he  was  about  to  leave 
for  the  opening  of  Congress.  So  important  did 
he  consider  the  occasion  that  he  delayed  his  de- 

1  The  attention  of  the  writer  was  called  to  this  problem  by  a 
discussion  of  the  relations  between  party  leaders  at  this  time  in 
Van  Buren,  Autobiography,  pp.  664  ff.  A  conversation  with  Clay 
in  1849  suggested  to  Van  Buren  the  part  which  Webster  played  in 
the  events  of  1833.  His  remarks  are  not  exclusively  based  upon 
memory,  for  in  certain  cases  he  refers  to  historical  sources.  In¬ 
formation  is  given  bearing  upon  the  relations  between  Webster  and 
Jackson  which  does  not  appear  elsewhere.  In  regard  to  his  own 
motives,  Van  Buren’s  explanations  probably  are  not  entirely 
accurate.  His  distrust  of  Webster’s  personal  integrity  and  his 
distinct  liking  for  Clay  (p.  665)  led  him  to  attribute  Webster’s 
actions  to  selfish  ambitions.  For  these  reasons  his  inferences  from 
facts  need  to  be  checked  wherever  possible  by  information  drawn 
from  other  sources. 


THE  CRISIS  OF  1833 


73 


parture  in  order  to  speak  at  a  meeting  in  Faneuil 
Hall  called  for  the  purpose  of  considering  the 

situation  in  South  Carolina  and  the  President’s 
proclamation.2 

The  Almighty  Power  only  knows,  [he  said]  whether, 
when  we  meet  again,  it  will  be  as  citizens  of  Massachu¬ 
setts  only.  .  .  .  The  general  principles  of  the  Pro¬ 
clamation  are  such  as  I  heartily  approve.  I  esteem  them 

to  be  the  only  true  principles  of  the  constitution.  .  .  . 

In  this  way  of  meeting  the  crisis,  I  shall  give  the  Presi¬ 
dent  my  entire  and  cordial  support.  ...  If  the  Gov¬ 
ernment,  on  this  first  trial,  shall  be  found  not  able  to 
keep  all  the  States  in  their  proper  places,  from  that 

moment  the  whole  Union  is  virtually  dissolved.  What¬ 
ever  link  be  struck  from  this  golden  chain,  breaks  the 
whole.3 

2  Ibid.,  p.  680.  Van  Buren  attributed  the  call  for  this  meeting  to 
Webster,  but  the  report  of  its  proceedings  supports  the  con¬ 
clusion  that  it  was  the  result  of  a  general  desire  among  those  who 
approved  Jackson’s  policy. 

3  National  Intelligencer,  December  22,  1832,  quoting  Boston  Daily 
Advertiser  and  Patriot,  Extra,  December  18,  1832.  This  speech 
is  not  printed  in  any  edition  of  Webster’s  works,  but  the  text  is 
given  in  an  appendix  to  G.  T.  Curtis,  Life  of  Webster  (N.  Y., 
1872),  I.  590-592.  Webster  was  reported  by  March  to  have  heard 
of  the  proclamation  for  the  first  time  when  on  his  way  to  Wash¬ 
ington.  C.  W.  March,  Reminiscences  (N.  Y.,  1850),  pp.  187,  188. 
This  version  was  used  by  Curtis  in  his  first  edition  ( Webster .  I. 
484)  but  this  error  was  later  corrected  in  an  appendix.  A  series 
of  resolutions,  reported  in  the  Intelligencer  cited  above,  which 
were  adopted  by  this  meeting,  not  only  endorsed  Jackson’s  policy 
but  also  read  into  the  proclamation  constitutional  theories  that 
substanially  agreed  with  those  of  Webster  in  his  debate  with 
Hayne.  It  was  probably  to  this  interpretation  that  Van  Buren 
had  reference  in  suggesting  that  these  resolutions  were  not 
entirely  satisfactory  to  Jackson.  Van  Buren,  Autobiography,  p. 
698.  H.  G.  Otis,  an  old  Federalist,  also  endorsed  the  proclamation, 
but  he  was  not  the  presiding  officer  as  suggested  by  Morison,  Otis, 
II.  292.  According  to  the  report  in  the  Intelligencer,  Charles 
Wells,  who  was  then  Mayor  of  Boston,  acted  as  chairman.  With 
a  view  doubtless  to  preventing  an  untimely  discussion  of  topics 
which  might  have  given  rise  to  criticism  of  other  phases  of  the 
administration’s  policy,  the  chairman  restricted  the  speakers  to 
the  two  points  specified  in  the  call  for  the  meeting. 


74 


ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 


Webster  was  not  alone  among  National  Repub¬ 
licans  in  his  approval  of  Jackson’s  position.  The 
Western  Reserve  Chronicle  reported  that  the  pro¬ 
clamation  “was  hailed  as  the  harbinger  of  glad 
tidings  by  the  opposers  of  the  administration. 
.  .  .  It  is  worthy  of  remark  that  the  returning 
sanity  of  the  President  was  hailed  by  spontaneous 
approbation.”4  It  was  the  opinion  of  the  “Spy  in 
Washington”  that  the  proclamation  had  effected 
a  revolution  in  the  personnel  of  parties,  that  it 
had  been  endorsed  by  many  “whom  it  was  sup¬ 
posed  nothing  could  have  reconciled  to  the  present 
chief  magistrate.”5  Ambrose  Spencer,  an  in¬ 
fluential  politician  in  New  York,  thought  Jack¬ 
son’s  reelection  fortunate  in  view  of  the  turn 
which  affairs  had  taken.6  Chancellor  Kent  was 
informed  by  his  nephew  in  New  York  City. 

We  are  all  Jackson  men  here  .  .  .  and  really  the 

old  gentleman  does  put  his  name  to  the  most  excellent 
documents.  Nothing  could  be  more  able  than  his  last 
message,  and  if  he  is  not  thwarted  by  the  House  he  will 
I  believe  preserve  the  Union,  and  what  is  more  keep  it 
in  such  a  state  that  it  will  be  worth  preserving.7 

4  National  Intelligencer,  January  2,  1833. 

5  Morning  Courier  and  New  York  Enquirer,  January  21,  1833. 
The  Enquirer  was  in  favor  of  settling  the  crisis  by  a  compromise, 
and  was  thus  disposed  to  minimize  its  importance.  “A  temporary 
excitement  is  pervading  the  Nation.  How  long  will  it  continue? 
Will  the  new  friends  which  Gen.  Jackson  has  acquired  be  faith¬ 
ful?”  It  is  known  that  Matthew  L.  Davis,  an  influential  journalist, 
wrote  under  the  pseudonym  of  the  “Spy  in  Washington.”  Frederick 
Hudson,  Journalism  in  the  United  States  (N.  Y.,  1875),  p.  216. 

‘A.  Spencer  to  Webster,  Albany,  February  21,  1833.  Webster 
MSS. 

7  William  Kent  to  James  Kent,  New  York,  January  30,  1833. 
Kent  MSS.  Library  of  Congress.  It  was  thought  that  Jackson, 
assured  of  a  second  term,  would  follow  policies  more  in  harmony 
with  those  of  the  opposition. 


THE  CRISIS  OF  1833 


75 


Pleasants  wrote  from  Richmond  that  the  few  who 
still  called  themselves  Federalists  had  to  a  man 
endorsed  the  proclamation  and  that  some  of 
Clay’s  friends  had  given  their  support  to  the 
President,  in  order  to  be  on  the  winning  side  or 
because  of  their  dislike  of  nullification.8 

Evidence  soon  began  to  accumulate  that  the 
disorganized  National  Republicans  were  not 
agreed  in  this  point  of  view.  The  change  which 
occurred  in  the  attitude  of  the  Intelligencer,  their 
most  important  newspaper,  toward  nullification 
and  Jackson’s  policy  is  indicative  of  the  growing 
divergence  of  opinion  within  the  party.  This 
journal  had  been  outspoken  in  its  censure  of  nulli¬ 
fication  before  that  movement  aroused  the  Presi¬ 
dent  to  issue  the  proclamation.9  When  events  indi¬ 
cated  that  he  would  drive  his  former  friends  in 
South  Carolina  into  opposition,  its  remarks  in  re¬ 
gard  to  the  situation  became  milder.10  Minor 
flaws  in  the  proclamation  were  picked  out  for  criti¬ 
cism,  and  in  the  way  of  approval  it  contented  itself 
with  an  acknowledgment  of  the  obvious  fact  that 

8J.  H.  Pleasants  to  John  Tyler,  Richmond,  January  1,  1833.  L. 
G  Tyler  Letters  and  Times  of  the  Tylers  (Richmond,  1884),  I. 
451,  452. 

“The  nullification  movement  was  denounced  during  the  summer 
of  1831  in  a  series  of  articles  under  the  title,  “The  Crisis,”  as 
the  most  serious  danger  which  the  country  had  faced  since  the 
Hartford  Convention.  National  Intelligencer,  August  27,  31. 
September  3,  7,  1831. 

10  In  reply  to  a  question  as  to  their  attitude  on  the  nullification 
question  the  editors  replied  that  it  could  be  found  in  the  articles 
referred  to  above.  Ibid.,  December  5,  1832. 


76 


ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 


it  was  a  powerful  document.11  In  order  not  to  give 
offense  to  possible  recruits  only  brief  mention  was 
made  of  the  progress  in  Congress  of  the  “force 
bill”  and  even  of  Clay’s  compromise  tariff  meas¬ 
ure.  There  was  as  yet  no  great  difference  of 
opinion  in  the  ranks  of  the  party  in  regard  to  the 
Bank  issue ;  accordingly  it  was  kept  constantly  be¬ 
fore  its  readers  in  preference  to  the  troublesome 
nullification  question,  which  was  adding  to  the 
popularity  of  the  administration. 

Clay,  like  the  Intelligencer,  was  critical  of  the 
proclamation,12  and  he  found  it  advisable  not  to 
take  an  active  part  in  support  of  the  “force  bill.” 
Webster,  on  the  other  hand,  cooperated  with  the 
administration  in  carrying  out  Jackson’s  recom¬ 
mendations.  It  is  said  on  good  authority  that  he 
was  asked  by  a  member  of  Jackson’s  cabinet  to 


“There  are  some  exceptional  features  in  it,  and  particularly 
the  personality  which  is  thrown  into  it,  even  in  the  very  caption, 
where  we  find  the  name  of  the  President  most  conspicuous.  This 
is  a  departure  from  usage,  as  is  also  the  allusion  to  the  President’s 
nativity,  both  of  which  had  been  well  avoided.  The  Proclamation, 
however,  is  a  powerful  composition,  and  cannot  fail  to  produce  a 
great  sensation ;  whether  for  good  or  evil  we  have  some  doubt.” 
Ibid.,  December  11,  1832.  Later  it  was  explained  that  the  phase 
“for  good  or  evil”  referred  to  the  effect  upon  the  relative  stand¬ 
ing  of  the  nullification  and  union  parties  in  South  Carolina  Ibid 
December  13,  1833. 

12  He  thought  there  were  some  good  things  in  it  especially  in 
the  part  dealing  with  the  power  of  the  judiciary,  but  “there  are 
some  entirely  too  ultra  for  me,  and  which  I  cannot  stomach.  A 
proclamation  ought  to  have  been  issued  weeks  ago,  but  I  think  it 
should  have  been  a  very  different  paper  from  the  present,  which, 
I  apprehend,  will  irritate  instead  of  allaying  any  excited  feeling  ’’ 
Clay  to  Francis  Brooke,  Washington,  December  12,  1832.  Colton 
Private  Correspondence,  p.  345. 


THE  CRISIS  OF  1833 


77 


lead  the  friends  of  the  bill  in  the  Senate,13  and 
that  on  his  suggestion  certain  changes  were 
made.14  Although  Jackson’s  friends  were  sup¬ 
porting  the  Verplanck  bill,  which  would  reduce 
duties  by  one-half  in  two  years,  Webster  was  not 
convinced  that  the  President  intended  to  abandon 
the  principle  of  protection,  for  he  believed  that 
Jackson  personally  did  not  approve  the  radical 
reduction  which  this  measure  involved.  Webster 
was  confident,  he  wrote  to  William  Sullivan,  that 
Jackson  did  not  wish  the  bill  to  pass  and  that  he 
would  prefer  to  make  a  direct  issue  with  nulli¬ 
fication  and  then  to  revise  the  tariff  when  the 


13  March,  Reminiscences,  p.  199.  Van  Buren  believed  that  this 
book  had  been  endorsed  by  Webster.  Van  Buren,  Autobiography, 

p.  701.  ,  ,  . 

Ibid  p  235  The  “Spy  in  Washington”  noted  the  important 
role  played  by  Webster.  “The  echoes  from  the  palace  announce 
that  Mr  Webster  is  considered  the  staff  on  which  reliance  must  be 

placed  in  the  Senate.  .  .  .  His  great  and  commanding  talents 

are  now  to  be  called  into  action,  in  defences  of  those  opinions  and 
those  principles  which,  in  early  life,  were  the  basis  of  his  political 
education.  At  a  moment,  the  most  unexpected  to  him,  to  his 
friends,  and  to  his  country,  he  finds  himself  called  upon  to  sustain 
the  measures  of  the  administration,  on  the  ground  that  they  are 
such  as  the  federal  party  of  1798  would  have  sustained.  .  ■  • 

Can  Mr  Webster  resist  these  appeals?  He  cannot  and  will  not. 

Yet  a  few  days,  and  his  influence  with  the  President  and 
his  cabinet  will  be  equalled  by  few;  surpassed  by  none .  .  ■  • 

The  Federalists,  with  a  portion  of  the  Clay  men,  have  taken  under 
their  charge  the  measures  of  the  administration.  Mark  what  1 
sav  Without  these  new  allies,  Gen.  Jackson  would  stand  almost 
alone,  in  both  Houses  of  Congress.”  Morning  Courier  and  New 
York  Enquirer,  February  2,  1833.  Webster  s  support  of  the  force 
bill  was  resented  by  many  Democrats  who  were  anxious  to  see 
the  question  amicably  settled  C.  C.  Cambreling,  an  influential 
Democratic  leader  from  New  York  in  the  House,  wrote  to  Van 
Buren  that  “the  real  friends  of  the  administration  are  calm  and 
anxiously  desiring  that  all  difficulties  may  adjusted  .  Cambre¬ 
ling  to  Van  Buren,  Washington,  February  5,  1833.  Van  Buren 
MSS.  Library  of  Congress. 


78 


ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 


administration  would  not  appear  to  be  yielding  to 
force.15  When  Clay  assumed  responsibility  for 
an  apparent  abandonment  of  the  tariff  in  his 
scheme  for  a  compromise  he  brought  upon  him¬ 
self  the  opposition  which  Webster  and  his  friends 
had  made  to  the  Verplanck  bill.  The  scheme  was 
probably  introduced  with  full  knowledge  that 
Webster  would  oppose  its  passage;  a  draft  had 
been  shown  to  him,16  and  he  had  been  present  at 
a  meeting  of  a  Senate  committee  at  which  it  was 
discussed.17 

The  trend  of  events,  indicating  an  unusual  co¬ 
operation  between  Jackson  and  Webster  and  a 
sharp  divergence  of  policy  within  the  opposition, 
gave  rise  to  a  general  discussion  of  a  possible 

15  Webster  to  William  Sullivan,  January  3,  1833.  Curtis,  Web¬ 
ster,  I.  436,  437.  Van  Buren  represents  Jackson  as  sincerely  in 
favor  of  affording  relief  to  South  Carolina,  whereas  Webster 
resisted  the  passage  of  Clay  s  compromise  which  would  have  this 
effect.  Van  Buren,  Autobiography,  p.  663. 

19  Webster  to  Hiram  Ketchum,  Washington,  January  18  1838 
Curtis,  Webster,  I.  440,  441.  Webster  was  at  this  time  defending 
his  record  on  the  tariff  questions  of  1833  and  seeking  material  with 
which  to  attack  Clay  on  this  point. 

17  Webster  to  Nathan  Appleton,  February  (?),  1833.  Van  Tyne 
Webster  Letters,  pp.  179,  180.  Cf.  Clay  to  Francis  Brooke,  Senate 
18^3.  Colton,  Private  Correspondence,  pp. 
349,  350.  The  friends  of  protection  at  first  were  generally  agreed 
in  interpreting  Clay’s  compromise  as  a  surrender  of  the  principle 
at  issue.  This  point  of  view  was  expressed  by  Niles.  “Mr.  Clay’s 
new  tariff  project  will  be  received  like  a  crash  of  thunder  in  the 
winter  season.  .  .  .  We  .  .  .  cannot  go  with  him  in  a 
measure  which  contains  the  surrendry  of  a  power  that  is  vital  to 
the  influence  of  the  United  States.”  Niles’  Register,  XLIII.  401 
An  active  campaign  was  inaugurated  by  Clay’s  friends  in  New 
England  to  convince  the  friends  of  protection  that  the  bill  was 
not  in  fact  destructive  of  the  protective  principle.  Peley  Sprague 
t0  •^arc*1  19,  1833.  Colton,  Private  Correspondence 

pp.  354-356;  Abbott  Lawrence  to  Clay,  Boston,  March  26,  1833’ 
Ibid.,  pp.  357,  358. 


THE  CRISIS  OF  1833 


79 


formation  of  parties  upon  new  issues.  The  evi¬ 
dence  is  sufficiently  abundant  and  varied,  not  only 
from  newspaper  editorials  but  also  from  private 
letters,  to  justify  the  conclusion  that  for  a  time 
in  the  spring-  and  summer  of  1833  there  was  a 
serious  possibility  that  this  would  take  place. 
The  “Spy  in  Washington”  suggested  this  as  a 
probability.  If  his  speculations  in  regard  to  the 
effect  of  the  proclamation  were  correct,  “then  has 
the  proclamation  laid  the  foundation  for  a  new 
grouping  of  parties.  The  talented  and  ancient 
leaders  of  federalism,  are  marching  forth  in  solid 
column  from  their  retirement.  .  .  .  They  tell 
you — ‘we  rally  round  the  Chief  who  now  com¬ 
mands!’ ”18  Webster’s  resolutions  on  the  tariff 
placed  him  at  the  head  of  the  tariff  forces  in  the 
opinion  of  the  Baltimore  Gazette.  It  anticipated 
an  understanding  between  Webster  and  the  ad¬ 
ministration  which  would  maintain  the  principle 
of  protection.19  P.  P.  F.  Degrand20  wrote  to 
Nicholas  Biddle: 

Ever  since  the  appearance  of  the  President’s  Procla¬ 
mation,  relative  to  South  Carolina,  several  of  my  leading 

18  Morning  Courier  and  New  York  Enquirer,  January  21,  1833. 

18  Poulson’s  American  Daily  Advertiser,  February  18,  1833.  This 
newspaper  was  published  at  Philadelphia. 

20  Degrand  was  an  immigrant  of  French  descent.  Without  large 
means  himself,  he  was  active  in  the  promotion  of  railroads  in 
Massachusetts.  He  was  much  ridiculed  during  his  life  for  the 
extravagance  of  his  predictions  which  however  “have  since  been 
more  than  realized.”  Justin  Winsor,  The  Memorial  History  of 
Boston,  1630-1880  (Boston,  1882),  IV.  135,  136.  The  Library  of 
Congress  has  the  files  of  the  Boston  Weekly  Report  of  Public  Sales 
and  Arrivals,  1819-1827,  a  publication  edited  by  Degrand. 


80 


ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 


friends,  as  well  as  myself,  have  had  a  notion  that  the 
consequences  of  the  decided  stand,  which  the  President 
takes  ‘against  State  Rights  (so  mis-called)  and  in  favor 
of  the  Judiciary, — would  necessarily  ultimately  lead  to  an 
alliance,  offensive  and  defensive,  between  Jackson  and  the 
Party  that  goes  against  the  mis-called  State  Rights ; — for 
the  judiciary; — for  internal  improvements; — for  the 
tariff;  and  for  the  bank,’ — because  Jackson  would  find 
himself  at  war  with  many  of  his  old  friends ;  and  as  a 
President  of  the  United  States  cannot  stand  upon  noth¬ 
ing,  he  must  necessarily  seek  and  husband  new  ones.21 

Niles  thought  that  the  old  parties  did  not  know 
where  they  stood  upon  the  new  issues.  “Some 
‘guess’  that  they  are  on  the  banks  of  Newfound¬ 
land;  but  the  fog  is  so  thick,  and  the  water  so 
much  disturbed,  that  neither  the  quadrant  nor 
the  lead  line  renders  accustomed  service.”22  The 
speculations  of  the  Salem  Gazette  as  to  the  cur¬ 
rent  rearrangement  of  parties  are  of  particular 
interest.  As  Degrand  had  suggested,  the  issues 
which  had  been  defeated  in  the  two  preceding 
campaigns  might  be  favorably  affected. 

Recent  political  events  make  it  plain  that  parties  must 
be  taken  into  a  new  draft.  The  late  combinations  have 
been  completely  broken  up — they  have  clubbed  the  batta¬ 
lion — the  front  has  been  changed  to  the  rear,  and  the 
flanks  to  the  center.  In  this  pell-mell  confusion,  it  will 
take  some  time  for  the  stragglers  to  rally  under  new 
banners  and  to  understand  new  signals.  Clay  and  Cal¬ 
houn  have  combined  Nullification  and  National  Republi¬ 
canism — the  West  and  the  South  are  henceforth  in  close 

21  Degrand  to  Biddle,  Boston,  February  15,  1833.  Biddle  MSS. 

22  Niles’  Register,  XLIV.  1. 


THE  CRISIS  OF  1833 


81 


alliance,  and  the  National  Republicans  of  the  Free  States 
are  henceforth  excluded  from  the  communion  with  any 
party. 

The  consequence  may  be  that  a  change  will  take  place  m 
public  policy.  Measures  of  state  we  have  a  long  time 
witnessed  are  merely  the  counters  with  which  gambling 
politicians  keep  their  game.  The  United  States  Bank, 
among  other  measures,  may  be  favorably  affected;  for 
those  who  have  hitherto  thought  it  a  piece  of  good  calcu¬ 
lation  to  oppose  the  renewal  of  its  charter  for  the  sake 
of  gaining  political  influence  may  hereafter  think  it  politic 
to  support  the  renewal  for  the  purpose  of  gaining  other 
friends  and  from  fear  of  losing  the  friends  they  already 
have.23 

The  possibility  that  Webster  was  either  seeking 
a  cabinet  office  under  Jackson  or  would  accept 
one  if  it  were  offered  him  was  widely  discussed.24 
To  an  objection  from  a  Democratic  source  that 
the  party  could  not  forget  Webster’s  past  asso¬ 
ciation  with  Federalism,  Hammond  of  the  Cin¬ 
cinnati  Daily  Gazette  thought  that  this  would  be 
a  minor  difficulty.  “Mr.  Webster  can  be  as  easily 
‘dyed  in  wool’  as  Mr.  Louis  McLane,  if  he  will 
only  consent  to  the  necessary  immersion. 
However,  all  rumors  of  a  difference  with  Clay 
that  would  drive  him  into  an  alliance  with  Jack- 
son  were  scouted  by  the  Intelligencer .26 

At  the  close  of  the  short  session  in  March, 
1833,  Webster  and  Clay  were  apparently  upon 

23  Poulson’s  American  Daily  Advertiser,  March  12,  1833. 

M  New  York  Daily  Advertiser,  February  15,  1833. 

"  Cincinnati  Daily  Gazette,  February  21,  1833. 

20  National  Intelligencer,  May  3,  1833. 


82 


ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 


the  best  of  terms;27  nevertheless  the  differences 
between  them  had  not  been  arranged.  Clay  wrote 
to  Biddle:  “As  for  your  friend  Mr.  W[ebster] 
(he  is  determined  not  to  allow  me  to  consider  him 
mine)  nothing  I  can  do  seems  right  in  his  mind.” 
Biddle  was  asked  “to  soothe  him  on  his  return. 
You  hold  a  large  flask  of  oil  and  know  well  how 
to  pour  it  out.”28  As  the  president  of  the  Bank, 
Biddle  was  not  in  a  position  nor  was  he  disposed 
to  act  as  a  disinterested  mediator.  His  first  con¬ 
cern  was  to  make  use  of  every  opportunity  for 
the  welfare  of  that  institution,29  and  the  split 
between  the  two  National  Republican  leaders 
might  be  made  to  serve  a  useful  purpose.  When 
Webster  rallied  to  the  support  of  Jackson,  a 
claim  was  established  to  his  gratitude  which 
could  with  careful  management  be  used  to  the 
Bank’s  advantage.  The  removal  of  the  deposits 
might  by  this  means  be  prevented,  and  a  new 
charter  was  not  beyond  the  range  of  possibili- 

27  Nathan  Sargent,  Public  Men  and  Events  (Philadelphia,  1875), 

I.  241-243. 

28  Clay  to  Biddle,  Washington,  March  4,  1833.  Biddle  MSS. 

29  Biddle’s  attachment  to  the  Bank  is  best  illustrated  in  a  letter 

of  an  earlier  date,  February,  1832,  to  C.  J.  Ingersoll.  “Here  am  I, 
who  have  taken  a  fancy  to  this  Bank  and  having  built  it  up  with 
infinite  care  am  striving  to  keep  it  from  being  destroyed.  .  .  . 

To  me  all  other  considerations  are  insignificant — I  mean  to  stand 
by  it  and  defend  it  with  all  the  small  faculties  which  Providence 
has  assigned  to  me.  I  can  go  for  no  party  in  politics  or  religion — 
have  no  sympathy  with  Mr.  Jackson  or  Mr.  Clay  or  Mr.  Wirt  or 
Mr.  Calhoun  or  Mr.  Ellmaker  or  Mr.  Van  Buren.”  Biddle  to  C. 

J.  Ingersoll,  Philadelphia,  February  11,  1832.  McGrane,  Biddle 
Correspondence,  179. 


THE  CRISIS  OF  1833 


83 


ties.30  If  these  results  could  have  been  counted 
upon  as  the  certain  consequences  of  the  division 
between  Clay  and  Webster,  Biddle  probably 
would  have  chosen  to  widen  the  breach  rather 
than  attempt  to  heal  it.  Their  realization  was 
too  problematical  however  to  warrant  the  burning 
of  his  bridges ;  accordingly,  while  he  made  what 
use  he  could  of  Webster’s  services  to  the  admin¬ 
istration,  at  the  same  time  he  used  his  influence 
to  prevent  a  complete  break  between  Webster  and 
Clay  in  order  to  preserve  a  political  force  which 
would  be  available  in  the  event  of  a  failure  to 
conciliate  Jackson.  This  analysis  of  Biddle’s 
motives  and  policy  is  illustrated  and  supported  by 
the  correspondence  of  the  three  men  in  the  spring 
and  summer  of  1833. 

Biddle  recognized,  in  his  reply  to  Clay  s  re¬ 
quest,  the  importance  of  avoiding  a  division.  It 
was  of  “great  importance  to  the  country  not  to 
permit  the  difference  of  sentiment  on  the  tariff  to 
produce  any  alienation  between  those  who  had 
hitherto  acted  in  harmony  on  all  other  great  pub¬ 
lic  measures.  .  .  To  prevent  an  occasion  for 


“John  Sargeant,  a  member  of  the  House  from  Pennsylvania, 
wrote  to  Biddle  that  the  combination  between  Calhoun,  Clay,  and 
their  friends  would  cause  the  administration  to  react  favorably  to 
the  Bank.  “Against  a  combination  that  threatens  to  become  so 
powerful,  Van  Buren  will  have  to  look  for  alliances  in  the  North, 
I  think,  and  in  so  doing  will  be  obliged  to  give  up  his  hostility  to 
the  Bank.  It  is  quite  possible,  indeed,  that  he  may  come  into 
conjunction  with  some  of  its  most  decided  friends.  In  the  mean¬ 
time,  Jackson’s  influence  will  by  no  means  have  the  same  weight  as 
heretofore.”  Sargeant  to  Biddle,  Washington,  March  2,  1833. 
Ibid.,  p.  201. 


84  ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 

this  undesirable  result,  Biddle  had  chosen  to  en¬ 
tertain  Webster  privately  when  he  had  recently 
passed  through  Philadelphia  rather  than  to  ar¬ 
range  a  public  dinner  with  the  inevitable  speeches. 
“In  regard  to  the  measure  itself,  he  retains  all  the 
opinions  he  publicly  expressed;  but  they  are,  I 
think,  unaccompanied  by  anything  of  an  unkind 
or  unfriendly  feeling  toward  yourself.  . 
Your  mutual  friends  seem  to  understand  each 
other  perfectly.”31  In  reply  Clay  acknowledged 
Biddle  s  efforts  to  prevent  a  further  estrange¬ 
ment,  and.  on  second  thought,  he  saw  in  Webster’s 
opposition  to  the  compromise  tariff  a  means  of 
persuading  the  South  that  a  decided  victory  had 
been  won.32  The  crisis  would  thus  be  brought  to 
a  satisfactory  close  and  his  own  political  position 
materially  strengthened,  since  the  victory  would 
be  the  fruit  of  his  leadership. 

There  now  began  a  series  of  obscure  negoti¬ 
ations  the  purpose  of  which  was  to  prolong  the 
cooperation  between  Webster  and  Jackson. 
Available  evidence  is  not  sufficient  to  justify  an 
accurate  estimate  of  the  various  influences  that 
determined  Webster’s  actions  at  this  time,  but  it 
is  clear  that  he  was  not  only  following  his  personal 
inclinations  but  was  also  acting  on  Biddle’s  ad- 

31  Biddle  to  Clay,  Philadelphia,  March  25,  1833.  Colton,  Private 
Correspondence,  pp.  356,  357.  Dr.  McGrane  suggests  that  Biddle 
tried  to  change  Webster’s  point  of  view  in  regard  to  the  compro¬ 
mise.  McGrane,  Biddle  Correspondence,  pp.  202,  203.  The  evi¬ 
dence  in  Biddle’s  letter  scarcely  justifies  this  conclusion. 

38  Clay  to  Biddle,  Ashland,  April  10,  1833.  McGrane,  Biddle 
Correspondence,  pp.  202-204. 


THE  CRISIS  OF  1833 


85 


vice.  The  middleman  in  this  negotiation  seems 
to  have  been  Edward  Livingston,  then  Secretary 
of  State.  After  his  conversation  with  Biddle  in 
Philadelphia,  in  the  course  of  which  the  subject 
may  well  have  been  discussed,  Webster  wrote  to 
Livingston  suggesting  that  the  latter  “would  not 
be  averse  to  a  confidential  interchange  of  opinions 
upon  topics  that  must  arise,  in  the  course  of  a 
short  time  and  on  which  men  will  be  obliged  to 
act.”  It  was  suggested  that  a  conference  be  ar¬ 
ranged  to  take  place  in  New  York  sometime  in 
April.33  Sufficient  evidence  exists  to  make  it 
reasonably  safe  to  assume  that  the  two  met  dur¬ 
ing  the  summer  of  1833,  although  the  exact  date 
is  uncertain.34  March35  and  Curtis36  not  only  as- 


33  Van  Tyne,  Webster  Letters,  pp.  181,  182.  Professor  Van 
Tyne  notes  that  the  MSS.  is  undated  and  has  no  address,  but  he 
identifies  it  as  a  letter  to  Clay.  It  is  also  printed  in  Writings  and, 
Speeches  of  Daniel  Webster  (National  Edition,  Boston,  19U3), 
XVI.  229,  230.  It  is  there  identified  as  a  letter  to  Edward  -Liv¬ 
ingston  Internal  evidence,  as  well  as  the  unfriendliness  which 
existed  between  Clay  and  Webster  at  this  time,  indicates  that  the 
latter  conclusion  is  probably  correct.  Webster  refers  to  his  corre¬ 
spondent’s  intention  of  going  abroad.  Livingston  s  appointment 
as  minister  to  France  was  under  consideration  at  this  tune,  while 
there  is  no  evidence  that  Clay  had  such  intentions.  Moreover, 
Clay  had  left  Washington  for  the  West  at  the  time  or  before  the 
letter  was  written.  National  Intelligencer,  March  23,  1833.  tne 
contents  of  the  letter  show  that  the  person  to  whom  it  was 
addressed  was  in  Washington. 

31  Webster  was  probably  in  New  York  April  5,  but  apparently 
the  interview  was  not  held  then.  He  was  still  there  April  10, 
for  on  that  date  Biddle  wrote  to  him  at  his  New  York  address 
that  Livingston  would  be  there  in  a  few  days.  Biddle  to  Webster, 
April  10,  1833.  Biddle  MSS.  Webster  may  have  seen  Livingston 
at  this  time,  but  in  any  case,  he  wrote  from  Boston,  April  13,  that 
he  had  heard  nothing  from  Livingston,  but  that  he  would  hold 
himself  in  readiness  to  go  to  New  York  if  necessary.  Webster  to 
Biddle,  Boston,  April  13,  1833.  Ibid.  A  week  later  he  wrote 
again  from  Boston  that  he  had  heard  nothing  from  the  elusive 


86 


ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 


sume  that  the  conversation  took  place,  but  they 
also  report  that  Livingston  was  authorized  by  the 
President  to  take  up  with  Webster  the  question 
of  his  continued  support  of  the  administration, 
and  that  he  acted  upon  this  instruction  in  an 
interview  with  Webster  in  New  York  after  the 
latter’s  return  from  his  later  tour  of  the  West. 
According  to  March,  it  was  generally  believed  by 
the  friends  of  both  men  that  a  seat  in  the  cabinet 
was  offered  and  that  an  agreement  was  made 
impossible  by  differences  upon  the  question  of  the 
deposits.  This  version  cannot  be  accepted  with¬ 
out  reservation.  Influenced  perhaps  by  a  desire 
to  clear  Webster  of  all  suspicion  of  disloyalty  to 
his  party,  it  placed  the  responsibility  for  the  nego¬ 
tiation  upon  Jackson  and  Livingston.  There  is 
reason  to  believe,  however,  that  an  arrangement 
with  the  administration  through  the  agency  of 
Livingston  was  most  desirable  from  the  point  of 
view  of  Biddle  and  Webster.  Furthermore,  if  a 

Livingston.  He  thought  that  the  Secretary  was  occupied  with 
an  inquiry  in  regard  to  the  burning  of  the  treasury  building. 
Webster  to  Biddle,  April  20,  1833.  Ibid.  The  fire  occurred 
March  31.  National  Intelligencer,  April  1,  1833.  These  letters 
give  no  precise  evidence  of  a  meeting  between  the  two  men  but 
they  reveal  clearly  the  eagerness  with  which  it  was  desired  by 
Biddle  and  Webster.  Webster  had  at  least  one  opportunity  to 
talk  with  Livingston  before  he  sailed  for  France.  On  Webster’s 
return  from  his  western  tour  both  took  the  same  boat  from  Phila¬ 
delphia  to  New  York.  National  Gazette  and  Literary  Register , 
July  19,  1833.  National  Intelligencer,  July  22,  1833. 

35  March,  Reminiscences,  pp.  249,  250. 

Curtis,  Webster,  I.  473.  There  is  no  first  hand  evidence,  ap¬ 
parently,  to  support  this  conclusion.  Livingston’s  papers  might 
throw  some  light  upon  this  question,  but  they  are  not  at  present 
available. 


THE  CRISIS  OF  1833 


87 


cabinet  office  was  offered  by  Livingston,  it  is  by 
no  means  certain  that  it  faithfully  represented 
Jackson’s  intentions.  Van  Buren  wrote  later  that 
Jackson  agreed  with  his  own  suspicions  of  the 
Secretary’s  loyalty  to  the  administration.37  It  is 
probable  that  on  another  occasion,  when  he 
sketched  a  plan  for  an  act  to  re-charter  the  Bank 
which  would,  he  said,  be  approved  by  the  Presi¬ 
dent,  he  had  taken  an  unwarranted  liberty  in 
anticipating  Jackson’s  wishes.38 

Biddle  repeatedly  urged  Webster  in  April  to 
make  his  peace  with  the  administration  before  it 
was  too  late  to  prevent  a  removal  of  the  deposits, 
and  Webster  was  not  opposed  to  the  suggestion. 
An  arrangement  was  made  with  C.  P.  White  a 
“politician  of  the  Van  Buren  type”  and  a  member 
of  the  House  from  the  city  of  New  York,  to  the 
effect  that  Webster’s  views  upon  the  question  of 
the  deposits  would  be  reported  to  Jackson.39  Ap¬ 
parently  this  was  done,  for  Webster  wrote  to 
Biddle  after  White’s  return  that  the  removal  had 
been  decided  upon:  “I  am  afraid  that  the  Presi- 

37  “We  were  well  aware  that  he  was  more  at  his  ease  talking 
and  not  infrequently  in  acting  upon  public  questions  in  the  company 
of  Mr.  Webster  and  Mr.  Biddle  than  with  us.  but  we  could 
afford  to  indulge  him.”  Van  Buren,  Autobiography,  p.  708. 

38  C.  J.  Ingersoll  to  Biddle,  Washington,  February  23,  1832. 
McGrane,  Biddle  Correspondence,  pp.  184,  185.  Cf.  J.  S.  Bassett, 
Life  of  Andrew  Jackson  (N.  Y.,  1911),  II.  616.  However,  Cat- 
terall  asserts  that  Livingston  probably  reported  Jackson  correctly. 
Catterall,  Second  Bank,  pp.  224-228. 

“Webster  to  Biddle,  New  York,  Wednesday  morning.  Biddle 
MSS.  This  letter  is  undated  but  internal  evidence  identifies  it  as 
having  been  written  in  the  latter  part  of  March  or  the  first  part 
of  April. 


88 


ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 


dent  has  settled  it  as  a  thing  to  be  done.”40  Biddle 
immediately  replied: 

I  have  no  information  of  the  intended  removal  of  the 
deposits,  though  my  opinion  is  that  they  will  not  dare  to 
remove.  Nevertheless  it  is  very  desirable  that  whatever 
is  done  in  the  way  of  pacification  should  be  done  soon — 
for  if  the  deposits  are  withdrawn,  it  will  be  a  declaration 
of  war  which  cannot  be  recalled.41 

Two  days  later  urgent  advice  to  the  same  effect 
was  sent  to  Webster.42  After  his  return  to  Bos¬ 
ton  Webster  wrote,  April  21,  that  the  political 
consequences  which  would  probably  result  from 
the  removal  had  been  brought  to  the  attention  of 
the  President  by  an  influential  friend  of  the  Presi¬ 
dent.  It  would  “create  warm  opposition  of  the 
North,  and  drive  those,  who  would  support  Gen¬ 
eral  Jackson  in  all  just  measures,  back  to  the  arms 
of  C.  [lay]  and  C.  [alhoun].”43  Thus,  by  means  of 
Democratic  channels,  even  assuming  the  doubtful 
character  of  the  Livingston  interview,  Webster 
adroitly  brought  to  Jackson’s  attention  the  price 
which  would  have  to  be  paid  for  a  continuation  of 
his  services.  His  motives,  however,  were  not 
restricted  to  a  desire  to  serve  the  interests  of 
Nicholas  Biddle  and  the  Bank,  for  he  considered 
the  possibility  of  cooperating  with  the  adminis¬ 
tration  after  the  removal  of  the  deposits  in  Sep- 

40  Webster  to  Biddle,  New  York,  April  7,  1833.  Ibid. 

11  Biddle  to  Webster,  Philadelphia,  April  8,  1833.  McGrane, 
Biddle  Correspondence,  p.  202. 

42  Biddle  to  Webster,  Philadelphia,  April  10,  1833.  Ibid.,  p.  205. 

43  Webster  to  Biddle,  Boston,  April  21,  1833.  Biddle  MSS. 


THE  CRISIS  OF  1833 


89 


tember  had  eliminated  Biddle’s  interests  in  the 
premises. 

Circumstances  attending  the  extensive  journeys 
of  party  chieftains  in  the  summer  of  1833  fur¬ 
nish  further  evidence  that  a  possible  realignment 
of  parties  was~  contemplated.  The  opportunity 
offered  by  the  adjournment  of  Congress  was 
seized  for  the  purpose  of  mending  political  fences 
that  had  weakened  or  perhaps  of  building  new 
ones.  Especially  important  for  present  purposes 
were  the  tours  of  Jackson  and  Webster  which 
made  possible  an  expression  of  mutual  esteem  by 
their  friends.  The  reception  given  to  Jackson  by 
Webster’s  associates  in  New  England  and  that  ac¬ 
corded  to  Webster  by  Jackson’s  in  the  West  could 
not  fail  to  strengthen  the  feeling  of  good-will  be¬ 
tween  them.  Webster  had  at  first  planned  to  be  in 
Boston  in  order  to  welcome  Jackson  personally. 
His  absence,  he  wrote  to  Secretary  Cass,  would 
be  open  to  misrepresentation;  he  would  therefore 
cut  short  his  own  tour  in  order  to  be  in  Boston 
at  the  proper  time.44  For  unexplained  reasons 
his  plans  did  not  materialize  in  this  respect;  he 
was  still  in  the  West  when  Jackson  appeared  in 
Boston.45  National  Republican  newspapers  saw 

44  Webster  to  Cass  (undated).  Webster,  Private  Correspondence, 
I.  536,  537.  This  letter  was  in  reply  to  one  from  Cass  in  which 
it  was  said  that  Jackson  would  be  in  New  England  about  June 
20.  Cass  to  Webster,  April  17,  1833.  Curtis,  Webster,  I.  460,  461. 

‘“According  to  Van  Buren,  Webster’s  absence  was  intentional. 
It  would  be  easier  to  approach  Jackson’s  friends  in  the  West  than 
as  the  chief  of  a  reception  committee  in  Boston.  Moreover,  Web¬ 
ster  knew  that  he  could  not  lead  his  party  in  New  England  to  sup¬ 
port  Jackson.  Van  Buren,  Autobiography,  pp.  690-694. 


90 


ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 


in  Van  Buren’s  presence  in  Jackson’s  party  a 
move  on  his  part  to  strengthen  himself  with  New 
England  Democrats  in  view  of  the  campaign  of 
1836, 46  but  Webster  was  informed  that  his  true 
motive  was  to  watch  Jackson  in  order  to  prevent 
a  suspected  effort  by  Federalists  “to  coax  and 
cajol  the  president.”47  Preparations  were  made  in 
Boston  to  give  Jackson’s  reception  a  non-partisan 
character,48  and  the  Washington  Globe  frowned 
upon  any  attempt  on  the  part  of  overzealous 
Democrats  in  New  England  to  keep  the  President 
to  themselves.49  Degrand  informed  Biddle  that 
Jackson’s  reception  was  in  fact  the  work  chiefly 
of  Webster’s  friends.  The  resolution  to  invite 
Jackson  had  been  introduced  in  the  House  by 

49 New  York  Daily  Advertiser,  May  3,  1833.  Cf.  New  Hamp¬ 
shire  Patriot  in  the  United  States  Telegraph,  July  12,  1833. 

47  D.  B.  Ogden  to  Webster,  New  York,  April  27,  1833.  Webster 
MSS. 

48  The  New  York  American,  a  newspaper  that  took  pride  in 
having  opposed  Jackson  at  every  turn  since  1823,  reported  that  his 
reception  in  New  York,  and  “we  believe  it  was  so  in  Philadelphia” 
was  distinctly  a  party  affair  under  the  management  of  Demo¬ 
cratic  leaders.  “The  mass  of  citizens,  the  clergy,  the  learned  pro¬ 
fessions,  and  the  great  middle  class  could  not  approach  him  at  all.” 
New  York  American,  June  15,  1833. 

49  Quoting  the  Boston  Post,  the  Intelligencer  at  first  attributed 
to  Massachusetts  Democrats  an  intention  to  make  the  President’s 
reception  a  partisan  affair.  National  Intelligencer,  April  23, 
1833.  The  next  day  it  acknowledged  that  such  was  not  the 
desire  of  the  Democratic  authorities  in  Washington.  In  this 
connection  was  quoted  a  statement  of  the  Globe  of  April  23.  “If 
Massachusetts  through  her  legislature  deems  it  proper  to  mark 
the  visit  of  the  President  to  that  State  with  any  token  of  personal 
respect,  we  should  consider  an  attempt,  on  the  part  of  those  assum¬ 
ing  to  be  exclusive  party  friends,  to  repeal  such  kind  intentions 
upon  the  ground  that  they  proceed  from  political  opponents,  not 
only  as  illiberal  to  those  proffering  the  courtesy,  but  derogatory 
to  the  object  of  it.”  Ibid.,  April  24,  1833. 


THE  CRISIS  OF  1833 


91 


Stephen  White,  who  moreover  had  left  Webster 
in  the  West  in  order  to  act  as  a  chairman  of  the 
legislative  committee  appointed  in  the  President’s 
honor.  He  was  welcomed  not  only  as  chief 
executive  but  as  one  who  had  expressed  New 
England  principles  jn  the  proclamation.  As  a 
result, 

Jackson  is  very  much  pleased  with  his  visit  to  this 
quarter  and  grateful  for  these  attentions  and  quite  grati¬ 
fied  that  his  ‘Union  must  be  preserved’  is  fully  sustained 
here.  ...  In  fact,  it  cannot  be  denied  that  a  sympa¬ 
thy  is  excited  in  his  breast  and  between  him  and  those 
who  approached  him  here  and  this  sympathy  pervades 
both. 

The  conclusion  was,  in  Degrand’s  opinion,  clear 
that  Webster  “no  longer  supports  Clay: — but 
stands  forth  as  ‘the  defender  of  the  constitution,’ 
i.e.  ‘of  the  administration’  while  the  ‘administra¬ 
tion  hold  the  Proclamation  as  their  standard’.”"0 
Fears  were  aroused  among  Democrats  that  Jack- 
son  was  approaching  the  Federalist  point  of  view. 
These  fears  were  expressed  in  the  vernacular  of 
the  famous  Downing  letters  in  a  report  of  an 
imaginary  conversation  with  “Jack  Downing.” 

We  told  him  ‘we  knew  a  thing  or  two;  and  as  there 
wasn’t  a  better  Fed.  in  the  country  than  Old  Hickory  we 
should  give  him  a  gun  perhaps.’  Jack  looked  grave,  and 
nodded,  and  said  he  had  warned  ‘the  Gineral,’  but  it  made 

"  p.  p.  F.  Degrand  to  Biddle.  Boston,  July  4,  1833.  Biddle 
MSS.  According  to  Degrand,  “True  Blue  Jackson”  men  had  co¬ 
operated  with  National  Republicans  in  the  election  of  Benjamin 
Gorham  to  congress,  and  it  had  been  suggested  that  this  cooper¬ 
ation  be  continued  in  the  next  gubernatorial  election. 


92 


ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 


his  heart  ache  to  see  the  old  man  so  budge  with  H.  G. 
Otis  and  Bill  Sullivan.  ‘But  I’ll  tell  you  what’  continued 
Jack,  .  .  .  ‘I’ll  fix  myself  in  Downingville,  and  I’ll 

stay  the  torrent  of  Federalism!  Thunder  and  mittens, 
there  is  strange  things  going  on  in  the  world.  Van  Buren 
is  chucking  the  Hero  into  the  bosoms  of  the  Feds.’51 

The  Intelligencer,  true  to  its  policy  of  covering 
up  all  traces  of  division  within  the  party,  inter¬ 
preted  Jackson’s  enthusiastic  reception  in  New 
England  as  evidence  of  a  sincerely  national  spirit, 
not  as  an  expression  of  restlessness  on  the  part 
of  Webster  and  his  friends.52  National  Republi¬ 
cans  in  Boston  met,  immediately  after  Jackson’s 
departure,  to  repair  whatever  damage  had  been 
done  to  the  party  by  his  visit.  A  dinner  was 
held,  as  Rufus  Choate  informed  Webster,  the 
immediate  purpose  of  which  “was  to  keep  our 
own  ranks;  and  to  see  that  none  of  our  members 
were  carried  away  by  the  recent  flow  of  good 
feeling.”  Choate  thought  there  had  been  no 
“particular  unfriendliness  to  the  President” ;  but 
Webster  was  warned  that  “Our  Jackson  men  here 
are  Van  Buren  men.”53  The  result  of  Jackson’s 
excursion  into  territory  that  had  formerly  been 
enemy  country  was  a  practical  demonstration  of 
the  support  which  New  England  gave  to  his 
nationalist  policy.  Nothing  definite  was  appar- 

51  National  Intelligencer,  July  8,  1833,  quoting  the  Portland 
Advertiser. 

“  Ibid.,  July  1,  1833. 

63  Choate  to  Webster,  Salem,  August  12,  1833.  Van  Tyne, 
Webster  Letters,  p.  184. 


THE  CRISIS  OF  1833 


93 


ently  done,  however,  to  bind  his  relations  with 
Webster  more  closely. 

While  Webster’s  friends  were  giving  Jackson 
a  friendly  reception  in  New  England,  the  favor 
was  being  returned  by  Jackson  men  in  the  West. 
The  Intelligencer  reported  that  “Mr.  Webster  has 
wrought  little  less  than  a  miracle  upon  the  feuds 
and  divisions  in  the  western  country.  He  has 
fairly  extinguished  the  one  and  obliterated  the 
other.”54  A  correspondent  of  the  United  States 
Telegraph  wrote  from  Cincinnati,  June  18,  that 
Webster  was  there  “gladdening  all  hearts.  To¬ 
morrow  he  partakes  of  a  public  dinner,  in  which 
all  parties  unite,  but  in  which  the  Jackson  party 
have  taken  the  lead.  Their  enthusiasm  has  been 
as  great  as  ours.”55  The  Louisville  Journal 
noticed  the  friendliness  of  Democrats:  “Wher¬ 
ever  he  goes,  the  friends  of  the  administration 
are  peculiarly  zealous  to  do  him  honor.  The  very 
men,  who,  a  year  ago,  were  daily  denouncing  him 
as  a' Hartford  convention  traitor  and  the  corrupt 
hireling  of  the  Bank,  are  now  proud  of  the  privi¬ 
lege  of  touching  but  the  hem  of  his  garment.”56 
W.  T.  Barry,  postmaster  general  under  Jackson, 
sent  to  Van  Buren  a  report  of  Webster’s  welcome 
by  the  Jackson  men  of  Cincinnati.  He  believed 


M  National  Intelligencer,  July  11,  1833.  Cf.  J.  B.  McMaster, 
Daniel  Webster  (N.  Y„  1902),  pp.  221-225.  Professor  McMaster 
made  no  attempt  to  interpret  the  political  significance  of  the  wel 
come  given  Webster  in  the  West. 

“  United  States  Telegraph,  July  8,  1833. 

M  Ibid.,  July  5,  1833. 


94 


ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 


that  Webster  was  aware  that  the  Democrats  were 
responsible  for  his  warm  reception.  “Mr.  Clay’s 
friends  and  especially  his  bank  friends,  were 
cold,  and  are  dissatisfied  with  the  speech  of  Mr. 
Webster  at  the  dinner.  It  was  a  patriotic  affair 
in  which  the  present  administration  was  highly 
complimented.”57  At  Pittsburg  he  was  again 
cordially  received  by  at  least  a  part  of  Jackson’s 
friends.  He  was  welcomed,  according  to  the 
Pittsburg  Advocate,  as  the  defender  of  the  con¬ 
stitution.  The  editor  knew  no  higher  praise  than 
to  compare  his  services  with  those  of  Jackson  at 
New  Orleans. 

Mr.  Webster  now  occupies  a  station  before  the  Amer¬ 
ican  people,  very  similar  to  that  in  which  Gen.  Jackson 
found  himself  after  the  battle  of  New  Orleans.  [When 
nullification  had  been  met  by  the  President],  what  did 
Daniel  Webster  do?  Did  he  respond  to  the  call  of  the 
Executive,  or  did  he  cling  to  party  ?  With  the  Constitu¬ 
tion  in  his  hand,  he  flung  defiance  in  the  teeth  of  his 
assailants.  .  .  .  It  is  this  that  has  attached  so  many 

of  the  President’s  friends  to  Mr.  Webster.58 

Other  Democratic  newspapers  in  Pittsburg,  how¬ 
ever,  did  not  join  the  chorus  of  praise.  One 
thought  his  reputation  much  exaggerated  and 
confessed  a  preference  for  certain  members  of  the 
city  bar  as  models  of  true  eloquence.  It  was 
noted  that  his  audience,  which  had  evidently  been 
drawn  from  all  classes,  had  not  been  responsive: 

57  W.  T.  Barry  to  Van  Buren,  July  7,  1833.  Van  Buren  MSS. 

68  New  York  American,  July  22,  1833.  Cf.  United  States  Tele¬ 
graph,  July  23,  1833. 


THE  CRISIS  OF  1833 


95 


“if  we  except  a  faint  attempt  to  cheer  him  which 
‘proved  no  go’.  The  Jacksonites  would  not  join 
in  and  they  are  the  only  boys  that  can  cheer  a  man 
properly.”59  Another  recognized  his  ability,  but 
it  was  careful  to  explain  that  he  was  welcomed 
“not  as  a  political  partisan,  but  as  a  fellow  citizen. 

.  .  .  In  his  reception  everything  of  a  political 
tendency  was  carefully  avoided.”60 

The  trend  toward  a  friendly  understanding 
between  Webster  and  Jackson  was  regarded  with 
alarm  by  certain  groups  within  the  Democratic 
party,  as  newspaper  comment  indicates.  Demo¬ 
cratic  opinion  in  New  England  was  especially 
hostile.61  The  Pennsylvanian ,  a  Democratic 
journal,  predicted  that  the  party  in  that  section 
would  refuse  to  cooperate  with  Webster.62  Isaac 
Hill  charged  him  with  hypocritical  motives  in  his 
support  of  the  proclamation  because  he  had  con¬ 
demned  Jackson’s  administration  not  long  before 
that  document  was  published.  Moreover,  he  had 
cooperated  with  Calhoun  in  the  campaign  of 

59  New  Hampshire  Patriot,  July  29,  1833,  quoting  the  Pittsburg 
Manufacturer. 

00  Poulson’s  American  Daily  Advertiser,  July  22,  1833,  quoting 
the  Pittsburg  Democrat. 

01  Boston  Statesman,  January  12,  1833. 

63  Pennsylvanian,  July  23,  1833.  This  editorial  offered  advice  to 
Webster  which  was  not  without  a  serious  significance  in  spite  of 
its  humorous  tone.  “Curl  your  hair,  coquette  a  little — be  cool, 
cautious  and  roundabout — talk  of  patriotism,  piety,  and  purity— 
don’t  touch  anti-masonry — don’t  go  where  cholera  is — avoid 
crowded  places — vote  for  our  friend  Blair  for  next  printer — cut 
Clay  and  all  his  clan — and  to  conclude,  spend  the  month  of  August 
at  Nahant,  and  take  a  peep  at  the  sea  serpent.’’ 


96 


ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 


1832, 63  a  charge  which  was  not  without  founda¬ 
tion.  On  another  occasion  Hill  wrote  that  the 
enthusiastic  reception  which  the  National  Repub¬ 
licans  in  Massachusetts  had  given  Jackson  indi¬ 
cated  a  complete  want  of  principle  on  the  part  of 
men  who  had  opposed  Jackson  in  the  last  two 
elections.64  There  were  certain  material  advan¬ 
tages  in  remaining  in  the  minority  while  the 
national  party  retained  power  which  a  politician 
like  Hill  could  appreciate.  The  control  of  the 
federal  patronage  for  that  section  was  in  the 
hands  of  Hill  and  his  fellow  politicians,  and  an 
alliance  with  Webster  would  involve  a  division 
of  the  spoils  with  new  allies.  Most  important  of 
all  was  the  intense  hostility  which  the  New  Eng¬ 
land  Democrats,  the  workers  in  the  towns  and 
the  poor  farmers  far  from  markets  or  tilling  an 
infertile  soil,  felt  for  their  more  fortunate  neigh¬ 
bors.65  Finding  his  interest  to  be  in  opposition 
to  a  realignment  of  parties,  Hill  made  effective 
use  of  the  cry  of  “Federalist”  to  deter  any  mem¬ 
bers  of  his  party  who  looked  favorably  upon  a 
union  with  Webster.66 

The  position  of  the  United  States  Telegraph 
and  its  editor,  Duff  Green,  as  the  mouthpiece  of 
the  “southern  rights”  section  of  the  opposition 

“  Boston  Statesman,  September  7,  1833. 

64  New  Hampshire  Patriot,  July  IS,  1833. 

“  A.  B.  Darling,  “Jacksonian  Democracy  in  Massachusetts,  1824- 
1848,”  American  Historical  Review,  XXIX,  271-278. 

MNew  Hampshire  Partiot,  July  12,  1833. 


THE  CRISIS  OF  1833 


97 


made  it  an  interested  commentator  upon  evidence 
pointing-  to  a  possible  understanding  between 
Jackson  and  Webster.  Two  purposes  apparently 
influenced  Green’s  editorials  dealing  with  this 
subject:  a  desire  to  discredit  Webster  as  a  leader 
of  the  National  Republican  party  by  arousing 
suspicion  of  his  party  loyalty  and  a  reluctance  to 
see  Jackson’s  position  strengthened  by  the  addi¬ 
tion  of  Webster  and  his  friends.  The  attainment 
of  both  objects  would  be  aided  by  exposing  on 
every  occasion  information  or  rumors  of  a  rap- 
prochment  to  the  searching  light  of  a  pitiless 
publicity.  The  Telegraph  persistently  asserted 
that  the  real  purpose  of  Jackson’s  tour  was  to 
secure  the  support  of  Webster’s  friends  for  Van 
Buren  in  the  next  campaign.  While  the  Presi¬ 
dent  was  on  his  way  to  New  England,  the  charge 
was  made  that  the  Globe,  on  behalf  of  the  admin¬ 
istration,  had  made  advances  to  New  England 
interests  by  hinting  that  the  tariff  might  be  modi¬ 
fied  for  the  purpose  of  protecting  the  growers 
of  wool  and  the  manufacturers  of  the  finer  grades 
of  woolen  cloths.67  The  tour  had  been  a  failure, 
it  was  announced  after  Jackson’s  return,  and  in 
due  time  the  Telegraph  reported  that  the  Albany 
Argus  had  attempted  to  explain  away  the  Globe’s 
apparent  concession  to  protection  in  order  to  con¬ 
ciliate  the  southern  wing  of  the  party.  Like  the 
Federalists  of  the  North,  the  Globe  was  urging 


m  United  States  Telegraph,  May  28,  29,  1833. 


98 


ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 


“since  the  quasi-assent  of  the  northern  Demo¬ 
crats  to  the  Proclamation,  that  there  was  no  dif¬ 
ference  between  the  parties,  and  that  they  should 
go  share  and  share  alike.”68 

A  pronounced  change  promptly  occurred  in  the 
political  situation  when  the  order  for  the  removal 
of  deposits  was  made  in  September.  Conditions 
no  longer  favored  a  far-reaching  reorganization 
of  parties.  The  motive  disappeared  which  had 
caused  Biddle  to  attempt,  through  Webster,  a 
reconciliation  with  the  administration.  The  re¬ 
moval  of  the  deposits  emphasized  the  fiscal  policy 
of  the  administration  and  thereby  brought  for¬ 
ward  an  issue  in  regard  to  which  Webster  was 
irreconcilably  at  odds  with  Jackson.  Accord¬ 
ingly,  when  the  new  Congress  assembled  in  De¬ 
cember,  Biddle  at  once  became  vitally  interested 
in  consolidating  the  opposition  in  support  of  an 
attempt  to  administer  a  rebuke  to  the  President. 

The  new  interests  evident  in  the  editorial  policy 
of  the  National  Gazette,  a  newspaper  that  was 
generally  known  as  the  “bank  organ,”  were  indi¬ 
cative  of  the  desires  of  the  Bank  and  its  friends. 
In  July,  before  it  was  known  that  the  removal 
had  been  definitely  adopted  as  the  policy  of  the 

68  According  to  Green,  northern  Democrats  had  pretended  to 
have  a  certain  interest  in  state  rights  for  a  time  following  the 
proclamation  in  order  to  maintain  their  strength  in  the  South. 
“Finding  their  mistake,  they  are  now  willing  to  cast  aside  all 
disguise,  and  abandon  State  Rights  in  all  its  forms  and  features, 
and  rush  into  consolidation.”  This  policy  had  been  adopted  to 
enable  Van  Buren  to  compete  with  Webster  for  the  support  of 
the  Federalists.  Ibid.,  June  1,  1833. 


THE  CRISIS  OF  1833 


99 


administration,  great  advantages  for  nationalist 
policies  were  seen  in  a  possible  realignment  of 
parties. 

The  main  and  very  serious  distinction  of  American 
parties  will  ere  long  be,  that  of  the  Unionists,  on  the  one 
hand,  defending  the  supremacy  and  integrity  of  our  Na¬ 
tional  and  Federal  System,  under  the  plain  text  and  spirit, 
and  old  apprehension  of  the  Constitution ;  and,  on  t  e 
other,  the  disaffected  Nullifiers  and  half-Nullifiers,  rally¬ 
ing  under  all  sorts  of  real  and  spurious  State-rights. 

The  Unionists  (now  in  the  great  majority  of  the 
people)  will  have  something  more  to  do  for  the  final 
triumph  of  their  cause  than  to  resist  the  theory  and  prac¬ 
tice  of  nullification ;  it  will  be  essential  on  their  side,  that 
the  national  defenses  and  plans  of  internal  improvement, 
and  the  establishments  which  secure  an  independent  judi¬ 
ciary,  a  sound  currency,  and  abundant  revenue,  and  a 
domestic  supply  of  manufacturers,  should  be  preserved. 

The  removal  of  the  deposits  convinced  the  Gazette 
that  it  had  mistaken  the  source  of  the  real  danger 
to  the  country.  The  nullification  movement  and 
even  the  disorganized  condition  of  the  currency 
“though  evils  of  magnitude  that  require  attention 
and  deserve  solicitude,  yet  are  of  considerably 
less  moment  and  urgency  than  the  recent  meas¬ 
ures  and  general  doctrines  of  the  Executive 
branch  at  Washington,  in  which  we  include  the 
two  cabinets  of  the  President,  and  the  Globe ,  the 
official  organ  and  champion.”70  With  the  open¬ 
ing  of  the  Congress  a  still  more  immediate  need 
was  felt  for  the  aid  of  the  southern  wing  of  the 

“  National  Gazette  and  Literary  Register,  July  27,  1833. 

'"'Ibid.,  November  26,  1833. 


100  ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 

opposition ;  accordingly,  the  menace  of  nullifica¬ 
tion  was  discounted.  Association  with  Calhoun 
was  no  longer  objectionable  after  the  tariff  ques¬ 
tion  had  been  arranged  by  means  of  the  compro¬ 
mise.  “There  is  no  longer  immediate  danger 
from  Southern  nullification — but  that  which  is 
enthroned  at  Washington  is  instant,  active  and 
formidable  to  the  highest  degree.”71  Alleged 
excesses  on  the  part  of  Jackson  and  his  cabinet 
had  deadened  the  enthusiasm  aroused  by  the 
proclamation,  and  a  majority  of  those  who  had 
opposed  Calhoun  and  his  southern  friends  were 
now  forced  to  regard  them  as  “only  secondary  or 
venial  delinquents,  dangerous  to  the  Union  in  but 
a  remote  and  inferior  degree,  even  as  desirable  or 
necessary  auxiliaries  to  combat  much  more  guilty 
offenders  and  leaguers  against  the  constitution 
and  the  essential  weal  of  the  Union.”72 

The  removal  of  the  deposits  did  not  immedi¬ 
ately  convince  Webster  that  there  should  no 
longer  be  any  thought  of  cooperating  with  Jack- 
son.  No  reconciliation  had  been  made  with  Clay. 
Webster  had  abandoned  his  plans  to  include 
Kentucky  in  the  itinerary  of  his  western  tour  on 
account  of  the  prevalence  of  cholera.73  There  is 

”  Ibid.,  December  18,  1833. 

72  Ibid.,  December  30,  1833. 

"Webster  to  Clay.  Columbus,  June  10,  1833.  Colton,  Private 
Correspondence,  p.  366;  Webster  to  Clay,  Chillicothe,  June  22, 
1833.  Ibid.,  pp.  366,  367.  A  journey  to  Kentucky,  presumably  for 
the  purpose  of  a  conference  with  Clay,  had  been  planned  by  Biddle 
and  Webster.  Biddle  to  Clay,  Philadelphia,  March  25,  1833.  Ibid 
p.  357. 


THE  CRISIS  OF  1833 


101 


no  evidence  that  they  had  met  when  Clay,  follow¬ 
ing  Jackson’s  example,  journeyed  to  New  Eng¬ 
land.  Webster’s  friends  apparently  took  little  or 
no  part  in  the  reception  given  to  Clay  in  Boston.74 
That  differences  still  existed  between  them  and 
that  there  was  still  a  possibility  of  an  under¬ 
standing  between  Webster  and  the  President  was 
evident  at  the  beginning  of  the  new  session  of 
Congress  in  December,  1833,  when  a  question 
arose  in  the  Senate  over  a  point  of  organization. 

The  formation  of  the  Senate  committees  had 
political  significance  at  this  time,  especially  the 
choice  of  the  committee  on  finance,  for  it  was  cer¬ 
tain  that  Jackson’s  attack  upon  the  Bank  would 
be  referred  to  it.  Both  Webster  and  Clay  saw  in 
the  organization  of  this  important  committee  a 
means  of  advancing  their  political  interests.  As 
a  result  of  Clay’s  influence,  Webster  was  selected 
as  its  chairman  and  was  thereby  forced  to  take  a 
positive  position.  It  was  to  Clay  s  interest  that 
this  choice  should  be  made  at  an  early  date  and 
upon  the  question  of  the  deposits;  almost  cer¬ 
tainly  Webster  would  thereby  be  compelled  to 
make  common  cause  with  the  opposition.  Seeing 
a  chance  to  make  political  capital  from  his 
chairmanship  of  the  finance  committee,  Webster 
took  advantage  of  the  situation  to  approach  the 
administration  again. 

T4  A  comparison  between  the  names  of  those  prominent  in  the 
reception  of  Jackson  and  Clay  indicate  that  Webster’s  friends 
while  actively  participating  in  the  first  were  not  involved  in  the 
second. 


102 


ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 


Since  1823,  the  Senate  committees  had  been 
appointed  by  the  president  pro  tempore,  who  was 
customarily  chosen  for  this  purpose  by  the  Senate 
at  the  end  of  the  preceding  session,  the  vice- 
president  absenting  himself  in  order  that  the 
committees  might  be  named  by  an  official  re¬ 
sponsible  to  the  majority.75  The  presiding  officer 
at  this  time,  Hugh  L.  White,  an  anti-Bank  Demo¬ 
crat  of  Tennessee,  would  not  serve  the  purpose 
of  the  opposition  in  its  desire  to  control  the 
membership  of  the  finance  committee  in  the 
interest  of  the  Bank.76  Accordingly,  Peleg 
Sprague  of  Maine,  a  friend  of  Clay,  moved,  De¬ 
cember  5,  1833,  that  “the  34th  rule  of  the  Senate 
shall  be  so  amended  as  to  read  and  stand  as  it 
did  prior  to  the  24th  day  of  November,  1823. ”77 
The  purpose  of  this  resolution  was  to  take  the 
power  of  naming  the  committees  out  of  the  hands 
of  Judge  White  and  place  it  in  the  Senate  as 
a  whole.  Clay  supported  the  motion  with  the 
argument  that  the  committees  should  be  so 
constituted  that  they  would  carry  out  the  will  of 
the  majority.  It  finally  passed  by  a  strict  party 
vote.‘s  According  to  Van  Buren,  this  power  was 

'5  Van  Buren,  Autobiography,  pp.  673,  674. 

'*  Van  Buren  believed  that  Clay  was  willing  to  intrust  the 
appointment  of  the  committee  to  \Vhite  if  political  considerations 
had  not  interfered.  Ibid.,  p.  674. 

"  Congressional  Globe,  23  Congress,  1  Session,  p.  12. 

8  With  Clay’s  support,  White’s  motion  to  be  excused  from 
voting  was  passed  in  the  face  of  Grundy’s  opposition.  Ibid.,  p.  19. 
Van  Buren  thought  that  in  this  there  was  evidence  of  a  growing 
friendship  between  Clay  and  White.  Van  Buren  Autobiography, 


THE  CRISIS  OF  1833 


103 


taken  from  White  in  order  to  prevent  a  loss  of 
his  availability  as  an  opposition  candidate  in  the 
South  through  animosity  aroused  by  a  distribu¬ 
tion  of  committee  appointments.  White,  how¬ 
ever,  had  not  left  the  Democratic  party,  and  in 
November  had  a  conversation  with  Jackson  which 
left  the  President  confident  of  his  loyalty.79 
Moreover,  the  opposition  had  not  yet  reconciled 
itself  to  the  necessity  of  running  more  than  one 
presidential  ticket  in  the  next  campaign. 

On  the  date  fixed  for  the  election  of  the  com¬ 
mittees,  Thursday,  December  12,  Felix  Grundy 
of  Tennessee  moved  that  action  be  delayed  until 
the  following  Monday  in  order  to  wait  for  the 
arrival  of  three  or  four  absentees.80  This  was 
obviously  a  Democratic  maneuver  to  bring  the 
party  in  the  Senate  to  its  full  strength  on  this 
crucial  test.  Determined  that  the  committees 
should  be  named  while  he  was  in  command  of  a 
safe  majority,  Clay  opposed  the  motion  on  the 
ground  that  the  Senate  was  as  complete  as  it  ever 
would  be.  Definite  evidence  of  Webster’s  inde¬ 
pendence  came  to  light  when  he  supported  this 

p  675.  Clay  evidently  had  a  political  object  in  mind  in  making 
this  move,  for  upon  his  own  initiative  four  years  later  the  new 
rule  was  discarded,  and  the  appointment  of  the  committees  was 
again  placed  in  the  hands  of  the  president  pro  tempore.  Con¬ 
gressional  Globe,  25  Congress,  I  Session,  p.  14. 

70  Andrew  Jackson  to  Van  Buren,  Washington,  November  16, 
1833.  Van  Buren  MSS. 

60  Congressional  Globe.  23  Congress,  1  Session,  p.  23.  This 
motion,  according  to  Van  Buren,  was  the  result  of  instructions 
from  Jackson  to  delay  action  until  the  arrival  of  Van  Buren 
December  15.  Van  Buren,  Autobiography,  pp.  677,  678. 


104 


ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 


motion  and  when,  in  explanation  of  his  position, 
he  said  that  he  had  in  fact  voted  for  Sprague’s 
motion  with  great  reluctance.  When  the  final  vote 
was  taken,  with  his  friends  six  of  whom  were 
from  the  New  England  states,  he  joined  forces 
with  the  administration.  His  desertion  of  the  op¬ 
position  caused  the  passage  of  Grundy’s  motion  by 
a  vote  of  twenty-three  to  nineteen,81  thus  delaying 
action  as  the  Democrats  had  desired  until  the  six¬ 
teenth.  It  was  therefore  by  no  means  certain 
that  the  control  of  the  committees  would  be  in 
the  hands  of  Clay  and  his  friends  if  this  defection 
should  be  repeated.  Clay  was  well  aware  of  this 
possibility  for  he  wrote  post-haste  from  the  Sen¬ 
ate  chamber  to  John  M.  Clayton,  a  National 
Republican  Senator  from  Delaware: 

Until  today,  we  have  gone  on  swimmingly  in  the  Sen¬ 
ate.  On  Tuesday  last  this  day  was  assigned  to  proceed 
to  the  appointment  of  the  committees  by  the  Senate  itself. 
We  came  prepared  ...  to  carry  them,  if  all  proved 
faithful.  To  my  surprise  a  motion  was  made  by  Mr. 
Grundy  and  supported  by  Mr.  Webster  to  postpone  the 
appointment  until  Monday  next  and  it  was  carried.  If 
you  are  here,  I  believe  we  shall  be  safe,  even  if  there  be 
defection.  For  God’s  sake  then  come  to  us.  And  do  not 
let  anything  keep  you  away.82 

The  “Spy  in  Washington’’  wrote  the  next  day 
that  Clay  had  been  exceedingly  angered  by  the 

81  Only  one  member  from  a  New  England  state,  Sprague,  voted 
with  Clay.  Congressional  Globe,  23  Congress,  1  Session,  p.  23. 

82  Clay  to  Clayton,  Senate  Chamber,  December  12,  1833.  Clay¬ 
ton  MSS.  Library  of  Congress.  Clay  told  Van  Buren  in  1849 
that  he  had  on  this  occasion  for  the  first  time  seriously  doubted 
Webster’s  loyalty  to  the  party.  Van  Buren,  Autobiography,  p.  671. 


THE  CRISIS  OF  1833 


105 


delay  in  the  selection  of  the  committees  and 
that  his  plans  for  their  composition,  though 
undoubtedly  arranged  in  detail,  might  not 
succeed.83 

The  danger  that  Webster’s  intransigent  atti¬ 
tude  would  be  continued  was  averted  by  his 
failure  to  arrange  satisfactory  terms  with  the 
administration.  According  to  Van  Buren,  the 
question  of  accepting  Webster’s  cooperation  was 
canvassed  at  a  conference  on  December  15  be¬ 
tween  Jackson,  Grundy,  and  himself.84  After 
stressing  the  importance  of  controlling  the  fi¬ 
nance  committee,  Grundy  asserted  that  arrange¬ 
ments  could  be  made  to  secure  Webster’s  support 
in  the  Senate  elections.85  Jackson  is  reported  to 
have  then  turned  to  Van  Buren  for  his  opinion. 
If  his  explanation  is  trustworthy,  he  urged  Jack- 
son  not  to  accept  Webster’s  aid  for  the  reason 
that  it  would  be  impossible  to  cooperate  with  him 
without  arousing  “in  the  then  excited  state  of 
public  feeling  .  .  .  the  suspicion  of  being  dis¬ 
posed  to  favor  such  a  coalition.  .  .  .”  The  ad¬ 
ministration’s  strength  was  founded  upon  the 

83  Albany  Argus,  December  21,  1833. 

84  Van  Buren,  Autobiography,  pp.  677-679.  A  search  of  the 
Jackson,  Van  Buren,  and  Webster  papers  in  the  Library  of  Con¬ 
gress  and  of  their  published  correspondence  failed  to  reveal  cor- 
robative  evidence  of  this  meeting.  Van  Buren’s  detailed  account, 
however,  is  sufficient  proof  that  it  took  place. 

85  Ten  days  later  Grundy  told  Adams  that  he  was  not  disposed 
to  defend  the  administration  against  Clay’s  resolutions  censuring 
the  President.  Adams  explained  this  coolness  by  reference  to  the 
favor  which  Jackson  had  shown  to  John  H.  Eaton,  his  opponent,  in 
the  Tennessee  senatorial  election.  Adams,  Memoirs,  IX.  60. 


106 


ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 


conviction  that  Jackson  was  unalterably  opposed 
to  the  Bank,  while  Webster  “was  regarded  by  all 
sides  as  one  of  its  most  unscrupulous  supporters. 

.  .  Jackson  thought  this  advice  was  good 
and  accordingly  urged  Grundy  to  drop  the  subject. 

The  failure  of  this  negotiation  resulted  in  the 
return  of  Webster  and  his  friends  to  the  opposi¬ 
tion  when,  on  December  16,  the  committees  were 
chosen.86  Clay,  perhaps,  was  not  informed  before 
the  first  vote  was  taken  that  Webster  had  made 
this  decision.  It  was  noted  by  the  correspondent 
of  the  Albany  Argus  that  he  betrayed  great 
excitement  at  this  time. 

Mr.  Clay  began  to  assume  a  kind  of  playfulness  and 
indifference  among  the  senators.  It  was  an  evident  effort 
to  seem  to  relieve  himself  of  the  embarrassment  he  labored 
under ;  as  a  person  sometimes  laughs  to  cover  a  confusion 
of  ideas.  He  overacted.  His  conduct  was  unusual  and 
was  observed  by  many.  His  attempts  to  conceal  his 
emotion  were  the  means  of  exposing  them  the  more 
to  public  view.87 

It  was  soon  observed  by  Democratic  and  opposi¬ 
tion  newspapers  alike  that  neither  Clay  nor  Cal¬ 
houn  was  chairman  of  a  committee  and  that 
Webster  was  chairman  of  the  finance  commit¬ 
tee.  The  Intelligencer  thought  that  these  things 
would  puzzle  the  uninitiated,  but  in  its  opinion 
the  opposition’s  plans  had  been  successful.88  It 

86  Congressional  Globe,  23  Congress,  1  Session,  p.  33. 

87  Albany  Argus,  December  23,  1833.  The  report  was  written, 
however,  on  the  day  that  the  vote  was  taken,  December  16. 

88  National  Intelligencer,  December  19,  1833. 


THE  CRISIS  OF  1833 


107 


was  suggested  by  the  New  York  American  that 
the  selection  of  William  Wilkins,  a  tariff  Demo¬ 
crat,  as  chairman  of  the  committee  on  foreign 
affairs  and  of  Felix  Grundy  in  the  place  of  Clay¬ 
ton  as  the  chief  of  the  post-office  committee  were 
further  evidence  of  skilful  maneuvers  on  the 
part  of  the  opposition.89  The  “Spy  in  Washing¬ 
ton”  reported  that  Clay  and  Calhoun  had  both 
asked  that  they  should  not  be  given  the  chairman¬ 
ship  of  any  committee.90  Democratic  newspapers 
interpreted  their  absence  from  important  places 
as  evidence  of  a  defeat.  The  Pennsylvanian  be¬ 
lieved  that  the  administration  had  checked  Clay’s 
plan  to  take  charge  of  some  of  the  committees.91 
The  Washington  correspondent  of  the  New  York 
Journal  of  Commerce  thought  that  the  opposi¬ 
tion’s  plan  had  been  nullified  by  the  absence  of 
harmony  between  the  northern  and  southern 
wings.92  The  Albany  Argus  was  more  accurately 
informed  when  it  represented  the  formation  of 
the  committees  “as  the  perfect  drill  of  the  coali¬ 
tion.”93  The  multiplicity  of  newspaper  specula¬ 
tions  upon  this  subject  testifies  to  a  general 
appreciation  of  its  importance;  happily  it  is 
unnecessary  to  sift  them  carefully  for  the  key  to 
the  Senate  elections.  Clay  wrote  the  same  day 
they  were  held : 

™New  York  American,  December  19,  1833. 

80  Morning  Courier  and  New  York  Enquirer,  December  20,  1833. 

81  Pennsylvanian,  December  19,  20,  1833. 

83  Albany  Argus,  December  21,  1833. 

83  Ibid.,  December  23,  1833. 


108 


ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 


We  were  highly  gratified  today  in  the  Senate.  We 
carried  the  appointment  of  every  chairman  of  the  com¬ 
mittees  as  we  wished;  and  as  far  as  we  have  proceeded, 
every  member  of  the  several  committees  with  one  unim¬ 
portant  exception.94 

It  was  good  politics  from  Clay’s  point  of  view 
to  place  Webster  at  the  head  of  the  finance  com¬ 
mittee,  even  if  he  had  known  that  the  negotiations 
between  Webster  and  the  administration  had 
failed.95  In  that  position,  he  would  be  compelled 
in  dealing  with  the  question  of  the  deposits  to 
take  a  definite  stand.  His  association  with  Bid¬ 
dle  and  the  Bank  made  probable  his  return  to  the 
opposition.96  There  is  evidence  in  Webster’s  let¬ 
ters  that  the  possibility  of  using  his  strategic 
position  as  a  means  of  securing  concessions  for 
the  Bank  from  the  administration  was  a  factor  in 
his  calculations  at  this  time. 

From  various  quarters  pressure  was  brought  to 
bear  to  maintain  the  union  between  Webster  and 
the  opposition  achieved  in  the  elections  of  the 
Senate  committees.  The  Baltimore  Patriot  denied 
that  there  was  any  foundation  for  the  current 
rumor  of  a  break  between  Clay  and  Webster  and 
protested  against  the  publicity  given  to  this 

91  Clay  to  Francis  Brooke,  Washington,  December  16,  1833.  Col¬ 
ton,  Private  Correspondence,  p.  375. 

95  In  1849  Clay  told  Van  Buren  that  his  account  of  the  meeting 
between  Grundy,  Jackson,  and  himself  explained  to  him  for  the 
first  time  the  reasons  for  the  defeat  of  the  plans  which  he  knew 
Webster  had  arranged.  Van  Buren,  Autobiography,  pp.  672,  673. 

98  Webster  had  suggested  that  Biddle  submit  the  question  of  the 
removal  of  the  deposits  to  Congress.  Webster  to  Biddle,  Boston, 
October  29,  1833.  McGrane,  Biddle  Correspondence,  pp.  216,  217. 


THE  CRISIS  OF  1833 


109 


rumor.97  The  National  Gazette,  with  the  interests 
of  the  Bank  in  mind,  wrote  two  days  after  the 
election  that  there  was  no  reason  to  doubt  the  con¬ 
tinuance  of  good  relations  between  Webster  and 
Clay: 

Seeing  the  republican  system  itself  and  other  vital  pub¬ 
lic  interests  assailed  by  the  executive  branch  of  the  gov¬ 
ernment,  he  will,  we  presume,  exert  all  his  energies  to 
defend  or  rescue  them,  glad  to  find  such  political  leaders 
as  Mr.  Clay  and  Mr.  Calhoun  engaged  in  the  same  noble 
and  pressing  cause.98 

Before  the  removal  was  ordered,  Biddle  was  ready 
to  sacrifice  the  unity  of  the  opposition  if  by  that 
means  Jackson’s  hostility  could  be  moderated; 
but  his  influence,  after  the  deposits  had  been 
removed,  was  directed  to  the  maintenance  and 
strengthening  of  the  opposition.  Webster  had  a 
long  conversation  with  him  while  on  his  way  to 
Washington  in  the  course  of  which  the  political 
situation  was  probably  canvassed.99  Webster’s 

87  Poulson’s  American  Daily  Advertiser,  December  24,  1833. 

88  National  Gazette  and  Literary  Advertiser,  December  18,  1833. 

88  Webster  to  Biddle,  New  York,  November  27,  1833.  Biddle 

MSS.  If  Van  Buren’s  suggestion  is  correct,  Webster  was  told  in 
the  course  of  this  conversation  that  Clay  would  be  the  leader  of 
the  Bank’s  forces  during  the  approaching  session  and  that  this 
information  and  his  own  political  ambitions  prepared  him  for  "an 
act  of  strong  mark,  the  least  effect  of  which  would  be  to  cripple 
if  not  altogether  neutralize  Mr.  Clay’s  promised  leadership  by 
securing  a  complete  umpirage  over  the  action  of  the  standing 
committees  of  the  Senate.”  Van  Buren,  Autobiography,  pp.  663, 
664  That  Webster’s  relations  with  the  Bank  at  this  time  were 
not  as  close  as  they  had  been,  is  evident  from  the  fact  that  he 
found  it  necessary,  December  21,  1833,  to  apply  for  a  renewal  of 
his  retainer’s  fee.  Webster  to  Biddle,  Washington,  December  21, 
1833.  McGrane,  Biddle  Correspondence,  p.  218.  He  assured 


110 


ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 


future  course  of  action  in  regard  to  his  relations 
with  Clay  was  discussed,  it  may  be  inferred,  but 
it  is  improbable  that  a  definite  engagement  was 
made.  Since  Biddle’s  interest  in  the  premises 
had  changed,  Webster  would  scarcely  confide  to 
him  his  hopes  for  a  continued  codperation  with 
Jackson.  It  is  clear,  however,  that  Biddle  tried 
to  keep  Webster  in  line  with  the  opposition,  and 
he  criticised  his  former  agent  in  his  negotiations 
with  Jackson  for  his  desertion,  December  12,  to 
the  administration.  Three  days  after  the  com¬ 
mittees  had  been  chosen  Webster  wrote  to 
Biddle: 

I  am  much  obliged  to  you  for  your  sermon,  and  will 
hope  to  profit  by  it.  I  mean  to  keep  extremely  cool  my¬ 
self,  but  I  fear  the  temperature  of  others  will  rise,  higher 
and  higher.  At  present,  there  is  no  coolness  whatever, 
between  those  whom  you  would  expect  to  see  acting  to¬ 
gether.  Some  little  difficulties  were  found,  in  arranging 
the  committees,  but  they  were  settled  by  mutual  and 
friendly  arrangements.100 

When  the  administration  rejected  a  possible  un¬ 
derstanding  with  Webster,  the  inevitable  result 
was  to  drive  him  back  into  his  former  political 
association  with  Clay  and  his  friends.  He  was 

Biddle  in  a  letter  accompanying  his  formal  application  that  be 
had  no  intention  of  identifying  himself  in  a  cause  against  the  Bank, 
that  the  enclosed  note  was  intended  merely  to  arouse  the  board  of 
trustees  to  action.  Webster  to  Biddle,  Washington,  December  21, 
1833.  Biddle  MSS.  Having  failed  in  his  attempt  to  arrange 
favorable  terms  for  the  Bank  with  Jackson  through  the  instru¬ 
mentality  of  Webster,  Biddle  with  good  reason  asked  Clay  to  lead 
the  opposition  on  the  question  of  the  deposits. 

100  Webster  to  Biddle,  Washington,  December  19,  1833.  Biddle 
MSS. 


THE  CRISIS  OF  1833 


111 


still,  however,  in  a  most  sensitive  mood,  as  Biddle 
was  informed  in  the  last  days  of  the  year  by  his 
representative  in  Washington: 

I  have  seen  Mr.  Webster  three  times.  At  first,  I  was 
exceedingly  alarmed  at  the  ground  he  took.  I  found  out 
subsequently  that  he  considered  himself  deeply  compro¬ 
mised  by  Mr.  Clay’s  premature  movement.  He  even  told 
me  that  at  one  time  he  had  determined  to  send  back  the 
memorial  and  request  the  Bank  to  get  some  one  else  to 
present  it.  I  entered  at  large  on  the  subject,  told  him  of 
the  public  anxiety  and  dependence  upon  him — particularly 
of  yourself  and  your  friends.101 

The  political  advantages  of  continuing  to  sup¬ 
port  the  administration  were  brought  to  Webster’s 
attention  by  a  Pennsylvania  Democrat.  The 
party  in  that  state  had  appreciated  his  policy  on 
the  nullification  question,  and  Van  Buren’s  in¬ 
fluence  there  was  not  so  strong  that  it  might  not 
be  overcome  by  subsequent  events.  Webster  was 
told  that  the  “discontented  part  of  the  Jackson 
party  in  our  State  are  looking  up  to  you,  that  they 
are  watching  your  course  this  winter  with  the 
utmost  anxiety.”102 

For  a  time  Webster’s  friends  advised  that  a 
neutral  policy  should  be  followed  rather  than 
one  of  complete  surrender  to  the  opposition. 
Stephen  White  wrote  in  December  that  “the  mad 

101 J.  Q.  Watmough  to  Biddle,  Washington,  December  30,  1833. 
Ibid.  Webster’s  displeasure,  mentioned  in  this  letter,  was  aroused 
by  the  resolutions  introduced  by  Clay,  December  26,  1833,  censuring 
the  President. 

m  N.  W.  Conrad  to  Webster,  Philadelphia,  December  17,  1833. 
Webster  MSS. 


112 


ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 


pranks  of  old  Jackson  under  the  influences  of 
Cabinet  impulses  and  of  his  natural  recklessness” 
had  placed  Webster  in  a  difficult  position.  How¬ 
ever,  it  was  desirable  that  he  should  not  be  com¬ 
mitted  upon  important  issues  to  either  party. 
“The  Jackson  people  here,  the  best  class  of  them 
I  mean,  lament  deeply  the  course  taken  by  the 
General  as  tending  to  drive  into  opposition  those 
whose  talents  and  influence  would  have  been  a 
tower  of  strength  to  the  Administration.”103 
Later,  Webster  was  informed  from  the  same 
source  that  a  portion  of  the  Democratic  party  in 
Boston  had  expressed  “a  strong  desire  that  you 
may  be  able  to  maintain  your  neutrality,” 
although  they  were  aware  that  the  removal  of  the 
deposits  in  spite  of  his  reluctance  might  force  him 
into  opposition.104  Even  White  soon  became  con¬ 
vinced  that  the  administration’s  attitude  left 
Webster  no  choice  short  of  a  close  union  with 
Clay.  This  decision  was  necessary  in  spite  of  the 
fact  that 


.  .  .  your  resolution  had  been  made  up  not  to  arouse 

if  possible,  in  the  course  you  should  adopt  in  the  Senate, 
any  opposition  on  mere  party  or  local  grounds  to  the 
measures  of  the  administration :  that  the  opinions  and 
measures  of  the  nullifiers  were  of  so  dangerous  and  mon- 

103  White  to  Webster,  Boston,  December  27,  1833.  Van  Tyne, 
Webster  Transcripts.  Webster’s  friends  in  Massachusetts  resented 
keenly  Clay’s  association  with  Calhoun.  White  wrote  in  this 
letter :  “Mr.  C.  must  and  will  commit  himself  ere  long.  He  cannot 
touch  pitch  without  being  defiled  and  the  moment  the  union  between 
himself  and  Calhoun  is  more  distinctly  seen  your  friends  will  move 
here  in  solid  column.” 

1W  White  to  Webster,  Boston,  December  30,  1833.  Ibid. 


THE  CRISIS  OF  1833 


113 


strous  a  character  that  the  preservation  of  the  union  and 
the  maintenance  of  the  legitimate  powers  of  the  general 
government  were  with  you  paramount  objects  .  .  . 

moderation  and  a  conciliatory  course  would  have  secured 
the  acquiescence  if  not  the  support  of  many  powerful  and 
patriotic  minds.105 

When  the  speculation  aroused  by  the  formation 
and  composition  of  the  Senate  committees  was 
exhausted,  opposition  newspapers  judiciously 
avoided  all  reference  to  Webster’s  past  or  present 
relations  with  the  administration.  The  Tele¬ 
graph,  however,  was  distinctly  interested  in  a  dis¬ 
position  to  conciliate  him  on  the  part  of  the 
Democratic  press.  It  was  probably  mistaken  in 
pointing  to  this  as  the  motive  when  the  New 
Hampshire  Patriot  for  a  time  was  unexpectly 
moderate  in  its  references  to  Webster.106  As  evi¬ 
dence  of  the  Democratic  point  of  view,  the  New 
York  Standard  was  quoted  to  the  effect  that 
Webster  would  not  act  with  Clay  and  Calhoun. 
“An  independent  position  in  which  he  can  control 
a  majority  of  the  Senate,  is  so  easy  of  attainment 
and  so  much  more  honorable  than  to  follow  the 
lead  of  two  disappointed  and  desperate  politicians 
that  I  think  he  will  not  fail  to  seize  upon  it.”107 
Green  was  of  course  far  from  the  mark  when  he 
asserted  that  Van  Buren  was  willing  to  reverse 
the  administration’s  policy  in  removing  the 
deposits  in  order  to  conciliate  Webster.108 

105  White  to  Webster,  Boston,  January  9,  1834.  Ibid. 

1M  United  States  Telegraph,  December  27,  1833. 

107  Ibid.,  December  28,  1833. 

108  Ibid.,  December  30,  1833. 


114 


ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 


The  hostile  report  on  the  removal  presented  in 
the  Senate  by  Webster’s  committee  marked  the 
definite  end  of  a  possible  realignment  of  parties. 
Webster  henceforth  was  in  complete  agreement 
with  the  opposition  upon  the  currency  question, 
and  Webster’s  old  political  associates  were  thus 
reassured  of  his  loyalty  to  the  party.  The  reac¬ 
tions  of  many,  both  North  and  South,  were 
doubtless  similar  to  those  expressed  by  a  corre¬ 
spondent  of  Willie  P.  Mangum.  Webster’s  re¬ 
port  had  demonstrated  his  political  honesty  as 
beyond  suspicion. 

If  Mr.  Webster  could  have  been  induced  to  forget  what 
was  due  his  country  here  was  ample  opportunity  to  have 
sold  himself  with  advantage.  Pressed  as  the  administra¬ 
tion  is,  beset  on  all  sides  by  the  ablest  and  most  eloquent 
men  of  the  nation,  driven  to  depend  on  talent  of  an 
inferior  grade,  and  for  safety,  to  the  ignorance  and  blind 
passions  of  the  mob,  what  a  triumph  it  woud  have  been  to 
have  enlisted  the  Briarius  of  the  North  in  its  cause,  what 
office  could  or  would  have  been  denied,  and  I  think  I  have 
heard  a  gentleman  not  very  far  from  the  honorable 
Senator  who  is  now  reading  this,  hint  that  such  things 
might  be.109 

According  to  the  Washington  correspondent  of 
the  New  York  Daily  Advertiser,  Webster  had 
been  loyal  to  his  party  in  the  face  of  the  manifest 

109  F.  Nash  to  W.  P.  Mangum,  Hillsboro,  February  21,  1834. 
Mangum  MSS.  Mangum  was  a  member  of  the  finance  commit¬ 
tee  under  Webster.  The  sectional  affiliations  of  the  members  of 
this  committee  are  interesting.  New  England  was  represented  by 
Webster,  the  West  by  Ewing  of  Ohio,  the  South  by  Mangum  of 
North  Carolina.  The  opposition  was  learning  by  experience  that 
resistance  to  the  financial  policy  of  the  administration  was  the 
most  effective  issue  upon  which  to  unite  its  heterogeneous  members. 


THE  CRISIS  OF  1833 


115 


anxiety  of  the  administration  to  retain  him.  He 
might  have  had  anything  and  _  everything  the 
party  could  bestow,  if  he  had  laid  the  Senate  at 
the  feet  of  the  President.  Mr.  Van  Buren  would 
have  cut  off  his  mustaches  ...  if  that  would 
have  moved  him.”110  Webster  explained  his 
policy  to  the  Senate  in  the  spring  of  1834. 

I  ardently  hoped  that  nothing  might  occur  to  place  me 
in  an  attitude  of  opposition.  In  all  respects,  and 
in  every  way,  it  would  have  been  far  more  agreeable.  to 
have  found  nothing  in  the  measures  of  the  administration 
which  I  could  not  cheerfully  support.  The  present  oc¬ 
casion  of  difference  has  not  been  sought  or  made  by  me 
It  is  thrust  upon  me,  in  opposition  to  strong  opinions  an 
wishes,  on  my  part  not  concealed.  The  interference  with 
the  public  deposits  dispelled  all  hope  of  continued  con¬ 
currence  with  the  administration ;  and  was  a  measure  so 
uncalled  for,  so  unnecessary,  and,  in  my  judgment,  so 
illegal  and  indefensable,  that,  with  whatever  reluctance 
it  might  be  opposed,  opposition  was  unavoidable.111 

Nothing  was  said  or  perhaps  could  have  been  said 
in  regard  to  his  negotiations  with  the  admims 
tration. 

In  view  of  the  exigencies  of  practical  politics 
the  influences  working  toward  a  realignment  of 
parties  upon  the  “union”  issue  in  1833  could  not 
be  permanently  successful.  There  was  first  and 
always  the  sharp  contrast  between  the  training 
and  traditions  of  Webster  and  Jackson;  only  a 
serious  crisis,  like  the  nullification  movement,  was 

1,0  New  York  Daily  Advertiser,  January  24,  1834. 

«» Mr.  Webster's  Speech  on  the  President’s  Protest,  Senate, 
May  7,  1834.  Pamphlet.  Library  of  Congress. 


116 


ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 


able  momentarily  to  bring  them  together.  In 
order  to  make  this  temporary  agreement  a  perma¬ 
nent  understanding  it  was  necessary  that  the  ad¬ 
ministration  reverse  its  policy  towards  the  Bank. 
This  the  leaders  of  the  Democratic  party  would 
never  do.  The  attack  upon  the  Bank  as  a  princi¬ 
ple  of  political  strategy  was  not  an  experiment  to 
be  readily  discarded.  Its  effectiveness  had  been 
so  thoroughly  demonstrated  by  the  results  of  the 
preceding  campaign  that  the  politicians  were 
wedded  to  it.  Open  acceptance  of  the  “union” 
issue  would  have  been  inconsistent  with  the  state 
rights  traditions  of  the  larger  number  of  Jack¬ 
son’s  friends  and  would  have  driven  many,  espe¬ 
cially  in  the  South,  into  opposition.  It  was 
equally  undesirable  from  the  point  of  view  of 
the  opposition’s  leaders,  since  nullification  had 
brought  Calhoun  as  a  welcome  ally.  Politicians 
in  both  camps  were  therefore  concerned  with 
maintaining  the  distinctions  between  parties  as 
they  had  existed  in  the  last  campaign. 

/"The  nullification  crisis  was  not  sufficiently 
serious  nor  did  it  last  long  enough  to  overcome 
the  inertia  of  politicians.  The  movement  for 
southern  rights,  of  which  it  was  an  early  episode, 
had  not  made  sufficient  progress  at  this  time  to 
convince  more  than  a  few  that  there  was  a  real 
danger  to  the  preservation  of  the  union.  At  no 
time  was  there  more  than  a  small  minority  even 
in  the  South  that  supported  South  Carolina  in 


THE  CRISIS  OF  1833 


117 


its  extreme  theories.  Nullification  had  lost  its 
importance  as  a  national  issue  by  the  fall  of 
1833;  politics  and  politicians  thereupon  promptly 
dropped  the  union  issue,  to  Webster’s  apparent 
regret,  and  raised  again  less  embarrassing  ques¬ 
tions.  Public  interest  thus  became  centered  upon 
the  currency  question  upon  which  Webster  and 
Jackson  had  no  basis  of  agreement. 

The  crisis  in  party  relations  of  1833  had  im¬ 
portant  consequences  upon  the  future  of  the 
National  Republican  party.  Its  organiaztion  had 
been  disrupted,  and  the  divisions  between  Clay 
and  Webster  made  improbable  a  renewal  of\ 
friendly  cooperation.  Discredited  by  his  defeat  l 
in  1832,  by  his  apparent  abandonment  of  the  pro¬ 
tective  tariff,  and  by  his  association  with  Calhoun, 
Clay  was  succeeded  by  Webster  as  thfe  logical 
candidate  of  the  nationalists.  His  support  of  the 
proclamation  and  the  force  bill  gave  Webster 
additional  strength  in  the  North,  but  he  was 
thereby  eliminated  as  the  leader  of  the  opposition 
in  the  South.  The  immediate  origins  of  the  di¬ 
visions  within  the  Whig  party  during  the  cam¬ 
paign  of  1836  are  therefore  to  be  found  in  the 
maneuvers  and  counter-maneuvers  of  1833. 


CHAPTER  IV 


PARTY  STRATEGY  AND  NEW  LEADERSHIP 

HE  National  Republican  party  was  thor- 


JL  oughly  discredited  at  the  end  of  1833.  Its 
leader  and  its  principles  had  been  rejected  in  the 
preceding  election,  and  nullification  had  sown  the 
seeds  of  suspicion  between  Webster’s  friends  and 
those  who  welcomed  the  alliance  with  Calhoun. 
In  August,  1833,  Niles  predicted  the  use  of  “new 
rules  of  action,’’1  and  in  November  Adams  com¬ 
mented  upon  the  disintegration  of  parties.2  The 
ground  was  therefore  cleared  for  a  new  organ¬ 
ization,  but  Webster’s  dreams  of  using  this  op¬ 
portunity  for  the  organization  of  a  party  in  open 
support  of  nationalist  ideas  came  to  nothing  in  a 
maze  of  political  intrigues.  Political  necessities, 
as  in  the  campaign  of  1832,  required  a  coalition, 
and  expediency  suggested  the  adoption  of  a  new 
name  that  would  be  free  of  the  National  Repub¬ 
lican  heritage  of  defeat.  The  Whig  party  was 
born  in  the  spring  of  1834  under  circumstances 
that  promised  a  successful  future.  It  was  not, 
however,  until  after  the  results  of  the  election  of 

1  Niles’  Register,  XLV.  1. 

2  Adams,  Memoirs,  IX.  35. 


NEW  LEADERSHIP 


119 


1836  had  been  studied  that  the  necessary  step  was 
taken  to  recognize  leaders  who  had  the  ability 
and  the  willingness  to  appeal  to  the  sources  from 
which  the  Democrats  drew  their  strength. 

The  removal  of  the  deposits  and  the  Bank’s 
systematic  restriction  of  its  loans  for  the  purpose 
of  creating  discontent  against  the  administration3 
encouraged  the  opposition  in  a  new  effort  at 
organization.  Fluctuation  in  the  value  of  the 
currency  and  difficulties  in  the  making  of  loans, 
Webster  was  told,  argued  so  strongly  in  the  in¬ 
terest  of  a  national  bank  that  “a  fearful  revolu¬ 
tion  of  opinion  against  General  Jackson  .  .  . 
might  be  successfully  organized  and  perhaps  the 
time  has  come  which  may  shake  even  his  baleful 
popularity  and  produce  a  radical  change  in  the 
relation  of  parties.”4  New  England  experienced 
the  full  evils  of  the  economic  depression.  “In  this 
land  of  snows,”  so  reads  a  letter  from  Connecti¬ 
cut  to  Mangum,  where  the  people  are  “cool,  cal¬ 
culating  and  serious,”  great  activity  was  taking- 
place  in  organizing  the  opposition  and  in  publish¬ 
ing  campaign  material.5  Word  came  to  Webster 
from  central  New  York  that  the  distress  caused 
by  the  removal  was  no  “humbug,”  and  that  seri¬ 
ous  changes  were  taking  place  in  public  opinion, 

8  This  topic  is  discussed  in  detail  in  Catterall,  Second  Bank,  pp. 
314-332. 

*  Stephen  White  to  Webster,  Boston,  December  30,  1833.  Van 
Tyne,  Webster  Transcripts. 

8  E.  H.  Burritt  to  Mangum,  New  Britain,  March  20,  1834. 
Mangum  MSS. 


120 


ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 


“especially  among  mercantile  men.  The  universal 
hurrah  for  Jackson  has  ceased,  and  men  begin  to 
look  with  deep  discontent  at  the  present  alarming 
condition  of  the  country.”6  Niles  noted  that 
prices  and  wages  were  falling,  that  interest  rates 
mounted  to  twelve  and  eighteen  percent,  and  that 
unemployment  was  increasing.7  Much  of  the  de¬ 
pression,  however,  was  due  to  temporary  causes. 
As  early  as  December,  1833,  Philip  Hone,  a  New 
York  merchant,  attributed  the  increasing  difficul¬ 
ties,  in  part,  to  the  removal  but  also  to  the  activi¬ 
ties  of  speculators,  who  were  buying  stocks  to  the 
value  of  millions  for  future  delivery  on  the  pros¬ 
pect  of  a  general  decline  in  prices.  He  pointed  to 
the  compromise  tariff  as  another  cause  of  depres¬ 
sion.8  Biddle  was  assured  by  Samuel  Jaudon,  the 
Bank’s  cashier  and  his  trusted  adviser,  that  the 
tariff  was  largely  responsible.9  Biddle  was  de¬ 
termined  to  make  good  use  of  prevailing  condi¬ 
tions.  He  wrote  to  the  president  of  the  branch  at 
Boston  that  Democrats  could  be  persuaded  to 
abandon  the  administration  only  by  “the  actual 
conviction  of  the  existing  distress  of  the  com¬ 
munity.  Nothing  but  evidence  of  suffering 

6J.  H.  Ostrom  to  Webster,  Utica,  January  21,  1834.  Webster 
MSS. 

7  Catterall,  Second  Bank,  p.  326. 

8  The  Diary  of  Philip  Hone,  1828-1851  (Bayard  Tuckerman  ed., 
N.  Y„  1889),  I.  85. 

9  “We  know  that  a  great  part  of  the  present  pressure  arises 
from  the  change  in  the  system  of  duties,  and  other  causes  that 
are  temporary.”  Jaudon  to  Biddle,  March  9,  1834.  Catterall, 
Second  Bank,  p.  298. 


NEW  LEADERSHIP 


121 


.  .  .  will  produce  any  effect  in  Congress.”  If 
the  Bank  should  be  induced  “by  too  great  a  sensi¬ 
tiveness”  to  relax  its  policy  of  restriction,  “the 
relief  will  itself  be  cited  as  evidence  that  the 
measures  of  the  government  are  not  injurious 
or  oppressive,  and  the  Bank  will  inevitably  be 
prostrated.”10 

However  artificial  the  depression  may  have 
been,  its  effects  were  real,  and  the  city  of  New 
York  felt  them  keenly.  Hone  wrote  that  the 
year  1833  had  ended  disastrously,  that  “personal 
property  has  no  fixed  value,  and  sauve  qni  peut 
is  the  maxim  of  the  day.”11  Conditions  continued 
unfavorable  through  the  spring  of  1834  and  thus 
aroused  hope  that  the  opposition  would  make  a 
good  showing  in  the  April  municipal  election. 
Ordinarily  of  merely  local  importance,  the  charter 
election  of  this  year  was  regarded  as  an  event  of 
national  significance,  since  it  was  the  first  test 
of  public  opinion  after  the  beginning  of  the  de¬ 
pression.  Early  in  March  Clay  told  Hone  that 
the  opposition’s  one  hope  was  in  the  New  York 
and  Pennsylvania  elections,  for  success  there 
would  encourage  the  revolt  of  a  sufficient  number 
of  Jackson  men  in  Congress  to  overthrow  the 
Democratic  control  of  legislation.12  Adams13  and 

10  Biddle  to  William  Appleton,  January  27,  1834.  McGrane, 
Biddle  Correspondence,  pp.  219-220. 

11  Hone,  Diary,  I.  86. 

u  Ibid.,  I.  94. 

u  Ibid.,  I.  94. 


122 


ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 


Webster14  were  of  the  same  opinion.  Since  it 
was  regarded  by  party  leaders  as  a  first  step  in  a 
new  campaign  against  Jackson,  wide  interest  was 
shown  in  the  electioneering  and  in  the  results  of 
the  New  York  election.  The  Intelligencer  and 
Niles  commented  upon  the  intensely  partisan 
activities  there.  City  journals,  it  was  said, 
teemed  with  accounts  of  public  meetings.  Cart¬ 
ers,  landlords,  seamen,  stone  cutters,  tailors  met 
for  the  purpose  of  denouncing  the  administra¬ 
tion.  Men  of  all  professions  and  from  every 
interest  entered  the  contest.15  Committees  were 
organized  to  protect  party  interests  at  the  polls, 
and  it  was  recommended  that  “friends  of  a  re¬ 
storation  close  their  stores  and  workshops  that 
they  might  attend  the  business  of  the  elections.”16 
The  Democrats  elected  their  candidate  for  mayor 
by  a  small  margin,  but  they  lost  control  of  the 
Council.17  The  result  was  hailed  everywhere  as 
a  significant  success.18 

M  Ibid.,  I.  98. 

15  National  Intelligencer,  April  5,  1834.  Cf.  New  York  Daily 
Advertiser,  March  31,  April  1,  1834. 

10  Niles’  Register,  XLVI.  82. 

17  Ibid.,  XLVI.  115.  Earlier  Niles  had  reported  that  the  parties 
seemed  to  be  engaged  in  a  death  struggle:  “the  public  officers 
and  all  their  dependents,  with  the  friends  of  general  and  state  gov¬ 
ernments  on  the  one  side — and  the  merchants  and  traders  on  the 
other.  Business  of  all  sorts  was  nearly  suspended — at  12  M.  the 
flag  of  the  union  was  hoisted  each  day  on  the  exchange,  the 
building  was  then  deserted  and  the  stores  in  all  parts  of  the  city 
generally  closed,  that  every  man  might  go  to  the  polls.”  Ibid., 
XLVI.  pp.  100,  101. 

18  According  to  Hone,  Whig  newspapers  reported  enthusiastic 
celebrations,  illuminations,  the  firing  of  cannons  on  the  arrival  of 
the  news  in  Philadelphia,  Albany,  Buffalo,  and  Baltimore.  Hone, 
Diary,  I.  103. 


NEW  LEADERSHIP 


123 


Members  of  the  opposition  first  called  them¬ 
selves  Whigs  in  the  course  of  this  exciting  local 
election.  Political  parties  in  the  Jacksonian  pe¬ 
riod  rarely  made  a  purposive  search  for  their 
names,19  and  the  name  Whig  has  been  traced  to  a 
variety  of  sources.  Most  recently,  Professor 
Dixon  R.  Fox  credits  its  first  use  to  Colonel 
Webb,  editor  of  the  New  York  Courier  and  En¬ 
quirer,  at  the  suggestion  of  Philip  Hone.20  Other 
historians  have  discovered  it  in  the  campaign  of 
1832  in  Maine,21  Pennsylvania,22  and  South  Caro¬ 
lina.23  A  contemporary  observer  credits  it  to 
Joseph  Duane,  a  writer  on  the  staff  of  the  Star 
Spangled  Banner  in  February  1834.24  It  appears 
from  the  first  day  of  the  election  in  the  diary  of 
Philip  Hone,  an  active  member  of  the  party,  but 
the  New  York  Daily  Advertiser  used  it  only  once 
in  its  reports  of  the  campaign  and  election.25  The 
number  of  these  explanations,  supported  in  each 
case  by  credible  evidence,  casts  doubt  upon  any 
as  the  exclusive  truth,  and  the  general  acceptance 

19  The  use  of  party  names  during  the  campaign  of  1832  is  dis¬ 
cussed  in  Gammon,  Campaign  of  1832,  pp.  155-162. 

“Fox,  Decline  of  Aristocracy,  p.  367.  Cf.  Barnes,  Memoir  of 
Thnrlow  Weed,  p.  48. 

21  L.  C.  Hatch,  History  of  Maine  (1919),  I.  210. 

22  Mary  G.  Bartlett,  The  Chief  Phases  of  Pennsylvania  Politics 
in  the  Jacksonian  Period  (Allentown,  1919),  p.  77.  The  value  of 
Miss  Bartlett’s  monograph  in  this  and  other  instances  is  lessened 
by  the  absence  of  exact  citations. 

23  Cole,  Whig  Party  in  the  South,  p.  18. 

“Nathan  Sargent,  Public  Men  and  Events,  I.  362. 

20  New  York  Daily  Advertiser,  April  7,  1834. 


124 


ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 


of  the  name  in  the  summer  of  1834  may  be  at¬ 
tributed  to  a  common  appreciation  of  its  political 
merits.  It  fixed  attention  upon  opposition  to 
Jackson  rather  than  upon  political  principles  as 
the  reason  for  the  party’s  existence.  Moreover, 
its  associations  with  the  struggle  against  the 
power  of  the  British  Crown  and  with  the  cause 
of  the  Revolutionary  patriots  had  a  sentimental 
attraction  for  men  who  were  smarting  under 
what  they  alleged  to  be  an  unconstitutional  exer¬ 
cise  of  the  president’s  powers.  The  enthusiasm 
with  which  the  new  campaign  began  was  evident 
in  the  high  ground  taken  by  the  party.  Quite  in 
keeping  with  its  alleged  mission  as  the  defender 
of  the  constitution,  a  miniature  frigate,  thus 
christened,  was  hauled  through  the  streets  of 
New  York  during  the  election26  and  was  later 
taken  to  Philadelphia.27  As  evidence  of  their 
patriotic  inclinations,  business  men  ordered  flags 
to  be  hoisted  above  the  Exchange.28 

The  Intelligencer  forthwith  interpreted  the 
Whig  success  in  the  city  as  a  promise  of  a  more 
important  victory  in  the  state  election  of  Novem¬ 
ber.29  Local  elections  in  Albany,  Syracuse,  Au¬ 
burn,  Troy,  and  New  Brunswick  gave  additional 
encouragement.  It  seemed  to  Niles  that  a  real 
change  had  taken  place  “in  the  political  opinions 

28  Niles’  Register,  XLVI.  116. 

27  Ibid.,  XLVI.  130. 

“Ibid.,  XLVI.  100,  101. 

29  National  Intelligencer,  April  14,  1834. 


NEW  LEADERSHIP 


125 


of  the  people  of  this  state,  or  there  is  new  zeal 
to  give  them  effect.”30  A  movement  of  great  sig¬ 
nificance  was  taking  place,  he  believed,  and  its 
momentum  was  being  “hourly  increased  by  the 
new  difficulties  in  business  and  the  greatly  in¬ 
creased  number  of  persons  out  of  employment. 

Undue  confidence,  however,  was  placed  in  the 
political  results  of  the  depression.  One  of  the 
most  important  causes  of  the  depression  was  re¬ 
moved  when  the  Bank  abandoned  its  policy  of 
restriction  in  July,3”  and  as  the  state  banks  had 
profited  by  federal  deposits  the  administration 
thereby  gained  their  support.33  Democrats  did 
not  fail  to  press  home  the  charge  that  the  national 
bank  was  responsible  for  the  depression.34  These 
circumstances,  Hone  declared  in  October,  re¬ 
quired  that  Whig  nominations  should  be  made 
with  exclusive  regard  to  the  political  strength  of 
the  candidates.  “All  personal  feelings  and  pre¬ 
dilections  must  be  sacrificed  for  the  success  of 
our  party,”  and  “we  must  .  .  .  without  com¬ 
mitting  ourselves  to  unworthy  persons,  run  only 
such  as  will  obtain  the  most  votes.  3j  The  party 

30  Niles’  Register,  XLVI.  190. 

31  Ibid.,  XLVI.  130. 

32  Catterall,  Second  Bank,  pp.  327,  328. 

33  Hammond,  Political  History  of  New  York,  II.  435. 

34  These  charges  were  summarized  in  an  address  prepared  by 
the  New  York  State  Democratic  Convention  in  September  1834. 
Niles’  Register,  XLVII.  63. 

38  Hone,  Diary,  I.  114,  115.  Whig  organization,  he  admitted, 
could  not  compare  with  that  of  their  opponents.  Our  folks  are 
not  so  well  drilled  .  .  .  they  will  think  for  themselves  not 

like  them  go  straight  forward  right  or  wrong  as  they  are  bidden. 


126 


ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 


in  New  York  suffered  from  the  complaint  of 
divided  leadership  that  was  chronic  in  its  national 
organization,  and  Seward’s  nomination  was  the 
result  of  a  secret  bargain  among  a  few  politi¬ 
cians.36  Nevertheless,  no  effort  was  spared  to 
elect  him  in  order  to  make  an  auspicious  begin¬ 
ning  in  the  national  campaign.  Niles  reported 
that  “such  doings  as  are  now  happening  in  New 
York  never  happened  before.”37  On  the  eve  of 
the  election,  he  declared  that  the  result  would  be 
the  turning  point  in  national  politics,  for  it  would 
“decide  whether  the  principles  of  General  Jack- 
son  are  approved  and  ratified  by  the  people,  and 
whether  Mr.  Van  Buren  is  to  be  his  successor.”38 

The  elation  of  the  W  higs  in  the  spring  and 
summer  proved  premature.  In  Pennsylvania  the 
party  lost  two  seats  in  Congress  which  the  Na¬ 
tional  Republicans  had  controlled.39  Seward’s 
defeat  was  foreshadowed  by  that  of  James  Find¬ 
lay  in  Ohio,  where  the  Democratic  candidate  for 
governor  was  elected.40  Optimism  was  further 
chilled  by  a  defeat  in  New  Jersey,41  which  was 
soon  followed  by  a  two  to  one  vote  for  the  Demo¬ 
cratic  candidate,  William  L.  Marcy,  in  the  New 
York  election.42  Horace  Greeley  attributed 

33  Seward,  Autobiography,  pp.  156,  157. 

37  Niles'  Register,  XL VII.  69. 

38  Ibid.,  XL VII.  116. 

39  Ibid.,  XL VII.  118. 

43  Ibid.,  XLVII.  138. 

41  Hone,  Diary,  I.  113. 

42  Niles’  Register,  XXLVII.  116. 


NEW  LEADERSHIP 


127 


Seward’s  defeat  to  a  return  of  prosperity,43  and 
this  opinion  was  also  expressed  by  Michel  Cheva¬ 
lier,  a  French  economist  then  in  this  country  on 
an  official  mission : 

Le  retablissement  des  affaires  industrielles  a  tourne 
.  .  .  au  desavantage  de  l’Opposition  .  .  .  Le 

commerce  est  prospere  maintenant ;  la  campagne  d’au- 
tomne  a  ete  excellent;  tout  porte  a  penser  que  celle  du 
printemps  prochain  ne  sera  pas  moins  avantageuse.44 

Events  had  proved  that  Democratic  strength  was 
too  solidly  established  to  be  overthrown  as  easily 
as  the  Whigs,  deceived  by  their  hopes,  had 
anticipated. 

While  the  prospects  for  success  in  the  national 
campaign  had  been  promising  in  the  spring  of 
1834,  the  situation  was  reversed  after  the  series 
of  failures  in  local  and  state  elections  of  the  sum¬ 
mer  and  fall.  In  addition,  there  was  a  dis¬ 
couraging  absence  of  principles,  if  we  except  a 
disposition  to  oppose  Van  Buren.  Sectional 
divergences  inherited  from  the  National  Repub¬ 
lican  party  made  union  in  support  of  a  single 
candidate  improbable.  New  England  Whigs  of 
nationalist  predilections  named  Webster  as  their 
candidate;  the  southern  wing  found  a  leader  in 
Judge  White,45  a  recent  recruit  from  Democratic 

43  Horace  Greeley,  Recollections  of  an  Active  Life  (N.  Y.,  1873), 

p.  112. 

44  Michel  Chevalier,  Lettres  sur  I’Amerique  du  Nord  (Bruxelles, 
1837),  pp.  269,  270. 

43  Cole,  Whig  Party  in  the  South,  pp.  38  ff. 


128 


ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 


ranks;  while  the  party  in  the  west  hesitated  be¬ 
tween  William  H.  Harrison  and  Clay.  All  were 
unavailable  for  the  leadership  of  a  united  party. 
Webster  and  White  could  hope  for  little  support 
outside  of  their  sections.  Clay’s  relations  with 
Calhoun  and  his  responsibility  for  the  compro¬ 
mise  tariff  made  him  unacceptable  to  the  party  in 
New  England,  and  few  anywhere  had  confidence 
in  him  as  a  candidate.  Oran  Follett  informed 
him  that  he  had  been  abandoned  as  a  candidate. 

I  feel  the  force  of  what  I  say,  and  no  one  regrets  the 
necessity  more  than  I  do,  that  compels  me  to  say  you  are 
not  the  man  on  whom  the  friends  of  the  country  can  rely 
for  the  canvass  of  1836.  This  is  the  secret  conviction  of 
the  whole  National  Republican  party,  with  perhaps  a  few 
exceptions.46 

The  lure  of  the  presidency  was  too  strong  for 
Clay  to  abandon  hope  of  a  nomination,  but  in 
the  summer  of  1833  he  declared  his  reluctance  to 
accept  one  without  assurance  of  certain  success.47 
Webster’s  return  to  the  opposition48  apparently 
encouraged  him,  for  he  immediately  sounded  a 
rallying  cry  for  a  new  attack  upon  the  adminis¬ 
tration.49  The  political  situation  remaining  un- 

46  Follett  to  Clay.  January  10,  1833.  Follett  Papers,  I.  76. 

47  Clay  to  Francis  Brooke,  Ashland.  May  30,  1833.  Colton, 
Private  C orrespondence ,  p.  362.  Cf.  K.  Thomas  to  McLean,  Cin¬ 
cinnati,  August  31,  1833.  McLean  MSS. 

48  See  the  preceding  chapter  for  a  discussion  of  this  topic. 

48  “I  mean  myself  to  open  and  push  a  vigorous  campaign.  _  It  is 
the  campaign  of  1777.  I  want  aid — all  the  aid  that  can  be  given. 
Clay  to  Brooke,  Washington,  December  16,  1833.  Colton,  Private 
Correspondence,  p.  375. 


NEW  LEADERSHIP 


129 


favorable,  by  the  summer  of  1835  he  became 
convinced  that  there  was  no  possibility  for  a  turn 
in  public  sentiment  in  his  favor.50  Elisha  Whit¬ 
tlesey,  writing  to  McLean  in  May  1833,  at¬ 
tributed  Clay’s  loss  of  strength  to  the  compromise 
tariff  which  had  made  him  “exceedingly  unpopu¬ 
lar  in  all  manufacturing  districts.”51  According 
to  the  New  York  Advertiser,  a  staunch  opponent 
of  Jackson  and  a  firm  advocate  of  protection, 
Clay  was  considered  by  “many  of  his  former 
friends  as  having  in  some  measure  abandoned 
them,  and  their  interests,  as  well  as  his  own 
principles.”  Convinced  that  he  must  give  up  his 
own  presidential  ambitions,  Clay  turned  to  a  con¬ 
sideration  of  the  merits  of  the  other  candidates. 
Webster  would  have  no  chance,  he  thought, 
although  his  qualifications  were  admittedly  su¬ 
perior.52  By  September,  1835,  he  had  decided 
that  Harrison  was  the  most  available  candidate.53 
This  decision  aroused  suspicion  that  Clay  in¬ 
tended  to  dominate  Harrison’s  administration  in 
the  event  of  his  election.  A  correspondent  of 
McLean  declared:  “If  he  cannot  be  himself 
elected  he  would  prefer  one  he  could  control  as 
a  father  his  child — if  not  a  Louisianan  his 

60  Clay  to  (?).  July  14,  1835.  Ibid.,  393. 

"  Whittlesey  to  McLean,  Canfield,  Ohio,  May  3,  1833.  McLean 
MSS. 

r,2New  York  Advertiser,  July  15,  1835. 

03  Clay  to  (?),  July  14,  1835.  Colton,  Private  Correspondence, 
p.  394. 


130 


ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 


slave.”54  To  what  extent  Clay  aided  Harrison’s 
campaign  must,  in  the  absence  of  information, 
remain  uncertain,  but  his  interest  in  Harrison  did 
not  prevent  a  revival  of  his  own  ambitions  in  the 
campaign  of  1840. 

The  elimination  of  Clay  opened  the  field  to 
other  candidates,  and  McLean  promptly  appeared 
again  with  his  plan  of  placing  himself  at  the  head 
of  a  fusion  party.  In  December,  1833,  he  wrote 
to  the  postmaster  of  New  York  that  in  his  opin¬ 
ion  both  parties  in  the  West  would  support  him. 
He  feared  that  “all  the  discipline  of  the  party  will 
be  brought  to  bear  against  me,  and  the  entire 
patronage  of  the  federal  government.”55  As  in 
the  campaign  of  1832,  he  proposed  to  appeal  to 
the  dissatisfied  members  of  both  parties.  To  this 
end,  the  prospectus  of  a  new  journal  with  the 
significant  name,  The  Moderator,  appeared  in 
the  columns  of  the  Washington  Globe.  Election 
of  any  one  of  the  candidates  then  in  the  field 
would  bring  dissension  and  perhaps  disunion  to 
the  country.  “It  will  therefore  be  both  expedient 
and  necessary  that  these  candidates  yield  their 
claims  to  those  of  one  enjoying  the  general  confi¬ 
dence  of  the  people.”56  That  McLean  was  to  be 
this  highly  desirable  candidate  does  not  appear  in 

64  George  Kesling  to  McLean,  Lebanon,  Ohio,  August  10,  1835. 
McLean  MSS. 

55  McLean  to  S.  L.  Gouverneur,  Richland,  Ohio,  December  10, 
1832.  Gouverneur  MSS. 

™  This  announcement  is  signed  by  W.  R.  Collier,  who  is  other¬ 
wise  unknown  to  fame.  Washington  Globe,  June  28,  1833. 


NEW  LEADERSHIP 


131 


the  text  of  this  announcement,  but  it  is  certain 
that  his  name  was  in  the  writer’s  mind.oT  His 
plan  of  appealing  to  members  of  both  parties  was 
commended  by  friendly  politicians.  Arrange¬ 
ments  had  been  made,  Whittlesey  informed  him, 
for  assemblies  of  Democrats  from  Pennsylvania 
and  Ohio  in  order  to  decide  upon  the  best  way  of 
bringing  his  name  before  the  public.08  Accord¬ 
ing  to  Albert  H.  Tracy,  an  Anti-Masonic  leader 
in  New  York,  only  McLean  could  unite  all  ele¬ 
ments  of  the  opposition,  and  his  nomination 
should  be  made  by  men  who  were  least  objection¬ 
able  to  the  Democrats.59  Thaddeus  Stevens,  at 
this  time  an  Anti-Masonic  politician  in  Pennsyl¬ 
vania,  advised  that  he  should  first  be  nominated 
by  his  Democratic  friends.60  For  a  year  McLean 
continued  to  count  upon  a  fusion  of  the  two 
parties.  Early  in  February,  1834,  he  declared 
that  his  friends  had  refused  to  withdraw  his 
name  because  “they  know  that  a  large  portion  of 
the  Jackson  party,  if  not  a  majority  of  them,  are 
willing  to  sustain  me,  and  that  this  force  united 
with  the  National  Republicans  would  make  its 
result  certain.”  However,  he  was  far  from  con¬ 
fident  of  the  loyalty  of  his  political  friends  in  the 
opposition.  “My  impression  is,  that  they  wish  to 

*’  N.  T.  Simpson  to  McLean,  Washington,  June  21,  1833.  Mc¬ 
Lean  MSS. 

58  Whittlesey  to  McLean,  Canfield,  September  14,  1833.  Ibid. 

"  Tracy  to  McLean,  New  York,  September  3,  1833. 

“Richards  to  McLean,  Harrisburg,  January  18,  1834.  Ibid. 


132  ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 

use  me,  at  least  some  of  them,  to  break  up  the 
Jackson  party  in  Ohio  and  Pennsylvania,  in  order 
to  increase  the  prospects  of  Mr.  Clay  or  Mr. 
Calhoun.”61  Unfortunately  for  his  prospects,  he 
declared  himself  as  opposed  in  principle  to  a  re¬ 
newal  of  the  Bank’s  charter  and  thus  alienated 
friends  in  the  Whig  party.62  In  August,  1834, 
Whittlesey  warned  him  that  his  Democratic  ad¬ 
mirers  could  not  be  relied  upon.  McLean’s  criti¬ 
cism  of  the  postal  service  had  apparently  been 
well  received  in  Democratic  circles,  but  if  Barry’s 
loyalty  to  the  administration  should  be  put  to  the 
question  “you  have  not  a  friend  in  the  House  who 
is  a  Jackson  man  that  will  not  say  aye,  with  a  full 
voice,  and  look  as  if  he  meant  it.”63 

The  result  of  the  Ohio  state  election  in  the  fall 
of  1834,  in  which  McLean  had  endorsed  James 
Findlay,  the  Whig  candidate,64  was  regarded  as 
a  test  of  McLean’s  political  strength.  Success 
there,  in  Tracy’s  opinion,  not  only  would  be  a 
serious  blow  to  Van  Buren  but  would  “go  further 
than  any  single  event  to  settle  the  question  be¬ 
tween  you  and  every  other  candidate.”  Should 

“  McLean  to  S.  T.  Chapman,  Washington,  February  27,  1834 
Ibid. 

92  Thomas  Corwin  to  McLean,  May  20,  1834.  Ibid;  Whittlesey 
to  McLean,  Washington,  June  2,  1834.  Ibid;  Charles  Hammond 
to  Thomas  Ewing,  Cincinnati,  March  27,  1834.  Ewing  MSS. 
Library  of  Congress. 

93  Whittlesey  to  McLean,  Canfield,  August  14,  1834.  McLean 
MSS. 

94  McLean  to  Findlay,  Washington,  February  7,  1834.  Torrence 
Papers,  I.  Quarterly  Publications  of  the  Ohio  Historical  and 
Philosophical  Society.  I.  81,  82. 


NEW  LEADERSHIP 


133 


the  Democratic  governor  be  reelected,  ‘'it  would 
go  far  to  blast  all  our  hopes  in  this  State  and 
would  be  irreparably  injurious  to  your  prospects 
throughout  the  country.”65  Findlay’s  defeat  did 
not  prevent  a  nomination  of  McLean  by  the  state 
legislature,66  but  without  the  prestige  of  an  initial 
success  in  his  own  state  it  was,  of  course,  coldly 
received.  In  July,  1835,  the  Intelligencer  pointed 
out  his  lack  of  support  outside  of  Ohio,  and,  in 
any  case,  that  the  encouragement  given  to  Mc¬ 
Lean  was  intended  as  a  “mark  of  respect  and 
confidence  rather  than  a  serious  intention  that  he 
should  leave  his  present  position  in  the  Supreme 
Court.”67  When  it  became  clear  that  the  Whigs 
contemplated  a  scheme  to  force  the  election  into 
the  House,— perhaps  a  timely  opportunity  to 
withdraw  from  a  hopeless  contest  ,  McLean 
refused  to  become  involved  and  accordingly 
withdrew  his  name  in  August,  1835. 68 

With  this  action  McLean  ceased  to  play  a  part 
in  Whig  politics  during  the  Jacksonian  period. 
Like  those  of  his  more  notable  rivals,  his  presi¬ 
dential  aspirations  were  doubtless  founded  upon 
personal  ambitions.  Adams  declared  that  he 
thought  “of  nothing  but  the  Presidency  by  day 
and  dreamed  of  nothing  else  at  night.  69  Due  to 

“  Tracy  to  McLean,  Buffalo,  May  28,  1834.  McLean  MSS. 

86  Niles’  Register,  XLVII.  138. 

87  National  Intelligencer,  July  11,  1835. 

88  McLean  to  Moses  H.  Kirby,  Richland,  August  31,  1835. 
McLean  MSS. 

80  Adams,  Memoirs,  VIII.  587. 


134 


ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 


the  scarcity  of  his  own  letters  and  other  evidence, 
McLean’s  attitude  toward  party  politics  must  re¬ 
main  obscure,  but  it  is  clear  that  his  interest  in 
partisan  measures  was  distinctly  less  than  that  of 
other  leaders.  His  point  of  view  resembled  that 
of  Adams  in  that  he  refused  to  be  completely 
identified  with  a  particular  party  and  clung  to  the 
ideal  of  a  non-partisan  administration.  Seeking 
support  wherever  he  could  find  it,  he  opened  him¬ 
self  to  criticism,  which  was  perhaps  not  without 
foundation,  as  a  scheming  politician.  Ready  to 
accept  the  aid  of  the  opposition,  he  was  quite 
willing  that  Democratic  leaders  should  believe 
that  he  was  one  of  themselves.  In  February, 
1833,  in  the  course  of  a  plea  for  Democratic  aid 
in  Pennsylvania,  he  declared:  “Indeed,  without 
the  countenance  and  support  of  this  party,  I  have 
never  designed  that  they  were  at  liberty  to  bring 
me  forward.  Since  the  commencement  of  my 
political  life,  I  have  acted  with  this  party,  and  I 
do  not  believe  that  any  other  safe  basis  can  be 
afforded  for  the  federal  constitution.”70 

The  nullification  crisis  failed  to  realize  Web¬ 
ster’s  hopes  of  a  new  party  in  support  of  na¬ 
tionalist  principles,  but  it  helped  to  nominate  him 
on  this  platform.  He  was  convinced,  according 
to  Tracy,  that  the  union  issue  would  determine 

70  McLean  to  Ingham,  Washington,  February  4,  1833.  Van 
Buren  MSS.  The  presence  of  this  letter  in  the  Van  Buren 
manuscripts  suggests  that  McLean’s  position  was  of  some  interest 
to  Democratic  leaders. 


NEW  LEADERSHIP 


135 


the  result  of  the  next  campaign,  and  Tracy  was 
confident  that  this  consideration  would  induce 
him  to  become  a  candidate.71  Early  in  January, 
1835,  he  was  nominated  by  a  group  of  his  ad¬ 
mirers  in  the  Massachusetts  legislature,72  and  an 
address  was  prepared  citing  his  constitutional 
principles  as  the  chief  reason  for  his  nomination. 

It  is  impossible  to  reconcile  all  the  differences  of  this 
wide  land;  but  there  is  one  question  in  which  all  parts  of 
it  have  the  same  interest.  Let  that  be  made  the  rallying 
point  of  the  Whigs.  Let  us  be  for  the  constitution,  and 
the  man  who  can  best  defend  it.73 

It  was  clear  to  Webster  that  support  of  an  ex¬ 
clusively  nationalist  character  would  scarcely 
meet  the  needs  of  a  campaign.  Believing  that 
useful  recruits  could  be  found  among  the  rem¬ 
nants  of  the  Anti-Masonic  party,74  he  seriously 
maneuvered  for  their  aid.75  The  party  main¬ 
tained  a  shadowy  existence  in  national  politics,76 

71  Tracy  to  Weed,  Buffalo,  June  10,  1833.  Barnes,  Memoirs  of 
Weed,  p.  49. 

u  National  Intelligencer,  January  26,  1835. 

73  Ibid.,  March  21,  1836.  Webster  selected  the  following  slogan 
for  his  campaign :  “Our  country,  our  country,  and  nothing  but  our 
country.” 

74  Webster  to  Jeremiah  Mason,  Washington,  February  1,  1835. 
Van  Tyne,  Webster  Letters,  p.  114. 

75  In  order  to  show  that  he  was  acting  in  accordance  with 
respectable  precedents,  Webster  sought  permission  to  publish  Mar¬ 
shall’s  letters  in  which  he  had  endorsed  Anti-Masonry.  Webster 
to  Edward  E.  Marshall,  Washington,  February  6,  1836.  Ibid.,  p. 
202. 

78  National  Intelligencer,  November  25,  1835.  A  make-shift  con¬ 
vention  met  in  the  summer  of  1836.  The  New  Yorker,  August 
20,  1836. 


136 


ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 


while  in  local  affairs  it  had  a  variety  of  experi¬ 
ences.  It  remained  an  active  force  in  Pennsyl¬ 
vania  as  a  result  of  local  issues  and  of  the  personal 
influence  of  Thaddeus  Stevens.77  In  New  York78 
and  Vermont79  its  members  drifted  into  the  Whig 
party,  but  in  Massachusetts  a  division  occurred, 
one  part  going  into  the  Democratic  ranks.80  Web¬ 
ster  had  no  objection  in  principle  to  an  association 
with  them.  In  November,  1835,  the  Anti-Ma¬ 
sonic  committee  of  Alleghany  county,  Pennsyl¬ 
vania,  asked  Webster  to  prepare  a  statement  of 
his  position  with  reference  to  the  principles  of 
that  party.81  In  reply  he  declared  that  they  had 
his  approval,  as  he  understood  them,  and  added 
that  he  had  endorsed  the  Massachusetts  statute 
against  secret  oaths.82  W.  W.  Irwin,  a  member 
of  the  committee,  without  showing  it  to  his  col- 

77  McCarthy,  Anti-Masonic  Party,  p.  461. 

78  Hammond,  Political  Parties  in  New  York,  II.  439.  Cf.  Adams, 
Memoirs,  IX.  114,  115. 

79  McCarthy,  Anti-Masonic  Party,  514. 

80  Adams,  Memoirs,  VIII.  70,  71.  Cf.  The  New  Former,  Novem¬ 
ber  19,  1836.  The  Anti-Masonic  party  had  drawn  some  of  its 
members  from  the  Democrats,  and  this  element  was  suspicious 
of  the  efforts  of  Whigs  to  gain  their  support.  Henry  Dana  Ward, 
a  leading  Anti-Mason  in  New  York,  declared  that  their  interest 
was  in  votes  not  principles.  Ward  to  E.  Tilden,  New  Lebanon, 
January  9,  1835.  Van  Buren  MSS.  Adams  thought  Ward  to  be 
acting  in  Van  Buren’s  interest.  Adams,  Memoirs,  IX.  170. 

81  Harmar  Denny  to  Webster,  Pittsburg,  November  11,  1835. 
Webster  MSS.  Webster  had  been  in  sympathy  with  the  aims  of 
Anti-Masonry  since  1833.  Included  in  a  series  of  points  prepared 
for  use  on  his  western  tour  was  one  condemning  unlawful  asso¬ 
ciations,  secret  oaths  and  all  societies  seeking  to  obtain  advantages 
not  enjoyed  by  other  citizens.  Van  Tyne,  Webster  Letters,  p.  183. 

82  Webster  to  the  Anti-Masonic  Committee  of  Alleghany  County, 
Boston,  November  20,  1835.  Webster  MSS. 


NEW  LEADERSHIP 


137 


leagues,  returned  Webster’s  statement  with  a 
request  that  his  views  should  be  stated  more 
forcefully.83  The  draft  of  Webster’s  letter  shows 
that  he  then  struck  out  the  qualifying  phrase  and 
instead  of  an  approval  of  the  Massachusetts 
statute  wrote:  “It  is  my  opinion  that  the  future 
administration  of  all  such  oaths  should  be  pro¬ 
hibited  by  law.”84  Even  this  statement  was  ap¬ 
parently  not  entirely  satisfactory,  for  Webster 
again  wrote  to  Irwin  that  he  could  not  promise  to 
appoint  Anti-Masons  exclusively,  in  the  event  of 
his  election,  although  there  could  be  no  doubt  as  to 
his  attitude.85  His  efforts,  however,  were  fruit¬ 
less,  for  the  Anti-Masons  at  Harrisburg  gave 
first  choice  to  Harrison  and  the  second  to  Francis 
Granger.86  Webster  was  told  that  he  was  the 
personal  choice  of  most  delegates  but  that  expedi¬ 
ency  forbade  his  nomination.  “Ah,  but  he  was  a 
Federalist!  Damning  sin!  Never  to  be  forgiven! 
But  he  was  opposed  to  the  war  !”87 

Webster  was  the  choice  of  perhaps  the  most 
influential  of  the  Whig  newspapers.  The  Boston 
Atlas,  the  New  York  American,  and  the  National 
Intelligencer,  in  so  far  as  they  supported  a  par- 

83  Irwin  to  Webster,  Pittsburg,  November  27,  1835.  Ibid. 

84  The  corrections  were  made  in  his  letter  of  November  20. 

85  Webster  to  Irwin,  Boston,  November  30,  1835.  Webster's 
Writings  (National  Edition),  XVI.  p.  260. 

88  National  Intelligencer,  December  19,  1835.  This  nomination 
was  of  little  importance,  since  it  was  soon  rejected  by  the  Pennsyl¬ 
vania  state  committee.  Ibid.,  December  22,  1835. 

87  Charles  Miner  to  Webster,  Harrisburg,  December  17,  1835. 
Webster  MSS. 


138 


ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 


ticular  candidate,  endorsed  him,  but  he  lacked  the 
qualities  necessary  to  arouse  enthusiasm.88  It 
was  generally  believed  that  he  had  few  contacts 
with  the  people.89  His  friends  argued  that  his 
superior  qualifications  should  be  recognized  by 
the  support  of  a  united  party.  The  Intelligencer 
despaired  of  republican  government  if  the  charge 
were  true  that  he  was  of  a  “too  high  order  of 
intellect,  of  too  pure  a  school  of  politics,  ever  to 
be  chosen  President  of  the  United  States.”90 

The  growing  popularity  of  Harrison’s  can¬ 
didacy  aroused  resentment  among  newspapers 
devoted  to  Webster.  Consistent  with  their  con¬ 
servative  character,  they  wished  to  maintain  the 
standards  for  the  presidency  as  they  had  existed 
before  the  advent  of  Jacksonian  Democracy.  The 
candidate  of  the  Whig  party,  they  declared, 
should  have  all  of  the  qualifications  given  by  ex¬ 
perience  and  ability.  The  Intelligencer  cautiously 
refrained  from  expressing  openly  an  opinion  as 
regards  Harrison’s  merits,  but  its  reactions  were 
clearly  revealed  in  the  clippings  it  printed.  The 
Pittsburg  Gazette  declared  that  his  abilities  were 
not  of  a  high  order  and  that  his  name  had  only 
recently  been  mentioned  as  a  possible  candidate. 

88  In  March,  1836,  the  Massachusetts  legislature  however  refused 
to  withdraw  his  nomination  until  a  more  convincing  case  could 
be  made  against  him.  National  Intelligencer,  March  24,  1836. 

89  He  found  it  necessary  to  deny  the  charge  that  had  ever  said, 
“  ‘Let  Congress  take  care  of  the  Rich,  and  the  Rich  will  take  care 
of  the  Poor’.”  Webster  to  James  Brooks,  Boston,  August  5,  1834. 
Webster’s  Writings  (National  Edition),  XVI.  241,  242. 

80  National  Intelligencer,  March  24,  1836. 


NEW  LEADERSHIP 


139 


He  would  never  have  been  considered  had  he  not 
commanded  at  Tippecanoe.  “The  ‘hero  of  Tippe¬ 
canoe’  figures  as  prominently  as  the  ‘hero  of  New 
Orleans’  used  to  be  in  the  Jackson  papers.”91  The 
Pittsburg  Advocate  refused  to  endorse  a  man  of 
second  rate  ability.91  Whig  success  would  depend, 
according  to  the  Philadelphia  Gazette,  upon 
“Whig  principles”  and  the  “superiority  of  their 
candidate”;  defeat  would  be  certain  in  the  event 
of  Harrison’s  nomination,  and  it  refused  to  aid 
the  election  of  a  “secondary  man.”92  In  October 
the  Advocate  asserted  again  that  its  candidate 
was  “Daniel  Webster,  not  General  or  Colonel 
Webster”  and  that  the  shallow  appeal  of  a  mili¬ 
tary  reputation  was  not  needed  to  convince  the 
people  of  the  need  for  a  change  in  the  adminis¬ 
tration.  Webster  was  “the  great  man  of  the 
country  ...  we  want  no  lesser  lights — no 
stars  of  the  second  magnitude.”93  Harrison’s 
nomination  at  various  points  in  the  West  drew 
from  “Massachusetts”  a  trenchant  letter  which 
affirmed  the  intention  of  Webster’s  friends  to  re¬ 
main  true  to  his  principles  rather  than  to  support 
merely  an  available  candidate.  Men  who  were 
now  urging  Harrison’s  election,  he  declared,  had 
formerly  denied  that  Jackson’s  greater  accom¬ 
plishments  and  abilities  merited  the  presidency. 
“If  New  Orleans  in  all  its  fame  of  truth,  should 

”  Ibid.,  September  30,  1835. 

“  Ibid.,  October  24,  1835. 

Ibid,,  October  28,  1835. 


140 


ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 


furnish  no  civic  wreath  to  the  victor,  can  Tippe¬ 
canoe  supply  it?”94  These  objectors  to  Harri¬ 
son  were  men  who  clung  to  the  traditions  of 
the  Federalist  and  National  Republican  parties. 
They  were  opposed  to  meeting  Van  Buren  with  a 
candidate  who  had  some  of  popular  qualities  of 
Jackson,  and  were  equally  willing,  according  to 
the  National  Gazette,  to  support  Webster  or  Clay. 

The  friends  of  Mr.  Webster  will  act,  not  with  reference 
simply  or  mainly,  to  his  personal  interests,  but  also  for 
the  important  end  of  obtaining  a  declaration  in  favor  of  a 
powerful  and  experienced  captain  of  the  civil  order 
.  .  .  in  contradistinction  to  a  vamped  hero  of  the 

military  species,  nominated  for  his  supposed  popularity 
for  military  deeds,  and  who  has  fallen  among  the  ‘illus¬ 
trious  obscure  and  inert’  during  the  whole  time  that  Whig 
battles  have  been  fought.95 

In  September,  1833,  Whittlesey  wrote  to  Web¬ 
ster:  “the  National  Republican  party  has  de¬ 
ceived  itself  by  consulting  and  taking  counsel 
almost  exclusively  from  those  in  the  highest 
walks  of  life.  The  rank  and  file  men  however  poll 
the  votes.”96  This  consideration,  he  thought, 
would  be  a  strong  point  for  McLean,  but  in  fact 
it  brought  Harrison  into  the  campaign.  His 
nomination  early  in  the  spring  of  1835  by  a 
group  of  “Democratic  Republicans”  in  Dauphin 
County,  Pennsylvania,  assembled  “without  re- 

M  Ibid.,  December  28,  1835. 

95  National  Gazette  and  Literary  Register,  November  20,  1835. 

96  Whittlesey  to  Webster,  Canfield,  September  14,  1833.  Webster 
MSS. 


NEW  LEADERSHIP 


141 


gard  to  former  differences  of  opinion,”97  had  little 
immediate  effect.  His  increasing  popularity  con¬ 
vinced  the  Intelligencer  in  September,  however, 
that  he  had  become  a  serious  factor.98  The  Cin¬ 
cinnati  Gazette  was  convinced  that  neither  Web¬ 
ster  nor  McLean  could  be  elected  and  that  events 
showed  Harrison  to  be  the  most  promising  candi¬ 
date.  ‘‘Harrison  takes  with  the  people— why  then, 
shall  not  the  politicians  adhere  to  him  ...  Mr. 
Webster  cannot  be  elected  President — Gen.  Har¬ 
rison  may  be  elected.  South,  Wbst,  North,  East, 
all  can  support  Gen.  Harrison.”99  In  a  letter  to 
Webster,  September,  1833,  Whittlesey  inadver¬ 
tently  outlined  the  more  important  of  Harrison’s 
advantages  as  a  candidate.  The  Whig  candidate, 
to  have  any  chance  against  Van  Buren,  ‘‘must 
have  belonged  in  former  days  to  the  Democratic 
party  .  .  .  I  say  this  from  my  knowledge  of 
human  nature,  and  the  magic  influence  a  name 
has  with  the  people.  He  must  divide  the  Jackson 
party,  and  concentrate  to  a  considerable  extent 
the  friends  of  Mr.  Adams  and  Mr.  Clay. 
While  this  letter  was  unknown  to  Harrison  poli¬ 
ticians,  their  actions  nevertheless  were  in  accord¬ 
ance  with  its  counsel.  They  appealed  to  Demo¬ 
cratic  prejudices  in  behalf  of  their  candidate,  and 

87  National  Intelligencer,  April  2,  1835. 

88  Ibid.,  September  5,  1835. 

80  Cincinnati  Gazette,  September  18,  1835.  The  editor,  Charles 
Hammond,  had  supported  Clay  in  the  campaign  of  1832. 

100  Whittlesey  to  Webster,  Canfield,  September  14,  1833.  Web¬ 
ster  MSS. 


142 


ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 


carefully  avoided  a  too  close  association  with 
the  Whig  party.  The  convention  which  nomi¬ 
nated  him  at  Harrisburg,  December,  1835,  was 
called  by  a  self-styled  Democratic  Republican 
Committee,  and  an  address  was  published  calling 
upon  both  parties  for  support.  “The  democratic 
supporters  of  the  present  chief  magistrate,  the 
democratic  Whigs,  and  the  democratic  anti¬ 
masons  may,  without  losing  their  party  names  or 
giving  up  their  party  organization,  be  cordially 
invited  to  appear.”101  Harrison’s  campaign,  as 
in  1840,  largely  ignored  reasoned  arguments102 
and  relied  upon  an  appeal  to  mob  psychology. 
‘‘Harrison  stock  has  reached  a  high  premium,” 
McLean  was  informed  in  February,  1836, 
“‘drums,  pipes  and  trumpets’  is  the  cry!”103 
Against  these  methods  the  more  prosaic  Webster 
had  little  chance  of  success;  he  was  “too  marked 
by  intellect  and  independence  of  soul,”  a  corre- 

101  Niles’  Register,  XLIX.  176.  Cf.  H.  R.  Mueller,  The  Whig 
Party  in  Pennsylvania  (New  York,  1922),  p.  29.  The  Anti- 
Masonic  party  met  in  Harrisburg  at  the  same  time ;  its  candidates 
and  electoral  ticket  were  taken  over  without  change.  National 
Intelligencer,  December  24,  1835. 

102  Harrison  would  do  well,  Biddle  declared,  to  say  nothing  about 
his  principles.  “If  General  Harrison  is  taken  up  as  a  candidate, 
it  will  be  on  account  of  the  past,  not  the  future.  Let  him  say  not 
one  single  word  about  his  principles,  or  his  creed— let  him  say 
nothing  promise  nothing.  Let  no  committee — let  no  convention 
—no  town  meeting  extract  from  him  a  single  word,  about  what 
he  thinks  now,  or  what  he  will  do  hereafter.  Let  the  use  of  pen 
and  ink  be  wholly  forbidden,  as  if  he  were  a  mad  poet  in  Bedlam.” 
Biddle  to  Herman  Cope,  Philadelphia,  August  11,  1835.  McGrane, 
Biddle  Correspondence,  p.  256. 

103  P.  C.  Gallagher  to  McLean,  Columbus,  February  12,  1836 
McLean  MSS. 


NEW  LEADERSHIP 


143 


spondent  declared  in  the  Intelligencer,  “ever  to 
be  a  favorite  with  the  people  in  these  degenerate 
days.”104 

Unconvinced  by  the  growth  of  Harrison’s 
popularity  in  the  West,  the  more  prominent  of 
the  Webster  newspapers  remained  loyal  to  him 
until  his  cause  was  seen  to  be  hopeless.  Even 
then  the  Boston  Atlas,  the  New  York  American, 
and  the  National  Gazette  of  Philadelphia  took 
only  a  languid  interest  in  Harrison’s  fortunes. 
The  attitude  of  the  Gazette  was  doubtless  typical 
of  the  reactions  of  Webster’s  friends  everywhere. 
In  October,  1835,  it  declared  that  Harrison  could 
not  count  for  success  upon  his  military  career. 
“There  is  no  parity  in  the  case  of  Harrison  with 
that  of  Jackson.  The  charm  is  not  the  same. 
Many  circumstances  exist  ...  to  lessen  or  de¬ 
stroy  the  influence  of  the  new  candidate’s  military 
fame.”105  When  a  charge  was  made  that  it  pre¬ 
ferred  defeat  in  the  approaching  election  to 
success  under  Harrison,  no  ground  was  given, 
and  it  confessed  that  defeat  under  a  candidate 
whose  real  strength  would  preserve  the  integrity 
of  the  party  was  more  attractive  than  victory 
under  a  discreditable  leadership.106  Those  who 
supported  Harrison  were,  according  to  the  Ga¬ 
zette,  modelling  their  tactics  upon  those  of  the 

104  National  Intelligencer,  December  29,  1834. 

10:1  National  Gasette  and  Literary  Register,  October  28,  1835. 

1M  Ibid.,  November  6,  1835. 


144 


ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 


Democratic  party,  and  this  surrender  to  expedi¬ 
ency  was  condemned. 

This  is  a  second  resort  to  military  prestige,  because  it 
was  so  successfully  tried  in  the  case  of  President  Jackson. 
It  is  an  attempt  to  profit  by  the  same  popular  delusion  in 
order  to  defeat  the  administration  party.  We  do  not 
think  ‘the  end  justifies  the  means’:  we  apprehend  that  the 
means  would  be  more  injurious  than  even  the  success  of 
Mr.  Van  Buren.107 

So  low  was  its  opinion  of  Harrison  that  it 
declared:  ‘‘Believing  as  we  do  that  General  Har¬ 
rison  is  absolutely  unfit  for  the  office  of  Presi¬ 
dent,  we  can  never  concur  in  recommending  him 
to  it,  whatever  may  be  done  by  conventions.”108 
Henceforth  the  Gazette  took  little  or  no  interest 
in  the  campaign,  and  most  of  the  newspapers  that 
had  supported  Webster  followed  its  example. 

There  were  some  who,  from  the  first,  doubted 
the  ability  of  the  party  to  unite  upon  a  single 
candidate.  The  diversity  of  sectional  and  fac¬ 
tional  interests  was  thought  to  be  so  great  that 
political  parties  would  find  it  impossible  to  re¬ 
main  united.  “The  next  President,”  J.  W.  Tay¬ 
lor  predicted  in  September,  1833,  “will  be  chosen 
by  the  H.  R.  and  not  only  the  next,  but  a  majority 
of  the  future  Presidents.  The  candidates  cannot 
be  limited  to  two.  It  is  probable  that  there  will 
not  be  less  than  four.”109  It  was  with  reluctance 

Ibid.,  November  11,  1835. 

108  Ibid..  November  14.  1835. 

109  Taylor  to  McLean,  Balliston,  N.  Y.,  September  19,  1833. 
McLean  MSS. 


NEW  LEADERSHIP 


145 


that  the  Intelligencer  at  length  abandoned  hope 
of  unity.  In  a  series  of  articles  during  the  sum¬ 
mer  of  1835  it  attempted  to  clarify  the  principles 
of  the  party.  Frank  acknowledgment  was  made 
of  differences  “on  some  minor  points  of  politics” 
and  also  in  regard  to  a  candidate.  “We  desire  a 
candidate  who  will  concentrate  all  our  suffrages ; 
and  we  desire  what  is  impossible  .  .  .  Let  us 
go  together  if  we  can,  but  against  the  legitimates 
at  any  rate.”110  Later  it  confessed  that  the  Whig 
party  was  without  a  national  organization ;  how¬ 
ever  united  the  various  groups  were  within  the 
states,  they  had  “no  common  understanding  in 
relation  to  the  affairs  of  the  general  govern¬ 
ment.”  The  party  was  so  seriously  divided  that 
any  attempt  to  create  union  was  regarded  with 
suspicion.111 

Various  schemes  were  proposed  to  minimize 
the  disadvantage  of  divided  interests  and  leader¬ 
ship.  The  Cincinnati  Gazette  suggested  that  the 
party  might  be  consulted  in  a  “primary”  election 
with  a  view  to  selecting  the  most  acceptable  can¬ 
didate.112  In  states  like  Ohio,  Pennsylvania,  and 
New  York,  where  there  was  no  clear  majority 
for  either  Harrison  or  Webster,  the  Concord 
Courier  advised  that  identical  electoral  lists 
should  be  submitted  to  the  voters.113  The  needs 

1,0  National  Intelligencer,  July  1,  1835. 

U1  Ibid.,  July  8,  1835. 

1,2  Ibid.,  August  1,  1835. 

11S  Poulson's  American  Daily  Advertiser,  November  10,  1833. 


146 


ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 


of  the  political  situation,  however,  were  more 
clearly  understood  by  Biddle,  and  his  prescrip¬ 
tion  was  more  practicable.  He  was  convinced 
that  a  large  majority  of  the  people,  not  only  as 
regards  numbers  but  also  as  regards  men  of 
property  and  intelligence,  were  opposed  to  the 
administration.  Although  they  had  been  unable 
to  agree  upon  a  single  candidate,  they  had  a  com¬ 
mon  purpose  and  were  “fixed  upon  several  men 
who  are  acceptable  to  the  various  sections.” 
Webster  should  be  the  candidate  in  New  Ene-- 
land,  White  in  the  South,  “and  wherever  in  any 
one  state  there  is  a  strong  opposition  man — to 
vote  for  him.  This  disease  is  to  be  treated  as  a 
local  disorder — apply  local  remedies — if  General 
Harrison  will  run  better  than  anybody  else  in 
Pennsylvania,  by  all  means  unite  upon  him.”114 
The  Intelligencer  agreed  with  Biddle  in  urging 
the  “friends  of  the  constitution”  in  each  state  to 
rally  in  support  of  the  candidate  who  had  the  best 
prospect  of  carrying  it.115  Harrison  it  could  not 
tolerate,  and  when  in  the  winter  of  1835-1836  it 
became  clear  that  he  was  the  most  popular  candi¬ 
date  in  the  North  and  West,  its  interest  declined. 
Few  references  to  politics  appeared  in  its  columns 
from  January  to  August,  1836,  although  it  again 
advised  that  an  attempt  be  made  to  throw  the 
election  into  the  House  of  Representatives.116 

Biddle  to  Herman  Cope,  Philadelphia,  August  11,  1835.  Mc- 
Grane,  Biddle  Correspondence,  pp.  255,  256. 

115  National  Intelligencer,  November  28,  1835. 

110  Ibid.,  August  13,  1836. 


NEW  LEADERSHIP 


147 


Irreconcilable  divisions  and  the  resort  to  com 
plicated  projects  designed  to  prevent  the  choice  of 
a  president  by  a  popular  vote  killed  the  enthusiasm 
with  which  the  Whigs  had  started  the  campaign. 
Party  journals  made  efforts  to  arouse  lagging 
spirits.  Local  victories  were  hailed  as  prophetic 
of  approaching  success,  but  this  optimism  was  of 
questionable  sincerity.  Not  only  had  the  party 
failed  to  agree  upon  a  candidate,  but  even  as  re¬ 
gards  campaign  issues  it  had  in  few  respects 
improved  upon  the  position  of  the  National  Re¬ 
publicans  in  the  campaign  of  1832.  Divided  by 
sectional  interests,  the  appearance  of  cooperation 
could  be  maintained  only  by  continuing  a  negative 
attitude.  Whig  campaign  arguments,  as  reflected 
in  the  Intelligencer’s  editorials  and  clippings,  com¬ 
prised  a  wide  range  of  criticism  directed  against 
the  administration,— its  failure  to  carry  out 
promised  reforms,  the  president’s  arbitrary  use 
of  the  veto  power,  the  appointment  of  members 
of  Congress  to  public  office,  corruption  in  the 
postoffice,  attacks  upon  the  Senate  and  judiciary, 
the  removal  of  the  deposits  and  the  consequent 
failure  to  provide  for  the  safety  of  the  public 
funds.117  Probably  few  Whigs  anticipated  suc¬ 
cess.  Adams,  though  not  closely  identified  with 
the  party,  believed  Van  Buren  s  election  to  be  as 
certain  as  “any  event  depending  upon  popular 
elections  could  be.”118  McLean  was  informed 

n1  Ibid..  November  4,  1835. 

UB  Adams,  Memoirs,  IX.  242. 


148 


ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 


that  the  plan  to  force  the  election  into  the  House 
made  Van  Buren’s  election  certain,  “so  much  are 
the  people  opposed  to  seeing  the  election  devolve 
upon  the  House,  that  knowing  Van  to  [be]  the 
strongest  candidate,  as  lie* would  be  if  all  run, 
that  they  would  vote  for  him  to  prevent  such  an 
occurrence.”119  In  one  respect  the  Whig  party 
benefited  by  the  experience  of  the  National  Re¬ 
publicans  in  1832;  it  made  no  serious  effort  to 
bring  the  Bank  issue  into  the  campaign. 

Whig  divisions  made  inevitable  V an  Buren’s 
overwhelming  victory.  In  the  South,  White  suc¬ 
ceeded  in  carrying  Georgia,  where  he  had  the  aid 
of  the  disgruntled  elements  of  the  Democratic 
party,120  and  Tennessee,  where  Jackson’s  favorit¬ 
ism  for  V an  Buren  had  aroused  keen  resentment. 
The  South  Carolina  legislature  followed  an  inde¬ 
pendent  course  and  gave  the  state’s  electoral  votes 
to  Willie  P.  Mangum.  The  most  promising  re¬ 
sult  of  the  election,  from  the  Whig  point  of  view, 
was  the  measure  of  Harrison’s  strength  in  a 
disappointing  year.  Without  political  experience 
and  in  a  campaign  covering  only  a  brief  period, 
he  carried  Ohio,  Indiana,  New  Jersey  and  Ver¬ 
mont,  and  lost  Illinois  and  Pennsylvania  by  a 
narrow  margin.  In  New  England,  outside  the 
strongly  Anti-Masonic  state  of  Vermont,  he 

113  George  Kesling  to  McLean,  Lebanon,  August  10,  1835.  Mc¬ 
Lean  MSS. 

“°  U.  B.  Phillips,  “Georgia  and  State  Rights,”  Annual  Report  of 
American  Historical  Association  (Washington,  1902),  pp.  138,  139. 


NEW  LEADERSHIP 


149 


failed  to  poll  the  normal  Whig  vote,  not  only  in 
the  frontier  states  of  Maine  and  New  Hampshire, 
where  the  Democrats  were  usually  strong,  but 
also  in  Rhode  Island  and  Connecticut.  Massa¬ 
chusetts  was  loyal  to  its  first  choice  in  casting  its 
vote  for  Webster. 

Expediency  pointed  to  Harrison  as  the  logical 
Whig  candidate  for  the  next  campaign,  but  at 
first  it  seemed  probable  that  the  party  s  experi¬ 
ences  from  1834  to  1836  would  be  repeated.  Clay 
and  Webster  again  made  an  effort  to  keep  the 
party  loyal  to  its  traditions.  As  in  1834,  dis¬ 
turbed  economic  conditions  promised  to  make 
a  Whig  triumph  so  certain  that  the  personality 
of  the  nominee  would  have  little  practical  im¬ 
portance.  The  crisis  of  1837,  precipitated  by 
the  specie  circular  and  the  distribution  of  the 
surplus,  stimulated  a  strong  movement  against 
Van  Buren’s  administration.  It  was  said  again 
that  the  turn  of  the  tide  would  come  as  a  result  of 
the  charter  election  in  New  York  City.  Men  like 
Hone  hoped  that  the  people  would  take  advantage 
of  this  opportunity  to  express  their  opinion  of 
Van  Buren’s  “driving  .  .  .  according  to  the 
Jackson  plan.”121  The  city,  since  its  prosperity 
depended  upon  commerce,  was  especially  affected 
by  prevailing  hard  times.  Improved  real  estate, 
bank  stocks,  railroad  and  canal  shares  had  all 
seriously  depreciated  in  value.  According  to 


1,1  Hone,  Diary,  I.  89. 


150  ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 

Hone,  desirable  lots  at  One  Hundredth  Street, 
which  sold  for  four  hundred  and  eighty  dollars 
under  normal  conditions,  had  been  purchased  for 
fifty.  “The  immense  fortunes  which  we  have 
heard  so  much  about  in  the  days  of  speculation 
have  melted  away  like  snows  under  an  April  sun. 
No  man  can  calculate  to  escape  ruin.  Happy  is 
he  who  has  a  little,  and  is  free  from  debt.”122 
That  these  conditions  favored  the  Whigs  was 
clear  in  the  election  of  their  candidate  for  mayor 
by  a  majority  of  more  than  three  thousand.123  But 
the  fall  election  for  the  state  legislature  provided 
a  more  decisive  test  of  Whig  strength.  Chastened 
by  his  disappointment  under  similar  circum¬ 
stances  in  1834,  Hone  feared  that  “the  mountain 
of  misrule  in  the  state  is  too  mighty  to  be  over¬ 
thrown  by  a  single  political  convulsion.  .  .  .” 
The  results  of  a  victory  under  these  conditions 
would  be  decisive.  “The  whole  United  States 
look  to  this  election  as  the  star  to  guide  them  on 
to  victory,  and  Mr.  Van  Buren,  and  his  cabinet, 
and  his  policy  must  rise  or  fall  by  its  result.”124 
The  result  justified  the  most  exaggerated  Whig 
anticipations.  A  Democratic  majority  of  sixty  in 
the  preceding  assembly  was  changed  to  a  Whig 
majority  of  sixty-seven.  Niles  at  once  declared 
this  success  to  be  “hailed  by  the  Whigs  as  a 
triumph  of  their  principles  and  a  certain  indi- 

122  Ibid.,  I.  250,  251. 

123  Niles’  Register,  LII.  113. 

124  Hone,  Diary,  I.  277. 


NEW  LEADERSHIP 


151 


cation  of  the  downfall  of  the  present  administra¬ 
tion,”125  and  the  New  York  correspondent  of  the 
Intelligencer  arrogantly  declared  that  while 
Washington  made  the  laws,  “Rome  is  here!  You 
make  laws  on  the  Capotiline  Hill,  but  we  make 
you  and  your  principles  for  you.”126  Ambrose 
Spencer,  a  politician  and  therefore  a  more  sober 
observer,  saw  “everywhere  indications  of  return¬ 
ing  sobriety  and  good  sense  on  the  part  of  the 
people.”127 

The  period  of  Whig  success,  however,  was 
again  brief,  and  since  the  crisis  had  been  precipi¬ 
tated  in  an  odd  year,  the  trend  in  public  opinion 
in  favor  of  the  Whigs  was  not  reflected  in  na¬ 
tional  politics.  The  tide  turned  towards  the 
Democrats  in  the  following  year  with  the  im¬ 
provement  in  economic  conditions.  In  October, 
1838,  the  Boston  Atlas  summarized  the  results  of 
recent  state  elections  under  the  title  “The  Bulle- 

U5  Niles’  Register,  LIII.  117.  The  geographic  distribution  of 
the  members  of  the  Assembly  as  a  result  of  the  November  elec¬ 
tion  was  distinctly  sectional.  The  western  half  of  the  state,  largely 
settled  by  people  from  New  England,  was  true  to  its  past  in 
returning  a  solid  Whig  delegation  except  from  Seneca  county  in 
the  lake  district.  Practically  all  of  the  river  counties,  including 
New  York  City  and  Long  Island,  where  the  results  of  the  crisis 
were  most  immediately  felt,  gave  majorities  for  the  Whig  candi¬ 
dates.  The  area  between  these  strongly  Whig  regions  and  most 
of  the  northern  counties,  either  mountainous  in  character  or 
undeveloped,  elected  Democratic  members.  Statistics  of  invested 
capital  in  1840  show  much  larger  amounts  for  the  Whig  counties 
than  for  those  that  returned  Democratic  majorities.  Compedium 
.  .  .  from  the  Returns  of  the  Sixth  Census,  etc.,  (Washington, 
1841). 

1M  National  Intelligencer,  September  13,  1837. 

Spencer  to  Webster,  Albany,  April  19,  1837.  Webster  MSS. 


152 


ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 


tin  of  the  Campaign.”  Whig  governors  in  Maine, 
Pennsylvania,  Illinois,  and  Ohio  had  been  de¬ 
feated.128  Even  the  apparently  safe  state  of 
Massachusetts  elected  the  Democratic  candidate, 
a  result  which  was  aided  by  his  opposition  to  an 
unpopular  temperance  law.129  Calhoun  and  his 
friends,  never  wholly  at  ease  in  their  alliance  with 
Clay,  took  advantage  of  the  sub-treasury  contro¬ 
versy  to  return  to  the  more  congenial  associations 
of  the  Democratic  party.130  Optimistic  prospects 
had  again  turned  to  ashes  and  dust.  A  welcome 
ray  of  light  was  seen  in  New  York  where  the 
Whigs  elected  Seward  by  a  safe  though  seriously 
reduced  majority,131  a  result  that  doubtless  gave 
local  Whig  leaders  greater  influence  in  the  affairs 
of  the  national  party. 

As  a  result  of  the  return  of  popularity  to  the 
Democratic  party,  a  Whig  success  in  1840  could 
no  longer  be  considered  a  certainty,  and  there¬ 
fore  a  careful  selection  of  a  candidate  became  an 
imperative  necessity.  There  was  a  tendency  to 
turn  back  to  preceding  elections,  and  especially 
to  that  of  1836,  in  order  to  weigh  the  relative 
strength  of  the  available  candidates.  The  Boston 
Atlas,  hitherto  a  staunch  friend  of  Webster,  was 
led  by  these  considerations  to  change  its  allegiance 
to  Harrison  in  the  summer  of  1838.  According 

133  National  Intelligencer,  October  27,  1837. 

129  Niles’  Register,  XLVIII.  197. 

130  Cole,  Whig  Party  in  the  South,  pp.  46-50. 

131  Greeley,  Recollections,  pp.  129,  130. 


NEW  LEADERSHIP 


153 


to  the  account  of  William  Schouler,  historian  and 
a  later  owner  of  the  Atlas,  Harrison’s  nomination 
was  the  work  of  Richard  Houghton,  proprietor 
at  that  time,  and  of  Richard  Hildreth,  who  wrote 
most  of  the  editorials  in  the  Atlas.  These  men 
decided  that  Webster  had  no  prospect  of  being 
nominated  by  the  Whigs  and  that  the  choice  must 
therefore  lie  between  Harrison  and  Clay.  Believ¬ 
ing,  according  to  Schouler,  that  Clay’s  strength 
was  largely  in  states  which  the  Whigs  could  not 
possibly  win,  they  determined  to  unite  the  friends 
of  Webster  and  Scott  in  order  to  defeat  Clay  in 
the  Harrisburg  convention.  It  was  necessary 
for  success  that  the  party  descend  “from  the 
forum”  and  take  “the  people  by  the  hand.”132  It 
is  improbable  that  the  Atlas  was  responsible  in 
this  degree  for  Harrison’s  nomination,  but  its 
well  known  position  as  a  Webster  newspaper 
made  its  change  in  policy  of  notable  significance. 
In  July,  1838,  it  prepared  for  a  later  change  of 
policy  by  urging  that  the  discussion  of  candi¬ 
dates  be  suspended  until  the  meeting  of  a  national 
convention.133  Two  months  later  it  openly  came 
out  as  an  advocate  of  Harrison’s  nomination. 
This  change  of  front  was  due,  according  to  an 
anonymous  letter  in  the  Boston  Daily  Advertiser, 
to  a  project  that  would  fundamentally  alter  the 
character  of  the  Whig  party. 

131  Frederick  Hudson,  Journalism  in  the  United-  States,  pp. 
392,  393. 

133  National  Intelligencer,  July  13,  1838,  quoting  Boston  Atlas, 
July  13,  1838. 


154 


ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 


It  is  now  said  with  all  the  pomp  and  circumstance  of  an 
original  discovery,  that  the  Whig  party  consists  of  aristo¬ 
cratic  and  democratic  members — in  other  words,  of  two 
parties  in  one, — That  the  respective  sections  are  of  course 
under  the  influence  of  different  views,  feelings  and  inter¬ 
ests,  of  which  those  appertaining  to  the  Democratic  section 
only  should  be  consulted ; —  that  Webster  and  Clay  are  so 
affiliated  with  the  aristocracy  of  the  Whigs  as  to  have 
lost  popularity  with  the  Democratic  and  more  numerous 
and  efficient  division  of  the  party.134 

Early  in  September  the  Atlas  explained  that 
Harrison,  of  the  available  candidates,  had  the  best 
chance  of  carrying  the  states  of  Ohio,  Pennsyl¬ 
vania,  and  Indiana,  and  that  “we  .  .  .  are  of 
the  opinion  that  it  is  best  to  yield  to  a  state  of 
things  which  it  is  highly  improbable  can  be 
changed  in  time  for  the  next  election.”135  This 
decision  convinced  a  correspondent  of  the  Daily 
Advertiser  that  the  Atlas  was  ready  to  sacrifice 
the  party’s  principles.  “Every  step  in  its  pro¬ 
cedure  proclaims  the  creed  .  .  .  that  party  suc¬ 
cess,  is  the  only  measure  of  political  virtue  and 
the  only  object  of  political  action.”136 

Suspicion  was  at  once  aroused  that  the  Atlas’ 
change  of  front  had  Webster’s  express  or  tacit 
approval  and  that  he  proposed  to  defeat  Clay  by 
this  diversion.  In  October,  1838,  Clay  asserted 
that  the  Atlas  had  at  least  assumed  Webster’s 

134  Boston  Daily  Advertiser  and  Patriot,  December  27,  1838 
Three  other  letters  appeared  by  the  same  writer  in  the  interest  oi 
Webster.  Clay  was  his  second  choice.  Ibid.,  December  28,  29 
31,  1838. 

136  New  York  American,  September  19,  1838. 

1M  Boston  Daily  Advertiser  and  Patriot,  December  3,  1838. 


NEW  LEADERSHIP 


155 


consent,137  and  in  spite  of  Webster’s  disavowal, 
he  remained  of  this  opinion.138  Abbott  Lawrence, 
a  wealthy  Whig  of  Boston  and  a  friend  of 
Clay,  told  Adams  that  Webster  was  working  for 
Harrison.139  C.  T.  Congdon140  and  William 
Schouler,141  both  of  whom  were  later  connected 
with  the  Atlas ,  report  a  tradition  in  its  office  that 
proof  of  the  first  editorial  in  which  this  change 
was  discussed  had  been  read  by  W ebster  and  that 
after  a  first  violent  reaction  he  agreed  to  take  no 
public  notice  of  it.  The  New  York  American, 
however,  claimed  his  authority  in  predicting  that 
he  would  remain  neutral  between  Harrison  and 
Clay.  Webster  had  not  been  in  Boston  at  the 
time,  it  claimed,  and  moreover  he  had  not  been 
informed  of  the  impending  change.1  It  is  clear, 
however,  that  relations  between  Webster  and 
Clay  were  cool  if  not  unfriendly  and  that  Massa¬ 
chusetts  voted  on  the  first  ballot  in  the  Harris¬ 
burg  convention  for  Harrison.  In  any  event,  an 
opportune  absence  in  Europe  in  1839  provided  a 
convenient  escape  from  the  unpleasant  necessity 
of  choosing  between  Harrison  and  Clay,  and 
while  in  England  he  withdrew  his  own  name  from 

137  Clay  to  Francis  Brooke,  Ashland,  October  9,  1838.  Colton, 
Private  Correspondence,  p.  429. 

138  Clay  to  Brooke,  Ashland,  November  3,  1838.  Ibid.,  pp.  429, 
430. 

139  Adams,  Memoirs,  X.  43. 

110  Congdon,  Reminiscences,  pp.  67,  68. 

141  Hudson,  Journalism  in  the  United  States,  p.  392. 

113  New  York  American,  September  19,  1838. 


156 


ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 


consideration.143  After  Harrison's  nomination, 
Samuel  Appleton  wrote  to  Webster,  who  was  his 
father-in-law:  “Now  we  have  got  the  Clay  off 
our  wheels,  we  shall  get  along.”144 

Harrison’s  record  in  the  preceding  campaign 
made  him  the  logical  choice  for  the  nomination. 
Such  was  the  position  taken  by  the  Democratic 
Republican  committee  of  Pennsylvania.  His 
name  invigorated  the  party  everywhere.  “It 
broke  the  inviolability  of  Federal  power  and 
patronage — brought  victory  where  defeat  before 
had  awaited  us — added  state  after  state  to  our 
standard,  and  placed  the  destiny  of  the  Demo¬ 
cratic  party  upon  the  vantage  ground  in  full  view 
of  a  certain  triumph  in  1840.”145  Harrison’s 
friends  declared  that  Whig  politicians  had  op¬ 
posed  him  in  1836.  According  to  the  Albany 
Journal,  his  nomination  “then  emanated  from  the 
people,  and  in  many  portions  of  the  Union  never 
received  even  the  assent,  much  less  the  support,  of 
our  leading  politicians.”146  The  Pennsylvania 
committee  feared  the  lesson  of  the  last  election 
had  not  been  learned:  “It  was  to  be  hoped  that 
the  lesson  taught  by  the  last  Presidential  contest 

143  Webster  to  J.  P.  Healy,  London,  June  12,  1839.  Webster’s 
Writings  '(National  Edition),  XVI.  311.  Cf.  Niles’  Register, 
LVI.  306. 

144  Appleton  to  Webster,  Boston,  March  10,  1840.  Van  Tyne, 
Webster  Transcripts. 

145  Harrison’s  friends  were  referred  to  in  this  address  as  the 
true  Democracy.  His  defeat  in  1836  was  in  part  attributed  to 
the  plan  to  throw  the  election  into  the  House.  National  Intelli¬ 
gencer,  April  20,  1838. 

148  Albany  Evening  Journal,  December  13,  1839. 


NEW  LEADERSHIP 


15  7 


would  not  so  soon  have  been  forgotten,  and  that 
politicians  would  have  learned  to  consult  the 
people,  and  not  to  control  them  in  the  choice  of 
condidates.”147  A  correspondent  in  the  New 
York  American  declared  that  Harrison’s  friends 
were  resolved  “that  the  people  shall  be  heard  in 
the  selection  of  their  chief  magistrate.  They 
are  determined  that  sinister  management  shall  not 
deprive  the  people  of  a  voice  in  the  election  of 
their  President.”148  Harrison  men  were  con¬ 
vinced  that  the  experiences  of  the  party  in  1836 
should  guide  its  nomination.  “In  that  slouching 
Whig  defeat  of  1836”  so  Greeley  wrote  later, 
“lay  the  germ  of  the  overwhelming  Whig  victory 
of  1840.”149 

Those  who  were  convinced  that  success  was 
certain  under  Harrison  saw  no  reason  for  the 
calling  of  a  national  convention.  They  insisted 
that  the  people  had  nominated  him  and  that 
formal  action  was  unnecessary.  Even  in  the  con¬ 
servative  columns  of  the  New  York  American  it 
was  suggested  that  undue  delay  in  arranging  for 
a  convention  made  it  advisable  to  leave  the  nomi¬ 
nation  “to  the  decision  of  the  people,  in  their 
respective  primary  assemblies,  in  their  respective 
states.”150  The  Cleveland  Herald  recommended 

1,7  National  Intelligencer,  April  20,  1838. 

uiNew  York  American,  February  13,  1838. 

Greeley,  Recollections,  p.  113. 

™New  York  Atnerican,  February  13,  1838. 


158 


ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 


“the  speedy  and  absolute  nomination  of  General 
Harrison”  rather  than  waiting  for  the  “uncertain 
decision  of  a  far  distant  National  Convention.”151 
The  Clay  faction  and  the  friends  of  Webster, 
before  he  withdrew  from  the  campaign,  generally 
favored  the  postponement  of  nomination  until  a 
convention  should  meet.  This  was  the  position  of 
the  Intelligencer,  acting  in  Clay’s  interests,152  and 
in  the  interest  of  harmony  Harrison’s  friends 
finally  agreed.153  In  spite  of  the  personal  dif¬ 
ferences  between  Webster  and  Clay,  their  friends 
liked  Harrison  no  better  than  they  did  in  the 
campaign  of  1836.  They  still  preferred  either 
Webster  or  Clay  as  representing  the  older  type 
of  leadership.  This  point  of  view  was  expressed 
by  the  Portland  Evening  Advertiser  in  an  edi¬ 
torial  which  was  endorsed  by  several  important 
newspapers. 

We  believe  that  the  Whig  candidate  for  President  must 
succeed.  It  is  fortunate  for  us  that  the  two  great  men 
we  have  named  [Clay  and  Webster]  occupy  so  prominent 
a  station,  and  stand  so  decidedly  in  advance  of  all  others, 
that  one  or  the  other  must  as  we  believe,  be  selected  by 
the  convention,  which  all  agree  must  be  held.  The  attach- 


151  National  Intelligencer,  November  21,  1838. 

162  Ibid.,  April  20,  1838.  In  1837  Clay  suggested  that  the  nomi¬ 
nation  should  be  left  to  a  national  convention.  Clay  to  a  New 
York  committee,  Ashland,  August  6,  1837.  Colton,  Private  Corre¬ 
spondence,  p.  416. 

This  was  the  decision  of  the  Ohio  State  Whig  Committee ; 
nevertheless  Harrison’s  nomination  was  recommended.  National 
Intelligencer,  June  6,  1838. 


NEW  LEADERSHIP 


159 


ment  to  both  is  universal.  Let  the  choice  fall  upon  either, 
and  it  rests  on  one  ‘whom  all  delight  to  honor’.”154 

The  withdrawal  of  Webster’s  name  narrowed 
the  contest  to  Clay  and  Harrison  with  Winfield 
Scott  as  the  dark  horse.  After  the  election  of 
1836  Clay’s  attitude  was  receptive  in  regard  to  a 
nomination,  and  in  1837  he  thought  he  would 
again  be  forced  into  the  arena.155  A  year  later 
he  was  convinced  that  his  strength  was  increas¬ 
ing.156  However,  the  hostility  of  leading  poli¬ 
ticians  in  New  York  became  apparent  when 
Weed  in  May,  1838,  dissuaded  the  Whigs  of  New 
York  city  from  openly  declaring  for  Clay.157  At 
Buffalo,  while  on  his  northern  tour  in  the  sum¬ 
mer  of  1839,  he  declared  that  he  was  ready  to 
withdraw  if  the  party’s  interests  demanded  it,158 
but  the  Intelligencer  announced  in  October  that 
he  was  still  in  the  race.159  Definite  opposition  to 
Clay  developed  in  the  pivotal  state  of  New  York 
on  two  counts.  In  his  Taylorsville  speech  he 
adopted,  it  was  charged,  a  hostile  attitude  toward 
the  anti-slavery  movement.160  He  also  urged  co- 

154  Boston  Daily  Advertiser,  January  3,  1838.  This  editorial 
was  printed  and  endorsed  by  the  New  York  American,  January  3, 
1838. 

155  Clay  to  G.  D.  Prentice,  Ashland,  August  14,  1837.  Colton, 
Private  Correspondence,  p.  418. 

1M  Clay  to  Francis  Brooke,  Washington,  April  14,  1838.  Ibid.. 
p.  426. 

181  Barnes,  Memoir  of  Weed,  p.  58. 

188  Niles’  Register,  LVI.  346,  347. 

180  National  Intelligencer,  October  12,  1839. 

180  Niles’  Register,  LVIII.  322-326. 


160 


ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 


operation  with  the  “Conservatives”161  and  thereby 
incurred  the  displeasure  of  the  Whig  extremists, 
who  would  consent  to  no  association  with 
them.162  Francis  Granger,  former  Anti-Mason 
and  the  vice-presidential  candidate  with  Harri¬ 
son  in  1836,  was  one  of  those  who  believed  that 
Clay’s  nomination  would  be  fatal  to  the  party’s 
chances  of  success.  “It  seems  to  me  that  Mr. 
Clay’s  strongest  friends  feel  that  however  just  it 
may  be  to  give  him  the  nomination,  it  would  be 
but  to  place  a  bauble  above  his  clutch  and  leave 
him  in  a  worse  position  than  at  present.”  Ac¬ 
cording  to  Granger,  a  group  of  New  York 
congressmen  who  agreed  with  this  conclusion 
decided  so  to  inform  the  state  delegation  in  the 
National  Convention.163  Clay  in  fact  did  not 
possess  qualities  which  were  most  desired  by 
Whig  politicians.  His  protracted  experience  in 
politics  was  not  highly  valued  by  politicians 
who  understood  the  prevailing  confidence  in  the 

ia  A  group  of  Democrats  under  the  leadership  of  Senators 
Rives  of  Virginia  and  Tallmadge  of  New  York  and  known  as 
the  “Conservatives”  seceded  from  the  party  in  protest  against  Van 
Buren’s  recommendation  of  the  independent  treasury.  The  New 
York  American  refused  to  countenance  an  attempt  to  profit  by 
this  split  in  Democratic  ranks,  since  that  would  entail  cooperation 
with  men  who  once  had  been  Democrats. 

162  Francis  Granger  to  Weed,  May  1,  1838.  Barnes,  Memoir  of 
Weed,  pp.  57,  58.  According  to  Henry  A.  Wise,  later  a  member 
of  Tyler’s  “corporal  guard”  and  thus  presumably  prejudiced 
against  Clay,  the  latter  had  made  certain  pledges  which  satisfied 
the  most  extreme  Democrats  in  order  to  win  the  support  of  Judge 
White  Henry  A.  Wise,  Seven  Decades  of  the  Union  (Richmond, 
1881),' pp.  167,  168. 

163  Granger  to  Weed,  Washington,  November  (?),  1839. 

Granger  MSS. 


NEW  LEADERSHIP 


161 


capacity  of  ordinary  men.  Moreover,  his  ex¬ 
perience  was  a  positive  disadvantage  in  that  he 
had  thereby  aroused  much  personal  hostility. 
Charles  B.  Penrose,  an  Anti-Masonic  leader  in 
Pennsylvania  who  was  to  play  an  important  part 
in  Harrison’s  nomination,  wrote  to  Biddle  that 
“his  long  and  brilliant  career  in  public  life  while 
it  furnishes  much  to  admire  is  fruitful  of  topics 
upon  which  he  is  vulnerable  to  the  prejudices  of 
large  masses  of  the  people  of  the  United 
States.”164  It  was  true  that  Clay,  like  Harrison, 
could  claim  a  democratic  origin,  but  in  spite  of 
his  magnetic  personality,  he  had  not  retained  his 
popularity  with  the  crowd.  In  1835  Adams  ex¬ 
plained  this  change :  “Clay  as  you  know  rose  upon 
the  broadest  shoulders  of  democracy.  But  his 
European  expedition  tinged  both  his  principles 
and  his  deportment  with  aristocracy,  perhaps  to 
the  improvement  of  his  character,  but  to  the  loss 
of  his  standing  with  the  democracy.”165 

In  accordance  with  the  call  issued  by  the  Whig 
congressional  caucus,  a  move  that  had  been  sug¬ 
gested  by  various  state  conventions,166  the  na¬ 
tional  convention  met  at  Harrisburg,  December  4, 
1839.167  Harrison’s  friends  had  complained  that 

104  Penrose  to  Biddle,  February  29,  1839.  Biddle  MSS. 

M5  Adams  to  A.  H.  Everett,  December  1,  1835.  J.  Q.  Adams 
MSS.  Library  of  Congress. 

180  Niles’  Register,  LIV.  178.  The  Caucus  called  the  convention 
to  meet  at  Harrisburg  on  the  first  Wednesday  in  December,  1859 
National  Intelligencer,  May  15,  1838. 

107  Niles’  Register,  LVII.  249-252. 


162  ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 

the  politicians  were  opposed  to  him;  if  this  were 
true  at  an  earlier  date,  they  had  now  been  re¬ 
placed  by  a  new  group  devoted  to  his  cause.  In 
his  interest,  the  convention  restricted  the  dis¬ 
cussion  of  candidates  to  the  various  state  delega¬ 
tions  and  adopted  the  unit  rule.168  Motions  were 
introduced  for  these  purposes  by  Penrose,  acting 
in  Harrison’s  behalf,  and  by  Joseph  Sprague,  a 
delegate  from  Massachusetts  and  a  friend  of 
Webster.  This  interesting  cooperation  between 
Harrison  and  Webster  men  and  the  distribution 
of  votes  on  the  first  ballot  indicate  clearly  the 
groups  that  made  Harrison’s  nomination  possible. 
Clay  had  the  support  of  a  solid  South  and  in 
addition  the  votes  of  Illinois,  Connecticut,  and 
Rhode  Island.  The  unit  rule  nullified  Clay’s 
strength  in  other  northern  states.  Clay  won  a 
plurality  on  the  first  ballot,  but  Harrison  polled 
the  votes  of  Indiana,  Ohio,  Maine,  and  New 
Hampshire  among  the  states  under  western  or 
frontier  influences.  The  support  of  Webster’s 
friends  in  Massachusetts  also  went  to  him  as  did 
that  of  the  Pennsylvania  delegation  under  the 
influence  of  Anti-Masonic  leaders.  Holding  the 
balance  of  power,  after  casting  their  votes  for 
Scott  on  the  first  ballot,  New  York  and  New 
Jersey  later  changed  to  Harrison  and  thus  assured 
his  nomination.169  The  result  was  due  to  a  com- 

,es  H.  R.  Mueller,  Whig  Party  in  Pennsylvania,  pp.  60,  61. 

189  A  Whig  meeting  in  New  York  city  drew  up  a  statement  in 
which  the  charge  was  made  that  the  state  delegation  had  been 


NEW  LEADERSHIP 


163 


bination  of  the  western  or  frontier  delegations, 
the  Anti-Masons,  and  the  friends  of  Webster. 

Old  leaders  were  pushed  into  the  background. 
In  naming  Harrison  as  its  candidate,  the  Whig 
party  passed  under  the  control  of  men  whose 
exclusive  interest  was  a  victory  in  1840.  Harri¬ 
son  was  an  admirable  instrument  for  this  pur¬ 
pose.  Even  his  lack  of  political  experience  was 
not  a  disadvantage,  as  perhaps  the  majority  of 
votes  did  not  consider  experience  essential,  and 
as  he  had  not  created  enemies  in  old  political  con¬ 
troversies.  According  to  the  anti-Van  Buren 
committee  of  Pennsylvania,  he  would  not  make  a 
merely  sectional  appeal.  Born  in  Virginia,  he 
could  claim  “the  love  and  confidence  of  the  South,” 
while  long  residence  in  Ohio  and  his  eminent 
political  services  had  endeared  him  to  all  classes 
in  the  northern  and  western  states.  In  brief, 
“his  name  subdues  all  prejudices  and  encounters 
none.”170  Chastened  by  the  failure  of  the  Na¬ 
tional  Republicans  in  1828  and  1832  and  that  of 
the  Whigs  in  1836,  politicians  were  now  convinced 
that  the  Democrats  should  be  fought  with  their 
own  weapons.  Harrison  in  analysing  the  ele- 


instructed  for  Scott  by  the  Harrison  men.  By  this  means  dele 
cates  were  selected  who  would  change  to  Harrison  at  the  proper 
fime  Albany  Evening  Journal,  August  17  1839,  quoting  New 
York  Courier  and  Enquirer,  August  15,  1839.  Weed  relates  tot 
Harrison’s  nomination  was  decided  at  a  meeting  between  the  New 
York  and  Pennsylvania  delegations  at  which  it  was  agreed  that 
Clay  could  carry  neither  state.  Weed,  Autobiography,  p.  431. 


1,0  Nile’s  Register,  LVIII.  pp.  190,  191. 


164 


ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 


ments  of  his  own  political  strength  implied  that 
on  this  account  he  should  be  nominated. 

I  am  amongst  the  oldest  and  most  extensively  known 
of  the  Western  pioneers.  I  have  stood  in  the  relation  to 
many  thousand  of  our  citizens  as  their  commander  or 
brother  soldier.  Now,  it  so  happens  that  almost  all  of 
the  pioneers  and  old  soldiers  of  the  West  were  on  the  side 
of  the  administration,  brought  over  to  that  side  by  their 
attachment  to  General  Jackson ;  and  that  attachment  was 
produced  by  his  being  himself  one  of  the  class  to  which  it 
was  their  boast  to  belong.  He  out  of  the  way,  is  there  any 
difficulty  in  believing  that  they  might  be  willing  again  to 
give  support  to  another  of  the  same  class,  although  of  in¬ 
ferior  pretensions,  rather  than  to  anyone  whose  pursuits 
and  course  of  life  had  no  semblance  to  their  own.171 

The  failure  of  the  Harrisburg  Convention  to  sub¬ 
mit  a  platform  with  Harrison’s  nomination  testi¬ 
fied  to  its  dread  of  controversial  topics,  and  it  also 
indicated  that  success  was  the  single  purpose,  of 
the  party.  All  could  unite~tn=the_elfort  to  defeat 
Van  Buren,  with  the  understanding  that  the  de¬ 
termination  of  the  party’s  program  would  be 
delayed  until  after  the  election.  Accordingly,  the 
Intelligencer  contributed  its  entire  strength  to 
the  campaign,  although  it  had  supported  Clay.172 
Philip  Hone  was  one  of  those  who  had  insisted 
that  the  party  should  nominate  either  Clay  or 
Webster,  but  when  he  saw  the  enthusiasm  which 
Harrison’s  nomination  aroused,  the  lure  of  an 
almost  certain  victory  persuaded  him  to  support 

171  Harrison  to  J.  R.  Giddings,  December  15,  1838.  G.  W. 
Julian,  The  Life  of  J.  R.  Giddings  (Chicago,  1892).  P-  55. 

na  National  Intelligencer,  December  10,  1839. 


NEW  LEADERSHIP 


165 


a  lesser  man.173  In  December,  1839,  Granger 
wrote  to  Weed  that  “Everybody’s  trying  to 
smooth  down  the  rough  edges,  and  we  shall  suc¬ 
ceed  in  doing  it.  Southern  Whigs  seem  more 
disposed  to  stick  to  the  integrity  of  the  party  than 
I  ever  knew  them,  and  more  disposed  to  give  up 
their  peculiar,  individual  whims.”174  John  Tyler 
was  named  as  the  candidate  for  the  vice-presi¬ 
dency  as  a  means  of  attracting  the  dissatisfied 
Democratic  vote  in  the  South. 

The  Whig  party  applied  the  lessons  of  its  ex¬ 
perience  not  only  in  its  nomination  but  also  in 
-divorcing  itself  from  the  Bank  issue.  This  issue 
rapidly  declined  in  favor  after  the  disaster  of 
1832. 175  Niles  frankly  acknowledged  that  the  de- 
~feat  of  Clay  sealed  the  Bank’s  fate  unless  a 
change  of  public  opinion  should  occur.176  In  1834 
Clay  declared  that  the  Bank  question  was  a  most 
unprofitable  issue  and  that  attention  should  be 
concentrated  upon  the  President’s  usurpation  of 
power.177  Early  in  his  career,  Weed  reached  the 
conclusion  that  support  of  the  Bank  had  no 
promise:  “I  was  not  long  in  discovering  that  it 

1,3  Hone,  Diary,  I.  pp.  393,  398. 

174  Granger  to  Weed,  Washington,  December  9,  1839.  Granger 
MSS. 

175  The  Intelligencer  was  an  exception.  On  many  occasions,  it 
refused  to  interpret  Clay’s  defeat  as  a  definite  repudiation  of  the 
Bank;  one  faction  of  the  Democratic  party  was  tolerant  of  the 
national  bank  idea,  and  another  would  support  the  renewal  of  the 
existing  charter  with  modifications. 

"'Niles’  Register,  XLIII.  177. 

177  Clay  to  Biddle.  Washington,  February  2,  1834.  McGrane, 
Biddle  Correspondence,  p.  220. 


166 


ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 


was  easy  to  enlist  the  laboring  classes  against  a 
‘monster  bank’  or  ‘moneyed  aristocracy’,  and  that 
as  a  political  issue,  we  should  lose  more  than  we 
would  gain  by  it.  ...  I  steadily  ignored  the 
bank  issue,  insisting  on  all  proper  occasions  that 
it  ‘hung  like  a  mill-stone’  about  our  necks.”178 
When  Tyler  in  1841  declared  himself  against  the 
incorporation  of  a  national  bank,  Clay  insisted 
that  the  election  of  1840  had  been  won  on  that 
issue.  He  was  mistaken,  for  it  played  no  impor¬ 
tant  part  in  the  campaign.  The  Intelligencer, 
after  the  election  of  1836,  abandoned  its  per¬ 
sistent  support  of  the  Bank  and  declared  that  it 
was  no  longer  an  issue.179  This  attitude  was 
maintained  through  1837, 180  and  early  in  the  fol¬ 
lowing  year,  it  stated  in  no  uncertain  terms  that 
it  was  hopeless  to  expect  a  new  charter.  ‘‘We 
state  our  belief  and  our  apprehension,  that  there 
is  very  little  probability  that  ...  we  will  live 
to  witness  the  establishment  of  another  Bank  of 
the  United  States.  Such  a  measure  will  certainly 
never  be  accomplished  but  under  the  influence  of 
a  necessity  stronger  than  any  that  now  exists.”181 

178  Weed,  Autobiography,  pp.  371,  424.  The  Anti-Masonic  party 
after  1832  was  willing  to  sacrifice  the  Bank  in  order  to  advance  its 
own  interests.  In  September,  1834,  the  Dauphin  County  Conven¬ 
tion  in  Pennsylvania  declared  that  the  party’s  principles  must 
prevail,  “let  the  Bank  sink  or  swim.”  McCarthy,  Anti-Masonic 
Party,  p.  461.  Governor  Palmer  of  Vermont,  an  Anti-Mason, 
declared  in  his  inaugural  address  that  he  was  opposed  to  the 
renewal  of  the  charter.  Ibid.,  p.  514. 

178  National  Intelligencer,  May  3,  1837. 

180  Ibid.,  September  28,  1837. 

181  Ibid.,  February  27,  1838. 


NEW  LEADERSHIP 


167 


Whigs  became  exceedingly  sensitive  to  the  charge 
that  the  party  was  irrevocably  associated  with  the 
Bank  issue. 

‘Bank!  Bank!  Bank!  has  been  the  cry  of  alarm  re¬ 
sorted  to  on  all  occasions,  by  the  opponents  of  a  sound 
currency  and  a  safe  system  of  finance,  when  argument 
failed  them,  to  drown  the  voice  of  common  sense  .  .  . 

Before,  behind,  and  all  around  us,  we  hear  little  else  than 
execrations  against  the  Bank  and  Biddle,  Biddle  and  the 
Bank.”182 

In  December,  1838,  the  Intelligencer  declared 
that  there  was  “no  immediate  occasion  for  the 
establishment  of  another  National  Bank,”183  and 
in  August  of  the  following  year  it  asserted  that 
“the  question  of  a  bank  is  not  now  before  the 
country.”184  Thereafter,  the  subject  was  given 
scant  attention  in  its  columns.  Even  Clay  used 
much  discretion  in  his  references  to  the  Bank. 
He  remarked,  vaguely  enough,  in  his  Taylorsville 
speech  that  the  question  “  ‘should  be  left  to  the 
arbitrament  of  an  enlightened  public  opinion’,” 
and  that  he  was  ready  to  accept  another  method, 
if  one  could  be  found,  for  the  maintenance  of  a 
sound  currency.185 

Ibid.,  March  20,  1838. 

183  Ibid.,  December  13,  1838. 

18‘  Tyler,  Letters  and  Times  of  the  Tylers,  I.  625.  Quoting  the 
National  Intelligencer,  August  1,  1840.  Even  the  Bank,  which  had 
secured  a  state  charter  in  Pennsylvania  seems  to  have  given  up 
hope,  as  in  1838  it  was  quite  willing  to  affect  an  understanding 
with  the  administration.  McGrane,  Biddle  Correspondence,  pp. 
273,  274,  321-323,  324,  325. 

185  Carl  Schurz,  Life  of  Henry  Clay,  (Boston,  1887),  pp.  186-188. 


168 


ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 


Definite  issues,  in  fact,  were  at  a  discount  in 
the  campaign  of  1840.  Not  only  did  the  poli¬ 
ticians  think  it  inexpedient  to  prepare  a  platform, 
but  steps  were  taken  to  prevent  Harrison  from 
committing  himself  upon  troublesome  ques-l 
tions.186  Clay  was  ready  at  all  times  to  act  as  the 
Moses  for  his  party,  but  even  he  was  not  certain 
that  a  definite  statement  of  principles  should  be 
made.187  Much  was  made  of  the  alleged  union 
between  the  sword  and  the  purse  under  Van 
Buren,  but  the  real  strength  of  the  Whig  position 
was  in  the  general  desire,  caused  in  part  by  eco¬ 
nomic  disturbances,188  for  a  change  of  adminis- 

180  A  committee  was  appointed  which  kept  a  check  on  his  corre¬ 
spondence.  Harrison  called  it  “my  conscience  keeping  committee.’' 
Harrison  to  James  Lyon,  North  Bend,  June  1,  1840.  National 
Intelligencer,  August  29,  1840.  A  Democratic  meeting  in  Pennsyl¬ 
vania  declared  it  to  be  a  fundamental  principle  of  democracy  that 
a  candidate  for  the  presidency  should  make  a  “fair,  full  and 
frank  exposure  of  his  principles  and  of  his  course  which  he  will 
pursue  if  elected.”  Niles’  Register,  LVIII.  411.  Harrison’s  posi¬ 
tion  was  expressed  in  vague  and  general  terms  in  a  letter  to 
Harmar  Denny,  December  2,  1838.  Niles’  Register,  LV.  360,  361^ 

187  In  May,  *1840,  Clay  asked  advice  of  Clayton  as  to  making  a 

statement  of  issues.  “Favor  me  .  .  .  with  an  expression  of 

your  opinion  as  to  promulgating  anything  like  a  creed.  The 
danger  is  of  supplying  fresh  aliment  for  demagogues.  On  the 
other  hand.  I  think,  perhaps  erroneously,  that  the  Harrisburg 
convention  having  omitted  to  publish  any  Address,  our  cause  suf¬ 
fers  from  the  imputation  of  the  other  side  that  the  Whigs  have 
no  principles  which  they  dare  openly  avow.  It  is  a  safe  general 
rule  that  it  is  best  to  remain  silent  and  not  act,  unless  you  are 
fully  convinced  that  what  you  mean  to  say  or  do  is  right;  and  in 
this  instance  I  do  not  wish  to  depart  from  the  rule.  Unless  there¬ 
fore  you  and  one  or  two  other  friends  should  think  the  movement 
judicious  I  do  not  wish  to  make  it.”  Clay  to  Clayton,  Wilming¬ 
ton,  May  29,  1840.  Clayton  MSS. 

188  According  to  Weed,  “The  element  of  strength  in  the  presi¬ 
dential  canvass  was  opposition  to  the  financial  policy  of  Mr.  Van 
Buren’s  administration,  a  policy  which  paralyzed  the  industries  of 
the  country.”  Weed,  Autobiography,  p.  492. 


NEW  LEADERSHIP 


169 


tration.189  Van  Buren  lacked  the  hold  upon  the 
people  that  had  been  Jackson’s,  and  he  in  turn 
was  denounced  “not  only  as  a  graceless  aristocrat 
and  a  dandy,  but  a  cunning  conspirator  seeking 
the  overthrow  of  his  country’s  liberties  .  .  .”190 
Nathan  Sargent,  a  contemporary  observer,  de¬ 
clared  that  the  people  were  not  interested  in 
Harrison’s  capacity;  what  they  wanted  and  were 
determined  to  have  was  “a  change  in  the 
government.”191 

The  Whig  party  was  organized  in  1834  for  the 
specific  purpose  of  driving  out  of  power  the  men 
who  were  charged  with  the  responsibility  for  the 
prevailing  economic  depression.  However,  it  was 
not  at  liberty  to  select  its  candidates  or  its  issues  or 
to  determine  its  methods,  because  it  was  the  heir 
of  the  National  Republican  party.  In  this  inherit¬ 
ance,  among  other  things,  was  the  leadership  of 
men  like  Webster  and  Clay,  with  their  dissensions 
and  attachments  to  issues  of  doubtful  popularity. 
Adams  was  discarded  as  a  result  of  his  defeat  in 
1828,  and  like  judgment  was  passed  upon  Clay 
after  1832,  from  which  he  was  unable  to  recover 
in  1839.  Webster,  the  last  of  the  triumvirate, 
was  set  aside  in  1838.  Thus  the  Whig  party 
repudiated  its  old  leadership  and  turned  to  men 
who  were  ready  to  copy  Democratic  methods  and 

180  This  is  the  substance  of  a  pamphlet  written  by  Calvin  Colton. 
The  Crisis  of  the  County  by  “Junius.”  Library  of  Congress. 

,00G.  W.  Julian,  Political  Recollections,  1840-1871.  (Chicago, 
1884),  I.  11. 

101  Sargent,  Public  Men  and  Events,  I.  110. 


170  ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 

even  to  go  beyond  them.  Old  issues  were  dis¬ 
carded  in  favor  of  a  campaign  of  sentimentalism. 
This  transition  in  the  character  of  the  Whig 
party  is  implied  in  the  Albany  Journal’s  reflec¬ 
tions. 

Indeed  since  1825,  we  have  never  entertained  any  hope 
of  success.  The  Whig  party,  for  three  successive  Presi¬ 
dential  conflicts,  has  been  in  a  false  position.  We  have 
been  forced  to  fight  upon  wrong  issues.  Nor  have  we  in 
our  past  campaigns,  presented  a  united  front.  .  .  . 

But  all  is  right  now.  The  great  and  powerful  Whig 
party  is  at  last  united.  Every  incumbrance  has  been 
thrown  off.192 

In  the  flush  of  success  politicians  were  not  likely 
to  regret  that  among  these  “incumbrances”  were 
the  party’s  ablest  men  and  the  principles  for 
which  they  stood.  The  reward  was  a  brief  tenure 
of  .  power  in  1841 ;  the  penalty  was  the  disruption 
of  the  party  when,  under  Tyler,  dissension  became 
active  again. 

m  Albany  Evening  Journal,  December  13,  1839. 


CHAPTER  V 


EXPEDIENCY  VERSUS  CONSISTENCY 

“f-T'HE  political  parties  which  I  style  great  are 

1  those  which  cling  to  principles  rather  than 
to  their  consequences;  to  general,  and  not  to 
special  cases;  to  ideas,  and  not  to  men  .... 
America  has  had  great  parties,  but  she  has  them 
no  longer.”1  De  Tocqueville  based  this  opinion 
upon  his  observations  of  American  politics  in 
1831,  but  the  appearance  of  the  Whig  party  in 
1834  in  no  sense  lessened  its  pertinence.  Princi¬ 
ples  had  little  part  in  the  origins  of  the  Whig 
party.  Except  for  occasional  periods  of  economic 
depression,  the  majority  of  voters  were  Demo¬ 
cratic,2  and  therefore,  in  order  to  have  any 
prospect  of  success,  the  opposition  to  the  Demo¬ 
crats  developed  as  an  alliance  of  all  who  were 
dissatisfied  with  the  Democratic  control  of  the 

'Alexis  C.  de  Tocqueville,  Democracy  in  America  (Cambridge, 
1873),  I.  p.  226. 

3  Van  Buren  believed  that  “experience  had  satisfactorily  demon¬ 
strated  the  fact  that  as  to  the  two  great  parties  which  divided 
the  country  the  spontaneous  feelings  of  a  large  majority  of  the 
People  were  on  our  side;  that  whenever  we  were  defeated  the 
result  could  be  traced  to  specific  and  extraneous  causes.  .  . 

Van  Buren,  Autobiography,  p.  222. 


172 


ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 


government.3  The  addition  of  Anti-Masons  dur¬ 
ing  and  after  the  campaign  of  1832  and  of  the 
“Conservatives”4  in  1837  brought  in  elements 
that  were  hostile  to  the  Bank  issue.  The  cooper¬ 
ation  of  Calhoun  and  Clay’s  compromise  of  1833 
created  differences  upon  the  tariff.  In  1834 
Adams  complained  that  all  parties  had  abandoned 
his  scheme  of  internal  improvements. 

My  own  system  of  administration,  which  was  to  make 
the  national  domain  the  inexhaustible  fund  for  progress¬ 
ive  and  unceasing  internal  improvement,  has  failed.  Sys¬ 
tematically  renounced  and  denounced  by  the  present  Ad¬ 
ministration,  it  has  been  undisguisedly  abandoned  by  H. 
Clay,  ingloriously  deserted  by  J.  C.  Calhoun  and  silently 
given  up  by  D.  Webster.  These  are  the  opposition  as¬ 
pirants  to  the  Presidential  succession,  not  one  of  them 
having  a  system  of  administration  which  he  would  dare 
to  avow,  and  at  this  time  scarcely  linked  together  by  the 

3  Whig  Almanac  and  United  States  Register  (N.  Y.,  1838), 

p.  3.  Cf„  Wise,  Seven  Decades,  pp.  165-167.  Adams  analyzed  the 
various  elements  of  the  Whig  party  in  December,  1835.  “The  op¬ 
position  to  Van  Buren  consists  1.  Of  part  of  the  Southern  democ¬ 
racy:  deserters  from  Jacksonism  in  two  divisions — one  of  Cal¬ 
houn  nullifiers,  chiefly  confined  to  South  Carolina.  .  .  .  The 

other  of  White  Tennesseans.  .  .  .  They  will  probably  unite 
all  the  servile  votes  of  the  South.  I  mean  all  the  votes  which  will 
be  biased  exclusively  by  slave  holding  passions,  prejudices  and 
panic.  ...  2.  Of  western  Clay  Democrats  or  rather  all  Clay 
Democrats.  ...  3.  The  Webster  federalists.  All  the  rem¬ 
nants  of  blue-light  federalism  have  rallied  together  and  made 
Webster  their  forlorn  hope.  ...  4.  The  Pennsylvania  and 

perhaps  the  Vermont  Anti-Masons  ...  5.  The  Wolf  portion 

of  the  Pennsylvania  democracy.  .  .  .  It  is  needless  to  say  that 

of  these  five  parties  .  .  .  there  are  no  two  that  hold  any  great 

political  principle  in  common.  Most  of  them  call  themselves 
Whigs,  only  for  the  sake  of  calling  their  adversaries  Tories.” 
Adams  to  A.  H.  Everett,  Washington,  December  1,  1835.  J.  Q. 
Adams  MSS. 

4  The  “Conservatives.”  many  of  whom  owned  stock  in  New  York 
state  banks,  wished  to  maintain  the  pet  bank  system. 


EXPEDIENCY  VERSUS  CONSISTENCY  173 

brittle  bond  of  common  opposition  to  the  unprincipled 
absurdities  of  the  present  incumbent.5 

The  American  System,  with  its  subsidiary  issues, 
accordingly  was  either  frankly  rejected  or  tacitly 
adjourned  to  a  more  favorable  occasion.  Loyalty 
to  no  definite  principles  or  issue,  except  that  of 
ousting  Van  Buren,  according  to  Weed  in  1839, 
was  required  in  order  to  be  a  good  Whig.  ’  The 
party,  he  declared,  included  all  those  who  were 
convinced  that  the  Democrats  were  responsible 
for  hard  times  and  that  therefore  they  should  be 
driven  from  office.  “He  who  thus  believes  from 
the  evidence  presented  to  his  mind,  and  acts  in 
accordance  with  that  belief,  is  a  Whig,  no  matter 
by  what  name  he  has  been  or  is  called.”6 

Divided  upon  principles,  the  opposition  had  to 
contend  with  other  disruptive  influences.  This 
study  reveals  the  remarkable  ease  with  which 
political  leaders  changed  their  party  ties  in  the 
Jacksonian  period.  More  concerned  with  the 
interests  of  his  section  than  with  those  of  any 
party,  Calhoun  first  abandoned  the  Democrats  in 
1832  and,  after  a  brief  union  with  the  Whigs, 
returned  to  his  former  allegiance  in  1838.  Mc¬ 
Lean  repeatedly  followed  the  will  o’  the  wisp  of 
a  fusion  party.  Webster  dallied  in  1833  with  the 
idea  of  a  nationalist  party  with  himself  and  Jack- 
son  as  its  leaders.  This  instability  was  in  part 


8  Adams,  Memoirs,  IX.  160. 

8  Albany  Evening  Journal,  November  25,  1839. 


174  ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 

due  to  the  absence  of  a  permanent  and  well- 
defined  party  organization  and  to  the  consequent 
absence  "of^party  discipline.  The  ambitions  of 
leaders  who  could  not  resist  the  lure  of  the  presi¬ 
dency  also  contributed  to  the  persistent  confusion 
within  the  opposition.  Almost  without  exception 
its  chieftains  considered  ways  and  mean  of 
winning  the  Anti-Masonic  nomination  in  1832. 
However,  political  issues  played  a  too  important 
part  to  label  this  a  period  of  merely  personal 
politics.  When  party  lines  were  broken,  as  they 
frequently  were,  it  was  usually  the  result  of 
differences  upon  political  questions. 

There  was  also  danger  that  the  party  would 
split  along  sectional  lines.  While  this  was  a  pos¬ 
sible  result  of  the  tariff  issue,7  unity  was  more 
seriously  threatened  by  the  slavery  question.  The 
South  was  forced  into  a  defensive  position  by 
the  abolition  movement,  and  sectional  solidarity, 
already  advocated  against  the  protective  tariff, 
was  thereby  immensely  strengthened.  Abolition 
had  its  origins  in  a  humanitarian  movement 
which  had  no  relation  to  parties.  Nevertheless, 
according  to  a  Connecticut  newspaper,  there  were 
politicians  in  each  party  who  wished  to  fasten 
the  responsibility  for  it  upon  their  opponents. 
“All  this  we  regret  to  see.  We  do  not  believe 
that  either  party,  as  such,  have  had  any  concern 
in  promoting  the  cause  of  the  abolitionists.  The 

'  This  of  course  was  a  contributing  factor  in  the  support  which 
the  South  gave  to  Judge  White  in  1836. 


EXPEDIENCY  VERSUS  CONSISTENCY 


175 


leaders  of  both  parties  have  sagacity  enough  to 
see  that  there  is  nothing  to  be  gained  by  such  a 
connection.”8  When  the  flood  of  anti-slavery 
petitions  in  the  House  of  Representatives  precipi¬ 
tated  the  struggle  over  the  right  of  petition,  it 
was  clear  that  the  slavery  question  endangered 
party  unity  in  the  common  purpose  of  defeating 
the  Democratic  administration.  The  South  im¬ 
mediately  took  alarm  and  insisted  that  the  federal 
government  should  in  no  way  concern  itself  with 
the  question.  Its  policy,  as  expressed  in  the  gag 
resolutions,  of  not  allowing  a  hearing  for  the 
petitions,  was  not  only  a  tactical  blunder  which  at 
once  involved  the  right  of  petition ;  but  an  analy¬ 
sis  of  the  votes  upon  these  resolutions  shows  a 
perfect  sectional  alignment  between  northern  and 
southern  Whigs.9  Northern  Whigs  declared  on 

8  National  Intelligencer,  October  3,  1835,  quoting  the  Courant. 

8  The  first  of  the  gag  resolutions,  third  of  a  series  of  resolutions 
by  Pinckney  of  South  Carolina,  was  adopted  by  the  House,  May 
26,  1836,  as  a  result  of  a  combination  of  the  Democratic  members 
of  both  sections  and  of  the  southern  Whigs  with  only  two  excep¬ 
tions.  Congressional  Globe,  24  Congress,  1  Session,  p.  505.  When 
it  was  decided  in  the  following  session,  January  9,  1837,  to  receive 
and  then  to  table  anti-slavery  petitions,  the  same  division  occurred 
within  the  Whig  party.  On  this  occasion,  however,  northern 
Democrats  voted  with  the  Whigs  of  that  section  in  favor  of 
receiving  the  petitions.  Ibid.,  24  Congress,  2  Session,  pp.  79,  80. 
On  January  18,  1837,  the  House  returned  to  the  policy  of  the 
preceding  session,  that  is  to  table  the  petitions  by  adopting  the 
Hawes  resolution  by  a  vote  of  almost  two  to  one.  All  but  eight 
of  the  southern  Whigs  voted  for  it,  while  only  three  of  the 
northern  wing  of  the  party  supported  the  resolution.  House  Jour¬ 
nal,  24  Congress,  2  Session,  p.  236.  The  sectional  alignment  within 
the  party  appeared  again  in  the  vote  which  defeated  the  resolution 
to  censure  Adams,  February  9,  1837.  On  this  issue,  the  northern 
Whigs  refused  to  act  with  their  southern  associates  against  him. 
Ibid.,  24  Congress.  2  Session,  p.  364.  When  the  more  extreme 
resolution  for  the  purpose  of  silencing  the  anti-slavery  agitation 


176 


ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 


the  floor  of  the  House  that  the  Democrats  were 
responsible  for  violating  the  right  of  petition  in 
that  the  gag  resolutions  could  not  have  passed 
without  their  practically  solid  support.  The  same 
charge  could  be  made,  however,  with  equal  justice 
against  the  southern  wing  of  their  own  party,  and 
therefore,  as  by  common  consent,  Whig  news¬ 
papers  gave  little  attention  to  debates  in  Congress 
on  the  right  of  petition  or  to  the  slavery  question 
in  general.10  In  January,  1839,  the  Intelligencer 
declared  that  it  had  no  intention  of  discussing 
any  aspect  of  slavery.11  The  question  cut  across 
both  parties,  and  therefore  Democrats  as  well  as 

so  far  as  the  House  was  concerned  was  adopted,  December  21, 
1837,  a  perfect  sectional  division  took  place  within  the  party.  Not 
a  southern  or  a  northern  Whig  departed  from  his  sectional  alle¬ 
giance.  Ibid.,  25  Congress,  2  Session,  p.  129. 

10  Charles  Shepard,  a  Democratic  member  of  the  House  from 
North  Carolina,  in  an  address  to  his  constituents,  December,  1838, 
drew  a  moral  from  the  votes  on  the  gag  resolutions.  “I  am  far 
from  saying  that  all  the  northern  Whigs  are  favorable  to  the 
schemes  of  these  misguided  people  [the  Abolitionists],  but  Mr. 
Van  Buren  having  early  taken  ground  against  them,  and  his 
friends  in  Congress  having  voted  with  the  southern  delegation 
thereby  incurring  the  hatred  of  the  fanatics,  whilst  the  Whigs 
have  received  their  thanks  and  praises,  it  is  not  unreasonable  to 
conclude  that  one  party  is  much  sounder  than  the  other.”  Niles’ 
Register,  LV.  p.  341. 

11  National  Intelligencer,  January  7,  1839.  The  question  of  the 
disposal  of  the  public  lands  also  threatened  the  unity  not  only  of 
the  Whig  but  also  of  the  Democratic  party.  At  first,  the  South 
and  the  West  were  united  against  the  East  in  favor  of  the  pre¬ 
emption  act  of  1830.  Clay  consistently  acted  with  the  East  in 
opposing  a  liberal  treatment  of  the  squatter,  and  in  1838  he  was 
supported  by  Calhoun  who  recommended  the  cession  of  the  public 
lands  to  the  states.  This  question  could  not  be  made  a  party 
issue,  however,  because  of  the  greater  influence  of  the  sectional 
interests  involved.  B.  H.  Hibbard,  A  History  of  the  Public  Land 
Policies  (N.  Y.,  1924),  pp.  152-258. 


EXPEDIENCY  VERSUS  CONSISTENCY 


177 


Whigs  tacitly  agreed  that  the  question  should  not 
be  made  a  political  issue. 

The  Whig  party  was  constantly  threatened  by 
these  disruptive  tendencies,  but  a  variety  of  influ¬ 
ences  were  also  operating  in  the  direction  of  a 
real  union.  Jackson  and  Van  Buren  aroused  an 
intensity  of  dislike  that  often  obscured  minor 
differences.  The  attitude  of  many  Whigs  was 
expressed  in  November,  1834,  in  a  letter  from 
Thurlow  Weed  to  Francis  Granger.  He  would 
have  few  regrets  for  the  failure  of  the  party  in 
the  recent  New  York  election  “if  our  defeats 
were  not  victories  for  those  I  hate,  and  who  ought 
to  be  hated.”12  There  was  a  general  agreement 
that  the  control  of  the  government  was  in  danger¬ 
ous  hands  and  that  rotation  in  office  was  under¬ 
mining  sound  principles.  According  to  a  Whig 
pamphlet,  published  in  1835,  before  Jackson’s  ad¬ 
ministration  “Office  was  considered  as  a  public 
commission  created  for  the  service  of  the  people, 
as  the  state  itself  is  constituted  for  their  benefit. 
The  emoluments  of  the  office  were  not  held  to  be 
the  object  of  its  creation  .  .  .  change  in  office 
was  deemed  a  misfortune.  .  .  .”13  Jackson  had 
departed  from  this  wise  policy  in  introducing  the 
practice  of  rotation  in  office. 

What  is  this  doctrine?  It  is,  that  offices  are  estab¬ 
lished,  not  as  the  necessary  means  of  administering  the 
Government,  but  for  the  support  of  individuals  at  the 

“Weed  to  Granger,  Albany,  November  23,  1834.  Granger  MSS. 

13  The  Political  Mirror,  a  Revietv  of  Jacksonianism  (N.  Y., 
1835),  pp.  6,  7. 


178 


ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 


public  expense,  and  that  the  incumbents  are  to  be  removed, 
from  time  to  time,  as  the  people  generally  may  partake  of 
official  emolument.  The  immediate  effect  of  the  doctrine 
is  to  awaken  the  cupidity  of  all  the  idle  and  ambitious 
of  the  land ;  to  turn  them  from  every  consideration  of 
patriotism  in  the  formation  of  party  attachments,  and  to 
substitute  for  it,  a  blind  devotion  to  powerful  leaders. 
It  holds  out  the  idea  that  all  men  are  qualified  for  all 
offices,  and  decries  the  value  of  experience,  faithfulness 
and  skill.14 

Whigs  were  agreed  that  the  quality  of  the  new 
office-holders  was  extremely  low.  An  anonymous 
contributor  in  the  Intelligencer  declared  in  one  of 
a  series  of  commemorative  articles  after  the  death 
of  John  Marshall  that  ‘‘men  have  jutted  up  into 
public  station  to  which  they  would  no  more  have 
aspired  in  the  days  of  Washington  than  they 
would  have  attempted  to  subvert  the  order  of 
nature.”15  According  to  J.  B.  Derby,  a  former 
Federalist  who  had  supported  Jackson  until  the 
removal  of  the  deposits  in  1833,  the  Massachu¬ 
setts  Democrats  “sought  recruits  only  in  the 
kennels  and  gutters,”16  and  their  organization  ob¬ 
tained  “under  Jackson  .  .  .  every  lucrative 
office  in  Boston  in  the  gift  of  the  President.”17 

Much  use  was  made  by  Whigs  of  an  alleged 
unconstitutional  extension  of  the  executive  pow¬ 
ers.  According  to  the  Intelligencer  in  December, 
1829,  Jackson’s  pronouncements  on  foreign  af- 

uIbid.,  p.  7. 

13  National  Intelligencer,  August  22,  1835. 

19  J.  B.  Derby,  Political  Reminiscences  (Boston.  1835),  p.  25. 

"Ibid.,  p.  13. 


EXPEDIENCY  VERSUS  CONSISTENCY  179 

fairs  “sound,  for  a  Republican  President,  rather 
too  imperially.”18  The  next  year,  in  connection 
with  the  Maysville  Road  veto,  it  declared  that  the 
president  had  no  power,  as  Jackson  had  alleged  in 
his  veto  message,  to  instruct  Congress  as  to  the 
bills  it  should  not  pass.19  After  Jackson’s  veto  of 
the  bill  to  recharter  the  National  Bank,  the  Intelli¬ 
gencer  protested  that  the  president  should  have 
no  power  to  defeat  the  will  of  the  people  as  ex¬ 
pressed  through  a  clear  majority  in  both  houses,20 
and,  after  the  removal  of  the  deposits,  it  advised 
Congress  not  to  pass  “any  appropriation  or  money 
bills  of  any  nature  whatsoever,  until  they  have 
vindicated  the  rights  which  the  Executive  has 
determined  to  outrage,  and  secured  them  against 
further  infraction  or  invasion  from  that 
source.”21  Niles  declared,  in  regard  to  the  Mays¬ 
ville  Road  veto,  that  the  framers  of  the  constitu¬ 
tion  had  not  intended  that  the  veto  should  be  used 
against  bills  originating  in  the  House  of  Repre¬ 
sentatives,  and  that  in  his  opinion  only  those 
should  be  vetoed  that  were  declared  unconstitu¬ 
tional  by  the  attorney  general  or  by  the  chief 
justice  of  the  Supreme  Court  upon  the  presi¬ 
dent’s  request  for  an  opinion.22  Whig  opinion  as 
to  the  proper  relations  between  the  president  and 

18 National  Intelligencer,  December  12,  1829. 

"Ibid.,  June  24,  1830. 

*  Ibid.,  July  14,  1832. 

21  Ibid.,  October  7,  1833. 

“  Niles’  Register,  XL.  146. 


180 


ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 


cabinet  officers  varied  at  different  times.  When 
Jackson’s  cabinet  was  dissolved  in  1831,  Niles  as¬ 
serted  that  “the  secretaries  are  only  as  clerks  of 
the  president,  presumed  to  have  no  will  or  power 
in  themselves  unless  specially  delegated,”23  and  in 
1840  Clay  took  the  opposite  position  in  claiming 
that  they  should  be  merely  under  the  general 
supervision  of  the  president.24  Differences  also 
appeared  in  regard  to  Jackson’s  practice  of  ap¬ 
pealing  directly  to  the  people.  The  Intelligencer 
saw  nothing  to  criticize  in  the  President  address¬ 
ing  the  people  in  his  message  vetoing  the  Mays- 
ville  Road  bill.  “The  President  is  responsible  to 
the  People,  and  they  have  a  right  to  pass  on  his 
official  acts.  It  is  but  just,  therefore,  that  he 
should  be  heard  in  vindication  of  his  official 
acts.”25  Webster  in  his  famous  speech  in  New 
York  March,  1837,  denied  that  the  president  was 
in  any  special  sense  the  representative  of  the  peo¬ 
ple  ;  if  he  were,  there  was  no  limit  to  the  powers 
he  could  claim.26 

I  The  position  of  the  Whigs  varied  according  to 
particular  circumstances,  but  they  were  consis¬ 
tent  in  their  vague  criticism  of  the  expansion 
of  executive  power.  After  the  National  Gazette 
abandoned  its  hope  in  1833  of  a  modification  of 

23  Ibid.,  XL.  145. 

uIbid„  LVIII.  322-326.  Members  of  the  cabinet  should  be  held 
responsible,  Clay  thought,  by  means  of  impeachment. 

25  National  Intelligencer,  June  19,  1830. 

26  Webster,  Writings  (National  Edition),  XI.  210. 


EXPEDIENCY  VERSUS  CONSISTENCY 


181 


Jackson’s  Bank  policy  by  means  of  Webster’s  in¬ 
fluence,  it  expressed  the  Whig  point  of  view  in 
no  uncertain  terms. 

Presidential  power,  as  claimed  and  exercised,  nullifies 
laws  and  charters — is  limited  only  by  personal  desire  and 
will,— and  reduces  the  first  functionaries  in  the  depart¬ 
ments  to  a  subserviency  as  slavish  and  indefinite  and 
dependence  as  degrading  and  complete  as  any  which  ever 
existed  at  the  footstool  of  Asiatic  despots.27 

The  Senate,  according  to  one  of  McLean’s  corre¬ 
spondents  in  May,  1834,  was  the  single  safeguard 
against  an  irresponsible  executive.  Let  it  be  re¬ 
moved  and  what  remains — an  ambitious  Presi¬ 
dent  with  one  foot  upon  the  constitution  of  his 
country,  the  other  on  the  revenue — the  sword  of 
state  brandishing  in  his  hands  while  he  dictates  to 
a  corrupt  and  crouching  house  the  terms  of  its 
precarious  and  slender  existence.  "8  Edward 
Everett  declared  in  the  summer  of  1834  that  the 
whole  force  of  party  discipline  was  used  by  the 
President  to  enforce  his  will  upon  the  House.29 
According  to  Adams,  the  balance  of  power  had 
shifted  from  Congress  to  the  President. 

There  is  a  tone  of  insolence  and  insult  in  his  inter¬ 
course  with  both  Houses  of  Congress,  especially  since  his 
reelection,  which  never  was  witnessed  between  the  Ex 
ecutive  and  legislature  before.  The  domineering  has 
heretofore  been  usually  on  the  side  of  the  legislative 

27  National  Gazette  and  Literary  Register,  November  26,  1833. 

28  J.  McMahon  to  McLean,  St.  Clairsville,  Ohio.,  May  28,  1834. 
McLean  MSS. 

2"  Niles’  Register,  XLVI.  p.  452. 


182 


ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 


bodies  to  the  Executive,  and  Clay  has  not  been  sparing  in 
his  use  of  it.  He  is  now  paid  in  his  own  coin.30 

In  the  campaign  of  1840,  Harrison  made  use  of 
the  Whig  dislike  of  executive  power  as  a  means 
of  avoiding  definite  pledges.  “Congress  should 
be  left  as  much  as  possible  untrammelled  by  ex¬ 
ecutive  influence,”  he  wrote  to  the  Whig  com¬ 
mittee  of  the  New  York  legislature,  “and  .  .  . 
a  better  guarantee  for  a  correct  conduct  of  a  chief 
magistrate  may  be  found  in  his  character  and  the 
course  of  his  former  life,  than  in  pledges  and 
opinions  given  during  the  pendency  of  a  doubtful 
contest.  .  .  He  believed  that  there  was  no 
constitutional  justification  for  making  the  execu¬ 
tive  “a  constituent  branch  of  the  legislature.”31 

Whigs  were  especially  aroused  by  the  alleged 
domination  of  Congress,  and  particularly  of  the 
House  of  Representatives,  by  the  executive 
department.  Newspapers,  pamphlets,  and  the 
speeches  of  party  leaders  made  this  their  chief 
stock  in  trade.  Attacking  the  attitude  of  the 
executive  in  his  relations  with  Congress,  much 
was  naturally  said  of  the  necessity  for  the  inde¬ 
pendence  of  the  legislative  department.  The  at- 

30  Adams,  Memoirs ,  IX.  51.  In  April,  1839,  the  Intelligencer 
quoted  the  Harrisburg  Reporter,  described  as  the  Democratic 
organ  in  Pennsylvania,  to  the  effect  that  an  amendment  would  be 
submitted  by  the  legislature  removing  the  life  tenure  of  the  federal 
judiciary.  National  Intelligencer,  April  18,  1839. 

31  Niles’  Register,  LVIII.  p.  294.  “The  habit,’’  he  declared,  “of 
considering  the  individual  [i.  e.  the  President]  as  the  source  from 
which  all  the  measures  of  government  should  emanate  is  degrad¬ 
ing  to  a  republic  and  of  the  most  dangerous  tendency.”  Cf.  Ibid. 
LVIX.  pp.  70-71. 


EXPEDIENCY  VERSUS  CONSISTENCY 


183 


tention  devoted  to  this  topic  and  the  immense 
amount  of  campaign  material  of  which  this  is 
the  central  theme  persuaded  older  historians  to 
interpret  the  Whig  party  in  the  light  of  political 
science  by  reading  into  it  a  defence  of  congres¬ 
sional  as  opposed  to  presidential  government.32  It 
was  obviously  the  exigencies  of  practical  politics 
that  brought  the  Whigs  to  the  defense  of  Con¬ 
gress  against  the  powers  of  the  president,  rather 
than  a  general  agreement  in  support  of  a  theory 
of  congressional  government.  It  was  not  so  much 
the  extension  of  the  president’s  powers  that 
aroused  the  anger  of  the  Whigs  as  it  was  the 
character  and  the  party  ties  of  Jackson  and  Van 
Buren.  The  Whig  defense  of  Congress  was  the 
necessary  result  of  the  charges  of  executive  en¬ 
croachment.  However,  when  an  opportunity  ap¬ 
peared  in  1837  for  a  direct  issue  with  the  Van 
Buren  administration  in  regard  to  the  executive 
control  of  the  House,  the  Whig  party  refused  to 
take  davantage  of  it  and  decided  to  continue  its 
policy  of  criticising  the  expansion  of  executive 
power  in  somewhat  vague  terms. 

Richard  Fletcher,  a  member  of  the  twenty-fifth 
Congress  from  Boston,  in  the  course  of  a  speech 
delivered  in  Faneuil  Hall  in  November,  1837,  de¬ 
clared  that  the  business  of  the  House  during  the 

82  J.  W.  Burgess,  The  Middle  Period  (N.  Y.,  1904),  pp.  281-284. 
Cf.,  William  MacDonald,  Jacksonian  Democracy,  pp.  294,  295.  1  his 
interpretation  of  the  Whig  party  appeared  in  a  campaign  pamphlet 
by  J.  P.  Kennedy  in  1844.  Defence  of  the  Whigs,  by  a  member  of 
the  Twenty  Seventh  Congress  (J.  P.  Kennedy),  pp.  12,  48,  49. 


184 


ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 


extra  session,  which  had  been  called  to  deal  with 
the  existing  financial  crisis,  had  been  controlled 
at  every  step  by  the  heads  of  departments  and 
by  the  President.  This  control  was  exercised 
through  the  committee  on  ways  and  means  of 
whose  nine  members  only  two  were  opposed  to 
the  administration. 

The  committee,  you  imagine,  look  over  the  message, 
see  what  is  recommended  to  be  done  for  the  benefit  of  the 
country;  consult  together  as  to  the  best  measures;  and 
lay  the  results  of  their  deliberations  before  the  House. 

I  once  entertained  the  same  ideas ;  but  I  soon 
found  my  error.  .  .  .  The  chairman  of  the  commit¬ 

tee,  steps  up  to  the  White  House,  and  there  receives 
from  the  President  or  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  such 
bills  as  they  wish  to  have  passed  by  the  House.  The 
chairman  puts  the  bills  in  his  pocket,  takes  them  to  the 
committee;  without  any  examination  the  majority  of  the 
committee  approve  them;  the  minority  can  do  nothing; 
the  bills  are  presented  to  the  House,  and  received  as  the 
doings  of  the  committee. 

According  to  Fletcher,  every  important  bill  which 
had  been  passed  by  Congress  during  the  extra 
session  was  framed  by  others  than  its  members. 
Representatives  had  become  machines  for  the  use 
of  the  executive.  “Executive  power  has  become 
a  very  colossus,  which  bestrides  the  land  from  one 
end  to  the  other ;  and,  .  .  .  if  we  do  not  over¬ 
throw  it  ...  it  will  crush  liberty  .  .  .  the 
Constitution  !”33  This  speech  was  reported  in  the 

33  Speech  of  Robert  Fletcher,  Fanueil  Hall,  November  6,  1837. 
Pamphlet.  Library  of  Congress.  Fletcher  was  a  minority  mem¬ 
ber  of  the  Committee  on  Ways  and  Means. 


EXPEDIENCY  VERSUS  CONSISTENCY 


185 


Boston  Atlas,  copied  in  part  by  Niles’  Register?* 
and  printed  as  a  campaign  pamphlet  which  was 
given  wide  circulation.35  Not  long  after  the  open¬ 
ing  of  the  regular  session  in  December,  1837,  the 
majority  members  of  the  committee  published  a 
reply  to  Fletcher  in  the  Washington  Globe,  in 
which  its  chairman,  C.  C.  Cambreling,  declared 
that  he  had  received  no  bills  from  the  President 
nor  had  he  consulted  with  him,  but  that  in  accord¬ 
ance  with  the  practice  since  the  beginning  of  the 
government  he  had  consulted  with  the  heads  of 
the  departments.  “This  is  but  an  act  of  courtesy 
to  the  officer  who  recommends  a  measure  con¬ 
nected  with  the  business  of  his  department,  and 
whose  duty  it  is,  when  the  law  is  enacted,  to  con¬ 
strue  and  execute  it.”  Bills  often  appeared  before 
the  committee  in  this  way,  but  it  was  denied  that 
they  were  accepted  in  their  original  form  as 
Fletcher  had  charged.36  Instead  of  maintaining 
his  position,  Fletcher  in  a  weak  speech  denied  that 
the  A  tlas  had  reported  him  correctly.  He  had  not 
intended,  he  declared,  to  launch  a  personal  attack 
upon  the  Democratic  members  and  had  wished 
merely  to  criticize  the  majority  members  for  con- 

34  Niles'  Register,  LIII.  199.  It  also  appeared  in  the  National 
Intelligencer,  January  2,  1838. 

35  C.  G.  Atherton,  a  Democratic  member  of  the  committee, 
from  New  Hampshire,  wrote  to  the  editor  of  New  Hampshire 
Patriot  December,  1837,  that  Fletcher’s  speech  had  been  printed 
in  nearly  all  of  the  Whig  newspapers  of  that  state  and  that  large 
numbers  of  the  pamphlets  had  been  distributed  there.  Niles' 
Register,  LIII.  315. 

“  Congressional  Globe,  25  Congress,  2  Session,  p.  21. 


186 


ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 


suiting  with  the  heads  of  departments  without  the 
knowledge  of  the  minority.37  The  affair  at  once 
attracted  wide  attention,38  but  the  uncertain  posi¬ 
tion  taken  by  Fletcher  gave  his  Whig  colleagues 
an  excuse  to  leave  him  to  his  own  resources.  The 
New  York  American  was  convinced  of  Fletcher’s 
sincerity  in  his  controversy  with  the  Atlas,  but 
declared  that  in  his  defence  he  had  not  been  “suf¬ 
ficiently  clear  and  explicit,  either  as  to  what  he 
meant  to  admit,  or  to  deny.”  He  had  “disavowed 
statements,  which,  nevertheless,  he  had  permitted 
to  be  circulated  as  true,”  with  the  result  that  mem¬ 
bers  of  the  House  who  otherwise  would  have 
hastened  to  his  defence  “could  not  sustain  one, 
who  seemed  unfaithful  to  himself.”39  Fletcher 
withdrew  from  the  committee  and  thereafter 
ceased  to  play  an  important  part  in  Congress.  In 
March,  1838,  Adams  noted  that  Fletcher  “since 
his  caucus  speech  in  Faneuil  Hall  and  his  falter¬ 
ing  defence  of  it  in  the  House,  is  a  cipher,  and 
will  drop  from  his  seat  or  decline  a  reelection.”40 
Whig  leaders  preferred  to  limit  themselves  to  a 

37  Ibid.,  p.  22. 

38  National  Intelligencer,  January  2,  3,  1838.  Cf.  Boston  Daily 
Advertiser,  January  3,  quoting  New  York  Courier  and  Enquirer; 
January  4,  quoting  Portsmouth  Gazette  and  Salem  Advertiser. 
Boston  Atlas,  December  18.  1837.  Niles’  Register,  LIII.  119. 

39  New  York  American,  January  2,  1838. 

40  Adams,  Memoirs,  IX.  503.  In  July,  1839,  the  Intelligencer 
announced  Fletcher’s  resignation  after  he  had  been  reelected.  He 
had  doubtless  “found  the  arena  of  the  House  of  Representatives 
too  crowded  and  boisterous  for  his  retired  and  deliberative  habits.” 
National  Intelligencer,  July  6,  1839.  He  was  later  a  member  of 
the  Massachusetts  Supreme  Court,  1848-1853. 


EXPEDIENCY  VERSUS  CONSISTENCY  187 

criticism  of  executive  encroachment  in  general 
terms  rather  than  to  support  Fletcher’s  definite 
issue. 

Common  interests  of  more  fundamental  im¬ 
portance  than  campaign  arguments  were  present 
in  the  Whig  party.  With  some  exceptions,  nota¬ 
bly  that  of  the  group  which  gained  control  of  the 
party  in  1839-1840,  it  expressed  in  many  ways 
the  conservative  point  of  view  in  politics.  Men 
who  were  conservative  by  temperament  either 
abandoned  politics  altogether  or  were  Whigs.41 
They  viewed  with  alarm  evidences  of  social  dis¬ 
order  and  waxed  pessimistic  as  to  the  future 
stability  of  society.  The  bitterness  of  partisan 
struggles  during  the  Jacksonian  period  resulted 
in  numerous  riots,  particularly  on  election  days. 
Street  fighting  occurred  in  New  York  City,  Al¬ 
bany,  and  Philadelphia  during  the  municipal 
elections  of  1834.  In  September,  1835,  Niles 
declared : 

Society  seems  everywhere  unhinged,  and  the  demon  of 
‘blood  and  slaughter’  has  been  let  loose  upon  us  .  .  . 

and  [I]  regret  to  believe  also  that  an  awful  political  out¬ 
cry  is  to  be  raised  to  rally  the  ‘poor  against  the  rich’. 

.  The  character  of  our  countrymen  seems  suddenly 
changed,  and  thousands  interpret  the  laws  in  their  own 
way — sometimes  in  one  case,  and  then  in  another  guided 
only  by  their  own  will.42 

41 M.  Chevalier,  Society,  Manners  and  Politics  in  the  United 
States  (Boston,  1839),  p.  438. 

“  Niles’  Register,  XLIX.  1. 


188 


ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 


When  Adams  was  asked  at  this  time  to  sign  a 
petition  for  the  abolition  of  capital  punishment, 
he  saw  in  it  evidence  of  a  declining  respect  for 
law.  “The  signs  of  the  times  are  portentous.  All 
the  tendencies  of  legislation  are  to  the  removal  of 
restrictions  from  the  vicious  and  the  guilty,  and 
to  the  exercise  of  all  the  powers  of  government 
.  .  .  by  lawless  assemblages  of  individuals.” 
He  anticipated  with  distinct  aversion  the  abolition 
of  the  death  penalty  not  only  in  Massachusetts 
but  in  all  states.43  Chevalier  noted  the  resem¬ 
blance  between  the  Democratic  speeches  against 
the  Bank  and  “our  Republican  tirades  of  1791  and 
1792.  There  is  the  same  declamatory  tone,  the 
same  swollen  style,  the  same  appeal  to  popular 
passions.  .  .  .”  The  opposition  of  Whigs  to 
these  tendences  and  to  the  Democratic  party, 
which  was  charged  with  the  responsibility  for  this 
state  of  affairs,  was  a  natural  result  of  their 
property  interests.  This  was  especially  true  of 
the  party  in  the  eastern  states.  According  to 
Congdon,  the  Massachusetts  Whigs  “claimed  all 
the  decency,  refinement,  wealth  and  cultivation  of 
the  State,  if  not  of  the  United  States.”44  In 
Maine,  business  men  were  reported  to  have  dis¬ 
charged  employees  who  opposed  the  Bank,  and  one 
declared  that  he  always  gave  preference  to  men 
who  voted  for  what  he  thought  were  the  best 

43  Adams,  Memoirs,  IX.  259,  260. 

44  Congdon,  Reminiscences,  p.  60. 


EXPEDIENCY  VERSUS  CONSISTENCY 


189 


interests  of  the  country.45  Few  of  the  wealthier 
merchants  of  New  York  City  belonged  to  the 
Democratic  party.  “The  mass  of  large  and  little 
merchants  have,  like  a  flock  of  sheep,  gathered 
either  in  the  Federalist,  Whig,  Clay  or  Republi¬ 
can  folds.  The  Democratic  merchants  could  have 
easily  been  stored  in  a  large  Eighth  Avenue  rail¬ 
road  car.”46  The  Intelligencer  commented  upon 
the  economic  character  of  the  Whig  party  in  New 
York  state  on  the  eve  of  the  election  in  Novem¬ 
ber,  1834.  “That  a  very  large  proportion  of  all 
the  voters  in  New  York,  who  have  any  stake  in 
the  national  prosperity,  or  who  have  an  essential 
interest  in  the  perpetuation  of  our  political  insti¬ 
tutions  or  indeed  in  the  preservation  of  social 
order,  are  now  numbered  among  the  Whigs,  is  a 
fact  which  cannot  be  controverted.”47  Even 
Whig  politicians  conceded  that  the  two  parties 
were  distinguished  by  this  difference.  Seward 
wrote  to  Weed  in  April,  1835,  that  Van  Buren 
could  not  be  defeated. 

The  people  are  for  him.  Not  so  much  for  him  as  for 
the  principle  they  suppose  he  represents.  That  principle 
is  Democracy ;  ...  It  is  with  them,  the  poor  against 

the  rich;  and  it  is  not  to  be  disguised,  that,  since  the  last 
election,  the  array  of  parties  has  very  strongly  taken  that 
character.  Those  who  felt  themselves  or  believed  them¬ 
selves  poor,  have  fallen  off  very  naturally  from  us,  and 

46  Hatch,  History  of  Maine,  I.  217. 

"  Fox,  Decline  of  Aristocracy,  p.  426,  quoting  W.  Barrett,  Old 
Merchants  of  New  York,  I.  81. 

47  National  Intelligencer,  November  3,  1834. 


190 


ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 


into  the  majority  .  .  .  while  ‘the  rich  we  have  always 

with  us’.  Our  papers  without  being  conscious  of  it,  have 
been  gradually  assuming  their  cause ;  not  from  choice,  but 
by  way  of  retaliation  upon  the  victors.48 

While  the  western  Whigs  were  probably  less 
prosperous  than  their  eastern  associates,  their 
point  of  view  in  politics  was  doubtless  similar. 
National  Republicans  and  Whigs,  in  migrating  to 
the  new  country,  inevitably  took  with  them  their 
political  opinions,  and  the  levelling  influences  of 
the  frontier  could  not  in  all  cases  overcome  tem¬ 
perament  and  family  traditions.  During  the 
Jacksonian  period  the  Whig  party  in  the  South 
had  every  reason  to  be  sympathetic  with  the  con¬ 
servative  point  of  view.  It  included,  with  few 
exceptions,  the  slave-holding  aristocracy  owning 
large  plantations  and  numerous  slaves.49  These 
men  turned  instinctively  to  an  association  with 

“Seward  to  Weed,  Auburn,  April  12,  1835.  Seward,  Auto¬ 
biography,  pp.  257-258.  The  earlier  struggle  between  Jackson  and 
the  Bank  naturally  forced  men  of  property  interests  into  opposi¬ 
tion.  In  April,  1834,  Niles  recognized  one  hundred  and  eighty- 
three  names  of  business  houses  that  had  signed  a  petition  in  Balti¬ 
more  urging  the  return  of  the  deposits.  Niles’  Register,  XLVI. 
p.  244.  James  Buchanan  wrote  to  Jackson  from  a  Pennsylvania 
watering  place  in  July,  1837 :  “It  is  mortifying  to  observe  what 
a  powerful  influence  the  Bank  of  the  United  States  exerts  over 
the  minds  of  those  who  consider  themselves  the  well  born  and 
well  bred  of  the  land.  At  this  watering  place,  there  are  but  few 
who  are  not  its  advocates  and  who  would  not  hail  its  recharter 
by  Congress  as  a  sovereign  panacea  for  all  our  political  evils. 
...  It  is  among  the  hard  handed  and  honest  farmers  and 
mechanics  of  the  country  that  the  opposition  to  this  institution 
and  to  a  monied  aristocracy  prevails.”  Buchanan  to  Jackson,  Bed¬ 
ford  Springs,  July  28,  1837.  Works  of  Buchanan  (J.  B.  Moore, 
ed.,  Philadelphia,  1908),  III.  256,  257. 

“  Cole,  Whig  Party  in  the  South,  pp.  69-72. 


EXPEDIENCY  VERSUS  CONSISTENCY 


191 


men  of  similarly  conservative  interests  in  the 
North.  A  correspondent  of  the  Intelligencer, 
writing  in  November,  1838,  urged  the  advantages 
of  acting  with  the  northern  Whigs. 

The  security  of  the  South  is  in  the  Northern  Whigs, 
for  they  are  the  defenders  of  society  as  it  is,  under  the 
Constitution.  They  are  the  Conservatives  in  opposition 
to  the  destructive  principle  of  Locofocoism,  which  is  for 
levelling  everything,  amalgamating  everything.  They  are 
men  who  have  a  stake  in  society,  and  tremble  over  con¬ 
vulsions.  If  the  South  now  sows  the  Locofoco  wind  in 
the  North  it  will  reap  the  whirlwind.  .  .  .  Law,  law, 

law,  is  the  call  of  the  Whigs.”50 

While  the  Whigs  were  influenced  in  their 
political  thinking  by  property  interests,  available 
evidence  does  not  support  the  theory  that  they 
differed  with  the  Democrats  in  the  ownership  of 
personal  in  contrast  with  real  property.  Professor 
Fox  has  demonstrated,  however,  that  the  wards  of 
New  York  City  showing  the  largest  assessments 
returned  consistent  majorities  for  the  National 
Republican  and  Whig  parties,  and  a  similar  con¬ 
clusion  was  established  in  regard  to  several  of  the 
smaller  cities.51  The  county  returns  for  the  na¬ 
tional  elections  also  show  that  the  Whigs  were 
usually  more  successful  in  developed  regions.52 
Committed  to  this  narrow  interest,  the  party  de¬ 
pended  upon  adventitious  circumstances  to  give 
it  a  more  effective  appeal  to  the  mass  of  voters. 

80  National  Intelligencer,  November  21,  1838. 

M  Fox,  Decline  of  Aristocracy,  p.  424,  433-435. 

“  See  appendix  for  election  maps. 


192  ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 

The  pressure  of  disturbed  economic  conditions 
was  felt  by  men  who  had  little  or  no  property. 
After  wages  fell  unemployment  increased,  and 
markets  for  farm  products  were  injured.  Hard 
times  were,  therefore,  the  most  persuasive  argu¬ 
ments  for  the  Whig  party.  Seward  acknowledged 
that  "this  party  of  ours  in  its  elements  is  such  that 
it  cannot  succeed  until  there  is  a  time  of  popular 
convulsion,  when  suffering  shall  make  men  feel, 
and  because  they  feel,  think  !”53  This  proved  to  be 
true  in  the  years  of  the  greatest  Whig  activity,  in 
1834  and  after  1837.  The  obvious  association 
between  hard  times  and  the  success  of  the  party 
tempted  those  who  had  a  material  interest  at 
stake  to  create  or  to  emphasize  existing  depres¬ 
sion.  This  was  done  by  Biddle  and  the  Bank  in 
the  spring  and  summer  of  1834.54 

Something  may  be  learned  of  the  character  of 
the  Whig  party  from  the  comments  of  its  leaders 
in  regard  to  their  opponents.  Its  point  of  view 
was  that  of  an  almost  hopeless  minority.  It  was 
Chevalier’s  observation  that,  "The  higher  classes 
in  the  United  States,  with  some  exceptions  and 
taken  as  a  whole,  have  the  air  and  attitude  of  the 
vanquished ;  they  bear  the  mark  of  defeat  on  their 
front.”55  The  long  tenure  of  power  in  Demo¬ 
cratic  hands  changed  the  emphasis  in  political  life 

“  Seward  to  Weed,  April  12,  1835.  Seward,  Autobiography,  p. 
258. 

See  above,  pp.  120,  121. 

“  Chevalier,  Society,  Manners  and  Politics,  p.  438. 


EXPEDIENCY  VERSUS  CONSISTENCY 


193 


from  the  professional  and  business  groups  to  the 
small  farmer  and  laborer.  Sir  Charles  Lyell,  the 
English  geologist,  who  travelled  in  the  United 
States  in  1845,  was  told  by  many  merchants: 

that  the  small  farmers  had  too  great  an  ascendency.  No 
feature,  indeed,  appeared  to  me  more  contrasted  in  the 
political  aspect  of  America  and  Great  Britain  than  this, 
that  in  the  United  States  the  democracy  derives  its  chief 
support  from  the  landed  interest,  while  the  towns  take  the 
more  conservative  side,  and  are  often  accused  by  the 
landed  proprietors  of  being  too  aristocratic.56 

While  Lyell’s  explanation  of  American  politics 
cannot  be  substantiated  in  detail,  it  indicated  a 
situation  which  nevertheless  existed.  Another 
traveller,  Alexander  Mackay,  who  came  to  this 
country  in  1846-1847  but  whose  observations 
were  doubtless  equally  valid  for  the  earlier  period, 
noted  the  important  part  played  by  the  farmer  in 
politics.  Debarred  by  the  limitations  of  his  en¬ 
vironment  from  the  accumulation  of  considerable 
wealth,  he  satisfied  his  ambitions  in  political  life. 
Local  offices  were  almost  entirely  in  his  control. 

“Charles  Lyell,  A  Second  Visit  to  the  United  States  (N.  Y., 
1849),  I.  84-85.  Chevalier  wrote  that  the  opinion  of  the  educated 
or  upper  classes  had  influenced  all  presidents  down  to  Jackson  and 
had  been  effective  in  some  measure  in  controlling  Congress.  “Au- 
jourd’hui  elle  a  completement  rompu  avec  le  President.  .  .  . 

Aujourd’hui  elle  n’a  plus  de  credit  que  pres  d’une  seule  des  Cham- 
bres,  parce  que  le  Senat  se  trouve  encore  compose  d’  hommes, 
qu’elle  peut  revendiquer  comme  siens  a  cause  de  leur  superiorite  de 
lumiers,  d’education  ou  de  fortune  .  .  .  Le  farmer  et  le  me¬ 

chanic  sont  les  seigneurs  du  Nouveau-Monde :  l’opinion  publique, 
c’est  leur  volonte  .  .  .  le  President  est  leur  elu,  leur  mandi- 

taire;  leur  seurvateur  .  .  .  En  un  mot,  l’Amerique  du  Nord, 

c’est  l’Europe  la  tete  en  bas  et  les  pieds  en  haut.”  Chevalier, 
Letters  sur  l’  Amerique,  pp.  313,  314. 


194 


ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 


Once  involved  in  politics,  his  vote  and  influence 
became  of  such  importance  that  he  could  not  with¬ 
draw,  and  his  interests  naturally  expanded  from 
the  township  to  county  and  state  affairs.  Wher¬ 
ever  Mackay  went  he  found  that  the  farmer  “as 
a  duck  takes  to  water,  so  does  he  very  soon  take 
to  politics,”  and,  moreover,  he  was  usually  well 
informed  on  political  matters.  “I  found  the 
farmers  in  the  remotest  districts,  not  all  equally, 
but  all  tolerably  conversant,  each  man  being  able 
to  assign  an  intelligent  reason  for  the  side  he  took 
and  the  vote  which  he  gave.”57  Lyell  believed 
that  the  effect  of  the  Democratic  appeal  to  the 
artisans  of  the  towns  and  cities  had  made  it  diffi¬ 
cult  if  not  impossible  for  men  of  wealth  to  achieve 
success  in  politics. 

During  my  subsequent  stay  in  New  England,  I  often 
conversed  with  men  of  the  working  classes  on  the  same 
subject  and  invariably  found  that  they  had  made  up  their 
mind  that  it  was  not  desirable  to  choose  representatives 
from  the  wealthiest  class.  ‘The  rich,’  they  say  ‘have  less 
sympathy  with  our  opinions  and  feelings ;  love  their 
amusements,  and  go  shooting,  fishing,  and  traveling ;  keep 
hospitable  houses,  and  are  inaccessible  when  we  want  to 
talk  with  them,  at  all  hours,  and  tell  them  how  we  wish 
them  to  vote.” 

It  was  his  conclusion  that  discrimination  against 
men  of  wealth  in  politics  was  the  result  of  “the 
desire  of  reducing  their  legislature  to  mere  dele¬ 
gates.”  Furthermore,  Lyell  was  informed  by  a 

67 Alexander  Mackay,  The  Western  World  (London,  1850), 
II.  6-12. 


EXPEDIENCY  VERSUS  CONSISTENCY  195 

lawyer,  who  was  probably  unsympathetic  with 
contemporary  changes  of  a  democratic  character : 

“  'In  choosing  a  delegate — the  people  consider 
themselves  as  patrons  who  are  giving  away  a 
place;  and  if  an  opulent  man  offers  himself,  they 
are  disposed  to  say,  'You  have  enough  already, 
let  us  help  some  one  as  good  as  you  who  is 
poor.’  ”58 

Travellers’  opinions  are  usually  more  sweeping 
than  accurate  in  detail,  but  in  this  case  they  pro¬ 
vide  evidence  of  a  condition  which  existed  in 
the  western  or  frontier  states  and  in  the  larger 
cities.  The  Whig  point  of  view  was  probably 
influenced  by  this  situation.  Fear  was  commonly 
expressed  that  the  control  of  the  government  had 
passed  into  incapable  or  dangerous  hands.  The 
New  Haven  Palladium  was  alarmed  by  the  char¬ 
acter  of  the  Democratic  party  in  the  New  York 
election  of  November,  1834. 

The  Tories  reaped  their  harvest  and  secured  all  the 
votes  of  all  those  who  were  termed  the  greatest  democrats 
because  the  most  worthless  vagabonds.  In  their  view,  the 
respectable  journeyman  mechanic  is  a  ruffleshirt  and  an 
aristocrat,  compared  with  those  whose  home  is  neither 
‘on  the  mountain  wave’,  nor  at  the  mechanic’s  bench,  but 
in  the  gutters  and  watch-houses  of  the  city — those  who 
instead  of  attending  church  or  reading  at  home  are  singing 
‘Yankee  Doodle’  on  Sundays  at  Tammany  Hall  and 
ridiculing  the  Scriptures.59 

M  Lyell,  A  Second  Visit  to  the  United  States,  I.  83. 

"  National  Intelligencer,  November  19,  1834. 


196 


ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 


The  Whigs  of  New  York  City  agreed  with  the 
Native  Americans  in  their  support  of  stringent 
requirements  for  the  naturalization  of  immi¬ 
grants  as  a  means  of  keeping  out  dangerous  ele¬ 
ments,60  and  the  two  parties  cooperated  in  several 
of  the  municipal  elections.61  The  New  York 
American  declared  that  it  was  not  a  party  ques¬ 
tion  and  that  it  was  to  the  interest  of  all  to  amend 
the  federal  constitution  in  order  to  “withhold 
from  all  men  of  foreign  birth,  who  may  hereafter 
be  naturalized,  all  political  rights.”62  Neverthe¬ 
less,  as  most  of  the  immigrants  became  Democrats 
under  the  able  management  of  party  leaders,63 
their  exclusion  from  the  franchise  would  weaken 
that  party  and  thereby  serve  Whig  interests. 
Whig  resistance  to  liberal  naturalization  laws  was 
of  course  centered  in  New  York,  where  the  prob¬ 
lem  was  most  acute,  but  Joseph  Duncan,  a  Demo¬ 
cratic  member  from  Illinois,  arraigned  the  party 
as  a  whole  for  its  attitude  upon  this  issue.64 

Fear  of  increasing  radicalism  was  in  some  de¬ 
gree  justified  by  the  appearance  of  the  Locofoco 

90  L.  L.  Scisco,  Political  Nativism  in  New  York  (N.  Y.,  1901), 
p.  23. 

91  Fox,  Decline  of  Aristocracy,  pp.  375,  376. 

,2New  York  American  (semi-weekly),  July  30,  1835.  Cf.  Ibid., 
June  30,  1835. 

93  Hone,  Diary,  I.  168.  Cf.  A.  B.  Faust,  The  German  Element 
in  the  United  States  (N.  Y„  1909),  II.  126,  127. 

94  Congressional  Globe,  26  Congress,  2  Session,  pp.  266-273.  This 
speech  is  analysed  in  F.  G.  Franklin,  The  Legislative  History  of 
Naturalisation  in  the  United  States,  from  the  Revolution  to  1861. 
(Chicago,  1906),  pp.  207-211. 


EXPEDIENCY  VERSUS  CONSISTENCY  197 

party  in  New  York  City  as  the  result  of  division 
in  the  Democratic  ranks  in  October,  1835.  This 
party  soon  made  common  cause  with  the  strug¬ 
gling  trade  union  movement  in  resistance  to  any 
and  all  bank  charters,  in  support  of  an  exclusively 
gold  and  silver  currency,  the  extension  of  the 
common  school  system,  and  the  election  of  all 
members  of  the  judiciary.  The  Whigs  of  New 
York  noted  with  approval  evidence  of  conserva¬ 
tism  among  the  majority  of  the  Democratic 
party,65  but  this  satisfaction  was  short  lived,  for 
the  Locofocos  returned  to  their  former  allegiance 
in  the  fall  of  1837  as  a  result  of  Van  Buren’s 
recommendation  of  a  divorce  between  the  govern¬ 
ment  and  the  pet  banks.66  Already  aroused  by 
the  vagaries  of  the  radical  Fanny  Wright,  who 
had  been  lecturing  in  New  York  City,67  Whigs 
now  declared  that  the  Democratic  party  was  in¬ 
fected  with  the  dangerous  theories  of  the  Loco¬ 
focos.  Whig  newspapers  replied  to  the  charge  of 
Federalism  with  the  assertion  that  the  Democrats 
were  Locofocos,  and  the  significance  of  this 

“  F  Byrdsall,  The  History  of  the  Loco  Foco,  or  Equal  Rights 
Party  (N.  Y.,  1842),  pp.  28-29. 

“William  Trimble,  “Diverging  Tendencies  in  the  New  York 
Democracy  in  the  Period  of  the  Locofocos,”  American  Historical 
Review,  XXIV,  410-412. 

87  The  New  York  correspondent  of  the  Intelligencer  assured  his 
readers  that  her  activities  were  a  part  of  the  Locofoco  campaign. 
“Fanny  Wright  is  now  lecturing  on  equal  rights  in  our  city.  I 
dropt  in  (six  cents  it  is)  to  hear  her  last  night.  Man  is  equal, 
woman  is  equal,  down  with  banks,  down  with  priests,  down  with 
religion,  down  with  everything,  was  the  sum  of  her  oration. 
National  Intelligencer,  October  15,  1837. 


198 


ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 


name  lies  in  their  interpretation  of  that  move¬ 
ment.  A  Locofoco  was  defined  in  a  clipping 
printed  by  the  Intelligencer  in  September,  1837, 
as  a  person  who  wished  to  destroy  existing  social 
institutions. 

A  Loco  Foco  in  the  present  acceptation  of  the  term,  is  a 
man  not  satisfied  with  anything  that  exists ;  but  is  in  favor 
of  an  equal  distribution  of  property,  an  uprooting  of  the 
institutions  of  the  country,  and  the  substitution  of  some 
monstrous  and  impracticable  fancy  of  his  own  in  their 
stead.  He  professes  to  be  in  favor  of  ‘Equal  Rights, 
Equal  Privileges,  and  Equal  Laws’,  by  which  he  means 
rights,  privileges,  and  laws,  which  will  make  him  as  rich, 
as  influential,  and  as  consequential  as  his  more  indus¬ 
trious,  prudent,  able,  persevering  and  thriving  neighbors, 
without  any  particular  talents  or  exertions  of  his  own.  A 
Loco  Foco  wants  a  new  Constitution ;  he  desires  that  there 
should  be  no  credits ;  that  all  debts  should  be  debts  of 
honor ;  that  no  man  should  be  superior  to  himself ;  that 
we  should  have  no  medium  of  exchanges  but  gold  and 
silver ;  that  the  whole  form  of  society  and  government 
should  be  changed,  and  that  they  should  have  the  privilege 
of  concocting  a  better.  He  is  a  restless,  unsatisfied 
mortal ;  and  could  he  have  all  his  heart’s  desire  today,  hr 
would  grumble  tomorrow  just  as  lustily  as  ever.68 

The  Intelligencers  New  York  correspondent 
wrote  a  few  days  later  that  if  the  Locofocos  were 
allowed  to  return  to  Tammany  “a  terrible  war  is 
to  commence  in  all  this  great  country  between 
European  Radicalism  of  the  worst  kind  and 
American  Conservatism.  .  .  He  anticipated 
that  the  Democrats  would  lose  control  of  New 

“  National  Intelligencer,  September  9,  1837,  quoting  New  York 
Observer  of  Utica. 


EXPEDIENCY  VERSUS  CONSISTENCY 


199 


York  state  if  this  occurred,  “for  the  rich  and 
powerful  men  of  Tammany  have  made  Mr.  Van 
Buren  all  he  is  .  .  .  and  if  he  drives  them  fur¬ 
ther,  they  will  turn  upon  him  in  wrath.”  Should 
the  President  follow  Silas  Wright’s  example  in 
drawing  the  line  of  “the  poor  against  the  rich,” 
his  defeat  will  be  turned  into  a  rout,  for  the 
Democratic  party  in  New  York  state  was  made 
up  of  the  “very  rich  and  the  very  poor,  acting 
against  the  middle  interests,  and  whenever  he 
draws  off  either  section,  he  is  in  a  great  minor¬ 
ity.”69  Moderation  was  of  course  a  character¬ 
istic  of  the  remarks  of  neither  party  in  regard  to 
its  opponents,  and  according  to  J.  S.  Buckingham, 
an  English  traveller  who  was  in  New  York  state 
during  the  fall  election  of  1838,  Whig  character¬ 
izations  of  Democrats  were  especially  vivid. 
They  were  “atheists,  infidels,  agrarians,  incendi¬ 
aries,  men  who  were  without  religion  and  honesty, 
who  desire  to  pull  down  all  that  was  venerable  in 
the  institutions  of  the  country,  to  seize  the  prop¬ 
erty  of  the  rich  and  divide  it  among  the  poor,  to 
demolish  the  churches.  .  .  .”70  In  January, 
1838,  the  New  York  Express  described  a  crowd 
of  Locofocos  that  attempted  to  break  up  a  meet¬ 
ing  of  conservative  Democrats  as,  “The  Slam 
Bang  fellows,  and  odds  and  ends  of  this  big  earth, 
agrarians  and  Fannie  Wright  men  in  scores 

**  Ibid.,  September  13,  1837. 

70  J.  S.  Buckingham,  America,  Historical,  Statistical,  and  Descrip¬ 
tive  (London,  1841),  I.  68. 


200 


ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 


began  to  assemble  .  .  .  with  wild,  fierce, 
squally  looks  betokening  the  coming  storm.”  The 
Democrats  who  still  remained  true  to  conservative 
principles,  it  was  hoped,  would  see  “that  it  is  not 
with  such  a  Buffalo  herd  government  is  to  be 
administered  ...  or  victory  won.”  If  this 
“clan”  should  succeed  in  gaining  control,  it  would 
introduce  “violence,  mobism,  force,  terror,  all  the 
anarchy  and  Jacobinism  of  the  French  Robespier- 
rians.  .  .  .”71  According  to  the  New  York 
American  in  November,  1838,  the  Evening  Post , 
an  important  Democratic  newspaper,  printed  and 
endorsed  the  address  of  a  Locofoco  meeting  in 
which  the  dangers  of  a  social  upheaval  were 
minimized.  “  ‘Nor  has  our  country  any  reason  to 
fear  social  disorder.  Anarchy  is  but  a  state  of 
transition.  The  very  nature  of  man  renders  so¬ 
cial  order  inevitable.’  ”72  There  was  danger,  how¬ 
ever,  that  this  conservative  attitude  would  be 
pushed  too  far.  As  a  means  of  demonstrating 
that  they  were  not  without  sympathy  for  the  poor, 
the  Whigs  of  New  York  City,  after  the  successful 
election  of  1837,  collected  a  considerable  purse  for 
the  purpose  of  relieving  their  needs,  and  it  was 
said  that  the  same  thing  was  to  be  done  in  Phila¬ 
delphia.  “This  is  the  party,  who  are  called  ‘haters 
of  the  poor’ — ‘aristocrats’ — ‘rag-barons’— ‘bank 
partisans — ‘oppressors  of  the  poor  .... 

" New  York  American,  January  3,  1838,  quoting  New  York 
Express. 

n  National  Intelligencer.  November  3,  1838. 

13  Ibid.,  November  22,  1837. 


EXPEDIENCY  VERSUS  CONSISTENCY 


201 


The  presidential  message  of  December,  1838, 
in  alluding  to  the  “  ‘Anti-Republican  tendencies 
of  associated  wealth’  ”  was  interpreted  by  Whigs 
as  containing  the  germs  of  the  most  dangerous  of 
radical  theories.  It  was  conceded  that  Van  Buren 
perhaps  intended  to  refer  to  “banking,  insurance, 
and  manufacturing  companies  only,”  but  he  had 
given  expression  to  a  heresy  which  in  its  logical 
conclusion  would  “stigmatise  as  unnatural  and 
anti-republican  all  notions  of  property,  all  con¬ 
tracts,  all  obligations  of  every  sort.”74  An  article 
on  “Radicalism”  in  the  Democratic  Review  for 
October,  1838,  was  taken  as  representative  of  the 
administration’s  point  of  view.  The  opinions 
expressed  therein  were  in  fact  tolerant  of  radical¬ 
ism  in  general  and  of  Locofocoism  in  par¬ 
ticular.  The  writer  asked  that  justice  be  done 
them.  Their  doctrines  “are  generally  sound,  and 
their  practice,  with  perhaps  slight  exceptions, 
would  make  the  world  happier  and  better.”75 
This  position  apparently  contained  little  of  a 
revolutionary  character,  but  the  Intelligencer 
immediately  declared  that  it  was  proof  that  the 
Democrats  intended  to  make  the  “rich  poor 
and  the  poor  rich,  by  reducing  to  harmony  the 
laws  of  nature,  which  they  alleged  to  have  been 
violated  by  artificial  and  unjust  distributions  of 
property.  .  .  .”  This  open  profession  of  agra- 

”  Ibid.,  December  8,  1838. 

"  The  United  States  Magazine  and  Democratic  Review  III. 
10S,  106. 


202  ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 

rian  principles  was  the  climax  of  folly  as  well  as 
of  political  error.  “If  put  into  practice  they  would 
break  up  the  great  deep  of  civil  society.”76  In 
August,  1840,  the  Intelligencer  pointed  to  the 
efforts  made  by  the  Democratic  members  of  the 
Senate  to  change  the  tenure  of  the  judiciary  as  an 
example  of  their  radicalism.  It  was  first  pro¬ 
posed  by  Senator  Tappan,  “this  trusty  counsellor 
of  the  President,”  in  December,  1838,  to  limit 
members  of  the  federal  judiciary  to  periods  rang¬ 
ing  from  one  to  seven  years,  and  later  it  was 
proposed  by  another  Democratic  senator  to  make 
these  offices  elective.  The  Democratic  Review ,  it 
declared,  went  even  to  greater  extremes  by  urging 
a  term  of  one  year  with  unlimited  re-eligibility 
for  the  presidency  and  also  the  change  from  an 
appointive  to  an  elective  provision  for  most  of  the 
offices  in  the  executive  department.77  It  is  possi¬ 
ble  that  the  forebodings  of  Whig  newspapers  as 
to  the  dangers  of  Democratic  radicalism  were  not 
entirely  sincere;  in  any  case,  it  was  expedient  to 
stress  the  union  between  the  Democratic  party 
and  Locofocoism.  To  the  charge  that  they  were 
the  successors  of  the  old  Federalists,  the  Whigs 
replied  that  the  Democrats  were  Locofocos. 

The  radical  views  of  Orestes  A.  Brownson,  edi¬ 
tor  of  the  Boston  Quarterly  Review,  furnished 
the  Whigs  another  opportunity  to  attribute  un- 

"  National  Intelligencer,  November  14,  1838. 

77  Ibid.,  August  22,  1840. 


EXPEDIENCY  VERSUS  CONSISTENCY 


20  3 


sound  principles  to  the  administration.  Brown- 
son  was  an  eccentric  who  established  the  Review 
in  1838  as  a  means  of  expressing  his  ideas  with¬ 
out  any  constraint.  “I  undertake  this  Review 
.  .  .  for  myself,”  he  declared  in  the  first  num¬ 
ber,  “not  because  I  am  certain  that  the  public 
wants  it,  but  because  I  want  it.  I  want  it  as  a 
medium  through  which  I  may  say  to  those  who 
choose  to  listen  to  my  voice,  just  what  I  wish  to 
say,  and  through  which  I  may  say  it  in  my  own 
way  and  time.  .  .  .”78  He  was  in  hearty  sympa¬ 
thy  with  the  Chartist  movement,  and  in  an  article 
on  this  subject  not  only  did  he  encourage  the 
leaders  of  the  English  movement,  but  he  also  ex¬ 
pressed  advanced  ideas  as  to  the  existing  economic 
system  in  the  United  States. 

The  only  enemy  of  the  Laborer,  is  your  employer, 
whether  he  appear  in  the  shape  of  a  master  mechanic,  or 
in  the  owner  of  a  factory  ...  we  say  frankly,  that, 
if  there  must  always  be  a  laboring  population  distinct 
from  proprietors  and  employers  we  regard  the  slave 
system  as  decidedly  preferable  to  the  system  at  wages.79 

Brownson  insisted  that  he  was  a  member  of  no 
party,  but  the  Intelligencer  in  August,  1840, 
identified  him  as  a  federal  office-holder  and  more¬ 
over  asserted  that  he  was  the  recipient  of  a  com¬ 
fortable  salary  for  a  slight  return  in  service.  The 
New  York  Evening  Post,  which  was  said  to  be 

18  Boston  Quarterly  Review,  I.  4. 

”  These  statements  were  quoted  by  a  Whig  pamphlet  written, 
under  a  pseudonym,  by  Calvin  Colton.  “Junius,”  American 
Jacobinism  (N.  Y.,  1840).  Library  of  Congress. 


204 


ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 


close  to  the  administration,  was  sympathetic  in  its 
attitude  and  had  virtually  endorsed  his  position. 
Its  remarks  in  reference  to  radicalism  were  espe¬ 
cially  offensive  from  the  Intelligencer’s  point  of 
view.  The  Post  thought  that  society  resented  too 
quickly  new  ideas  that  questioned  its  “ancient 
habits  and  established  modes  of  faith.”  Radicals 
are  “what  the  spur  is  to  the  sluggish  steed.  They 
break  in  upon  its  heavy  slumbers  .  .  .  and 
impel  it  more  quickly  in  the  career  of  improve¬ 
ment.  .  .  .  The  curse  of  human  action  is,  that 
it  moves  too  slow,  is  reluctant  to  break  its  ac¬ 
customed  routine,  and  thus  goes  on  for  ages  under 
abuses  which  a  year  might  correct.”80  While  the 
Intelligencer  attributed  the  administration’s  toler¬ 
ance  of  Brownson  to  a  desire  for  the  radical  vote, 
Calvin  Colton  interpreted  the  Post’s  position  as 
evidence  of  the  Democratic  party’s  approval  of 
his  ideas.81  In  fact,  when  the  Boston  Quarterly 
Review  came  to  the  end  of  its  brief  career  in  1840 
it  was  merged  with  the  Democratic  Review,  a 
demonstration  that  the  administration  was  not 
unfriendly. 

The  federal  government  under  the  control  of 
the  Democratic  party,  according  to  Whig  opinion, 
had  turned  towards  radical  democracy.  Thomas 
Hamilton,  an  English  traveller  with  democratic 
sympathies  whose  remarks  on  America  were  pub¬ 
lished  in  1833,  reported  that  all  intelligent  men 

*°  National  Intelligencer,  August  11,  1840. 

81  Junius,  American  Jacobinism,  p.  1. 


EXPEDIENCY  VERSUS  CONSISTENCY  205 

with  whom  he  had  talked  confessed  that  the  spirit 
of  the  constitution  had  changed.  “It  was  un¬ 
doubtedly  the  wish  of  Washington  and  Hamilton 
to  counterpoise,  as  much  as  circumstances  would 
permit,  the  rashness  of  democracy  by  the  caution 
and  wisdom  of  an  aristocracy  of  intelligence  and 
wealth.  There  is  now  no  attempt  at  counter¬ 
poise.”82  Late  in  1838,  the  Boston  Daily  Adver¬ 
tiser  declared  that  “the  distinction  between  a 
Republic  and  a  Democracy  has  become  dim,”  and 
that  it  was  the  policy  of  the  Democratic  party  to 
change  the  character  of  the  American  govern¬ 
ment.  “They  have  proclaimed  by  word  and  deed 
that  ‘our  government  is  a  Democracy’;  until  the 
difference  between  regarding  and  confounding 
the  distinction  had  become  the  difference  between 
the  Whigs  and  their  opponents.”83  Such  was  the 
point  of  view  taken  by  Calvin  Colton  in  a  pamph¬ 
let  written  for  the  purpose  of  correcting  some  of 
the  mistaken  ideas  for  which  British  travellers 
were  responsible.  “American  society,”  he  de¬ 
clared,  “has  manifested  two  leading  and  opposite 
tendencies;  one  towards  the  lowest  level  of  de¬ 
mocracy,  and  the  other  towards  a  spiritual  su¬ 
premacy.”  He  had  no  patience  with  the  natural 
rights  theorists,  and  asserted  that  the  use  of 
“liberty”  in  the  Declaration  of  Independence 

SJ  Thomas  Hamilton,  Men  atid  Manners  in  America.  (London, 
1833),  I.  298,  299. 

83  National  Intelligencer,  January  8,  1839,  quoting  Boston  Daily 
Advertiser. 


206 


ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 


meant  only  “representation  and  influence  in  the 
government.”  Advancement  in  civilization  was 
necessarily  accompanied  by  increasing  restrictions 
upon  liberty.  Only  the  savage  enjoys  perfect 
liberty.  “Who,  then,  has  liberty?  and  where  is  it 
to  be  found?  Who  desires  it?  None,  but  the 
vicious — none  but  the  enemy  of  society.”  Equal¬ 
ity,  he  declared,  merely  meant  the  abolition  of 
monarchy  and  titles.  A  decisive  struggle  was 
taking  place  in  America  between  “a  Constitutional 
republic,  as  originally  set  up,  and  a  radical  democ¬ 
racy.  The  storm  of  radicalism  has  been  gather¬ 
ing  and  lowering  in  the  American  sky  for  an  age, 
while  the  helm  of  the  ship  of  State  has,  for  the 
most  part,  been  in  its  hands.”84 

Brownson  thought  that  in  all  organized  society 
there  is  a  natural  division  between  two  parties. 
One,  composed  of  men  who  are  benefited  by 
existing  institutions,  is  accordingly  opposed  to 
change;  the  other,  deriving  its  strength  from 
those  who  bear  the  burdens  of  society,  is  the 
party  of  movement  and  change.85  Colton  saw  in 
the  conflict  between  American  political  parties  a 
struggle  between  those  who  wished  to  keep  politi¬ 
cal  institutions  as  they  were  and  men  of  radical 
ideas.  Substantially  the  same  conclusion  was  ex¬ 
pressed  by  foreign  travellers  who  paid  any  atten¬ 
tion  to  American  politics.  While  they  were 

81 A  Voice  from  America  to  England,  by  an  American  Gentle¬ 
man  (London,  1839). 

86  Boston  Quarterly  Review,  I.  123-125. 


EXPEDIENCY  VERSUS  CONSISTENCY 


207 


agreed  in  general  that  there  existed  no  differences 
of  opinion  as  to  the  forms  of  government,  they 
saw  in  the  clash  between  Whigs  and  Democrats 
the  same  differences  that  distinguished  conserva¬ 
tives  from  liberals  or  radicals  everywhere.  As 
they  saw  it,  this  distinction  was  universal  and 
inevitable  in  politics,86  and  as  they  were  accus¬ 
tomed  to  party  divisions  of  this  character  in  the 
politics  of  their  own  country,  perhaps  their  study 
of  American  political  conditions  was  not  entirely 
impartial.  They  were  much  impressed  by  the 
similarity  between  American  parties  and  those  of 
Europe.  De  Tocqueville  was  of  the  opinion  that 
beneath  a  superficial  influence  of  party  leaders 
and  of  opportune  issues,  there  were  more  funda¬ 
mental  characteristics.  “The  deeper  we  penetrate 
into  the  inmost  thought  of  these  parties,  the  more 
do  we  perceive  that  the  object  of  the  one  is  to  limit, 
and  the  other  to  extend,  the  authority  of  the 
people.”87  Thomas  Hamilton,  having  supported 
the  Reform  Act  of  1832,  for  this  reason  found 
himself  “quite  as  much  a  Radical  in  Boston  and 
very  nearly  so  in  New  York,  as  I  had  been  con¬ 
sidered  in  England.  It  was  soon  apparent  that 
the  great  majority  of  the  enlightened  classes  in 
both  cities,  regarded  any  great  and  sudden  change 

88  De  Tocqueville,  Democracy  in  America,  I.  223.  Harriet 
Martineau,  Society  in  America  (London,  1837),  I.  10-44. 
Hamilton,  Men  and  Manners,  I.  288.  Frederick  von  Raumer, 
America  and  the  American  People  (N.  Y.,  1846),  pp.  270  ff. 
Raumer  was  a  professor  in  the  University  of  Berlin. 

81  De  Tocqueville,  Democracy  in  America,  I.  226,  227. 


208 


ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 


in  British  institutions  as  pregnant  with  the  most 
imminent  danger.”88  A  lecture  tour  in  1837  that 
took  him  into  all  parts  of  the  country  gave  J.  S. 
Buckingham  an  exceptional  opportunity  for  the 
study  of  American  parties,  and  it  is  suggestive 
that  he  also  noticed  the  unsympathetic  attitude  of 
the  Whigs  towards  the  liberal  movement  in 
England. 

They  are  nearly  all  in  favor  of  giving  wealth  a  more 
open  and  direct  influence  than  it  now  possesses,  in  the 
suffrage  for  elections,  and  would  be  glad  to  exclude  from 
the  electoral  body  all  who  have  not  some  fixed  amount  of 
property.  They  are  against  any  changes  that  would  in¬ 
crease  the  power  or  influence  of  the  people.  .  .  . 

They  sympathize  almost  universally  with  the  Tory  party 
in  England;  they  think  that  even  Lord  Grey  carried  the 
principles  of  reform  too  far,  and  would  be  glad  to  see 
the  Duke  of  Wellington  and  Sir  Robert  Peel  restored  to 
office.  .  .  .  Nearly  all  the  rich  capitalists  and  merch¬ 

ants  belong  to  this  party;  the  more  wealthy  tradesmen 
also  adhere  to  it ;  while  the  Episcopal  clergy,  lawyers  and 
the  medical  profession — in  short,  all  who  desire  to  rank 
with  the  aristocratical  or  genteel  portion  of  society,  either 
really  entertain,  or  find  it  convenient  to  profess,  Whig  or 
conservative  principles,  and  prefer  the  latter  name  to  the 
former.89 

Harriet  Martineau  was  told  that  the  ‘grand 
question  of  the  time  was,  whether  the  people 
should  be  encouraged  to  govern  themselves,  or 
whether  the  wise  should  save  them  from  them¬ 
selves.’  ”90  Although  an  immigrant  from  Bo- 

88  Hamilton,  Men  and  Manners,  I.  244. 

88  Buckingham,  America,  I.  60. 

80  Martineau,  Society  in  America,  I.  22. 


EXPEDIENCY  VERSUS  CONSISTENCY 


209 


hernia  rather  than  a  traveller,  F.  J.  Grund’s  long 
experience  as  a  journalist  in  Philadelphia  gave 
him  exceptional  opportunities  for  observing 
American  politics.  He  was,  however,  Democratic 
in  his  sympathies,  and  therefore  his  assertion  of 
the  essential  continuity  between  the  Federalist, 
National  Republican,  and  the  Whig  parties  is 
not  of  much  value.  It  was  his  opinion  that  the 
Whigs  wished  to  confide  “power  to  the  compara¬ 
tive  few,  and  to  deprive  the  masses  of  the  privilege 
of  voting.  They  take  it  as  a  political  maxim  that 
the  people  are  unable  to  govern  themselves,  be¬ 
cause  the  people  are  never  sufficiently  enlightened 
for  that  purpose.”91  The  opinions  of  J.  R.  Godley 
were  formed  as  a  result  of  travels  in  1844,  but 
they  were  doubtless  applicable  to  the  conditions  of 
the  earlier  period.  “There  is  a  greater  anxiety,” 
he  declared,  “for  the  preservation  of  order  and 
tranquillity  felt  by  the  Whigs  than  by  their  op¬ 
ponents;  as  being,  generally  speaking,  a  more 
‘substantial’  class  of  men  .  .  .  they  are  more 
cautious  but  less  consistent.  .  .  .”92  Raumer 
was  told  by  Whigs  that  behind  differences  upon 
specific  political  questions  “  ‘lie  hidden  .  .  . 
greater  dangers,  which  without  constant  effort  on 
our  part  would  burst  forth  and  involve  us  all  in 
ruin.  The  locofocos  might  finally  subject  all  laws 

”  F.  J.  Grund,  The  Americans  in  their  Moral,  Social  and  Politi¬ 
cal  Relations  (Boston,  1837),  p.  407.  Grund  was  educated  in 
Vienna  and  had  taught  in  Brazil  before  coming  to  America 
in  1826. 

"Godley,  Letters  from  America  (London,  1844),  II.  110. 


210 


ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 


to  popular  license,  and  abolish  the  right  of  prop¬ 
erty.  We  Whigs  are  the  conservative  class;  our 
opponents  the  destructive.’  ”93 

Whigs  were  not  averse  to  expressing  the  con¬ 
servative  point  of  view  upon  occasions  that  did 
not  commit  the  party  upon  questions  of  national 
importance.  In  reply  to  the  doctrines  of  class 
warfare  advocated  by  Fanny  Wright  and  Brown- 
son,  the  essential  solidarity  of  the  entire  popula¬ 
tion  was  insisted  upon.  This  was  the  intent  of 
a  resolution  adopted  by  a  Whig  meeting  in 
Philadelphia : 

That  the  interests  of  every  class  of  society  are  so 
intimately  blended  in  this  country,  where  with  few  excep¬ 
tions,  every  rich  man  has  once  been  poor,  and  where  there 
is  scarcely  a  poor  man  who  may  not  reasonably  hope  to 
become  rich,  that  no  policy  of  the  Government  can  oper¬ 
ate  to  the  injury  or  benefit  of  any  class,  without  affecting 
all  others  in  a  similar  way.94 

The  Intelligencer  declared  in  September,  1834, 
that  in  the  more  advanced  sections  of  Maine, 
which  were  “accessible  to  frequent  mails  and  free 
communication”  the  Whigs  were  gaining  in 
strength.95  More  definite  statements  of  the  atti¬ 
tude  of  the  Whigs  towards  conservatism  were 
made  with  reference  to  the  question  of  cooperat¬ 
ing  with  those  Democrats  who  had  left  their  party 

”3  Raumer,  America,  p.  270.  Mackay  wrote  that  “the  Whigs  are 
justly  regarded  as  the  conservative,  the  Democratic  as  the 
‘go-ahead’  party.”  Mackay,  Western  World,  p.  16. 

M  National  Intelligencer,  November  24,  1837. 

>s  Ibid.,  September  17,  1834. 


EXPEDIENCY  VERSUS  CONSISTENCY  211 

over  the  independent  treasury  issue  and  who  were 
therefore  called  the  Conservatives.  One  section 
of  Whig  opinion,  represented  by  the  New  York 
American,  refused  to  have  anything  to  do  with 
men  who  had  been  the  associates  of  orthodox 
Democrats.  However,  not  all  were  agreed  in  this 
unreceptive  attitude.  The  New  York  Gazette  de¬ 
clared  that  “we  are  willing  to  identify  ourselves 
with  Conservatism  ...  all  we  ask  of  the 
honest  politicians  of  all  parties  is,  to  join  with  us, 
or  permit  us  to  join  with  them,  in  exercising  a 
conservatism  that  shall  perpetuate  our  institu¬ 
tions.”96  The  Gazette  later  was  even  more  defi¬ 
nite.  “The  truth  is,  conservatism  is  the  principle 
element  of  which  our  party  is  composed,  and  when 
we  find  that  feeling  it  should  be  cherished.”97 
True  to  their  point  of  view,  Whigs  looked 
askance  at  the  struggling  labor  movement.  It  was 
sharply  condemned  in  1838  by  the  New  York  Re¬ 
view,98  in  an  article  that  won  the  approval  of  the 
American.  The  Review’s  article  had  been  “unan¬ 
swerable  in  the  indications  of  the  injury  from  all 
such  unions  to  the  parties  that  constitute  them, 
and  to  the  general  interests  of  the  community; 
they  are  traced  also  to  a  foreign  origin,  and  from 
sources  whence  Americans  should  have  disdained 
to  seek  instructions.”99  When  the  courts  decided 

06  Ibid.,  October  30,  1839. 

07  Ibid.,  November  18,  1839. 

““Trade  Unions,”  Nnv  York  Review,  II.  1-48. 

“  New  York  American,  January  6,  1838. 


212 


ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 


in  1835  in  accordance  with  the  old  English  law 
that  unions  were  conspiracies  in  restraint  of 
trade,  Whig  newspapers  gave  their  approval.100 
The  diary  of  Philip  Hone  throws  much  light  upon 
the  reactions  to  contemporary  problems  and  events 
of  a  conservative  whose  interest  in  politics  was 
distinctly  amateurish.  Even  Whig  meetings  ar¬ 
ranged  especially  to  attract  the  wage  earner  were 
distinguished,  according  to  Hone,  by  their  moder¬ 
ate  and  correct  attitude.  One  he  described  as 
“consisting  principally  of  the  most  respectable 
mechanics  .  .  .  men  of  character,  respectabil¬ 
ity  and  personal  worth.”101  In  a  similar  descrip¬ 
tion  the  writer  unconsciously  revealed  something 
of  his  own  personality:  “the  great,  the  sublime, 
the  intelligent  mass  separated  and  retired  with 
decorum  and  dignity.  Such  an  assembly  was 
never  before  seen  in  New  York  ...  a  solid 
mass  of  faces  beaming  with  intelligence,  actuated 
by  one  strong  feeling,  silent,  attentive,  decorous. 
.  .  ,”102  Some  of  his  unctuousness  perhaps 
came  from  personal  knowledge  of  the  rough  and 
boisterous  Democratic  rallies  that  attracted  much 
attention  in  the  Whig  press. 

Leaders  of  the  National  Republican  and  Whig 
parties  and  considerable  groups  of  their  mem¬ 
bers  were  agreed  in  a  broad  conception  of  the 
powers  of  the  federal  government,  except  for 

100  Fox,  Decline  of  Aristocracy,  pp.  390,  391. 

101  Hone,  Diary,  I.  91. 

102  Ibid.,  I.  93. 


EXPEDIENCY  VERSUS  CONSISTENCY 


213 


their  passing  objection  to  the  growth  of  presi¬ 
dential  authority,  and  usually  in  a  more  ambitious 
national  policy  than  that  which  the  Democrats 
approved.  John  Quincy  Adams  conceived  during 
his  administration  a  far-reaching  scheme  for  edu¬ 
cational  and  internal  development.  In  February, 
1837,  he  wrote  that  “The  great  effort  of  my 
administration  was  to  mature  into  a  permanent 
and  regular  system  the  application  of  all  the  sur¬ 
plus  revenue  of  the  Union  to  internal  improve¬ 
ment  which  at  this  day  would  have  afforded  high 
wages  and  constant  employment  to  hundreds  of 
thousands  of  labourers.”103  He  had  intended,  so 
he  declared  in  an  address  to  his  constituents  in 
1842,  to  use  the  public  lands  as  a  source  of  income 
for  this  purpose  and  also  for  a  national  develop¬ 
ment  of  education.104  After  Adams’  elimination 
as  a  leader  of  his  party,  the  tradition  of  a  lati- 
tudinarian  policy  was  carried  on,  particularly  by 

103  Adams  to  C.  W.  Upshaw,  Washington,  February  2,  1837. 
Adams,  Degradation  of  the  Democratic  Dogma,  pp.  24,  25. 

104  Ibid.,  pp.  27,  28.  In  1832  Clay  discarded  Adams’  plan  of 
using  the  proceeds  from  the  sale  of  the  public  lands  for  these 
purposes.  An  opportunity  was  seen  to  strengthen  the  case  for 
the  protective  tariff  by  distributing  the  surplus  revenue  among  the 
states.  Jackson  failed  to  sign  an  act  for  this  purpose,  and  in 
December,  1833,  explained  his  action  on  the  ground  that  it  would 
lead  to  undesirable  centralization.  The  Democratic  party  favored 
the  sale  of  the  public  lands  at  prices  that  would  meet  the  costs  of 
administration,  and  therefore  there  would  be  no  revenue  to  divide. 
At  first  the  distribution  was  largely  a  sectional  issue  in  that  it 
was  supported  by  the  eastern  states  as  a  means  of  securing  a 
share  in  the  benefits  of  the  public  land ;  in  1841  it  was  openly 
recognized  as  a  policy  of  the  Whig  administration  and  coupled 
with  a  new  preemption  measure  in  order  to  conciliate  the  West,  it 
became  a  law.  Hibbard,  Public  Land  Policies,  pp.  173-187. 


214 


ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 


Webster  and  his  friends.  Their  attitude  was 
expressed  by  H.  A.  Dearborn,  a  Massachusetts 
Whig. 

The  grand,  the  fixed,  the  only  true  policy  of  this  Re¬ 
public  is,  to  encourage  national  production,  in  all  its 
numerous  departments,  and  extend  the  lines  of  inter¬ 
communication  over  the  whole  country.  Nations  must 
not  act  like  individuals.  .  .  .  The  former  must  make 

the  income  commensurate  with  the  necessary  expenditures. 
It  must  promote  intelligence  and  industry  and  therefore 
must  establish  schools  and  seminaries  of  learning  and 
construct  roads,  canals  and  harbours.  The  question  is 
not,  have  we  the  means  in  hand  to  do  all  this,  but  is  this, 
should  it  be  done,  and  if  so,  the  means  must  be  obtained, 
the  money  must  be  raised.105' 

A  storm  of  protest  arose  among  Whigs  in  Sep¬ 
tember,  1837,  when  Van  Buren  declared  in  his 
message  to  Congress  that  people  “looked  to  the 
government  for  too  much.”  The  Intelligencer 
interpreted  the  administration’s  position  to  the 
effect  that  “government  cannot  interfere  too  little 
with  the  pursuits  of  the  people.”106  Clay  replied 
to  this  position  in  the  Senate:  "We  are  all,  people, 
States,  Union  and  banks,  bound  up  and  inter¬ 
woven  together,  united  in  fortune  and  destiny, 
and  all  entitled  to  the  protecting  care  of  a  paternal 
government.”107  Although  Van  Buren’s  decla¬ 
ration  was  originally  made  with  reference  to  the 
possibility  that  legislation  would  improve  the  eco- 

105  Dearborn  to  Webster,  Boston,  March  18,  1840.  Van  Tyne, 
Webster  Transcripts. 

100  National  Intelligencer,  February  27,  1838. 

1OT  Sargent,  Public  Men  and  Events,  II.  20. 


EXPEDIENCY  VERSUS  CONSISTENCY 


215 


nomic  situation,  and  was  therefore  justified  to  a 
considerable  degree,  Whigs  immediately  attri¬ 
buted  it  to  the  indifference  of  Democratic  office¬ 
holders  to  the  sufferings  of  the  people. 

A  frank  acknowledgement  of  its  conservative 
character  and  an  explicit  statement  of  nationalist 
policies  would  have  given  the  Whig  party  a  real 
unity  which  it  in  fact  did  not  have,  but  this,  from 
the  point  of  view  of  practical  politics,  would  have 
been  fatal  to  its  prospects  of  success.  Consider¬ 
able  numbers  scattered  in  all  sections  would  have 
seceded  from  the  party.  The  difficulties  of  the 
Whigs  in  this  respect  were  illustrated  in  the  posi¬ 
tion  of  Calhoun  and  his  friends.  After  leaving 
the  Democratic  party  as  a  result  of  his  differences 
with  Van  Buren  and  as  a  consequence  of  the 
nullification  controversy,  Calhoun  went  over  to 
the  opposition,  since  it  had  the  character  of  an 
alliance  which  would  permit  the  retention  of 
his  sectional  bias.  Early  in  1834  he  was  elated 
by  the  reflection  that  the  conservative  character 
of  the  northern  wing  was  increasing  southern 
strength  in  councils  of  the  party.  Thousands  in 
the  North,  he  declared,  “now  look  to  the  South, 
not  only  for  protection  against  the  usurpation  of 
the  Executive,  but  also  against  the  needy  and 
corrupt  in  their  own  section.  They  begin  to  feel 
what  I  have  long  foreseen,  that  they  have  more  to 
fear  from  their  own  people  than  we  from  our 


216 


ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 


slaves.”108  Conservatism  in  social  questions  was 
therefore  a  bond  between  the  northern  Whigs 
and  the  Calhoun  faction  in  the  South.  But  as 
regards  definite  nationalist  policies  there  was  no 
agreement.109  Rather  than  run  the  danger  of  a 
nationalist  as  presidential  candidate  in  1840  or  of 
a  leader  with  no  definite  principles  and  with  a 
questionable  record  upon  the  slavery  question  Cal¬ 
houn  returned  to  the  Democratic  ranks  in  1837.110 
Political  expediency  required  that  causes  of  party 
dissension  should  be  kept  in  the  background.  For 
this  reason  one  after  another  of  the  ideas  which 
had  formerly  been  cherished  were  sacrificed. 

The  explanation  of  the  inconsistent  position  of 
the  Whig  party  is  to  be  found  in  the  changes  in 
American  politics  caused  by  the  advent  of  Jack¬ 
sonian  democracy.  “Political  influence,”  Cheva¬ 
lier  declared,  “is,  at  present,  entirely  in  the  hands 
of  the  .  .  .  [American  democracy]  as  with  us 
it  is  monopolized  by  the  Middle  classes.”  The  re¬ 
turn  to  power  of  the  upper  and  middle  classes  in 
the  United  States  was  impossible  except  as  a  re- 

108  Calhoun,  to  Duff  Green,  Fort  Hill,  July  27,  1837.  Jameson, 
Calhoun  Correspondence,  pp.  374-377. 

109  In  1838  Calhoun  wrote  that  his  only  hope  was  in  the  Demo¬ 
cratic  party.  “As  much  as  the  party  has  strayed  from  the  true 
principles  and  policy  of  the  Republican  party,  I  believe  that  our 
only  recruiting  ground  is  in  their  ranks.  We  can  have  no  hopes 
from  that  of  the  Nationals,  or  Northern  Whigs.  Not  only  their 
acts,  but  their  principles  are  opposed  to  us.  They  are  consolida- 
tionists  by  profession.  .  .  .”  Calhoun  to  D^rnall,  Fort  Hill, 
October  26,  1838.  Ibid.,  p.  409. 

110  Calhoun  to  Duff  Green,  Fort  Hill.  July  27,  1837.  Ibid.,  pp. 
374-377. 


EXPEDIENCY  VERSUS  CONSISTENCY 


217 


suit  of  accidental  divisions  in  Democratic  ranks 
“when  they  may  rally  to  their  standard  a  portion 
of  the  farmers  and  mechanics.”111  Public  opin¬ 
ion,  according  to  Colton,  had  placed  a  premium 
upon  the  semblance  of  democracy. 

No  political  party  can  dispense  with  it.  .  .  .  What¬ 

ever  their  principles,  radical  or  conservative,  their  best 
passport  is  democracy.  Hence,  under  all  the  rapidly  suc¬ 
ceeding  changes  of  party  names,  adopted  and  given,  which 
have  characterized  the  history  of  American  politics,  the 
radicals  now  stand,  self-styled,  democratic,  and  the  con¬ 
servatives  cannot  do  without  it,  and  are  forced  to  assume 

the  style  of  democratic  republicans,  democratic  whigs 
112 

Under  these  circumstances  candidates  were  more 
than  ever  compelled  to  cater  to  popular  prejudices. 
Marryat,  who  was  aristocratic  in  his  point  of 
view,  wrote  that  a  candidate  with  whom  he  had 
been  talking  changed  his  coat  before  going  out 
with  him  for  fear  of  losing  the  election  if  he 
appeared  in  formal  attire. 

To  be  popular  with  the  majority  in  America,  to  be  a 
favorite  with  the  people,  you  must  first  divest  yourself  of 
all  freedom  of  opinion,  you  must  throw  off  all  dignity, 
you  must  shake  hands  and  drink  with  every  man  you 
meet;  you  must  be,  in  fact,  slovenly  and  dirty,  in  your 
appearance,  or  you  will  be  put  down  as  an  aristocrat.113 

Although  Hamilton  was  told  that  experience 
under  Democratic  rule  had  strengthened  the  con- 

111  Chevalier,  Society,  Manners  and  Politics,  p.  399. 

112  Colton,  Voice  from  America,  p.  3. 

113  Marryat,  Diary  in  America.  II.  69. 


218 


ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 


servatism  of  the  Whigs,  they  dared  not  express 
this  point  of  view  when  running  for  office.114 . 

The  increasing  democratic  character  of  politics 
resulted  not  only  in  setting  aside  Whig  principles 
but  also  in  the  elevation  of  new  men  to  leadership 
in  the  party.  In  New  York  the  old  aristocracy 
of  birth  and  of  landed  proprietorship  no  longer 
occupied  influential  positions  in  politics  by  the 
campaign  of  1840.115  Hone’s  diary  in  this  con¬ 
nection  expresses  the  reaction  of  a  wealthy 
Whig  to  the  new  conditions.  A  Whig  rally  in 
October,  1838,  chose  David  B.  Ogden  “that  excel¬ 
lent  old  Whig,”  as  its  chairman,  and  Hone’s 
reflections  on  this  incident  express  his  own  re¬ 
sentment  and  that  of  men  like  him  at  the  change 
that  had  taken  place  in  the  Whig  party. 

It  is  refreshing  once  in  a  while  to  see  a  relic  of  honest 
political  principles  .  .  •  allowed  to  take  a  prominent 

part  in  public  affairs.  It  is  almost  the  only  thing  of  its 
kind  I  have  seen  in  relation  to  the  coming  election.  _  I 
cannot  recognize  the  name  on  either  ticket  of  a  leading 
Federalist  or  National  Republican;  they  are  permitted  to 
work  and  pay  money  ;  they  must  bake  the  loaves  and  catch 
the  fishes,  but  they  get  precious  few  for  themselves.116 

Hone  wished  in  1839  to  secure  the  party’s  nomi¬ 
nation  for  the  state  senate  but  was  told  by  the 
politicians  that  “  ‘I  am  a  gentleman  .  .  .  and 
no  gentleman  can  win’.  ...  If  they  are  right 

114  Hamilton,  Men  and  Manners,  I.  290. 

115  Fox,  Decline  of  Aristocracy,  pp.  415,  416. 

1,6  Hone,  Diary,  I.  328,  329. 


EXPEDIENCY  VERSUS  CONSISTENCY 


219 


in  what  they  say,  the  party  is  not  worth  sustain¬ 
ing,  better  it  would  be  that  everything  should  go 
back  to  the  dunghill  of  Democracy  and  let  us  see 
if  something  better  may  not  spring  from  it.”117 

Men  who  had  come  into  the  party  from  the 
Anti-Masons  or  from  the  Democratic  ranks,  and 
others  who  were  willing  to  change  their  methods 
and  ideas  to  meet  the  needs  of  the  new  political 
conditions  exercised  a  decisive  influence  in  the 
campaign  of  1840.  They  were  convinced  that  a 
change  of  tactics  was  essential  to  a  Whig  success. 
Such  was  the  opinion  of  Thurlow  Weed  as  early 
as  1834. 

Our  party  as  at  present  organized,  is  doomed  to  fight 
merely  to  be  beaten.  .  .  .  The  longer  we  fight  Jack- 

sonianism  with  our  present  weapons,  the  more  it  won’t 
die!  The  truth  is,  in  all  this  part  of  the  State,  we  are  in 
the  condition  of  the  old  federal  party.118  The  people  are 
against  us,  and  they  won’t  change  in  our  favor  so  long  as 
the  existing  party  lines  are  drawn.  .  .  .  With  Clay, 

Webster,  or  Calhoun,  or  indeed  any  man  identified  with 


117  Ibid.,  I.  384.  However,  his  estimate  was  higher  of  the  Whig 
members  of  Congress.  In  his  opinion,  Abbott  Lawrence,  a  mem¬ 
ber  of  the  House  from  Massachusetts,  was  “an  amiable  man,  and 
a  wise  man,  and  a  gentleman  and  thereby  unsuited  for  the  society 
of  the  Robespierres,  and  the  Marats,  and  the  Couthnons,  who  con¬ 
stitute  the  present  majority  of  our  modern  Jacobin  Club  at 
Washington;  and  of  such  men  as  Abbot  Lawrence  the  Whig  party 
in  that  House  is  mainly  constituted.”  Ibid.,  II.  19. 

118  The  continuity  of  the  Federalist,  National  Republican,  and 
Whig  parties  is  impossible  of  demonstration  in  detail.  Niles  cited 
numerous  instances  of  Federalists  joining  the  Democratic  party. 
Niles’  Register,  XLIII.  71,  101.  Ibid.,  XLVI.  256,  266.  But  the 
similarity  between  the  political  ideas  of  these  patries  is  sufficient 
demonstration  that  it  is  a  fact. 


220 


ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 


the  war  against  Jackson  and  in  favor  of  the  Bank,  or  the 
Bank’s  shadow,  the  game  is  up.119 

The  nomination  of  an  old  soldier  whose  home 
happened  to  be  in  a  log  cabin  and  whose  opinions, 
if  he  had  any,  caused  a  minimum  of  dissension 
within  the  party  was  the  visible  evidence  of  the 
change  which  had  taken  place  in  the  Whig  party. 
In  thus  casting  aside  its  older  leaders  and  princi¬ 
ples  the  party  achieved  a  superficial  unity  and, 
riding  upon  the  wave  of  an  emotional  campaign, 
won  a  temporary  victory  by  sacrificing  any 
attempt  to  maintain  a  consistent  position. 

“Weed  to  Granger,  Albany,  November  23,  (1834?)  Granger 
MSS. 


CONCLUSIONS 


JACKSONIAN  Democracy  not  only  controlled 
the  federal  government  in  the  period  from 
1828  to  1840  but  it  was  also  perhaps  the  most 
important  influence  in  shaping  the  character  of 
the  opposition.  The  opposition’s  chief  problem, 
whether  as  the  National  Republican  or  as  the 
Whig  party,  was  the  determination  of  ways  and 
means  of  regaining  power.  This  period  is,  there¬ 
fore,  a  unit  in  the  history  of  the  Whig  party,  in 
which  it  gradually,  and  in  some  measure  against 
its  will,  underwent  changes  under  the  influence 
of  the  dominant  Democracy.  Old  issues  and 
methods  were  relegated  to  the  background  or 
changed  to  serve  more  effectively  the  party’s 
needs.  Old  leaders  were  replaced  by  new  men 
who  had  taken  no  conspicuous  part  in  the  past 
'  struggles  with  the  democratic  movement  and  who 
could  therefore  seek  its  support.  It  is  the  chief 
purpose  of  this  study  to  trace  the  process  by  which 
the  Whig  party  was  shaped  to  suit  the  needs  of 
the  political  situation. 

The  brief  history  of  the  National  Republican 
party  constitutes  the  first  phase  of  the  problem 
because  the  causes  of  its  failure  go  far  to  explain 
the  weakness  of  party  which  followed  it.  These 


222 


ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 


causes  are  to  be  found  chiefly  in  the  leadership 
of  John  Quincy  Adams.  Elected  in  1824  with 
the  aid  of  many  of  the  country’s  ablest  leaders,  he 
failed  to  create  a  strong  party  during  his  adminis¬ 
tration.  He  displayed  considerable  skill  as  a  poli¬ 
tician  in  the  negotiations  prior  to  his  election,  but, 
once  in  office,  he  preferred  a  non-partisan  policy 
and  yielded  with  reluctance,  and  too  late  to  have 
material  results,  to  the  requests  of  his  associates 
for  aid  in  the  organization  of  a  party.  Most  im¬ 
portant  of  all  was  his  lack  of  sympathy  for  and 
understanding  of  the  political  significance  of  the 
frontier.  His  defeat  in  1828  eliminated  him  as 
the  leader  of  the  party. 

In  1829  there  was  a  possibility  of  defeating 
Jackson  as  the  leader  of  the  new  democracy  in  the 
ensuing  campaign  without  compromising  too 
much  the  character  of  the  National  Republican 
party.  Three  problems  required  solution  in  order 
to  attain  this  result :  ( 1 )  organization  without 
the  aid  of  the  patronage,  (2)  the  nomination  of 
the  candidate  who  had  the  best  prospect  of  suc¬ 
cess,  and  (3)  the  selection  of  an  effective  cam¬ 
paign  issue.  The  party  solved  none  of  these 
problems.  After  the  failure  of  the  congressional 
caucus  to  establish  itself  in  a  position  similar  to 
that  of  the  national  committees  today,  the  party 
was  without  national  leadership  except  that  which 
was  supplied  by  Clay  and  other  prominent  Na¬ 
tional  Republicans  and  by  the  National  Intelli- 


CONCLUSIONS 


223 


gencer.  Within  the  several  states  the  National 
Republicans  of  New  York  led  in  the  organization 
of  party  machinery  by  reviving  the  scheme  of 
correspondence  committees  of  Revolutionary 
times.  No  effort  was  made  to  select  from  avail¬ 
able  candidates  the  one  best  qualified  to  lead  the 
party.  Clay’s  nomination  was  certain  from  the 
beginning,  and  therefore  no  adequate  attention 
was  given  to  John  McLean  whose  candidacy  at 
least  had  the  possibility  of  dividing  the  Demo¬ 
cratic  vote.  Accident  determined  the  campaign 
issue  when  Biddle  decided  to  apply  for  a  renewal 
of  the  Bank’s  charter  before  the  election.  With¬ 
out  any  other  issue,  Clay  and  his  party  made  the 
cause  of  the  Bank  their  own  in  the  hope  that 
Jackson’s  hostility  would  be  an  asset,  an  anticipa¬ 
tion  which  of  course  was  disappointed  in  the 
election  of  1832. 

Even  before  Jackson’s  reelection  discontent 
appeared  in  regard  to  Clay’s  leadership,  and  the 
thoroughness  of  his  defeat  discredited  the  party. 
Attention  was  centered  in  1833,  as  a  result  of  the 
nullification  crisis,  upon  questions  that  had  no 
relation  to  existing  party  divisions,  and  the  situa¬ 
tion  was  further  confused  when  Clay  favored  a 
compromise  of  the  tariff  question  in  order  to  gain 
strength  in  the  South.  Aroused  by  Clay’s  tempo¬ 
rizing  policy,  Webster  endorsed  Jackson’s  posi¬ 
tion  and  considered  the  possibility  of  a  party  in 
support  of  nationalist  principles  in  which  he 


224 


ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 


would  share  the  leadership  with  Jackson.  He  was 
encouraged  by  Biddle  during  the  summer  of  1833 
to  negotiate  with  the  administration  in  order  to 
moderate  Jackson’s  Bank  policy.  Cooperation 
between  Webster  and  Jackson  was  made  impossi¬ 
ble,  however,  by  the  removal  of  the  deposits, 
because  there  was  no  common  ground  between 
them  upon  this  question.  Clay  thereupon  pro¬ 
cured  the  election  of  Webster  as  chairman  of  the 
Senate  finance  committee,  a  position  in  which  he 
was  compelled  to  take  a  positive  stand  against  the 
President’s  policy  in  the  removal. 

A  temporary  depression  in  the  spring  of  1834, 
caused  in  part  by  the  Bank’s  restriction  of  credit, 
reacted  in  favor  of  the  opposition.  It  was  at¬ 
tributed  to  the  administration’s  war  upon  the 
Bank,  and,  in  order  to  make  the  most  of  the  favor¬ 
able  turn  of  events,  the  opposition  assumed  the 
name  of  Whig  because  of  the  associations  of 
that  name  with  earlier  struggles  in  English  and 
American  history  against  an  irresponsible  execu¬ 
tive.  Confidence  in  an  immediate  success  was 
aroused  by  a  partial  victory  in  the  New  York  City 
election  of  April,  1834,  but  returning  prosperity 
in  the  fall  removed  a  tangible  evidence  of  Demo¬ 
cratic  misrule,  with  the  result  that  the  Whigs  lost 
what  little  ground  they  had  gained.  Moreover, 
it  was  soon  apparent  that  sectional  divisions 
within  the  party  would  make  harmony  impossible 
in  the  approaching  election,  and  in  the  end  three 


CONCLUSIONS 


225 


candidates  were  placed  in  the  field  in  the  vain 
hope  of  forcing  the  election  into  the  House  of 
Representatives. 

During  the  campaign  of  1836  the  friends  of 
Clay  and  Webster  declared  that  they  would  never 
sacrifice  old  and  experienced  leaders  in  favor  of 
the  practically  unknown  Harrison.  But  the  elec¬ 
tion  revealed  Harrison’s  unexpected  strength  and 
introduced  a  new  factor  in  the  Whig  party.  At 
first  an  attempt  was  made  to  keep  the  party  loyal 
to  its  old  leaders  through  movements  for  the 
nomination  of  Webster  or  Clay.  Webster  nego¬ 
tiated  for  this  purpose  with  the  survivors  of  the 
Anti-Masonic  party.  In  1837  the  party  repeated 
its  experiences  of  1834,  when  the  crisis  of  that 
year  seemed  to  guarantee  a  certain  Whig  victory 
in  the  next  election.  The  Whigs  as  a  result  won 
a  series  of  victories  in  the  fall  of  1837,  the  most 
important  being  the  election  of  a  large  majoritv 
in  the  New  York  Assembly.  The  parallel  with 
the  party’s  earlier  experiences  did  not  end  here, 
however,  for  in  the  following  year  much  of  the 
ground  that  had  been  gained  was  lost.  The  party 
elected  its  candidate  for  governor  of  New  York 
by  a  greatly  reduced  majority;  aside  from  this, 
there  was  little  reason  for  confidence.  Instead  of 
certain  victory  in  1840,  therefore,  Whigs  had  rea¬ 
son  to  fear  another  defeat,  and  as  a  result  opinion 
turned  against  the  nomination  of  either  Webster 
or  Clay.  Webster  failed  in  his  efforts  to  secure 


226  ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 

the  Anti-Masonic  nomination,  and  it  was  thought 
that  Clay  would  have  no  chance.  An  opportunity 
was  thus  given  to  the  friends  of  Harrison,  who 
argued  that  his  showing  in  1836  made  him  the 
logical  choice  for  the  nomination.  He  was  nomi¬ 
nated  by  the  Anti-Masons  in  1838,  and  one  of  the 
most  influential  newspapers  that  previously  sup¬ 
ported  Webster  went  over  to  him.  It  was  argued 
that  in  order  to  win  the  election  of  1840  the 
democratic  element  in  the  party  must  be  given 
control.  Harrison’s  nomination  by  the  Harris¬ 
burg  convention  was  made  possible  by  the  support 
of  the  western  and  frontier  delegates  as  a  result 
of  a  decision  to  copy  the  methods  of  the  Demo¬ 
cratic  party.  Men  who  had  formerly  declared 
their  unalterable  opposition  to  Harrison  as  un¬ 
worthy  of  the  party  now  rallied  to  his  support. 

Temporary  harmony  was  won  by  the  sacrifice 
of  the  leaders  and  principles  of  the  National  Re¬ 
publican  party.  That  this  sacrifice  was  necessary 
in  order  to  achieve  success  was  due  to  the  char¬ 
acter  of  the  party  as  an  alliance  whose  existence 
was  threatened  by  dissension  upon  specific  politi¬ 
cal  and  sectional  issues.  Except  for  the  desire  of 
office,  which  was  common  to  all  branches  of  the 
party,  real  union  existed  only  in  a  conservative 
point  of  view  among  the  majority  of  its  members. 
The  conservatism  of  the  party  was  revealed 
by  its  attitude  towards  radical  tendencies,  towards 
the  naturalization  of  aliens,  towards  the  labor 


CONCLUSIONS 


227 


movement,  towards  the  disposal  of  the  public 
lands,  towards  the  qualifications  of  office-holders 
and  towards  the  scope  of  the  powers  of  the  fed¬ 
eral  government.  A  frank  expression  of  its  con¬ 
servative  principles  would  have  created  a  united 
party,  but  it  would  have  been,  according  to  Wil¬ 
liam  Schouler,  “a  respectable,  but  never  a  success¬ 
ful  one.”1  The  most  active  of  Whig  politicians 
and  editors  after  1836,  men  like  Weed,  Greeley, 
Ewing  of  Ohio,  Thaddeus  Stevens,  and  Richard 
Houghton  of  Boston,  preferred  success  to  a  con¬ 
sistent  position  and,  therefore,  influenced  the 
party  to  make  its  campaign  in  the  form  of  an 
appeal  to  popular  emotion  and,  for  this  purpose, 
terfopy  the  methods  of  the  Democratic  party. 

1  Hudson,  Journalism  in  the  United  States,  pp.  392,  393. 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 


I — Unpublished  Letters 

Lmless  otherwise  stated,  the  following  manuscripts  are 
in  the  possession  of  the  Library  of  Congress. 

J.  Q.  Adams  MSS.  A  small  collection,  but  contains  a 
useful  series  of  letters  to  A.  H.  Everett. 

James  Barbour  MSS.  New  York  Public  Library.  An 
important  source  for  political  conditions 

Biddle  MSS.  This  monumental  collection  contains 
many  letters  throwing  light  upon  political  questions  which 
are  not  printed  in  Professor  McGrane’s  edition  of  the 
Biddle  Correspondence. 

Clay  MSS.  A  small  but  useful  collection. 

Clayton  MSS.  A  valuable  and  little  used  source. 

A.  C.  Flagg  MSS.  New  York  Public  Library.  Flagg 
corresponded  with  many  of  the  important  Democratic 
leaders. 

Thomas  Ewing  MSS.  Chiefly  concerned,  in  this 
period,  with  local  parties  in  Ohio. 

Gouverneur  MSS.  New  York  Public  Library. 
Gouverneur  was  the  postmaster  of  New  York  City. 

Francis  Granger  MSS.  Useful  for  New  York  politics. 

Jackson  MSS.  This  collection,  while  important  for 
the  Democratic  point  of  view,  has  little  value  for  the 
purposes  of  this  study. 

William  Kent  MSS.  Of  little  value  for  political  con¬ 
ditions. 

Mangum  MSS.  Important  for  the  point  of  view  of  the 
southern  Whigs. 

McLean  MSS.  A  little  used  and  valuable  source. 

Van  Buren  MSS.  Of  a  restricted  value  for  this  study. 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 


229 


Van  Tyne,  C.  H.,  Webster  Transcripts.  Typewritten 
copies  of  Webster’s  letters  in  the  possession  of  the  New 
Hampshire  Historical  Society. 

Webster  MSS.  Contains  many  letters  of  importance 
which  have  not  been  published  in  the  various  editions  of 
Webster’s  letters. 

Wirt  MSS.  Of  no  value  for  political  conditions. 

II — Newspapers 

Albany 

Albany  Argus,  1833.  (D.) 

Albany  Evening  Journal,  1838-1839. 

Boston 

Boston  Daily  Advertiser  and  Patriot,  1833,  1838. 
Boston  Atlas,  (semi-weekly),  1836-1838. 

Boston  Statesman,  (semi-weekly),  1833.  (D.) 

Cincinnati 

Cincinnati  Daily  Gazette,  1833. 

Concord,  New  Hampshire 
New  Hampshire  Patriot,  1833.  (D.) 

New  York 

New  York  American,  1833,  1838. 

Morning  Courier  and  New  York  Enquirer,  1833. 

New  York  Daily  Advertiser,  1833-1834. 

Philadelphia 

Paulson’s  American  Daily  Advertiser,  1833. 

National  Gazette  and  Literary  Register,  1833. 

The  Pennsylvanian,  1833.  (D.) 

Washington 

Washington  Globe,  1833.  (D.) 

Daily  National  Intelligencer,  1827-1840. 

United  States  Telegraph,  1833. 


230 


ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 


III — Published  Letters 

Colton,  Calvin,  The  Private  Correspondence  of  Henry 
Clay,  New  York,  1856. 

Cox,  Isaac  J.,  ed.,  “Torrence  Papers,”  Quarterly  Publi¬ 
cation  of  the  Historical  and  Philosophical  Society  of 
Ohio,  I.  65-96,  II.  5-36,  III.  69-120. 

Ford,  P.  L.,  ed.,  Writings  of  Thomas  Jefferson,  10  vols., 
New  York,  1892-1899. 

Hamlin,  L.  Belle,  ed.,  “Follett  Papers,”  Quarterly  Pub¬ 
lication  of  the  Historical  and  Philosophical  Society  of 
Ohio,  vol.  V.  no.  2. 

Jameson,  J.  Franklin,  ed.,  “Correspondence  of  John  C. 
Calhoun,”  Annual  Report  of  the  American  Historical 
Association,  1899,  vol  II. 

McGrane,  R.  C.,  ed.,  The  Correspondence  of  Nicholas 
Biddle  dealing  with  National  Affairs,  1807-1844,  Bos¬ 
ton,  1919. 

Moore,  J.  B.,  ed.,  Works  of  James  Buchanan,  12  vols., 
Philadelphia,  1908-1911. 

Quarterly  Journal  of  Economics,  vol.  II.,  pp.  490-491.  A 
useful  letter  written  by  Clay. 

Van  Tyne,  C.  H.,  ed.,  Webster  Letters,  New  York,  1902. 

Webster,  Fletcher,  ed.,  The  Private  Correspondence  of 
Daniel  Webster,  2  vols.,  Boston,  1857. 

Writings  and  Speeches  of  Daniel  Webster  (National  Edi¬ 
tion),  Boston,  1903,  vol.  XVI. 

IV — Memoirs,  Reminiscences,  and  Contemporary 
Interpretations 

Adams,  J.  Q.,  The  Memoirs  of  J.  Q.  Adams  (C.  F. 
Adams,  ed.,)  12  vols,  Philadelphia,  1876. 

[Benton,  Thomas  H.],  Thirty  Years  View,  or  A  His¬ 
tory  of  the  Workings  of  the  American  Government  for 
Thirty  Years,  from  1820  to  1850,  by  a  Senator  of 
Thirty  Years,  2  vols.,  New  York,  1854-1856. 

Byrdsall,  F.,  The  History  of  the  Locofocos,  or  Equal 
Rights  Party,  its  movements,  conventions,  and  proceed¬ 
ings,  New  York,  1842. 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 


231 


Congdon,  C.  T.,  Reminiscences  of  a  Journalist,  Boston, 
1880. 

Greeley,  Horace,  Recollections  of  a  Busy  Life,  New 
York,  1868. 

Hamilton,  James  A.,  Reminiscences,  New  York,  1869. 

Harvey,  Peter,  Reminiscences  of  Daniel  Webster,  Bos¬ 
ton,  1877. 

Hone,  Philip,  The  Diary  of  Philip  Hone,  1828-1851 

(Bayard  Tuckerman,  ed.,)  2  vols.,  New  York,  1889. 

Julian,  G.  W.,  Political  Recollections,  1840-1872,  Chi¬ 
cago,  1884. 

Kendall,  Amos,  Autobiography  of  Amos  Kendall  (Wil¬ 
liam  S.  Stickney,  ed.,)  Boston,  1872. 

March,  C.  W.,  Reminiscences  of  Congress,  New  York, 
1850. 

Mason,  Jeremiah,  The  Memoirs  and  Correspondence  of 
Jeremiah  Mason,  Cambridge,  1873. 

Sargent,  Nathan,  Public  Men  and  Events  from  the 
Commencement  of  Mr.  Monroe’s  Administration  in 
1817  to  the  close  of  Mr.  Fillmore’s  Administration  in 
1853,  2  vols.,  Philadelphia,  1875. 

Seward,  William  H.,  Autobiography  of  William  H. 
Seward,  from  1801  to  1834,  with  a  Memoir  of  his  Life, 
etc.,  (F.  W.  Seward,  ed.,)  New  York,  1877. 

Van  Buren,  Martin,  “Autobiography  of  Martin  Van 
Buren”  (J.  C.  Fitzpatrick,  ed.,)  Annual  Report  of  the 
American  Historical  Association,  Washington,  1918, 
vol.  II. 

Van  Buren,  Martin,  Inquiry  into  the  Origin  and  Course 
of  Political  Parties  in  the  United  States  (edited  by  his 
sons),  New  York,  1867.  This  book  was  at  first  in¬ 
tended  as  a  part  of  his  autobiography,  (p.  9)  but  later 
Van  Buren  decided  to  complete  it  as  a  separate  study. 

Weed,  Thurlow,  The  Life  of  Thurlow  Weed,  2  vols., 
Boston,  1884.  Vol.  I.  Autobiography  (Flarriet  A. 
Weed,  ed.) 

Wise,  Henry,  A.,  Seven  Decades  of  the  Union,  etc., 
Richmond,  1881. 


232 


ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 


V —  Pamphlets 

[Colton,  Calvin],  A  Voice  from  America  to  England, 
by  an  American  Gentleman,  London,  1839. 

[Colton,  Calvin],  American  Jacobinism,  by  “Junius,” 

New  York,  1840. 

[Colton,  Calvin],  The  Crisis  of  the  Country,  by 

“Junius,  Philadelphia,  1840. 

Derby,  J.  B.,  Political  Reminiscences,  Boston,  1835. 

Durasmont,  Frances  (Wright),  What  is  the  Matter,  A 
Political  address  as  delivered  in  Masonic  Hall,  October 
28,  1838,  New  York,  1838. 

Speech  of  Richard  Fletcher,  Faneuil  Hall,  November  6, 
1837. 

Hildreth,  Richard,  My  connection  with  the  Atlas  news¬ 
paper,  etc.,  Boston,  1839. 

[Kennedy,  J.  P.],  Defence  of  the  Whigs,  by  a  member 
of  the  Twenty-Seventh  Congress,  1844. 

Proceedings  of  the  Democratic  Whig  convention,  Decem¬ 
ber  4,  1839,  for  the  purpose  of  nomination  of  President 
and  Vice-President. 

The  Political  Mirror,  a  Review  of  Jacksonianism,  New 
York,  1835. 

Mr.  Webster's  Speech  on  the  President’s  Protest,  Senate, 
May  7 ,  1834,  Washington. 

VI —  Periodicals 

Boston  Quarterly  Rezdew,  1838-1840. 

The  New  Yorker,  1836-1840. 

The  New  York  Review,  1838. 

Niles’  Register,  1824-1840. 

Truth’s  Advocate  and  Monthly  Anti-Jackson  Expositor, 

Cincinnati,  January  to  October,  1828. 

The  United  States  Magazine  and  Democratic  Review, 

1838-1840. 

VII — Debates,  Statistics,  Etc. 

Bradford.  T.  G.,  An  Illustrated  Atlas,  geographical,  sta¬ 
tistical  and  historical,  of  the  United  States  and  adjacent 
countries,  Philadelphia,  1838. 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 


233 


Congressional  Globe,  23  Congress,  1  Session;  24  Con¬ 
gress,  1  and  2  Sesions ;  25  Congress,  2  Session. 

House  Journal,  24  Congress,  2  Session;  25  Congress,  2 
Session. 

Matthias,  Benjamin,  The  Politician’s  Register,  Phila¬ 
delphia,  1835.  Library  of  Congress.  My  attention  was 
called  to  this,  the  only  known  source  for  the  returns 
by  counties  for  the  election  of  1832,  by  Dr.  C.  O. 
Paullin. 

Works  of  Daniel  Webster,  Sixth  edition,  6  vols.,  Boston, 
1853. 

Whig  Almanac  and  United  States  Register,  New  York 
1838-1840. 

Compendium  of  the  Enumeration  of  the  Inhabitants  and 
Statistics  of  the  United  States,  as  obtained  at  the  De¬ 
partment  of  State,  from  the  Returns  of  the  Sixth 
Census,  etc.,  Washington,  1841. 

VIII — Books  on  America  by  Foreign  Travellers 

Buckingham,  J.  S.,  America,  Historical,  Statistic,  and 
Descriptive,  3  vols.,  London,  1841. 

Chevalier,  Michel,  Letters  sur  I’Amerique  du  Nord, 
2  vols.,  Bruxelles,  1837. 

Chevalier,  Michel,  Society,  Manners  and  Politics  in  the 
United  States,  Boston,  1839. 

Godley,  John  Robert,  Letters  from  America,  2  vols., 
London, 1844. 

Grund,  Francis  J.,  The  Americans,  in  their  Moral,  So¬ 
cial,  and  Political  Relations,  Boston,  1837. 

Hamilton,  Thomas,  Men  and  Manners  in  America,  2 
vols.,  London,  1833. 

Lyell,  Sir  Charles,  A  Second  Visit  to  the  United  States, 
2  vols.,  New  York,  1849. 

Mackay,  Alexander,  The  Western  World,  or,  Travels 
in  the  United  States  in  1846-1847,  4  edition,  3  vols., 
London,  1850. 

Marrgat,  Frederick,  Diary  in  America,  3  vols.,  London, 
1839. 

Martineau,  Harriet,  Society  in  America,  3  vols.,  Lon¬ 
don,  1837. 


234 


ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 


Raumer,  Frederick  von,  America  and  the  American 
People,  New  York,  1846.  _  . 

Tocqueville,  Alexic  C.  de.  Democracy  in  America,  5th 
edition,  2  vols.,  Cambridge,  1873. 


IX — Biographies 


Appleton's  Cyclopcedia  of  American  Biography  (J.  G. 
Wilson  and 'John  Fiske,  editors),  6  vols.,  New  York, 
1887 

Bancroft,  Frederic,  The  Life  of  William  H.  Seward,  2 
vols.,  New  York,  1900. 

Bassett,  J.  S.,  The  Life  of  Andrew  Jackson,  2  vols.,  New 

York,  1911.  .  r  _ 

Colton,  Calvin,  The  Life  and  Times  of  Henry  Clay,  2 
vols.,  New  York,  1846. 

Curtis,  George  T.,  Life  of  Daniel  Webster,  2  vols.,  New 

York,  1872.  iono 

Tulian,  G.  W.,  Life  of  Joshua  Geddmgs,  Chicago,  1892. 
Kennedy,  James  P.,  Memoirs  of  the  Life  of  William 
Wirt,  2  vols.,  Philadelphia,  1860. 

Lodge,  H.  C..  Life  of  Daniel  Webster  (American  States¬ 
men  Series),  Boston,  1884. 

McMaster,  J.  B.,  Daniel  Webster,  New  York,  1902. 
Morison,  Samuel  E.,  The  Life  and  Letters  of  Harrison 
Gray  Otis,  Federalist,  1765-1848.  2  vols.,  Boston,  1913. 
Ogg.  Frederick,  A.,  Daniel  Webster  (American  Crisis 
Biographies),  1914. 

Parton,  James,  The  Life  of  Andrew  Jackson,  3  vols., 
New  York,  1861. 

Schurz,  Carl,  Life  of  Clay,  2  vols.,  Boston,  1887. 
Shepard,  Edward  M.,  Martin  Van  Buren  (Amrican 
Statesmen  series),  Boston,  1899. 

Tyler,  L.  G.,  The  Letters  and  Times  of  the  Tylers,  3 
vols.,  Richmond,  1884. 

The  Life  of  Thurlow  Weed,  2  vols.,  Cambridge,  1884,  vol. 
II.  Memoir  of  Thurlow  Weed  (T.  W.  Barnes,  ed.) 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 


235 


X — Monographs 

Adams,  Henry,  The  Degradation  of  the  Democratic 
Dogma,  New  York,  1920.  (Brooks  Adams,  “The 
Heritage  of  Henry  Adams”). 

Bartlett,  Mary  Q.,  The  Chief  Phases  of  Pennsylvania 
Politics  in  the  Jacksonian  Period,  Allentown,  1919. 

Bourne,  Edward  Q.,  The  History  of  the  Surplus  Revenue 
of  1837,  being  an  account  of  its  origin,  its  distribution 
among  the  States,  and  the  uses  to  which  it  was  applied, 
New  York,  1885. 

Catterall,  R.  C.  H.,  The  Second  Bank  of  the  United 
States,  Chicago,  1903. 

Cole,  A.  C.,  The  Whig  Party  in  the  South,  Washington, 
1913. 

Darling,  A.  B.,  “Jacksonian  Democracy  in  Massachu¬ 
setts,  1824,  1848,”  American  Historical  Review,  XXIX. 
271-287. 

Dawson,  Edgar,  “Origin  of  the  American  Whig  Party,” 
The  History  Teacher’s  Magazine,  II.  160,  161.  Inter¬ 
prets  the  Whig  party  as  “more  nearly  the  Jeffersonian 
Republican  party  struggling  for  existence  in  its  old 
age,”  than  as  the  Federalist  party  renamed.  No  at¬ 
tempt  is  made  to  prove  this  assertion. 

Faust,  A.  B.,  The  German  Element  in  the  United  States, 
2  vol.,  New  York,  1909. 

Fish,  C.  R.,  The  Civil  Service  and  the  Patronage,  New 
York,  1905. 

Fiske,  John,  Essays  Historical  and  Literary,  2  vols., 
1902. 

Fox,  D.  R.,  “The  Decline  of  Aristocracy  in  the  Politics 
of  New  York,”  Studies  in  History,  Economics,  and 
Public  Law,  Columbia  University,  New  York,  1919. 

Fox,  D.  R.,  “The  Economic  Status  of  the  New  York 
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236 


ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 


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Hammond,  Jabez  D.,  The  Political  History  of  New  York, 

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Hinsdale,  Mary,  A  History  of  the  President's  Cabinet, 
Ann  Arbor,  1911. 

Hudson,  Frederick,  Journalism  in  the  United  States, 
New  York,  1873. 

Matthews,  Lois  K.,  The  Expansion  of  New  Enqland , 
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Annual  Report  of  the  American  Historical  Association, 
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Mueller,  H.  R.,  “The  Whig  Party  in  Pennsylvania,” 
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Ormsby,  R.  McKinley,  A  History  of  the  Whig  Party, 
or  Some  of  its  Main  Features,  Boston,  1859. 

Phillips,  U.  B.,  “Georgia  and  State  Rights,”  Annual 
Report  of  the  American  Historical  Association,  1902. 

Phillips,  U.  B.,  “The  Federalists  in  South  Carolina,” 
American  Historical  Review,  XIV,  776-790. 

Phillips,  U.  B.,  “The  Southern  Whigs,”  Turner  Essays 
in  American  History,  New  York,  1910. 

Rammelkamp,  C.  H.,  “The  Election  of  1824  in  New 
York,”  Annual  Report  of  the  American  Historical 
Association,  1904,  pp.  177-201. 

Roseboom,  Eugene,  “Ohio  in  the  Presidential  Election 
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Scisco,  F.  L.,  “Political  Nativism  in  New  York,”  Studies 
in  History,  Economics  and  Public  Law,  Columbia  Uni¬ 
versity,  New  York,  1901. 


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Stan  wood,  Edward,  A  History  of  Presidential  Elections, 
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Trimble,  William,  “Diverging  Tendencies  in  the  New 
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vols.,  Boston,  1882. 

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238 


ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 


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New  York,  1903. 


INDEX 


Abolition  movement,  non-parti¬ 
san  in  origin,  174. 

Adams,  Henry  Degradation  of 
the  Democratic  Dogma,  cited, 
2,  213  235 

Adams,  J.  Q,  30,  70,  134,  155, 
169;  political  leadership,  2, 
11,  12,  23,  24,  26,  31  n„ 
32,  39,  222 ;  his  conserva¬ 
tism,  4;  and  Jackson  in  1824, 
4,  5;  campaign  of  1824,  5-11; 
quarrel  with  Massachusetts 
Federalists  in  1807,  8  n. ;  West 
and  internal  improvements,  8, 
n;  patronage,  10,  11,  12,  13, 
16,  17,  agrees  with  J.  McLean 
on,  18 ;  personality,  13 ;  use  of 
money  in  elections,  15 ;  cam¬ 
paign  of  1828,  26,  27 ;  election 
of  1828,  30;  considered  by 
Anti-Masons  for  presidency, 
50;  attitude  towards  Clay, 
1832,  67;  New  York  City 
charter  election,  1834,  121 ; 
Van  Buren’s  election  certain, 
147 ;  Clay’s  democracy,  161 ; 
Whig  leaders  and  internal  im¬ 
provements,  1834,  172 ;  char¬ 
acter  of  Whig  party,  172  n., 
173  n. ;  growth  of  executive 
powers,  180,  181 ;  Richard 

Fletcher,  186,  186  n. ;  decline 
in  respect  for  law,  188;  in¬ 
ternal  improvements,  213. 

Adams,  J.  Q.,  MSS.,  cited,  161, 
172,  228. 

Albany,  124. 

Albany  Argus,  cited,  105,  106, 
107,  229;  Washington  Globe 
and  Tariff,  97. 

Albany  Journal,  cited,  156,  163, 
n„  170,  229. 


American  System,  25,  37,  47 ; 
and  National  Republican 
party,  1832,  58;  attitude  of 
Whig  party,  173. 

Anti-Masonic  party,  origin,  48 
n. ;  relations  with  National 
Republicans,  49,  49  n.,  52,  53, 
67 ;  and  Clay,  49,  50,  68 ;  con¬ 
siders  Richard  Rush  and  J.  Q. 
Adams  for  presidency,  50; 
preference  for  J.  McLean,  50; 
nominates  William  Wirt,  51; 
position  in  1835,  135,  136;  ana 
Webster,  1835,  136,  137; 

Democratic  members,  136  n. ; 
Harrisburg  convention,  1835, 
137 ;  influence  in  Harrisburg 
convention,  1839,  162,  189 ; 
Bank  issue,  166  n. ;  joins 
Whig  party,  172 ;  general  de¬ 
sire  for  its  nomination,  1832, 
174. 

Anti-slavery,  see  abolition  move¬ 
ment  ;  Clay’s  Taylorsville 
speech,  159;  petition  strug¬ 
gle,  175,  176;  silence  of  press, 
176. 

Appleton,  Samuel,  156. 

Atherton,  C.  G.,  185. 

Auburn,  124. 

Autobiography  of  Amos  Ken¬ 
dall,  cited,  231. 

Autobiography  of  Martin  Van 
Buren,  (J.  C.  Fitzpatrick, 
ed.),  cited.  4,  72,  73,  77,  78, 
87,  89,  102,  104,  105,  108,  109, 
171,  231. 

Autobiography  of  T  hurl  ow 
Weed  (Harriet  A.  Weed, 
ed.),  cited,  14,  163,  166,  168, 
231,  234. 


240 


ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 


Bailey,  John,  15. 

Baltimore  Gazette,  cited,  79. 

Baltimore,  National  Republican 
Convention,  1831,  57;  Anti- 
Masonic  Convention,  1831,  66. 

Baltimore  Patriot,  cited,  108. 

Bancroft,  Frederick,  Life  of 
William  H.  Seward,  cited,  234. 

Bank  issue,  see  removal  of  de¬ 
posits ;  National  Bank;  223; 
National  Republican  Young 
Men’s  Convention,  58 ;  re¬ 
sponsibility  for,  1832,  58-64; 
in  Congress  1831,  62;  Biddle’s 
use  of  money,  1833,  65 ;  cam¬ 
paign  of  1836,  148 ;  and  Whig 
party,  165-167 ;  and  Anti- 
Masons,  172;  and  Loco-Focos, 
197. 

Barbour,  James,  MSS.,  cited, 
26,  27  n„  29  n„  30,  31,  40, 
54  n„  67,  228. 

Barnes,  T.  W.,  Memoir  of 
Thurlow  Weed,  cited,  60,  159, 
234. 

Barrett,  W.,  Old  Merchants  of 
New  York,  cited,  189. 

Barry,  W.  T„  132;  Webster’s 
reception  in  Cincinnati,  1833, 
93. 

Bartlett,  Mary  G.,  Chief  Phases 
of  Pennsylvania  Politics  in 
the  Jacksonian  Period,  cited, 
123,  235. 

Bassett,  J.  S.,  Life  of  Andrew 
Jackson,  cited,  87  n.,  234. 

Benton,  Thomas  H.,  Thirty 
Years  View,  cited,  230. 

Biddle,  Nicholas,  88,  223 ;  re¬ 
sponsibility  for  Bank  issue, 

1832,  58-62 ;  use  of  Bank 

funds  to  influence  public  opin¬ 
ion,  65 ;  supports  Clay,  1832, 
66;  nomination,  1831,  66; 

Clay  and  Webster,  1833,  82, 
83,  84,  183,  224;  attachment 
to  Bank,  82  n. ;  urges  Webster 
to  confer  with  E.  Livingston. 
84  n. ;  removal  of  deposits, 

1833,  82-89,  98;  Webster’s  re¬ 


turn  to  opposition,  1833,  108, 
110;  political  value  of  eco¬ 
nomic  depression,  1834,  120; 
advice  on  Whig  methods. 
1836,  146. 

Biddle  MSS.,  cited,  61,  80,  82, 
87,  88,  109,  110,  111,  161, 
228. 

Blair,  Francis  P.,  8  n.,  95  n. 

Boston,  72,  89,  101,  112,  155, 
178. 

Boston  Atlas,  cited,  153,  155, 
185,  229;  supports  Webster, 
1836,  137 ;  political  results  of 
improved  economic  conditions, 
1838,  151,  152;  abandons 

Webster  for  Harrison,  1838, 
152-156. 

Boston  Daily  Advertiser,  cited, 
43,  73  n„  153,  205,  229; 
charges  Boston  Atlas  with 
sacrificing  party  principles, 
154,  155. 

Boston  Post,  cited,  90  n. 

Boston  Statesman,  cited,  95,  96, 
229. 

Boston  Quarterly  Review,  cited, 
202,  203,  204,  206,  232. 

Boston  Weekly  Report  of  Pub¬ 
lic  Sales  and  Arrivals,  cited, 
79,  232. 

Bourne,  E.  G.,  History  of  Sur¬ 
plus  Revenue,  cited,  235. 

Bowers,  Claude,  Party  Battles 
in  the  Jacksonian  Period, 
cited,  237. 

Bradford,  T.  G.,  An  Illustrated 
Atlas,  cited,  232. 

Brooke,  Francis,  on  Jackson’s 
election,  30. 

Brownson,  Orestes  A.,  radical 
views,  202 ;  on  party  divisions, 
206;  doctrines  of  class  war¬ 
fare,  210. 

Buchanan,  James,  McLean’s 
strength  in  Pennsylvania, 
1830,  41 ;  character  of  Bank 
supporters,  190  n. 


INDEX 


241 


Buckingham,  J.  S.,  America, 
Historical,  Statistical,  and 
Descriptive,  cited,  199,  208, 
233. 

Buckingham,  J.  S.,  character  of 
Whig  party,  208 ;  reaction  to 
political  issues  in  England, 
208. 

Buffalo,  159. 

“Bulletin  of  the  Campaign,” 
151,  152. 

Burgess,  J.  W.,  Middle  Period, 
cited,  183  n.,  237. 

Byrdsall,  F.,  History  of  the 
Loco  Foco  or  Equal  Rights 
Party,  cited,  197,  230. 

Cadwallader,  Thomas,  Biddle’s 
agent  in  Washington,  62;  re¬ 
lations  with  G.  McDuffie,  63. 

Calhoun,  J.  C„  47,  128,  132,  172; 
Adams  and  Jackson  in  1824, 
5 ;  J.  McLean  and  patronage, 
17,  18;  and  J.  McLean,  40,  45, 
46;  relations  with  National 
Republicans,  1832,  53-55 ; 

strength  outside  South  Caro¬ 
lina,  1832,  53  ;  support  of  Bank 
charter,  1816,  63 ;  relations 
with  National  Republicans, 
62,  64,  95,  100,  101 ;  returns 
to  Democratic  party,  152,  173; 
conservatism  of  southern 
Whigs,  215,  216. 

Cambreling,  C.  C.,  attitude  of 
Democratic  members  in  House 
of  Representatives  on  nullifi¬ 
cation,  77  n. ;  replies  to  Fletch¬ 
er’s  charges  of  executive  con¬ 
trol,  185. 

Camp,  John  G.,  influential 
friend  of  Clay,  67. 

Campaign  funds,  J.  Q.  Adams 
solicited  for  use  in  Kentucky 
election,  1827,  15. 

Cass,  Lewis,  89. 

Catterall,  R.  C.  H.,  Second  Bank 
of  the  United  States,  cited, 
58,  62,  63,  n.,  87  n„  119,  120, 
125,  235. 


Channing,  Edward,  History  of 
the  United  States,  cited,  17  n., 
237. 

Chartist  movement,  Brownson’s 
sympathy,  203. 

Chevalier,  Michel,  Lettres  sur 
I’Amerique,  cited,  127,  193, 
233. 

Chevalier,  M.,  resemblance  be¬ 
tween  Democratic  speeches 
and  those  of  French  Revolu¬ 
tion,  188;  ascendancy  of  the 
farmer  and  mechanic,  193  n. ; 
power  in  hands  of  the  masses, 
216. 

Chevalier,  M„  Society,  Manners 
and  Politics  in  the  United 
States,  cited,  187,  192,  217, 
233. 

Choate,  Rufus,  influence  to¬ 
wards  National  Republican 
unity  in  Boston,  1833,  92. 

Cincinnati,  Clay’s  speech  at, 
1831,  59,  60,  61 ;  economic 
conditions  in  1832,  65 ;  Web¬ 
ster  dinner,  1833,  93-94. 

Cincinnati  Advertiser,  cited,  65. 

Cincinnati  Daily  Gazette,  229; 
party  policy  after  election  of 
1828,  37,  38 ;  Webster’s  co¬ 
operation  with  Jackson,  81 ; 
Harrison’s  candidacy,  1835, 
141. 

Civil  service  under  J.  Q.  Ad¬ 
ams,  16. 

Clay,  Henry,  7,  8,  9,  48,  51,  52, 
53,  75,  132.  140.  141,  153,  156, 
164,  169,  222,  223;  supports  J. 
Q.  Adams,  1825,  6;  party  or¬ 
ganization,  1824-1828,  12;  Mc¬ 
Lean,  16;  patronage,  20;  tariff 
convention,  1827,  25  n. ;  pro¬ 
tection  and  internal  improve¬ 
ments,  25,  32 ;  congressional 
caucus.  1831.  31-33;  leader  of 
party,  35,  36-38,  40;  popular¬ 
ity,  38,  39 ;  Kentucky  state 
election,  1831,  43;  Anti- 

Masonry,  51 ;  amendment  on 
veto  power,  56;  Calhoun  in 


242 


ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 


1831,  53-55,  64;  compromise 
tariff  and  South,  64,  84,  129 ; 
supported  by  Bank’s  re¬ 
sources,  64,  65 ;  opposition  to 
his  leadership,  1832,  66,  67 ; 
and  Webster,  1832,  68,  69; 
Edward  Everett,  1832,  68  n. ; 
conversation  with  Van  Buren, 
1849,  72  n. ;  nullification  pro¬ 
clamation,  76,  77 ;  political  ef¬ 
fects  of  compromise  tariff, 
78 ;  and  Webster,  1833.  81,  82, 
100,  101,  109,  112,  117;  atti¬ 
tude  of  Webster’s  Boston 
friends,  101 ;  Senate  commit¬ 
tee  on  finance,  101-108,  224 ; 
Bank  leader  in  Senate,  109 
n.;  New  York  City  charter 
election,  1834.  121 ;  New  Eng¬ 
land  in  1836,  128;  supports 
Harrison,  1836,  129;  desire 
to  control  administration, 
129,  130;  Schouler  on  cen¬ 
ters  of  Clay’s  strength,  153; 
Webster  and  Boston  Atlas 
support  Harrison,  154,  155; 
relations  with  Webster,  1838. 
155;  campaign  of  1840,  159- 
161 ;  Taylorsville  speech,  159, 
160;  Granger  advises  against 
his  nomination,  160;  cooper¬ 
ation  with  “Conservatives,” 
160;  first  ballot  at  Harris¬ 
burg  convention,  1839,  162 ; 
Bank  issue  after  1832,  165- 
167 ;  issues  in  1840,  168,  168 
n. ;  relations  between  presi¬ 
dent  and  cabinet  officers,  180; 
on  public  lands,  213  n. ;  “a 
paternal  government,”  214. 

Clay  MSS.,  cited  49,  57. 

Clayton,  John  M.,  104,  107. 

Clayton  MSS.,  cited,  104,  168 
n„  228. 

Cleveland  Herald,  cited,  158. 

Cole,  A.  C„  Whig  Party  in  the 
South,  cited,  24,  55,  123,  127, 
152,  190,  235. 


Colton,  Calvin,  204;  American 
political  institutions,  204,  205  ; 
importance  of  democratic 
habits  in  politics,  217. 

Colton,  Calvin,  Life  and  Times 
of  Henry  Clay,  cited,  234. 

Committee  on  finance,  1833,  101- 
108,  114  n. 

Committee  on  ways  and  means, 
McDuffie,  Chairman  of,  59 
n. ;  executive  control  of,  184, 
185. 

Compendium  .  .  .  from  the 

Returns  of  the  Sixth  Census, 
cited,  151  n.,  233. 

Concord  Courier,  cited,  145. 

Congdon,  C.  T.,  Reminiscences 
of  a  Journalist,  cited,  29,  155, 
188  231 

Congdon,  C.  T.,  Webster  and 
Boston  Atlas,  1838,  155. 

Congress,  78;  power  to  annul 
veto,  56 ;  “force  bill”  76,  101, 
121,  147 ;  independence  of, 
182;  Whig  defense  of,  182, 
183. 

Congressional  caucus,  222;  Na¬ 
tional  Republican,  1832-33,  31, 
32;  campaign  of  1840,  161. 

Congressional  Globe,  cited,  102, 
103,  104,  106,  175  n„  185,  196 
n„  233. 

Connecticut,  119;  supports  Clay 
at  Harrisburg  convention, 
1839,  162. 

Connecticut  Courant,  cited,  175. 

Conservatism,  real  character  of 
Whig  party,  211;  bond  be¬ 
tween  northern  Whigs  and 
Calhoun  faction,  216. 

“Conservatives,”  Clay  urges  co¬ 
operation,  160 ;  origin,  160  n. ; 
anti-Bank  element  in  Whig 
party,  172. 

Correspondence  committees  in 
New  York,  34,  35,  223. 

Correspondence  of  J.  C.  Cal¬ 
houn,  (J.  F.  Jameson,  ed.), 
cited,  47,  53,  54,  55,  216,  230. 


INDEX 


243 


Correspondence  of  Nicholas 
Biddle  (R.  C.  McGrane,  ed.), 
cited,  60,  61,  62,  63,  64,  82  n., 
83  n„  84,  87,  88,  108,  109,  121, 
142,  146,  165,  167  n„  230. 

Currency  question,  197. 

Corrupt  bargain,  6,  7. 

Curtis,  G.  T.,  Life  of  Webster, 
cited  73  n.,  78,  85,  86  n.,  89  n., 
234. 

Darling,  A.  B.,  “Jacksonian 
Democracy  in  Massachusetts,” 
cited,  96,  235. 

Davis,  John,  congressional  cau¬ 
cus,  32. 

Davis,  Matthew  L.,  see  “Spy  in 
Washington.” 

Dawson,  Edgar,  “Origin  of  the 
Whig  Party,”  cited,  235. 

Dearborn,  H.  A.,  nationalist 
policies,  214. 

Degrand,  P.  P.  F„  realignment 
of  parties,  1833,  79,  80;  Jack¬ 
son’s  journey  to  New  Eng¬ 
land,  1833,  89,  90. 

Delaware,  104. 

Democratic  party,  dissensions 
in,  1828,  24;  under  Regency, 
33 ;  break  between  Calhoun 
and  Van  Buren,  53 ;  effect  of 
nullification  crisis,  70;  Web¬ 
ster  and  dissatisfied  Demo¬ 
crats  in  Pennsylvania,  1833, 
111 ;  divided  in  Boston  by  re¬ 
moval  of  deposits,  112;  un¬ 
willingness  of  politicians  to 
abandon  Bank  issue,  116;  atti¬ 
tude  towards  McLean,  1834, 
131-132;  McLean’s  attitude, 
134;  favorable  events,  1838, 
151,  152;  J.  Tyler  and  dissatis¬ 
fied  Democratic  vote  in  South, 
165 ;  Democratic  members  of 
House  and  gag  resolutions, 
175  n.,  176  n.;  influence  of 
farmers  and  mechanics.  192- 
195;  character  of  Democratic 
party  in  New  York  state, 
195;  and  Loco-Focoism.  197; 
possible  result  of  fusion  in 


New  York  state,  198,  199; 
Whig  characterization  of 
Democrats  in  1838,  199  ;  elec¬ 
tive  judiciary,  202;  distinction 
between  a  Republic  and  a 
Democracy,  205  ;  foreign  trav¬ 
ellers  on  party  differences,  206- 
208 ;  and  public  lands,  213  n. 

Derby,  J.  B.,  Democratic  office 
holders  in  Massachusetts,  178. 

Derby,  J.  B.,  Political  Reminis¬ 
cences,  cited,  178,  232. 

Diary  of  Philip  Hone,  cited, 
120,  121,  122,  125,  126,  149, 
150,  165,  196,  212,  218,  231.  • 

Duane,  Joseph,  origin  of  name 
Whig,  123. 

Duncan,  Joseph,  arraigns  Whig 
party  on  naturalization  policy, 
196. 

Durasmont,  Frances,  What  ts 
the  Matter  .  .  .  ?,  cited, 

232. 

Eaton,  John  H.,  Tennessee  sena¬ 
torial  election,  105  n. 

Economic  conditions,  as  result 
of  Bank  veto,  65,  66;  causes 
of  depression  of  1834,  119; 
activities  of  speculators,  1834, 
120;  improvement,  July,  1834, 
125;  results  in  New  York 
election,  1834,  127;  crisis  of 

1837,  149;  conditions  in  New 
York  City.  1837.  149;  im¬ 
provement  in  1838,  151 ;  cre¬ 
ates  desire  for  change  of  ad¬ 
ministration,  1840,  168,  169 ; 
hard  times  best  Whig  argu¬ 
ment,  192. 

Election,  of  1828,  28 ;  of  1831  in 
Kentucky,  43,  60,  68,  69 ;  of 
1832,  70;  New  York  City 
charter  election.  1834.  121, 

122;  in  New  York  state,  1834. 
126;  of  1834  in  Ohio,  132;  of 
1836,  148,  149;  New  York 
City  charter  election.  1837, 
149'  150;  in  New  York  state, 
1837  150;  in  New  York  state, 

1838,  152;  of  1840,  220. 


244 


ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 


England,  1SS. 

Era  of  good  feeling,  3. 

Everett,  A.  H.,  asks  Clay  to 
withdraw,  1832,  67,  68. 

Everett,  Edward,  21 ;  corre¬ 
spondence  with  J.  McLean  on 
patronage,  18-20 ;  congres¬ 
sional  caucus,  1831,  32;  asks 
Clay  to  withdraw,  1832,  67, 
68;  coolness  towards  Clay  in 
campaign  of  1832,  68  n. ;  Jack¬ 
son’s  control  of  House  of 
Representatives,  181. 

Ewing,  Thomas,  227. 

Ewing,  Thomas,  MSS.,  cited, 
132  n.,  228. 

Executive  powers,  Whig  opposi¬ 
tion,  178  ff. ;  foreign  affairs, 
178,  179;  control  of  legisla¬ 
tion,  179,  182;  veto  power, 
179;  relations  between  presi¬ 
dent  and  cabinet  officers,  179, 
180;  Harrison’s  use  of  Whig 
opposition  to  avoid  statement 
of  issues,  182. 

Faust,  A.  B.,  German  Element 
in  the  United  States,  cited, 
196  n„  235. 

Federalist  party,  persistence  of 
principles,  3,  24;  divisions  in 
1824,  4;  and  J.  Q.  Adams,  4; 
attitude  of  other  parties,  1824, 
20. 

Findlay,  James,  defeat  in  Ohio 
election,  1834,  26;  test  of  Mc¬ 
Lean’s  political  strength,  1834, 
132,  133. 

Fisk,  C.  R.,  Civil  Service  and 
the  Patronage,  cited,  16,  23, 
235. 

Fiske,  John,  Essays  Historical 
and  Literary,  cited,  235. 

Flagg,  A.  C.,  MSS.,  cited,  22, 
228. 

Fletcher,  Richard,  attacks  Jack¬ 
son’s  control  of  legislation, 
183-187. 

Floyd,  John,  Calhoun’s  candi¬ 
date,  1832,  55. 


Follett,  Oran,  organization  of 
National  Republican  party  in 
New  York,  33,  34;  proposes 
Clay’s  withdrawal,  1831,  67; 
Clay’s  candidacy,  1833,  128. 

“Follett  Papers,”  (L.  Belle 
Hamlin,  ed.),  cited,  34,  35,  67, 
128,  230. 

Force  bill,  76. 

Ford,  W.  C.,  17  n.,  18  n. 

Foreign  affairs,  Jackson’s  pro¬ 
nouncements,  178,  179. 

Fox,  D.  R.,  Decline  of  Aristo¬ 
cracy  in  the  Politics  of  New 
York,  cited,  3,  123,  191,  196, 
212,  218,  235. 

Fox,  D.  R„  “Economic  Status 
of  the  New  York  Whigs,” 
cited,  235. 

Fox,  D.  R.,  origin  of  name 
Whig,  123 ;  Whig  property  in¬ 
terests,  191. 

France,  84  n. 

Franklin,  F.  G.,  Legislative  His¬ 
tory  of  Naturalisation  in  the 
United  States,  cited,  196  n., 
235. 

Frontier,  24,  25. 

Gag  resolutions,  175,  176. 

Gales,  Joseph,  13,  21. 

Gammon,  S.  R.,  Presidential 
Campaign  of  1832,  cited,  12, 
34,  50,  52,  53,  65,  123,  235. 

Garrison,  G.  P.,  Westward  Ex¬ 
pansion,  cited,  237. 

Georgia,  61  n.,  148. 

Godley,  J.  R.,  differences  be¬ 
tween  Whig  and  Democratic 
parties,  209. 

Godley,  J.  R.,  Letters  from 
America,  cited,  209,  233. 

Gorham,  Benjamin,  91  n. 

Gouveneur,  S.  L.,  45. 

Gouverneur,  S.  L.,  MSS.,  cited, 
45,  228. 

Granger,  Francis,  MSS.,  cited, 
160,  165,  177,  220,  228. 

Granger,  Francis,  177;  nomi¬ 
nated  for  vice-presidency  by 
Anti-Masons,  1835,  137 ; 


INDEX 


245 


Clay’s  nomination  inadvisable, 
1838,  160;  on  southern  Whigs 
in  1840,  165. 

Greeley,  Horace,  227 ;  explains 
Whig  defeat  in  New  York 
state  election,  1834,  126,  127 ; 
significance  of  election  of 
1836,  157. 

Greeley,  Horace,  Recollections 
of  an  Active  Life,  cited,  127, 
152,  231. 

Green,  Duff,  combination  be¬ 
tween  McLean  and  Calhoun  in 
1830,  45 ;  Clay  and  Calhoun 
in  Virginia,  1831,  54;  on  co¬ 
operation  between  Jackson 
and  Webster,  1833,  196,  198; 
on  administration’s  Bank 
policy,  1833,  113. 

Grey,  Charles,  Lord,  208. 

Grund,  F.  J.,  character  of  Whig 
party,  209. 

Grund,  F.  J.,  The  Americans  in 
their  Moral,  Social  and  Po¬ 
litical  Relations,  cited,  209, 
233. 

Grundy,  Felix,  107 ;  motion  to 
delay  election  of  Senate  com¬ 
mittees,  1833,  103,  104;  con¬ 
ference  in  regard  to  cooper¬ 
ation  with  Webster,  1833,  105. 

Hamer,  Thomas  L.,  J.  McLean 
and  Calhoun  in  1830,  45. 

Hamilton,  James,  Reminis¬ 
cences,  cited,  231. 

Hamilton,  Thomas,  character 
of  Whig  party,  207,  208. 

Hamilton,  Thomas,  Men  and 
Manners  in  America,  cited 
205,  207,  208,  218,  233. 

Hammond,  Charles,  141 ;  editor 
of  Cincinnati  Gazette,  14; 
Webster’s  cooperation  with 
Jackson,  81. 

Hammond,  J.  D„  Political  His¬ 
tory  of  New  York,  cited,  64 
n„  125,  136,  235. 

Harrisburg  Reporter,  cited,  182. 


Harrison,  W.  H.,  153 ;  minister 
to  Colombia,  23 ;  as  candidate 
of  western  Whigs,  1836,  127, 
128;  Clay’s  support  of,  1835, 
129;  nominated  by  Anti-Ma¬ 
sonic  convention,  1835,  137 ; 
newspaper  reaction  to  grow¬ 
ing  popularity,  138-140,  143, 
225 ;  source  of  opposition  to 
Harrison,  1835,  140;  methods 
of  politicians  in  campaign  of 
1836,  141,  142;  Biddle’s  ad¬ 
vice,  1835,  142,  146;  strength 
in  election  of  1836,  148,  149, 
225 ;  logical  candidate  for 
1840,  149,  156;  Boston  Atlas 
abandons  Webster,  1838,  152- 
154;  Massachusetts  gives  him 
vote  on  first  ballot  at  Harris¬ 
burg  Convention,  1839,  155; 
friends  charge  hostility  of 
Whig  politicians  in  1836,  156; 
friends  oppose  national  con¬ 
vention,  1838,  157 ;  candidacy 
opposed  by  friends  of  Clay  and 
Webster,  1838,  158,  159;  co¬ 
operation  between  his  and 
Webster’s  friends  at  Harris¬ 
burg  Convention,  1839,  162; 
elements  responsible  for  his 
nomination,  162,  163 ;  advan¬ 
tages  of  his  candidacy,  1840, 
163,  164;  “my  conscience 

keeping  committee,”  168  n. ; 
nomination  makes  union  pos¬ 
sible,  220. 

Hartford  Convention,  22,  75  n„ 
93. 

Harvey,  Peter,  Reminiscences 
of  Daniel  Webster,  cited,  231. 

Hatch,  History  of  Maine,  cited, 
123,  189,  236. 

Hibbard,  B.  H.,  History  of  the 
Public  Land  Policies,  cited 
176  n„  213  n„  236. 

Hildreth,  Richard,  change  in 
policy  of  Boston  Atlas,  1838, 
153. 


246 


ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 


Hildreth,  Richard,  My  connec¬ 
tion  with  the  Atlas  news¬ 
paper,  cited,  232. 

Hill,  Isaac,  transportation  of 
mails,  18  n. ;  patronage  in 
New  Hampshire,  21 ;  Web¬ 
ster’s  support  of  nullification 
proclamation,  95;  Webster’s 
reception  in  Boston,  1833,  96. 

Hinsdale,  Mary,  History  of  the 
President’s  Cabinet,  cited,  17 
n„  236. 

Hone,  Philip.,  explains  causes 
of  economic  depression,  1834, 
119;  economic  condition  in 
New  York  City,  1834,  121 ; 
advice  as  to  Whig  nomina¬ 
tions  in  New  York  state,  1834, 
125;  on  prospects  in  New 
York  state  election,  1837, 
150;  supports  Harrison,  1840, 
164,  165. 

Hopkinson,  Joseph,  21,  23. 

Houghton,  Richard,  change  in 
Boston  Atlas’  policy,  1838, 
153,  227. 

House  Journal,  cited,  175  n., 
176.  233. 

House  of  Representatives,  elec¬ 
tion  of  1824,  6;  committee  on 
ways  and  means,  59;  Bank 
issue,  62;  anti-slavery  peti¬ 
tions,  175;  vote  on  gag  resolu¬ 
tions,  175  n. ;  Jackson’s  con¬ 
trol  of,  182-183 ;  Fletcher’s 
charges  of  executive  control, 
183-187. 

Hudson,  Frederick,  Journalism 
in  the  United  States,  cited,  74 
n„  153,  155,  236. 

Hunter,  J„  cashier  of  branch 
bank  at  Savannah,  61,  n. 

Illinois,  Harrison  loses  by  nar¬ 
row  margin,  1836,  148;  Whig 
governor  defeated.  1838,  152; 
supports  Clay  at  Harrisburg 
convention,  1839,  162. 

Immigrants,  154;  majority  join 
Democratic  party,  196. 


Indiana,  154;  carried  by  Harri¬ 
son,  1836,  148;  supports  Har¬ 
rison  at  Harrisburg  conven¬ 
tion,  1839,  162. 

Internal  improvements,  54;  atti¬ 
tude  of  Whig  leaders,  172. 

Irwin,  W.  W.,  136. 

“Jack  Downing,”  91,  92. 

Jackson,  Andrew,  1,  2,  3,  6,  37, 
40,  41.  100,  111,  126,  132,  178, 
179,  180,  183,  213  n„  223; 
democracy,  4;  frontier,  25, 
26 ;  six  militiamen,  27 ;  crowd 
at  inaugural,  1832,  29;  results 
of  election,  29,  30;  on  tariff, 

1832,  56;  internal  improve¬ 
ments,  56;  real  issue  in  1832, 
57 ;  bank  issue,  59,  60,  63  n. ; 
Bank  veto,  64 ;  nullification 
policy,  71,  72;  proclamation, 
72;  effect  in  New  York,  74; 
special  message,  1833,  72; 
Webster  on  Jackson’s  tariff 
policy,  1833,  77 ;  relations 
with  Webster,  1833,  78 ;  Web¬ 
ster  possible  cabinet  member, 
83  ;  Sargeant  on  his  influence, 

1833,  83;  E.  Livingston’s  plan 

to  recharter  bank.  87 ;  re¬ 
moval  of  deposits,  87,  88,  98 ; 
Webster  and  the  removal,  88; 
journey  to  New  England, 
1833,  89-92;  reception  in 

Philadelphia,  90 ;  National  In¬ 
telligencer  on  New  England 
tour,  92 ;  Democratic  confer¬ 
ence  on  cooperating  with 
Webster,  105,  106;  Harrison’s 
appeal  to  same  sources  of  po¬ 
litical  strength.  164 ;  direct 
appeals  to  people,  180. 

Jackson  MSS.,  cited,  105,  228. 

Jacksonian  Democracy,  2,  221. 

jaudon,  Samuel,  explains  causes 
of  economic  depression,  1834, 
120. 

Jefferson,  Thomas,  3. 

Judiciary,  involved  in  Whig  is¬ 
sues  of  1836,  147 ;  Loco-Focos 
support  elective  terms,  197. 


INDEX 


24  7 


Julian,  G.  W.,  Life  of  J.  R.  Gid- 
dings,  cited,  164,  234. 

Julian,  G.  W.,  Political  Recol¬ 
lections,  cited,  169,  231. 

“Junius,”  A  Voice  from  A.mer- 
ica  to  England,  cited,  206,  217, 
232. 

"Junius,”  American  Jacobinism, 
cited,  204,  232. 

“Junius,”  Crisis  of  the  Country, 
cited,  169  n.,  232. 

Kennedy,  J.  P.,  Defence  of  the 
Whigs,  cited,  183  n.,  232. 

Kennedy,  J.  P.,  Memoirs  of  the 
Life  of  William  Wirt,  cited, 
SI,  52,  234. 

Kent,  James,  possible  conse¬ 
quences  of  Jackson’s  reelec¬ 
tion,  74. 

Kent,  James,  MSS.,  cited,  74, 
228. 

Kentucky,  24,  100;  state  elec¬ 
tion  of  1831,  43,  60,  68,  69. 

King,  Rufus,  22. 

Lawrence,  Abbott,  Webster  and 
Harrison,  1838,  155 ;  Hone’s 
opinion  of,  219  n. 

Laws  and  the  Facts,  cited,  27. 

Letcher,  Robert,  Clay  and 
Adams  in  1824,  7. 

Livingston,  Edward.  84 ;  nego¬ 
tiations  between  Webster  and 
Jackson,  1833,  84 ;  reports  of 
interview  with  Webster,  1833, 
85,  86,  88;  offers  cabinet  office 
to  Webster,  1833,  86;  indis¬ 
cretion  in  regard  to  Bank 
charter,  87 ;  Van  Buren’s  esti¬ 
mate  of,  87  n. 

Loco-Foco  party,  191 ;  origin, 
196,  197 ;  common  cause  with 
trade  union  movement,  197 ; 
principles,  197 ;  return  to 
Democratic  party  on  sub¬ 
treasury  issue,  197 ;  definition 
of  a  Loco-Foco,  198. 

Lodge,  H.  C.,  Life  of  Daniel 
Webster,  cited,  234. 

Louisiana,  24,  53. 


Louisville  Journal,  Webster’s 
welcome  in  West,  1833,  93. 

Lyell,  Sir  Charles,  ascendency 
of  small  farmers,  193. 

Lyell,  Sir  Charles,  Second  Visit 
to  the  United  States,  cited, 
193,  195,  233. 

MacDonald,  William,  Jackson¬ 
ian  Democracy,  cited,  237. 

Mackay,  Alexander,  ascendency 
of  small  farmers,  193,  194; 
character  of  Whig  party, 
210  n. 

Mackay,  Alexander,  Western 
World,  cited,  194,  233. 

Macy,  Jesse  ,. Political  Parties 
in  the  United  States,  cited, 
237. 

Maine,  origin  of  name  of  Whig 
party,  123  ;  Harrison’s  strength 
in  1836,  149 ;  supports  Harri¬ 
son  at  Harrisburg  convention, 
1839,  162 ;  pressure  exerted 
by  business  in  politics,  188, 
189;  centers  of  Whig  strength, 
210. 

Mangum,  W.  P.,  MSS.,  cited, 
63,  114,  119,  228. 

Mangum,  W.  P.,  114,  119;  re¬ 
ceives  South  Carolina  electoral 
votes,  1836,  148. 

March,  C.  W.,  Reminiscences 
of  Congress,  cited,  73  n.,  77, 
85,  86  n. 

Marcy,  William  L.,  elected  gov¬ 
ernor  of  New  York,  1834,  126. 

Marietta,  economic  conditions, 
1832,  65. 

Marryat,  Frederick,  Diary  in 
America,  cited,  217,  233. 

Marryat,  Frederick,  importance 
of  democratic  habits  in  poli¬ 
tics,  217. 

Maryland,  election  of  1832,  55. 

Marshall,  John,  178. 

Martineau,  Harriet,  Society  in 
America,  cited,  207,  208,  233. 

Mason,  Jeremiah,  4,  9. 


248 


ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 


“Massachusetts,”  affirms  loyalty 
of  Webster’s  friends,  1835, 
139. 

Massachusetts  Historical  So¬ 
ciety,  Proceedings  of,  cited, 
17  n.,  18  n.,  20  n.,  22  n. 

Massachusetts,  32,  214;  Na¬ 
tional  Republicans  and  Anti- 
Masons  in  1832,  53 ;  Webster’s 
nomination  by  legislature, 
1835,  135 ;  Anti-Masonic  party 
divides,  1835,  136;  casts  vote 
for  Webster,  1836,  149 ;  elec¬ 
tion  of  Democratic  governor, 
1838,  153 ;  supports  Webster 
on  first  ballot  at  Harrisburg 
convention,  1839,  155;  Demo¬ 
cratic  office-holders,  178 ;  char¬ 
acter  of  Whigs  in,  188. 

Matthews,  Lois  K.,  Expansion 
of  New  England,  cited,  236. 

Matthias,  Benjamin,  Politician’s 
Register,  cited,  233. 

Maysville  road  veto,  179 ;  po¬ 
litical  results  of,  56. 

McCarthy,  C.,  Anti-Masonic 
Party,  cited,  48,  52,  136,  166 
n.,  236. 

McDuffie,  George,  Bank  me¬ 
morial,  1832,  59 ;  influences 
Biddle  on  Bank  question,  62 ; 
Clay  and  Calhoun  bargain,  64. 

McGrane,  R.  C.,  Bank  issue  and 
slavery  controversy,  62  n. ; 
Biddle  and  Webster,  1833, 
84  n. 

McLane,  Louis,  81. 

McLean,  John,  MSS.,  cited,  17, 
18,  21  n„  41,  42,  43,  44,  45, 
46.  59,  64.  66,  128,  129,  130, 
131,  132,  133,  142,  144,  148, 
181  228 

McLean"  John,  21,  47,  51,  129, 
142,  147 ;  retention  as  post¬ 
master  general  under  J.  Q. 
Adams,  16;  on  patronage,  16 
n. ;  correspnodence  with  Ed¬ 
ward  Everett  on  patronage, 
18-20;  candidacy  in  campaign 
of  1832,  40-43,  223 ;  combina¬ 


tion  with  Calhoun,  45-47 ;  and 
Anti-Masonic  nomination,  66; 
campaign  of  1836,  132;  esti¬ 
mate  of  political  career,  133, 
134;  and  fusion  party,  173. 

McMaster,  J.  B.,  Daniel  Web¬ 
ster,  cited,  93  n„  234. 

McMaster,  J.  B.,  History  of  the 
United  States,  cited,  237. 

Memoirs  and  Correspondence 
of  Jeremiah  Mason,  cited,  11, 
231. 

Memoirs  of  J.  Q.  Adams,  cited, 
5,  6,  7,  8,  9,  10.  11,  12,  16,  21, 
23.  28,  30,  32,  33,  51,  68,  105, 
118,  133,  136,  147,  155,  182, 
186.  188,  230. 

Metcalf.  Thomas,  15. 

Moderator,  cited,  130. 

Monroe,  James,  16,  40. 

Morison,  S.  E.,  Life  and  Letters 
of  Harrison  Gray  Otis,  cited, 
3,  8,  73  n„  234. 

Morning  Courier  and  New  York 
Enquirer,  cited,  74,  77  n.,  79, 
107,  163  n„  229. 

Mr.  Webster’s  Speech  on  the 
President’s  Protest,  Senate, 
May  7,  1834,  cited,  232. 

Mueller,  H.  R.,  Whig  Party  in 
Pennsylvania,  cited,  142,  162, 
236. 

National  Bank,  see  Bank  issue; 
71,  81,  88,  106;  corrupt  mo¬ 
nopoly,  66;  Biddle’s  interest 
in,  82  n. ;  political  conse¬ 
quences  of  credit  restriction, 
1834,  119,  120;  abandons 

policy  of  restriction,  124 ; 
seeks  understanding  with  ad¬ 
ministration,  167  n. ;  Jackson’s 
veto,  179;  business  men  sup¬ 
port  recharter,  190  n. 

National  Gazette,  cited,  20. 

National  Gazette  and  Literary 
Register,  cited,  145,  229;  on 
cooperation  between  Webster 
and  Jackson,  1833,  98-100; 
relations  between  Clay  and 
Webster,  1833,  108;  affirms 


INDEX 


249 


support  of  Webster  or  Clay, 
1835,  140;  recommends  party 
primaries,  1835,  145;  con¬ 

demns  growth  of  executive 
power,  180,  181. 

National  Intelligencer,  cited,  13 
18,  21,  27,  28,  32,  33  n.,  35,  38, 
43,  45,  50,  63  n.,  65,  73,  74,  81, 
85,  92,  93,  106,  135,  141,  145, 
147,  152,  153,  156,  157,  158, 
159,  161,  168  n„  182  n„  185, 
186,  189,  198,  199,  200,  203, 
204,  205,  214,  222,  229;  leader¬ 
ship  of  National  Republican 
party,  36;  National  Republi¬ 
can  Convention,  1831,  39; 
public  opinion  on  Bank  veto, 
1832,  65 ;  nullification  procla¬ 
mation,  75,  76;  on  Jackson’s 
New_  England  tour,  1833,  92; 
reaction  in  West  to  Webster’s 
tour,  1833,  93  ;  New  York  City 
charter  election,  1834,  122, 
124;  change  in  public  opinion, 
1834,  124 ;  McLean’s  candi¬ 
dacy,  1835,  133 ;  supports 

Webster,  1836,  137,  138 ;  Har¬ 
rison’s  capacity,  138;  Harri¬ 
son’s  candidacy,  1835,  141 ; 
abandons  hope  of  single  Whig 
candidate,  1835,  144,  145,  146; 
importance  of  New  York  state 
election,  1837,  151 ;  supports 
Harrison,  1840,  164;  on  Bank 
issue  after  1832,  165  n.,  166, 
167 ;  silence  on  slavery  issue, 
1839,  176;  office-holders  under 
Jackson,  178;  Jackson’s  pro¬ 
nouncements  on  foreign  af¬ 
fairs,  178,  179;  Jackson’s  use 
of  veto  power,  179;  his  direct 
appeal  to  people,  180;  char¬ 
acter  of  Whig  party  in  New 
York,  1834,  189 ;  northern 
Whigs,  the  security  for  the 
South,  191 ;  character  of  New 
York  Democrats,  195. 

National  Republican  Party,  2, 
4;  nucleus  for,  6;  J.  McLean 
and  patronage,  16;  centers  of 


strength  in  1828,  24;  position 
after  1832,  30,  31 ;  materials 
on  organization,  31  n. ;  con¬ 
gressional  caucus,  31,  32; 

weak  national  organization, 
33  ;  in  New  York  state,  33-35  ; 
Baltimore  convention,  1831, 
35,  45,  57 ;  National  Republi¬ 
can  Young  Men’s  Convention, 

1832,  35,  38 ;  relations  with 

Anti-Masons,  1832,  51-53 ; 

Calhoun  in  campaign  of  1832, 
53-55 ;  search  for  an  issue,  55- 
64;  nullification  crisis,  70; 
“Spy  in  Washington”  on  ef¬ 
fect  of  nullification  proclama¬ 
tion,  74;  division  on  procla¬ 
mation,  75;  effect  of  Jackson’s 
New  England  tour,  1833,  92; 
effect  of  crisis  of  1833,  117; 
discredited  in  1833,  118;  Mc¬ 
Lean’s  suspicions  of  leaders, 
1834,  131 ;  problems  in  cam¬ 
paign  of  1832,  222-223. 

National  Republican  Young 
Men’s  Convention,  1832,  state¬ 
ment  of  issues,  58. 

Native  Americans,  Whigs  agree 
on  naturalization  policy,  196. 

Naturalization  of  aliens,  226. 

New  Brunswick,  124. 

New  England,  9,  21  n„  22,  29, 
151  n. ;  reception  of  Jackson, 

1833,  89 ;  federal  patronage, 
96;  Clay’s  journey  to,  1833, 
101 ;  vote  of  senators  on 
Sprague’s  motion,  104;  eco¬ 
nomic  depression,  1834,  119; 
Webster  as  candidate  of 
Whigs,  1836,  127,  146;  Har¬ 
rison’s  strength  in  1836,  148. 

New  Hampshire,  Harrison’s 
strength  in,  1836,  149;  sup¬ 
ports  Harrison  at  Harrisburg 
convention,  1839,  162. 

New  Hampshire  Patriot,  cited, 
18  n„  95,  96,  113.  229. 

New  Jersey,  21  n. ;  Whig  defeat 
in,  1834.  126;  carried  by  Har¬ 
rison,  1836.  148 ;  abandons 


250 


ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 


Scott  for  Harrison  at  Harris¬ 
burg  convention,  1839,  162. 

New  York,  145,  159,  182;  Na¬ 
tional  Republican  state  organ¬ 
ization,  33-35,  223 ;  Anti-Ma¬ 
sons,  49,  52;  political  effects 
of  economic  depression,  1834, 
119;  state  election,  1834,  126; 
Anti-Masonic  party,  1835, 
136;  Whigs  carry  state  elec¬ 
tion,  1837,  150;  elect  Whig 
governor,  1838,  152;  at  Har¬ 
risburg  convention,  1839,  162; 
character  of  Whig  party  in, 
189;  character  of  Democrats, 
195;  Loco-Focos  return  to 
Democratic  party,  197 ;  possi¬ 
ble  results  of  fusion,  198,  199 ; 
new  leadership  in  Whig  party, 
218. 

New  York  American,  cited,  38, 
90  n„  107,  154,  155,  200,  229; 
supports  Webster,  1836,  137 ; 
Webster’s  neutrality,  1848, 
157 ;  people  demand  Harrison, 
1838,  157 ;  questions  need  of 
national  convention,  157 ;  on 
Richard  Fletcher’s  speech, 
186;  political  rights  of  immi¬ 
grants,  196;  refuses  cooper¬ 
ation  with  “Conservatives,” 
211;  labor  union  movement, 
211. 

New  York  City.  74,  124,  159, 
189 ;  charter  election  of  1834, 
121,  122;  charter  election  of 
1837,  149,  150;  economic  con¬ 
ditions,  1837,  149,  150;  in  state 
election,  1837,  151  n. 

New  York  Commercial  Adver¬ 
tiser,  38. 

New  York  Daily  Advertiser, 
cited.  81,  115.  123,  129.  229. 
New  York  Evening  Post,  cited, 
200.  203,  204. 

New  York  Express,  description 
of  Loco  Focos,  199,  200.^ 
New  York  Gazette,  on  “con¬ 
servatives,”  211. 


New  York  Journal  of  Com¬ 
merce,  cited,  107. 

New  York  Observer  (Utica), 
definition  of  a  Loco-Foco,  198. 

New  York  Review,  cited,  211. 

New  York  Standard,  cited,  113. 

Newspapers,  support  of  by  Na¬ 
tional  Republicans,  14,  15; 
fund  for  National  Republican 
newspaper  in  New  York,  34. 

Niles’  Register,  cited,  4,  32,  34, 
49,  51,  57,  58,  60.  78,  80,  118, 
122,  124,  126.  133,  142,  150, 
151,  152,  159,  161,  163,  165, 
168  n„  176,  180,  181,  182,  185, 
187,  190,  219. 

Niles,  Hezekiah,  58 ;  motives  of 
Clay’s  interest  in  tariff,  32; 
attitude  towards  Anti-Masons, 
49;  definite  statement  of  is¬ 
sues,  1830,  57 ;  on  Clay’s  com¬ 
promise  tariff,  1833,  78  n., 
party  confusion,  1833,  118; 
economic  depression,  1834, 
120;  New  York  state  election, 
1834.  126;  economic  condi¬ 

tions  in  New  York  City,  1837, 
150;  result  of  New  York  state 
election,  1837.  150.  151 ;  defeat 
of  Bank,  1832,  165;  president 
and  cabinet  officers,  180 ; 
“poor  against  rich,”  187. 
North  Carolina,  63  n„  176  n. 
Nullification  movement,  see  nul¬ 
lification  proclamation ;  69,  71, 
73,  115,  116.  134;  attitude  of 
Democrats  in  House  of  Rep¬ 
resentatives,  77  n. 
Nullification  proclamation,  effect 
on  parties,  71 ;  “Spy  in  Wash¬ 
ington”  on  its  political  effect, 
74;  Webster  on  Jackson’s 
policy,  72,  73 ;  attitude  of  Na¬ 
tional  Intelligencer,  75.  76; 
Clay’s  attitude,  76;  and  the 
administration.  90 ;  attitude  of 
northern  Democrats,  98. 
Ogden,  David  B.,  218. 

Ohio.  17,  42,  43;  National  Re¬ 
publicans  and  Anti-Masons, 


INDEX 


251 


1832,  52;  carried  by  Harrison, 
1836,  148 ;  Whig  governor  de¬ 
feated,  1836,  152;  supports 
Harrison  at  Harrisburg  con¬ 
vention,  1839,  162. 

Ogg,  F.  A.,  Daniel  Webster,  234. 

Ogg,  F.  A.,  Reign  of  Andrew 
Jackson,  cited,  237. 

Ormsby,  R.  M.,  History  of  the 
Whig  Party,  cited,  235. 

Ostrogorski,  M.,  Democracy 
and  Organization  of  Political 
Parties,  cited,  237. 

Otis,  H.  G.,  and  Nullification 
Proclamation,  73  n. 

Panama  mission,  14. 

Parton,  James,  Life  of  Andrew 
Jackson,  cited,  29,  234. 

Party  loyalty,  weakness  of,  31, 
173,  174;  lure  of  the  presi¬ 
dency,  174. 

Party  organization,  see  party 
loyalty;  National  Republican 
prospects  in  1825,  2 ;  disinte¬ 
gration  of  Federalist  party, 
3;  J.  Q.  Adams  favors  non¬ 
partisan  administration,  12 ; 
National  Republicans  subsid¬ 
ize  newspapers,  T4 ;  Edward 
Everett  on,  18,  19. 

Patronage,  2,  9,  10,  222;  Web¬ 
ster  on,  12;  J.  McLean  on, 
16  n. ;  in  New  England,  96; 
qualifications  for  office,  177, 
178  227 

Peel,  Sir  Robert,  208. 

Pennsylvania,  23,  25,  43,  145, 
146,  154;  National  Republi¬ 
cans  and  Anti-Masons,  1832, 
52 ;  Bank  shares,  63,  107 ;  ori¬ 
gin  of  name  of  Whig  party, 
123 ;  election  of  1834,  126 ; 
McLean,  1833,  131 ;  Anti-Ma¬ 
sonic  party  in,  136 ;  election 
of  1836,  148;  defeat  of  Whig 
governor,  1838,  152;  Harrison 
committee,  156,  157;  supports 
Harrison  at  Harrisburg  con¬ 
vention.  1839,  162;  Bank  issue 
and  Anti-Masons,  166  n. 


Pennsylvanian,  cited,  95,  107, 
229. 

Penrose,  C.  B.,  disadvantages  of 
Clay’s  nomination,  1839,  161 ; 
Harrisburg  convention,  1839, 
162. 

Pet  banks,  197. 

Philadelphia,  84,  124. 

Phillips,  U.  B.,  “Federalists  in 
South  Carolina,”  cited,  24, 
236. 

Phillips,  U.  B.,  Georgia  and 
State  Rights,  cited,  148,  236. 

Phillips,  U.  B.,  “The  Southern 
Whigs,”  cited,  236. 

Pickering,  Timothy,  asks  Clay 
to  withdraw,  67. 

Pittsburg  Advocate,  cited,  94; 
on  Harrison’s  capacity,  1835, 
139. 

Pittsburg  Democrat,  cited,  95. 

Pittsburg  Gazette,  on  Harrison’s 
ability,  138. 

Pittsburg  Manufacturer,  cited, 

/  95. 

'Pleasants,  J.  H.,  15,  45 ;  re¬ 
movals  from  office,  30;  Fed¬ 
eralists  and  nullification  pro¬ 
clamation,  75. 

Plumer,  William.  9. 

Poinsett,  Joel  R.,  minister  to 
Mexico,  22. 

Political  Mirror,  a  Review  of 
Jacksonianism,  cited,  177,  178, 
232. 

Porter,  Peter  B„  member  Ad¬ 
ams’  cabinet,  23. 

Portland  Advertiser,  cited,  92 ; 
urges  nomination  of  either 
Clay  or  Webster,  1838,  158, 
159. 

Postal  service,  under  J.  Mc¬ 
Lean,  17,  132;  involved  in 
Whig  issues,  1836,  147. 

Poulson’s  American  Daily  Ad¬ 
vertiser,  cited,  79,  81,  95,  109, 
145,  229. 

Private  Correspondence  of 
Henry  Clay,  (Calvin  Colton, 
ed.),  cited,  8,  36,  50,  53,  54, 


252 


ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 


55,  56.  60,  67,  68,  70,  76,  78, 
84,  100,  108,  128,  129,  155,  158, 
159,  230. 

Private  Correspondence  of  Dan¬ 
iel  Webster  (Fletcher  Web¬ 
ster,  ed.),  cited,  10,  11,  12,  29, 
36,  45,  56,  89. 

Proceedings  of  the  Democratic 
Whig  convention,  1839,  cited, 
232. 

Public  lands,  213  n.,  227 ;  Cal¬ 
houn  and,  54;  J.  Q.  Adams 
and,  213. 

Public  opinion,  Clay’s  nomina¬ 
tion,  1832,  39. 

Quarterly  Journal  of  Eco¬ 
nomics,  cited,  25,  230. 

Radicalism,  danger  from  union 
of  Democrats  and  Loco-Focos, 
198;  and  New  York  Evening 
Post,  200,  204;  Van  Buren’s 
“Anti-Republican  tendencies 
of  associated  wealth,”  201 ; 
article  in  Democratic  Review, 
201 ;  Democratic  efforts  to 
make  judiciary  elective,  202; 
Orestes  A.  Brownson  and 
Boston  Quarterly  Review,  202, 
203 ;  Calvin  Colton  on  Amer¬ 
ican  radicalism,  206;  Brown- 
son’s  doctrines  of  class  war¬ 
fare,  210. 

Rammelkamp,  C.  H.,  “Election 
of  1824  in  New  York,”  cited, 
236. 

Reed,  John,  J.  Q.  Adams  and 
the  Federalists,  9. 

Removal  of  deposits,  119,  179, 
223 ;  Biddle  and  Webster’s  in¬ 
fluence  with  Jackson,  1833, 
82-89 ;  results  of  removal, 
98-100,  224. 

Rhode  Island,  National  Repub¬ 
licans  and  Anti-Masons,  1832, 
53 ;  Harrison’s  strength  in 
election  of  1836,  149;  supports 
Clay  at  Harrisburg  conven¬ 
tion,  1839,  162. 

Rhode  Island  Republican,  50  n. 


Richards,  B.  W.,  66;  McLean’s 
political  adviser,  42 ;  advises 
McLean  to  try  for  vice-presi¬ 
dency  with  Jackson,  42. 

Richmond,  Van  Buren  in,  1829, 
63  n. 

Richmond  Enquirer,  18. 

Richmond  Whig,  15,  30. 

Roseboom,  Eugene,  “Ohio  in 
the  Presidential  Election  of 
1824,”  cited,  8,  236. 

Rotation  in  office,  177,  178. 

Rush,  Mrs.  Richard,  Washing¬ 
ton  society  under  Jackson, 
29  n. 

Rush,  Richard,  vice-presidency 
in  1824,  10;  McLean’s  Anti- 
Masonic  friends,  42;  consid¬ 
ered  by  Anti-Masons  for 
presidency,  50. 

Salem  Gazette,  realignment  of 
parties,  1833,  80,  81. 

Sargeant,  John,  Clay,  Calhoun 
and  the  Bank,  83  n. 

Sargent,  Nathan,  chief  issue, 
1840,  169. 

Sargent,  Nathan,  Public  Men 
and  Events,  cited,  82,  123, 
169,  214,  231. 

Savannah,  cashier  of  branch 
bank,  61. 

Schouler,  William,  227 ;  change 
in  policy  of  Boston  Atlas, 
1838,  152,  153,  155. 

Schouler,  William,  History  of 
the  United  States,  cited,  238. 

Schurz,  Carl,  Life  of  Henry 
Clay,  cited,  167,  234. 

Scisco,  L.  L.,  Political  Nativism 
in  New  York,  cited,  196,  236. 

Scott,  Winfield,  153. 

Senate,  declaration  by  National 
Republican  Young  Men’s  Con¬ 
vention,  1832,  58;  and  Bank 
issue,  62,  63 ;  election  of  Sen¬ 
ate  committees,  1833,  101-108, 
110;  Democratic  attack  as 
issue,  1836,  147 ;  safeguard 
against  irresponsible  execu¬ 
tive,  181. 


INDEX 


253 


Separation  of  powers,  National 
Republican  Young  Men’s  Con¬ 
vention,  1832,  58. 

Seward,  W.  H.,  Autobiography, 
cited,  30,  31,  126,  190,  192, 
231. 

Seward,  W.  H.,  results  of  Jack¬ 
son’s  election,  29,  30;  nomina¬ 
tion  for  governor  of  New 
York,  1834,  126;  elected, 

1838,  152 ;  people  for  Van 
Buren,  189,  190;  hard  times 
favors  Whig  party,  192. 

Shepard,  Charles,  abolitionists 
and  Van  Buren,  176  n. 

Shepard,  E.  M.,  Martin  Van 
Buren,  cited,  234. 

Smith,  T.  C.,  Parties  and  Slav¬ 
ery,  cited,  238. 

South,  53,  116;  National  Re¬ 
publicans  in  1828,  24 ;  and  J. 
McLean’s  candidacy,  1830,  43; 
Clay’s  strength,  1832,  55 ; 

sectional  unity,  55 ;  southern 
compromise  tariff,  1833,  84; 
southern  rights,  116;  White 
and  southern  Whigs,  1836, 
127,  128,  145;  solid  South 
back  of  Clay,  1839,  162;  Har¬ 
rison,  163 ;  attitude  of  south¬ 
ern  Whigs,  1840,  165;  Tyler 
and  dissatisfied  Democratic 
vote,  165 ;  southern  Whigs  in 
Congress  and  gag  resolutions, 
175,  175  n.,  176  n. ;  conserva¬ 
tism  of  southern  Whigs,  190, 
191. 

South  Carolina,  Calhoun’s  in¬ 
fluence,  53,  55 ;  Bank  shares, 
63  n. ;  nullification  movement, 
69,  73,  75 ;  origin  of  name 
Whig,  123 ;  gives  electoral 
votes  to  W.  P.  Mangum,  1836, 
148. 

Speech  of  Richard  Fletcher, 
1837,  cited,  184,  232. 

Spencer,  Ambrose,  on  Jackson’s 
reelection,  74;  on  New  York 
state  election  of  1837,  151. 

Spoils  system,  16,  20. 


Sprague,  Joseph,  Harrisburg 
convention,  1839,  162. 

Sprague,  Peleg,  election  of  Sen¬ 
ate  committees,  1833,  102,  104. 

“Spy  in  Washington,”  see  Mat¬ 
thew  L.  Davis;  74,  74  n.,  77 
n.,  79,  104. 

Stan  wood,  Edward,  History  of 
Presidential  Elections,  cited, 
237. 

Star  Spangled  Banner,  123. 

123. 

Stevens,  Thaddeus,  227 ;  Demo¬ 
cratic  support  for  McLean  in 
Pennsylvania,  1834,  131 ;  and 
Anti-Masonic  party,  1835,  136. 

Stewart,  Andrew,  effect  of  Ken¬ 
tucky  election  on  Clay,  1831, 
43,  44. 

Stone,  W.  L.,  editor  of  New 
York  Commercial  Advertiser, 
38  n. 

Streeter,  F.  A.,  Political  Parties 
in  Michigan,  cited,  237. 

Sub-treasury,  Calhoun’s  return 
to  Democratic  party,  1838, 
152. 

Supreme  Court,  National  Re¬ 
publican  Young  Men’s  Con¬ 
vention,  1832,  58. 

Syracuse,  124. 

Tappan,  Senator,  202. 

Tariff,  and  internal  improve¬ 
ments,  24,  25 ;  Clay,  1831,  54, 
68 ;  an  issue  in  campaign  of 
1832,  56;  “adequate  tariff,” 
32,  58,  68 ;  Clay  and  Calhoun, 

1832,  64;  Clay’s  compromise, 

1833,  64,  172,  223;  Webster 
on,  70;  Webster’s  resolutions, 
79 ;  Webster  and  Clay,  84 ; 
Washington  Globe  on,  1833, 
97 ;  sectional  divisions  on,  174. 

Taylor,  J.  W..  31  n„  32. 

Tennessee,  102,  103,  105  n. 

The  New  Yorker,  cited,  135  n. 

Thompson,  C.  M.,  Illinois 
Whigs  before  1846,  cited,  237. 


254 


ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 


Tocqueville,  Alexis  de,  Democ¬ 
racy  in  America,  cited,  171, 
207,  213. 

Tocqueville,  Alexis  de,  on 
American  political  parties,  71, 
207. 

“Torrence  Papers,”  (Isaac  J. 
Cox,  ed.),  cited,  46  n.,  132, 
230. 

Tory  party,  in  England,  208. 

Tracy,  Albert  H.,  132,  Anti- 
Masonic  support  of  McLean, 
50,  51 ;  Clay’s  prospects,  1832, 
51 ;  McLean  as  only  hope  of 
union  in,  1836,  131 ;  Webster 
and  union  issue,  134,  135. 

Trade  union  movement,  211,  216. 

Trimble,  William,  “Diverging 
Tendencies  in  the  New  York 
Democracy,”  cited,  197,  237. 

Troy.  124. 

Truth’s  Advocate  and  Monthly 
Anti- Jackson  Expositor,  cited, 
27,  232. 

Turner,  F.  J.,  Rise  of  the  New 
West,  cited,  7,  17. 

Tyler,  L.  G.,  Letters  and  Times 
of  the  Tylers,  cited,  75,  167, 
234. 

Tyler,  John,  Whig  nomination 
for  vice-presidency,  1839, 
165. 

United  States  Magazine  and 
Democratic  Review,  cited, 
201,  202,  204,  232. 

United  States  Telegraph,  cited, 
45,  93,  94,  113;  on  cooperation 
between  Webster  and  Jackson, 
96-98. 

Van  Buren,  Martin,  93,  126,  127, 
132,  148,  149,  183 ;  forces  Cal¬ 
houn  out  of  Democratic  party, 
53 ;  and  Bank  issue,  62,  63  n. ; 
distrust  of  Webster’s  in¬ 
tegrity,  72  n. ;  liking  for  Clay, 
72  n. ;  relations  between  Jack- 
son  and  Webster,  72  n. ;  opin¬ 
ion  of  Webster’s  and  Jack¬ 
son’s  position  on  nullification, 
78  n. ;  Clay  and  Calhoun  and 


his  attitude  towards  Bank,  83 
n. ;  estimate  of  E.  Livingston, 
87  n. ;  advises  Jackson  not  to 
accept  Webster’s  aid,  1833, 
105 ;  influence  in  Pennsyl¬ 
vania,  111;  his  election  in 
1836,  148 ;  union  between 

sword  and  purse,  168;  finan¬ 
cial  policy,  168  n. ;  lacks  Jack¬ 
son’s  popularity,  169;  normal 
Democratic  majority,  171; 
recommends  divorce  between 
government  and  pet  banks, 
197 ;  danger  in  union  with 
Loco-Focos,  199;  presidential 
message  of  1838,  201 ;  scope 
of  federal  powers,  214. 

Van  Buren  MSS.,  cited,  77  n., 
94,  103,  105,  134,  136  n„  228. 

Van  Tyne,  C.  H.,  Webster 
Transcripts,  cited,  4,  112,  113, 
119,  156,  214,  229. 

Vermont,  National  Republicans 
and  Anti-Masons  in  election 
of  1832,  52;  Anti-Masonic 
party  in  1835,  136;  carried  by 
Harrison,  1836,  148 ;  Bank 
issue  and  Governor  Palmer, 
166  n. 

Verplanck  bill,  77 ;  Webster’s 
opposition,  78. 

Von  Raumer,  Frederick,  Amer¬ 
ica  and  the  American  People, 
cited,  207,  210.  234. 

Von  Raumer,  Frederick,  char¬ 
acter  of  Whig  party,  209,  210. 

Walsh,  Robert,  attitude  toward 
J.  Q.  Adams,  20,  21,  23. 

War  Department,  28. 

Ward,  H.  D.,  Whig  interest  in 
Anti-Masonic  votes,  136  n. 

Warfield,  H.  R.,  10. 

Washington  Globe,  cited,  45,  99, 
130.  185,  229;  administration 
and  the  tariff,  97. 

Webb,  Colonel  J.  W„  123. 

Webster,  Daniel,  92,  119,  128, 
142.  159,  164,  169;  relations 
with  Adams  in  1824,  8-11;  on 
patronage,  12 ;  congressional 


INDEX 


255 


caucus,  1831,  32;  party  policy 
after  1828,  36 ;  Bank  question, 
62;  and  Clay  in  campaign  of 
1832,  68,  69;  anticipates  at¬ 
tack  on  tariff,  1831,  70;  urges 
Clay  to  reenter  Senate,  1831, 
70;  political  position  after 

1832,  70;  and  Jackson,  72,  78, 

95,  96,  110,  223,  224;  speech 
on  proclamation,  1832,  73 ;  on 
Jackson’s  tariff  policy,  1833, 
77,  78;  tariff  resolutions,  1833, 
79;  cabinet  office  under  Jack- 
son,  1833,  81,  86,  87 ;  relations 
with  Clay,  1833,  81,  82,  100, 
101 ;  suggests  conference  with 
E.  Livingston,  1833,  85; 

Western  tour,  1833,  89,  93- 
95 ;  effect  of  Jackson’s  New 
England  tour,  1833,  92 ;  “cor¬ 
rupt  hireling  of  the  Bank,” 
93;  result  of  removal  of  de¬ 
posits,  98;  Senate  committee 
on  finance,  1833,  101 ;  Demo¬ 
cratic  conference  on  cooper¬ 
ation  with  him,  1833,  105 ;  re¬ 
turns  to  opposition,  1833,  106; 
suggests  consideration  by 
Congress  of  removal  of  de¬ 
posits,  108 ;  Bank  leader  in 
Senate,  109  n. ;  applies  for  re¬ 
newal  of  retainer’s  fee,  1833, 
109  n. ;  acknowledges  Biddle’s 
sermon,  1833,  110;  dislikes 
Clay’s  censure  of  President, 

1833,  111;  dissatisfied  Penn¬ 
sylvania  Democrats,  112; 
friendly  attitude  of  Demo¬ 
cratic  press,  113:  value  as  ally 
of  Democratic  party,  1833, 
114;  Speech  on  President’s 
Protest,  115;  reasons  for 
break  with  Jackson,  1833,  115- 
117;  differences  with  Clay, 
117;  fails  to  form  nationalist 
party,  118,  173;  New  York 
City  charter  election,  122 ; 
candidate  of  New  England 
Whigs,  1836,  127,  145;  cam¬ 
paign  of  1836,  134-138 ;  nomi¬ 


nated  by  Massachusetts  legis¬ 
lature,  1835,  135;  negotiations 
with  Anti-Masons,  1835,  135- 

136,  225 ;  lack  of  contacts  with 
people,  138;  Boston  Atlas 
goes  over  to  Harrison,  1838, 
152-154;  his  part  in  shift, 
154-156;  relations  with  Clay, 

1838,  155;  withdraws  name, 

1839,  155,  156;  cooperation  of 
his  friends  and  Harrison’s  at 
Harrisburg,  1839,  162;  presi¬ 
dent  as  representative  of  peo¬ 
ple,  180. 

Webster,  H.  J.,  “History  of  the 
Democratic  Party  Organiza¬ 
tion  in  the  Northwest,  1824- 

1840, ”  cited,  237. 

Webster  Letters  (C.  H.  Van 
Tyne  ed.),  cited,  21,  68,  69, 
78,  84,  92,  135,  136,  230. 

Webster  MSS.,  cited,  14,  15,  20, 
25,  36,  38,  105,  111,  120,  136, 

137,  140,  141,  151,  229. 

Webster,  Noah,  3  n. 

Weed,  Thurlow,  227 ;  J.  Q.  Ad¬ 
ams  as  politician,  13 ;  on  Bank 
issue  after  1832,  165,  166; 
definition  of  a  Whig,  1839, 
173;  hates  Democrats,  177; 
inadequacy  of  old  leaders  and 
old  issues  of  Whig  party,  219, 
220. 

Wellington,  Duke  of,  208. 

Wells,  Charles,  chairman  of 
Faneuil  Hall  meeting  on  nul¬ 
lification,  73  n. 

West,  National  Republicans  in, 
1828,  24,  25 ;  reception  of 
Webster,  1833.  92:  Harrison 
and  Clay  in  campaign  of  1836, 
128 ;  Harrison  in  campaign  of 
1840,  163,  164;  character  of 
western  Whigs,  190 ;  and  pub¬ 
lic  lands,  213  n. 

Western  Reserve  Chronicle, 
cited,  74. 

Western  Times,  party  policy 
after  election  of  1828,  37. 


256 


ORIGINS  OF  THE  WHIG  PARTY 


Wheeler,  H.  G.,  History  of 
Congress,  etc.,  cited,  56,  237. 

Whig  Almanac,  cited,  172,  233. 

Whig  party,  1,  2,  132,  171 ;  ori¬ 
gins  of  divisions  within,  117; 
favorable  prospects,  1834, 118; 
effect  of  economic  depression, 

1834,  119,  224;  New  York 
City  charter  election,  1834, 
121,  122;  origin  of  name,  123, 
124,  224;  local  elections,  1834, 
124,  224;  divided  leadership  in 
New  York,  1834,  126;  losses 
in  state  elections,  1834,  126, 
127 ;  sectional  divergencies, 
127,  128.;  plan  to  force  elec¬ 
tion  into  House,  1836,  133 ; 
failure  to  agree  on  one  candi¬ 
date  in  1836,  144.  145,  224, 
225  ;  National  Intelligencer  on 
situation  of  Whig  party,  1835, 
144.  145 ;  direct  “primary,” 

1835,  145 ;  identical  electoral 
lists,  1835,  145;  Biddle’s  ad¬ 
vice,  1835,  146;  position  in 
1835,  1836,  147,  148 ;  campaign 
issues  in  1836,  147 ;  loyalty  to 
old  leaders,  149,  225 ;  political 
results  of  crisis  of  1837,  149; 
New  York  City  charter  elec¬ 
tion,  1837,  150;  New  York 
state  election,  1837,  150,  151; 
improved  economic  conditions 
and  results,  1838,  151,  152, 
225 ;  Calhoun  returns  to 
Democratic  party,  1838,  152; 
uncertain  future,  152;  demo¬ 
cratic  and  aristocratic  wings 
of,  154;  Harrison’s  follow¬ 
ing,  1838,  156;  opposition  to 
national  convention,  1838,  157, 
158;  convention  desired  by 
Clay  and  Webster  factions, 
158;  opposition  to  Harrison  as 
Whig  candidate,  158,  159; 
Harrisburg  convention,  1839, 
161-163;  abandons  old  lead¬ 
ers,  163,  169 ;  experience  of 
National  Republican  party, 
163 ;  effect  of  Harrison’s 


nomination  on  party  unity, 
164,  165;  attitude  of  southern 
Whigs,  165 ;  Bank  issue  in 
campaign  of  1840,  165-167 ; 
issues  in  1840, 168,  l69j  copies 
Democratic  methods,  169, 170; 
Albany  Journal  on  character 
of  party,  1839,  170;  lack  of 
principles,  171 ;  as  coalition, 
171,  172;  differences  on  main 
issues,  172,  173 ;  attitude  to¬ 
wards  American  System,  173; 
Weed’s  definition  of  a  Whig, 
1839,  173;  lack  of  party  loy¬ 
alty,  173,  174;  sectional  di¬ 
vision  on  tariff,  174;  slavery 
issue,  174-176;  influences  to¬ 
wards  union,  177  ff. ;  opposi¬ 
tion  to  extension  of  executive 
powers,  177,  187 ;  inconsist¬ 
ences  in  opposing  presidential 
power,  179,  180 ;  congressional 
government,  183-187 ;  con¬ 
servative  point  of  view,  187 
ff.,  210,  211,  226;  character  of 
Massachusetts  Whigs,  188 ; 
Seward  on  character  of  Whig 
party,  189,  190;  western 

Whigs,  JSOf  property  inter¬ 
ests,  191 ;  hard  times  best 
argument,  192;  charitable  ac¬ 
tivities,  200 ;  foreign  travellers 
on  party  differences,  206-208; 
nationalist  policies,  212-215, 
227 ;  results  of  acknowledging 
conservatism,  215 ;  new  lead¬ 
ers,  218,  219;  effect  of  Harri¬ 
son’s  nomination,  220,  226 ; 
old  leaders  and  issues  set 
aside,  221. 

White,  C.  P.,  agrees  to  inform 
Jackson  of  Webster’s  views, 
1833,  87. 

White,  Hugh  L.,  election  of 
Senate  committees,  1833,  102  ; 
Jackson’s  confidence  in  his 
party  loyalty,  1833,  103 ;  can¬ 
didate  of  southern  Whigs,  1836. 
127,  128,  146;  carries  Georgia 
and  Tennessee,  1836,  148. 


INDEX 


257 


White,  Stephen,  Webster’s  posi¬ 
tion,  1832,  69 ;  acts  as  chair¬ 
man  to  welcome  Jackson  in 
Boston,  1833,  90,  91 ;  effect  of 
Jackson’s  removal  of  deposits 
on  better  class  of  Democrats, 
1833,  112. 

Whittlesey,  Elisha,  J.  McLean 
and  the  moderates,  41 ;  Mc¬ 
Lean  and  Calhoun,  1830,  46 ; 
McLean  and  Clay,  1830,  47, 
48 ;  bargain  between  Clay  and 
Calhoun,  64;  Clay  and  com¬ 
promise  tariff,  1833,  129; 

Democratic  support  of  Mc¬ 
Lean,  1833,  131 ;  warns  Mc¬ 
Lean  of  attitude  of  Demo¬ 
cratic  leaders,  1834,  132;  fail¬ 
ure  of  National  Republican 
political  methods,  140;  Whig 
candidate  must  divide  Demo¬ 
cratic  party  in  campaign  of 
1836,  141. 

Wilkins,  William,  107. 

Winsor,  Justin,  Memorial  His¬ 
tory  of  Boston,  cited,  79  n., 
231. 

Wirt,  William,  MSS.,  cited,  229. 


Wirt,  William,  nominated  by 
Anti-Masons,  51 ;  readiness  to 
withdraw,  51 ;  campaign  of 
1832,  67. 

Wise,  Henry  A.,  Clay’s  pledges 
to  gain  Judge  White’s  support, 
160  n. 

Wise,  Henry  A.,  Seven  Decades 
of  the  Union,  cited,  160  n., 
231. 

Woodburn,  J.  A.,  Political 
Parties  and  Party  Problems, 
cited,  238. 

Works  of  James  Buchanan  (J. 
B.  Moore,  ed.),  cited,  190  n., 
230. 

Works  of  Daniel  Webster,  cited, 
233. 

Wright,  Fanny,  197,  197  n.,  210. 

Wright,  Silas,  criticizes  Adams’ 
disposal  of  patronage,  22 ; 
“poor  against  the  rich,”  199. 

Writings  and  Speeches  of  Dan¬ 
iel  Webster  (National  Edi¬ 
tion),  cited,  11,  68,  84  n.,  137, 
138,  156,  180,  230. 

Writings  of  Thomas  Jefferson 
(P.  L.  Ford,  ed.),  cited,  3, 
230. 


APPENDIX 


The  following  maps  showing  the  relative  strength  of 
parties  in  the  presidential  elections  of  1832,  1836,  and 
1840  require  explanation  in  regard  to  apparent  omissions 
as  well  as  to  their  significance.  Although  based  upon 
county  returns,  county  lines  have  not  been  shown  within 
areas  of  the  same  political  complection.  Important  omis¬ 
sions  appear  in  the  map  for  the  election  of  1832  in  the 
southern  states  as  a  result  of  the  absence  of  data.  In 
South  Carolina  the  presidential  electors  were  chosen  then 
as  well  as  in  the  two  later  elections  by  the  state  legislature. 
They  were  elected  in  Georgia  on  a  state-wide  ticket,  but 
the  returns  indicate  a  majority  for  the  Jackson  electors 
of  sixty  to  seventy-five  percent.  Although  the  vote  was 
taken  by  counties  in  Alabama  and  Missouri,  the  relative 
unimportance  of  the  vote  in  these  States  and  their  situ¬ 
ation  on  the  frontier  explain  in  part  the  failure  of  con¬ 
temporary  statisticians  to  record  their  returns.  The  total 
vote  in  Alabama  was  said  to  be  approximately  twenty 
thousand,  and  of  these  the  Jackson  ticket  was  credited 
with  a  majority  of  sixty  to  seventy-five  percent.1  The 
counties  in  Missouri  which  reported  numerical  majorities 
with  few  exceptions  gave  a  large  Democratic  vote.2  In 
Vermont  and  Massachusetts  the  Anti-Masons  ran  their 
own  lists  of  presidential  electors,  but  their  vote  has  been 
combined  with  that  of  the  National  Republicans  as  being 
in  the  main  sympathetic  with  their  political  aims. 

A  comparison  of  the  maps  for  1832  and  1836  demon¬ 
strates,  more  clearly  for  the  northern  than  for  the  south¬ 
ern  states,  the  succession  of  the  Whig  from  the  National 
Republican  party.  Approval  of  Jackson’s  policies  was 

’Matthias,  Benjamin,  The  Politician’s  Register  (Philadelphia, 
1835),  pp.  76ff. 

1  St.  Louis  Republican,  November  20,  1832. 


260 


APPENDIX 


too  pronounced  in  the  South  for  the  development  of 
effective  National  Republican  strength  in  the  election  of 
1832,  except  for  restricted  areas  in  Maryland,  Kentucky, 
and  Louisiana.  Virginia  and  North  Carolina  approved 
his  Bank  policy,  and  the  same  consideration  combined 
with  native-son  sentiment  gave  to  the  President  the  over¬ 
whelming  support  of  all  sections  of  Tennessee.  His 
Indian  policy,  yielding  as  it  did  to  the  constant  demand 
of  the  frontiersmen  for  more  land,  explains  in  large  part 
the  absence  of  material  National  Republican  strength  in 
Georgia  and  Alabama.  In  Louisiana,  however,  that  party 
was  able  to  make  a  more  creditable  showing  in  the  “sugar 
bowl’’  where  economic  interest  was  an  effective  argument 
on  behalf  of  the  protective  tariff.  In  general,  therefore, 
and  with  this  exception,  the  distinctive  interests  of  the 
regions  of  the  large  plantations,  which  led  them  (as  Pro¬ 
fessor  Cole  has  shown)  to  the  support  of  the  Whig  party 
in  later  elections,  did  not  induce  them  to  vote  for  Clay  in 
the  election  of  1832. 

In  New  England  especially,  the  National  Republican 
and  the  Whig  parties  were  most  successful  in  the  more 
developed  and  prosperous  areas.  The  co-incidence  of 
majorities  for  these  parties  in  western  New  York  and  the 
then  far  West  with  the  location  of  settlements  of  New 
Englanders3  suggests  a  disposition  on  their  part  to  carry 
their  politics  with  them  into  the  new  country.  Not  only 
western  New  York,  but  the  Western  Reserve,  the  Mari¬ 
etta  country  on  the  Ohio  river,  and  those  parts  of  Indiana 
and  Illinois  which  had  been  largely  settled  from  this 
source  voted  heavily  for  the  National  Republican  and 
Whig  candidates.  Local  issues,  however,  were  probably 
contributing  causes.  It  is  to  be  noted  also  in  explanation 
of  these  maps  that  the  Anti-Masons  as  a  rule  went  into 
the  Whig  party,  but  in  Massachusetts,  as  indicated  by  the 
increased  Democratic  vote  in  the  election  of  1836,  there 
was  a  temporary  drift  into  the  enemy’s  camp.  By  1840 
this  uncomfortable  alliance  seems  to  have  been  dissolved. 

3  Matthews,  Lois  K.,  The  Expansion  of  New  England  (Boston, 
1919),  pp.  168,  169. 


PRESIDENTIAL 

election  rrr  ia32 
National  Republican  majority 

B  50-60%  of  total  vote 
60-75%of  total  vote 


T° 


over  75%  oF  total  Vote 
Democratic  majority 
-60°/b  of  total  Vote 
-75'  to  of  total  vote 
%  of  total  vote 


PRESIDENTIAL 
ELECTION  OF  1836 

Whicj  majority 
50  "60%  of  total  vote 
60"75%of  total  vote 
o\7er  75% of  total  Vote 
Democratic  majority 
-60%  of  total  Vote 


gg  60-75%  of  total  vote 
HH  over 75%  of  total  vote 


PRESIDENTIAL 
ELECTION  OF  1840 


Whiy  majority 


U  50" 60%  of  total  vote  ^ 
60“75%of  total  vote 


|]  over  75%  of  total  Vote 
Democratic  majority 
50“60%of  total  Vote 
60-75%  of  total  vote 
oVer75%  of  total  vote 


